Hon'ble AGARWAL, J.—The first of these appeals has been preferred by the accused-appellant under Section 374 Cr.P.C. against that part of the judgment and order dated 17.7.1984 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge No.2, Jaipur City (Jaipur) in Sessions Case No.33/83 whereby the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant for offence under Section 363 IPC and sentenced for rigorous imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs.200/- and in default thereof to further suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month whereas the State of Rajasthan has filed the appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. against that part of the aforesaid judgment whereby the accused has been acquitted for offences under Sections 366 and 376 IPC. 2. Brief relevant facts for the disposal of the appeals are that a missing report came to be registered on the written report Ex.P3 filed by the mother (PW2) of the prosecutrix on 13.8.1983 at Police Station Bani Park, Jaipur wherein it was alleged that the prosecutrix (PW1) aged about 15 years did not return home and all efforts to trace her out have failed. It appears that some efforts were made to trace out the prosecutrix, but without any success. Thereafter, on 16.8.1983, father of the prosecutrix PW4-Shri Nathu Singh lodged a written report Ex.P5 before the same police station in which apart from other, it was alleged that on enquiry being made it has come to his knowledge that his daughter has been taken away by the brother of his former tenant-Shri Sukhdev Sharma namely Shri Shyam Sharma (the accused). It was also alleged that he was not at Jaipur when the incident occurred and he has returned only on 15.8.1983. On the basis of the report, FIR No.216/1983 for offence under Section 363 IPC was registered against the accused-appellant and investigation commenced. During investigation the prosecutrix was recovered when she was at a railway platform alongwith the accused, the accused was arrested, statements of witnesses were recorded, the prosecutrix and the accused were medically examined and after usual investigation charge-sheet for offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC was filed against the accused-appellant. Charges for the aforesaid offences were framed and the prosecution produced oral as well as documentary evidence in support thereof. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and evidence in defence was also produced. Charges for the aforesaid offences were framed and the prosecution produced oral as well as documentary evidence in support thereof. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and evidence in defence was also produced. Learned trial Court after evaluating and appreciating the evidence available on record passed the impugned judgment and order. Feeling aggrieved, both accused-appellant and the State of Rajasthan have filed the appeals. 3. Findings of the trial Court in brief may be stated as below:- (1) The accused took the prosecutrix alongwith him to his village, out of the keeping of the lawful guardianship of the father without his consent. This defence theory was disbelieved and rejected that the prosecutrix herself alone went to his village from Jaipur to meet him. (2) She at her own will went alongwith the accused and no force was used by the accused. No deceitful means was also used to induce her to go away alongwith him. (3) Although it cannot be held that the age of the prosecutrix was above eighteen years but there was every possibility that she was of the age of more than sixteen years at the time of the incident. (4) The accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix more than once but it was with her consent. (5) The prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse. 4. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant raised the following grounds:- (i) Although, the learned trial Court has rightly held the age of the prosecutrix to be more than 16 years at the time of the alleged incident, but it has wrongly held that she was below the age of 18 years as the evidence available on record clearly shows that she was above the age of 18 years on the date of incident. (ii) The learned trial Court has rightly held that the prosecutrix was a consenting party to have sexual intercourse with the accused-appellant. Her conduct during the entire period in which she remained with the appellant and more particularly not raising alarm by her, not telling anybody about her kidnapping and rape to anybody including to the family members of the appellant is clear indication of her free consent. Injuries were not found on any part of her body and no definite opinion was given about commission of rape. Injuries were not found on any part of her body and no definite opinion was given about commission of rape. Learned trial Court has rightly observed that the prosecutrix was found habitual to sexual intercourse which is a clear indication of her consent. (iii) The well settled legal position is that it is always upon the prosecution to discharge its burden and prove commission of an offence beyond reasonable doubt and weakness of the defence does not strengthen the case of the prosecution. In the present case, even if it is assumed that the accused-appellant failed to prove the defence taken by him, but it does not mean that prosecution is not required to prove the charges levelled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of evidence available on record. (iv) So far as the appeal filed by the State is concerned, it is well settled legal position that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court should not reverse the same when the view taken by the trial Court was possible or plausible. In the present case, learned trial Court after appreciating and evaluating the evidence available on record and recording reasons has come to a definite conclusion that offences under Sections 366 and 376 IPC are not made out. It cannot be said that the findings of the trial Court are perverse or against the evidence available on record. (v) If for any reasons, the appeal filed by the State is allowed and the accused is also held guilty for offence under Section 366 or 376 IPC or for both, he may be sentenced for the period of imprisonment already undergone/served by him as no minimum period of imprisonment was prescribed at the relevant time even for the offence under Section 376 IPC. The accused now has attained the age of about fifty years and both the victim and the accused are settled in their life, he has family to look after, therefore, it would not be in the interest of justice to send him back to Jail. 5. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the cases of Mahtab Singh & Anr. vs. State of U.P. reported in 2009 (2) Crimes 184 (SC) and State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. reported in 2007 (2) Crimes 294 (SC). 6. 5. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the cases of Mahtab Singh & Anr. vs. State of U.P. reported in 2009 (2) Crimes 184 (SC) and State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. reported in 2007 (2) Crimes 294 (SC). 6. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor submitted as below:- (i) This finding of the learned trial Court is contrary to the evidence available on record that the prosecutrix was of the age of more than 16 years at the time of the incident as it has failed to properly appreciate and evaluate the evidence available on record. At the most it can be held that her age was 14 years on the date of the incident. (ii) If the Court comes to a conclusion that the age of the prosecutrix was below 16 years at the time of the incident then her consent or will becomes irrelevant and the accused-appellant is liable to be convicted for offence under Section 366 as well as 376 IPC. (iii) Otherwise also, from the evidence available on record it cannot be said that the prosecutrix was a consenting party to the sexual intercourse and she at her own free-will went alongwith the appellant. Learned trial Court has misread and misinterpreted the admissions made by the prosecutrix during her cross-examination. Although, it was medically opined that the prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse, but that does not mean she was a consenting party more particularly in view of the fact that the accused-appellant committed rape upon her several times. (iv) Although, the scope of appeal against acquittal is limited, but it is well settled that if the findings of the trial Court are perverse and against the evidence available on record and the same has not been properly appreciated and evaluated by the trial Court, the appellate Court has jurisdiction to re-assess the same and come to its own conclusion and reverse the finding of the acquittal also. In the present case, the findings arrived at by the trial Court in respect of age and consent of the prosecutrix are against the evidence available on record and the same has not been properly considered and, therefore, this Court is entitled to reverse the findings on both the points. The judgment of the learned trial Court is full with contradictory findings. 7. The judgment of the learned trial Court is full with contradictory findings. 7. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, perused the record as well as the relevant legal provisions and the case law including that relied upon by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant. 8. Before entering into the merit of the appeals, it would be useful to consider and refer the legal position in respect of an appeal against an order of acquittal. 9. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. (supra), has held as below:- “While exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with.” 9. In this regard Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghurey Lal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2008) 10 SCC 450 , culled out the following principles:- “1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong.” 10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ganpat vs. State of Haryana reported in (2010) 12 SCC 59 has laid down the following principles: “(i) There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded and to come to its own conclusion. (ii) The appellate court can also review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. (iii) While dealing with the appeal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and by giving cogent and adequate reasons may set aside the judgment of acquittal. (iv) An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference. (v) When the trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts, etc. the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial court depending on the materials placed. 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly looking to the charges, for which the accused-appellant was tried, the question of age of the prosecutrix at the time of the alleged incident is very relevant. The prosecution claimed that at the time of the incident the prosecutrix at the most was of the age of 14 years whereas the accused-appellant claimed that she was above the age of 18 years. The learned trial Court has held that she was of the age of more than 16 years but not of 18 years or more as claimed by the accused. The learned trial Court has held that she was of the age of more than 16 years but not of 18 years or more as claimed by the accused. To prove the age of the prosecutrix, the prosecution produced following three types of evidence:- (a) Oral (b) School Record. (c) Medical opinion No independent or separate evidence was produced by the accused in this regard. It is to be seen whether the finding of the trial Court is perverse and is required to be reversed looking to the evidence available on record and the legal position prevalent in this regard. 12. Although, the prosecutrix PW1 in her examination-in-chief did not said a word regarding her age or date of birth but she was cross-examined at length and several questions were put to her to ascertain her age at the time of the incident. In the initial part of the cross-examination questions regarding birth of her sisters and brother and their age and marriage etc. and the school in which she took her education were asked and the same were satisfactorily replied by her, but it does not give any clear idea about her age at the time of the incident or her date of birth. In the last part of her cross-examination she stated that at the time of one of her sister's marriage she was of the age of one month whereas at the time of marriage of her third sister, her age was about 9-10 years and she was student of Class-II. She further stated that she did not fail in any class and two years have expired since she passed her Class-V. The statement of the prosecutrix was recorded on 20.01.1984 whereas the incident is of 13.08.1983. If calculation is made on the basis of statement made by the prosecutrix in the last part of her cross-examination, her age at the time of the incident at the most comes about 14 years. Although, a person of this age cannot be said to be a competent witness to depose about his age, but as the prosecutrix was cross-examined on behalf of the accused-appellant to ascertain her age or date of birth, I am of the view that her statement becomes relevant even in regard to her age or date of birth. Although, a person of this age cannot be said to be a competent witness to depose about his age, but as the prosecutrix was cross-examined on behalf of the accused-appellant to ascertain her age or date of birth, I am of the view that her statement becomes relevant even in regard to her age or date of birth. Learned trial Court has not at all considered this aspect of the matter and did not assign any reason why her statement in this regard is not relevant and is to be ignored. 13. PW2-Smt.Tej Kanwar, mother of the prosecutirx, in her examination-in-chief has stated that at the time of the incident the age of the prosecutrix was 13-14 years. Although, she failed to disclose the exact date of birth, but she specifically stated that the prosecutrix was born in the year 1971. In her cross-examination the witness satisfactorily replied about the year in which she got married, when other children were born to her and got married. Although, in her cross-examination she tried to deny that the age of the prosecutrix was claimed to be 15 years in Ex.P3 i.e. the missing report and in her statement (Ex.D2) recorded during investigation under Section 161 Cr.P.C., but if for the sake of arguments it is admitted that she claimed the age of the prosecutrix to be 15 years, even then at the most according to these admissions at the time of the incident the age of the prosecutrix was 15 years. It is pertinent to note that it has further been stated by the witness that the prosecutrix was admitted in Class-I in “Shri Kanya Sadachar Shishu Niketan” and she passed her Class-V from there. She has denied the suggestion that the prosecutrix took her studies in Saraswati School, Madho Singh Circle and at the time of her statement the age of the prosecutrix was 19 years. Thus, according to the admissions made by the mother of the prosecutrix at the time of the incident the age, at the most, was fifteen years. 14. In this regard father of the prosecutrix PW4-Shri Nathu Singh in his examination-in-chief has stated that perhaps the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 25.7.1971. He has further stated that in school also the same date was recorded. 14. In this regard father of the prosecutrix PW4-Shri Nathu Singh in his examination-in-chief has stated that perhaps the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 25.7.1971. He has further stated that in school also the same date was recorded. In his cross-examination he has satisfactorily replied about birth of his other children, their approximate age and the year in which his marriage took place. He admits that when his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded the age of the prosecutrix was about 15 years. It is to be noted that his statement was recorded on 16.8.1983. Thus, according to admi-ssion of this witness also at the most at the time of the incident the age of the prosecutrix was 15 years. PW8-Shri Rajeshwar Singh, husband of elder sister of the prosecutrix, in his cross-examination has stated that the prosecutrix was of 16 years at the time of the incident, but he has not disclosed the source from which he gathered the knowledge about the age of the prosecutrix. It is to be noted that this witness was produced by the prosecution not to prove the age of the prosecutrix and no question was put to him in his examination-in-chief in this regard. In my opinion this witness was not competent to say anything about her age. Otherwise also, according to this witness at the most the age of the prosecutrix was 16 years at the time of the incident. 15. PW7-Shri Chandra Prakash was the Headmaster of a school in which the prosecutrix took her studies for a certain period. He has proved the Admission Form Ex.P10, Transfer Certificate Ex.P11 of a previous school and Ex.P12 Transfer Certificate issued by the school of which the witness was Headmaster at the relevant time. If his statement alongwith the aforesaid documents is minutely perused, it is revealed that the prosecutrix took admission in Class-III on 5.7.1980 in a Government School situated at Govindgarh and she passed out from there on 1.7.1981 and in this regard the Transfer Certificate (Ex.P11) dated 3.7.1981 was issued. In this certificate the recorded date of birth of the prosecutrix is 25.7.1971. As already stated father of the prosecutrix PW4-Shri Nathu Singh, apart from others, in his examination-in-chief has stated that in the school also date of birth was got recorded as 25.7.1971. In this certificate the recorded date of birth of the prosecutrix is 25.7.1971. As already stated father of the prosecutrix PW4-Shri Nathu Singh, apart from others, in his examination-in-chief has stated that in the school also date of birth was got recorded as 25.7.1971. It is thus clear in the school record the date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded on the basis of information furnished by her father. Ex.P10, Admission Form of Shri Kanya Sadachar Pathshala, Bani Park, Jaipur dated 4.7.1981 shows that date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded as 25.7.1971 on the basis of transfer certificate (Ex.P11) issued by the Government School, Govindgarh. The Admission Form Ex.P10 was presented by the father of the prosecutix. This fact is clear indication of the fact that when the prosecutrix was got admitted in Shri Kanya Sadachar Pathshala, Bani Park, Jaipur, her father was also present and her date of birth was entered in his presence. In the Transfer Certificate Ex.P12 issued by the aforesaid school her date of birth was recorded as 25.7.1971. Thus, according to school record the date of birth of the prosecutrix comes out to be 25.7.1971. 16. In the case of State of Chhatisgarh vs. Lekhram reported in (2006) 5 SCC 736 , it was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as below:- “The register maintained in a school is admissible in evidence to prove date of birth of the person concerned in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.It may be true that an entry in the school register is not conclusive but it has evidentiary value.” 17. The same view has been expressed in Arjun Singh vs. State of H.P. Reported in (2009) 4 SCC 18 . 18. In the case of Satpal Singh vs. State of Haryana reported in (2010) 8 SCC 714 , it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:- “The entry made in the official record by an official or person authorised in performance of an official duty is admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the party may still ask the Court/Authority to examine its probative value. The authenticity of the entry would depend as to on whose instruction/information such entry stood recorded and what was his source of information. Thus, entry in school register/certificate requires to be proved in accordance with law. The authenticity of the entry would depend as to on whose instruction/information such entry stood recorded and what was his source of information. Thus, entry in school register/certificate requires to be proved in accordance with law. Standard of proof for the same remains as in any other civil and criminal case.” 19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harpal Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 1981 Cr.L.J. 1 (SC) held that entry made by the concerned official in discharge of his official duties, then the document becomes admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine its author. 20. In the present case, the evidence available on record, as already been referred, clearly shows that the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 25.7.1971 was recorded in the school record (Ex.P10 and Ex.P12) on the basis of a previous entry made in the transfer certificate (Ex.P11) issued by a Government School and at the time of admission in the next school father of the prosecutrix was also present and he endorsed the date of birth of her daughter, so, it cannot be said that source of information upon which the entry was made was not disclosed or was not available. 21. Now, it is to be seen whether the medical evidence available on record has been properly appreciated and evaluated by the learned trial Court. 22. PW11-Dr.R.S.Modi conducted ossification test of the prosecutrix to ascertain her age. In his examination-in-chief he has stated that on the relevant date he was posted as Radiologist in SMS Medical College, Jaipur and on the basis of x-ray plates Ex.P18 and Ex.P19 he found the age of the prosecutrix between 12 and 14 years and prepared report Ex.P14. He has clarified the reasons on the basis of which opinion about the age was given by him. In his cross-examination he has further clarified the symptoms found by him while examining the aforesaid x-ray plates. He has admitted that variation to the extent to 2 to 3 years may come when opinion regarding age of a person is given on the basis of examination of bones. It is to be noted that in the present case the witness has already opined the age to be between 12 and 14 years. 23. He has admitted that variation to the extent to 2 to 3 years may come when opinion regarding age of a person is given on the basis of examination of bones. It is to be noted that in the present case the witness has already opined the age to be between 12 and 14 years. 23. PW9-Dr.Mathur was the Medical Jurist who examined the prosecutrix to ascertain the commission of rape upon her as well as her age at the time of the incident. She on the basis of x-ray report (Ex.P14) prepared by PW11-Dr.R.S.Modi opined the age of the prosecutrix to be 12 to 14 years. Although, this witness did not independently examine the prosecutrix to ascertain her age, but in her cross-examination she disclosed the various symptoms of bones of a person from which his age can be ascertained. In her cross-examination she specifically denied the suggestion that the age of the prose-cutrix was between 14 to 16 years. No suggestion was given that the age of the prosecutrix was more than eighteen years or at least more than sixteen years. She has further stated that the opinion regarding age has been given by her on the basis of a book written by Dr.Modi. Thus, according to the medical evide-nce produced by the prosecution the maximum age of the prosecutrix was 14 years when she was examined after few days from the alleged incident. 24. If considered on the basis of the entire evidence available on record, the finding of the trial Court is required to be held to be perverse and it has been arrived at without properly appreciating and evaluating the same, rather, it has been given ignoring and misreading it. Undue importance has been given to the opinion given by defence witness Dr.S.M.Duggad, who admittedly did not personally examine the prosecutrix. This witness has made statement on the basis of experience gained by him as a Medical Jurist for some years in SMS Hopsital, Jaipur and also on the basis of a book authored by Dr.Modi. I am of the view that when this witness did not get opportunity to physically examine the prosecutrix he was not in a position to say that on the basis of her medical examination report Ex.P13 and x-ray report Ex.P14 her age must be above 16 years. I am of the view that when this witness did not get opportunity to physically examine the prosecutrix he was not in a position to say that on the basis of her medical examination report Ex.P13 and x-ray report Ex.P14 her age must be above 16 years. No reason has been recorded by the learned trial Court in support its finding why the evidence produced by the prosecution is to be discarded and that produced by the defene is to be believed. It is well settled legal position that the medical evidence has not overridng effect on the ocular evidence. The opinion of the Medical Officer is only to assist the Court as he is not a witness of fact and the evidence given by the Medical Officer is really of an advisory character and not binding on the witness of fact. 25. In the case of Ramdev Chauhan vs. State of Asam reported in (2001) 5 SCC 714 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that :- “An X-ray ossification test may provide a surer basis for determining the age of an individual than the opinion of a medical expert but it can by no means be so infallible and accurate a test as to indicate the exact date of birth of the person concerned. Too much of reliance cannot be placed upon text books, on medical jurisprudence and texicology while determining the age of an accused. In this vast country with varied latitude, heights, environment, vegetation and nutrition, the height and weight cannot be expected to be uniform. 26. Learned trial Court has also relied upon some observations made in a book titled “Crime Investigation and Medical Science” authored by Dr.R.M.Jhala to the effect that if there are 28 teeth the age of the person could not be less than 14 years. In the present case, according to Dr.Mathur on examination of prosecutrix 28 teeth were found. Even if the observations of the author is to be relied upon even then it cannot be held that at the time of the examination her age was above 16 years and at the most it can be held that her age was not less than fourteen years. Even if the observations of the author is to be relied upon even then it cannot be held that at the time of the examination her age was above 16 years and at the most it can be held that her age was not less than fourteen years. It is to be noted that no cross-examination of Dr.Madhu Mathur was conducted on the basis of observations made in the aforesaid book and attention was not invited towards it and in absence thereof it was wrong on the part of the learned trial Court to rely upon the aforesaid observations. 27. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dilip vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2013 Cr.L.J.1449, has observed that:- “28 teeths in jaw of the prosecutrix indicates that her age was 14 years.” 28. Learned trial Court on the basis of some observations made by Dr.Modi in his book of Medical Jurisprudence and the statement of Dr.Madhu Mathur opined that the age of the prosecutrix was between 14 to 16 years but without any further evidence, it was also observed that there is every possibility that at the time of the incident her age was above 16 year. When on the basis of evidence available on record and observations made by the learned author of the aforesaid book the trial Court came to a definite conclusion that the age of the prosecutrix was between 14 to 16 years, how without any further evidence it can be observed that there is every possibility that at the time of the incident her age was above 16 years. 29. The learned trial Court has concluded that:- ^^vr% fpfdRlh; lk{; ls Hkh ljkst dh vk;q 12 o"kZ ls 14 o"kZ dh dnkfi ugha ekuh tk ldrh gSA vfirq 14 o"kZ ls 16 o"kZ ds vklikl izrhr gksrh gSA vr% bl ckr dh iwjh laHkkouk gS fd ljkst dh vk;q ?kVuk ds le; 16 o"kZ ls Åij Hkh gks ldrh gS ysfdu fo}ku vf/koäk dh ;g nyhy fdlh Hkh izdkj tkus tkus ;ksX; ugha gS fd ljkst dh vk;q ?kVuk ds le; 18 o"kZ ls vf/kd FkhA cfYd ljkst dh vk;q fuf'pr :i ls 18 o"kZ ls de FkhA ekSf[kd lk{; ls Hkh ?kVuk ds le; ljkst dh vk;q 16 o"kZ ls vf/kd fl) ugha gksrh gSA** 30. Apart from that, if considered in the light of the view expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Jarnail Singh vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 7 SCC 263 , the age of the prosecutrix is to be ascertained from the school record and it should be given preference over the medical evidence. In this case it has been observed that: “Even though Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix.” 31. It was further observed that:- “The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusi-vely determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certifi-cate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for deter-mining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion.” 32. Following the scheme of Rule 12 of the Rules, it is apparent that the age of the prosecutrix PW1 could not be determined on the basis of the matriculation or equivalent certificate as it is an admitted fact that she had studied upto the Class Fifth only, and thereafter, left her school and took no further studies anywhere. The prosecution in the facts and circumstances of this case, had endeavoured to establish the age of the prosecutrix on the next available basis in the sequence of options expressed in Rule 12 (3) of the Rules. The prosecution produced PW7-Shri Chandra Prakash to prove the age of the prosecutrix. He was the Headmaster of Shri Kanya Sadachar Pathshala, Bani Park, Jaipur where the prosecutrix had studied in Class-IV and V . Shri Chandra Prakash had proved the certificates Ex.P10, Ex.P11 and Ex.P12 as having been made on the basis of school record indicating that the prosecutrix was borne on 25.7.1971. In the scheme contemplated under Rule 12 (3) of the Rules it is not permissible to determine the age in any other manner, and certainly not on the basis of an option mentioned in a subsequent clause. I am, therefore, of the view that I would be fully justified in relying on the aforesaid basis for establishing the age of the prosecutrix PW1. It would also be relevant to mention that under the scheme of Rule 12 of the Rules it would not be proper to rely on any other material including the ossification test, for determining the age of the prosecutrix. It is to be noted that nothing has come in the cross-examination of Shri Chandra Prakash so as to doubt the entry in respect of date of birth of the prosecutrix in the school record. It is to be noted that nothing has come in the cross-examination of Shri Chandra Prakash so as to doubt the entry in respect of date of birth of the prosecutrix in the school record. It is not the case of the accused-appellant that the aforesaid certificates are forged. Therefore, the date of birth of the prosecutrix indicated in the aforesaid certificates as 25.7.1971 assumes finality. Accordingly, it is clear that the prosecutrix was less than 16 years old on the date of occurrence i.e. 13.8.1983. 33. Once it is found that the prosecutrix was less than 16 years old on the date of the incident, her consent becomes immaterial. It is well settled that sexual intercourse with a woman under the age of 16 years is rape and in such a case consent is immaterial and does not absolve the accused from his guilt. Clause fifthly of Section 375 IPC at the relevant time provided that a man is said to commit rape who has sexual intercourse with a woman with or without her consent when she is under 16 years of age. In the present case, although this Court has held that the age of the prosecutrix was less than 16 years at the time of the incident, but if for the sake of arguments it is admitted that she was above the age of 16 years, it is to be seen whether from the evidence available on record she can be said to be a consenting party. It is also to be seen whether the accused-appellant in fact had sexual intercourse with her. Before considering the evidence, it would be useful to refer the well settled legal position prevalent in this regard. 34. In the case of Buddhu alias Parshottam & Anr. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2011 Cr.L.J.5020, Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that the fact that the prosecutrix was habitual to intercourse is not itself sufficient to discard her testimony. It was further held that no one is allowed to interfere the privacy of woman. Even woman of easy virtue is entitled to her privacy, same cannot be invaded by any person. It was further held that no one is allowed to interfere the privacy of woman. Even woman of easy virtue is entitled to her privacy, same cannot be invaded by any person. It is also well established principle of law that even the prostitute has a right to protect her person and when some one commit intercourse with her without her consent then he is liable to be punished under Section 376 IPC. 35. In the case of O.M. Baby (dead) by LRs vs. State of Kerala reported in 2012 Cr.L.J.3794, it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that absence of injuries or mark of violence on person of prosecutrix is not decisive particularly, when victim did not offer any resistance on account of threat or fear. It is well settled that testimony of prosecutrix cannot be ignored for want of corroboration unless inconsistencies or contradictions are sufficiently serious. While appreciating testimony of the prosecutrix the fact that prevailing values in country woman would not come with false case of sexual assault is to be kept in mind. 36. In the case of Parmod Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 2014 Cr.L.J. 405, Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court has held that complete penetration of penis with emission of semen and rupture of hymen not necessary to constitute offence of rape. Every partial penetration of penis with labia majora with or without any emission of semen or even attempt of penetration is sufficient. It was also held that absence of marks of violence on private parts or on person of prosecutrix is wholly inconsequential when prosecutrix is merely child of less than 13 years and virtually surrendered to accused. 37. In the case of Ganga Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2013 Cr.L.J. 3966, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the prosecutrix is a victim of crime and not an accomplice. Her evidence needs no corroboration. Her evidence has to be given the same weight as is given to an injured witness. It was further held that if accused does not raise the plea that sex was with consent then finding that sexual intercourse was with consent cannot be recorded. 38. Her evidence needs no corroboration. Her evidence has to be given the same weight as is given to an injured witness. It was further held that if accused does not raise the plea that sex was with consent then finding that sexual intercourse was with consent cannot be recorded. 38. In the case of State of U.P. vs. Munesh reported in 2013 Cr.L.J.194, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as below:- “The primary concern both at national and international level is about the devastating increase in rape cases and cases relating to crime against women in the world. India is no exception to it. Although the statutory provisions provide strict penal action against such offenders, it is for the courts to ultimately decide whether such incident has occurred or not. The Courts should be more cautious in appreciating the evidence and the accused should not be left scot-free merely on flimsy grounds. In the instant case, the accused had committed rape, which repels against moral conscience as he chose a girl of 11 years to satisfy his lust and subsequently murdered her.” 39. In the case of Roop Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2013) 7 SCC 89 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that “Consent for the purpose of Section 375 IPC requires voluntarily participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the signifance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances. Thus, unless there is voluntary participation by the woman to a sexual act after fully exercising the choice in favour of assent, the Court cannot hold that the woman gave consent to the sexual intercourse.” 40. In the case of Satpal Singh vs. State of Haryana reported in 2010 Cr.L.J. (SC) 4283, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that :- “It can be held that a woman has given consent only if she has freely agreed to submit herself, while in free and unconstrained possession of her physical and moral power to act in a manner she wanted. Consent implies the exercise of a free and untrammeled right to forbid or withhold what is being consented to, it is always a voluntary and conscious acceptance of what is proposed to be done by another and concurred in by the former. An act of helplessness on the face of inevitable compulsions is not consent in law. More so, it is not necessary that there should be actual use of force. A threat or use of force is sufficient.” 41. It was further held that :- “The concept of `Consent' in the context of Section 375 IPC has to be understood differently, keeping in mind the provision of Section 90 IPC, according to which a consent given under fear/coercion or misconception/mistake of fact is not a consent at all. Scheme of Section 90 IPC is couched in negative terminology. Consent is different from submission.” 42. Scheme of Section 90 IPC is couched in negative terminology. Consent is different from submission.” 42. In this case the prosecutrix has appeared as PW1 and in her examination-in-chief she has stated as below: ^^;g 13-8-83 dh ckr dh ckr gS eSa >wyk >wyus ds fy, pkSFkey ds edku esa xbZ FkhA ogka eSaus >qyk >wykA ml jkst >wyk >wy dj okfil 3&4 cts fnu ds VksMjey ekxZ ij igqaph rks eq>s ';ke eqyfte ekStwnk vnkyr feykA blus eq>s dgk fd rq>s esjh HkkHkh feyus ds fy, cqyk jgh gSA fQj eSa blds lkFk pyh xbZA m/kj ls ,d VSDlh xqtj jgh FkhA ';ke us mlesa eq>s cSBk fy;kA fQj fo'odekZ ua-1 ij igqapsA fQj ogka mrjsA viuh HkkHkh ds ikl feyus ugha ys x;kA b/kj m/kj fQjkrk jgkA fQj eSaus dgk fd viuh HkkHkh ds ikl D;ksa ugha ys pyrsA rc blus dgk fd ;g rks eSa rw>s cgkuk djds ys ds vk;k gawA eSa rqEgkjs lkFk 'kknh d:axkA fQj blus eq>s pkdw fn[kkdj b/kj m/kj ?kqekrk jgkA eSa pkdw ls Mj xbZA pkdw fn[kkdj bljs ;g dgk fd gYyk xqYyk fd;k rks tku ls ekj nwaxkA fQj mlus eq>s ,d Vªd esa cSBkdj Jhek/kksiqj ys x;kA fQj Jh ek/kksiqj ls nwljs fnu 3-4 cts fnu dks jsyxkM+h esa cSBkdj jsokM+h ys x;kA fQj jsokM+h ls jkr dks okil tks/kiqj dh xkM+h esa cSBkdj ihiM+ jksM esa mrkj fn;kA fQj vius xkao cqMfd;k iSny ys x;kA cqMfd;k esa igys vius ?kj ys x;k fQj vius dq, ij ys x;kA fQj eq>s 5] 6 fnu rd dq, ij gh j[kkA dq, ij ,d >ksiM+k Fkk mlesa j[kkA dq, ij esjs lkFk jkst cqjk dke djrk FkkA [kqn Hkh ogha jgrk FkkA eSa dgha ugha vkrh tkrh FkhA eq>s irk ugha Fkk dgka tkuk gS dgka ugha tkuk gSA ;g cqjk dke esjh fcuk ethZ ds fd;k djrk FkkA ;g vius ckFk:e djus esjh ckFk:e djus dh txg esa Mky nsrk FkkA ;g vius diM+s rks ml le; [kksy nsrk Fkk vkSj esjs diM+s nwljs fnu /kqyk ysrk FkkA fQj cqMfd;k ls eq>s tks/kiqj ys x;k vkSj ogka gksVy esa ,d fnu j[kkA gksVy esa eq>s viuh cgu crk dj j[kkA fQj tks/kiqj ls okil xkao ys vk;kA fQj nks rhu ckn vius xkao ys vk;kA fQj mlus dgk fd esjs fj'rsnkj egkjk"Vª esa jgrs gSa ogka ys pyks 'kknh d:axkA** 43. In her cross examination she has stated that:- ^^';ke lqUnj dkSu ls lu~ esa gekjs fdjk;snkj jgk ;kn ughaA eSa ';ke lqUnj ds HkkbZ 'kqdnso dks tkurh gwaA 'kqdnso us gekjs ;gka ,d dejk fdjk;s ij ys j[kk FkkA og viuh iRuh ds lkFk jgrk FkkA ';ke dHkh jgrk Fkk dHkh ugha jgrk FkkA ';ke ls 'kqdnso th ds fdjk;s ij vius ds fdrus fnu ckn esjh cksy pky gqbZ ;kn ughaA gekjs dqy 8 fdjk;snkj gSA bUnj flag vkSj lqesj flag Hkh gekjs edku esa fdjk;snkj gSA 'kqdnso th gekjs ;gka fdrus eghus rd fdjk;s ij jgs ;kn ughaA esjs vkSj 'kqdnso th dh iRuh ds fe=rk gks xbZ FkhA gekjk edku NksM+us ds ckn 'kqdnsoth dh iRuh jksM+ ua-1 ij jgus yx xbZA gekjk edku NksM+us ds ckn 'kqdnso th] mudh iRuh o ';ke dHkh ugha vk;sA 13-8-83 ls fdrus lky igys 'kqdnsoth vkSj mudh iRuh us gekjk edku [kkyh dj fn;k Fkk eq>s irk ughaA ;g xyr gS fd 13-8-83 ls igys nks lky rd 'kqdnso dh iRuh ls ugha feyh gwaA ysfdu fdrus lky igys feyh ;g eq>s /;ku ughaA jksM+ ua-1 ij eqyfte us eq>s ckcwyky ds edku ij ugha NksM+k FkkA 13-8-83 dks jkr dks eqyfte gekjs edku ij ugha vk;k ij lqesj th ds ;gka vk;k Fkk tks gekjs edku esa gh fdjk;snkj gSA ;g lgh gS fd mlds nwljs fnu ge yksx Jhek/kksiqj x;s FksA ;g lgh gS fd Jhek/kksiqj IysVQkeZ ij eSa vkSj ';ke cSBs jgsA 5&6 fnu rd eSaus [kkuk ugha [kk;kA eSaus cqMfd;k xkao esa [kkuk [kk;k FkkA jkLrs esa [kkuk ugha [kk;kA cqMfd;k esa 3&4 fnu esa igqaph FkhA cqMfd;k esa eqyfte ds firkth feys Fks ogha geus [kkuk [kk;k FkkA muds ?kj ij nknh vkSj pkph vkSjrs Hkh FkhA ogka [kkuk pkphth us f[kyk;k FkkA pkph us esjs ls esjk uke irk tkfr vkfn lc ckrs iwNh Fkh vkSj eSaus crk fn;k FkkA jkr dks nknh pkph ds ?kj esa eSa mUgha ds ikl jghA nwljs fnu eSaus mlh edku esa ugk /kksdj diM+s cnysA eSaus ';ke dh nknh pkph ls mudk [ksr dqvka ns[kus dh bPNk tkfgj ugha dh FkhA dq, ij tks diM+s eSaus ugk /kksdj igus Fks ogh igu dj xbZ FkhA ml dq, ij batu yxk gqvk FkkA ogka ij j[kokyh okyk dksbZ ugha FkkA bl dq, ij dksbZ Hkh vkneh vkdj esjs ls ugha feykA ,d vkneh 19-8-83 dks feyk Fkk mldk uke esok jke Fkk ;k ugha eq>s irk ughaA ;g lgh gS fd eSa 19] 20] 21] 22 rkjh[k dks eSa dq, ij mlh >ksiM+s esa jghA bu pkj fnuksa esa esjk [kkuk ?kj ls vkrk FkkA [kkuk budh pkphth ykrh FkhA 'kke dk [kkuk eqyfte dk firk ykrk Fkk vkSj lqcg dk [kkuk pkph ykrh FkhA eq>s eqyfte ds firkth vkSj pkphth us ;gka dgk Fkk fd vki t;iqj pyh tkvksA eSaus muls ;g dgk Fkk fd blus esjh tkr fcxkM+ nh gS vc eSa t;iqj tkds D;k d:axhA pkphth us ';ke ls ,slk ugha dgk Fkk fd tc rqe Nksjh dks ysdj vk;s gks rks 'kknh Hkh djksA ;g lgh gS fd tc rd eSa ';ke ds lkFk jgh eSaus ';ke ds ?kjokyksa ls ugha dgk fd eSa ';ke ls 'kknh ugha djuk pkgrhA tc eSa t;iqj ls xbZ Fkh vkSj fQj tc t;iqj okil vkbZ bl chp esa ekgokjh vkbZ FkhA ';ke us ekgokjh ds le; Hkh esjs lkFk cqjk dke fd;kA eSaus eqyfte ds firkth o pkphth ls ;g ugha dgk fd ';ke esjs lkFk cqjk dke djrk gSA t;iqj ls eka cki dh ethZ ds f[kykQ tkus dk i'pkrki Fkk ;g lgh gS fd eSa bl i'pkrki ds dkj.k ';ke ds firkth ds dgus ckotwn Hkh t;iqj ugha vkbZA tc eSa ';ke ds ?kj ls xq, ij jokuk gqbZ ml le; ';ke ds firkth o pkpkth ?kj ugha FksA dgka Fks eq>s irk ughaA eSa tc t;iqj Fkkus ij vkbZ Fkh rc esjs ekrk firk esjs ls feys FksA MkWDVjh eqvk;us ds ckn eq>s Fkkusnkj th us esjs dks >ksVokM+k esjh cM+h cgu ds ikl NksM+ fn;kA eSa vius ekrk firk ds tkudj ugha xbZA eftLVªsV lkgc ds lkeus esjs c;ku gq, FksA xokg dks eftLVªsV lkgc dk fy;k gqvk c;ku ,Dth Mh-1 i<+dj lquk;k] xokg us dgk blesa pkdw fn[kkus okyh ckr ugha fy[kh gqbZ gSA bl c;ku esa , Vw ch esjs nLr[r gSA fo'odekZ ds ckn eqyfte us /kedh xkao esa nh FkhA fo'odekZ esa Hkh /kedh nsus okyh ckr ,Dth-Mh1 c;ku esa ugha gSA** 44. Although, the prosecutrix in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.(Ex.D1) did not state that the accused-appellant threatened her using a knife whereas in her examination-in-chief she has so stated, but merely by that reason her entire statement cannot be discarded and at the most to that extent her statement can be disbelieved, but it is clear that the appellant took her away with him when she was returning home from neighbourhood on the false pretext that his “Bhabhi” who was known to the prosecutrix prior to the incident wants to meet her. If a person takes away another person with him on a false pretext, it cannot be said that the person voluntarily went with the former. Otherwise also, it has been clearly stated by the prosecutrix that threat to kill her was given by the appellant if she raised cries. Similar statement has also been made by her in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ex.D1). Although, she did not try to escape and to raise cries and resist the appellant to take her away alongwith him even after coming to know that the appellant has brought her to Vishwakarma area on a false pretext, but looking to the position of the prosecutrix at that time it was not expected from her to do so. In her examination-in-chief the prosecutrix has clarified her position by saying that being alone with no one known to her nearby except the appellant she had no choice, but to surrender before the appellant. Similarly, this fact is also of no relevance that the prosecutrix shared food with appellant which was brought for them by his family members during the period in which she was with the appellant in a hut situated on his agriculture land by the reason that being helpless, she had no option except to do so and conduct of prosecutrix is not indication of the fact that she was a consenting party. For the similar reason this fact is also of no relevance that she did not tell about the incident to the family members of the appellant telling them about the act done by him with her during this period. They were all knowing about it, but were keeping their eyes shut. For the similar reason this fact is also of no relevance that she did not tell about the incident to the family members of the appellant telling them about the act done by him with her during this period. They were all knowing about it, but were keeping their eyes shut. The prosecutrix has explained her position for continuing to reside with the appellant to his family members and about her unwillingness not to return Jaipur by saying that when her honour has been ruined by the appellant, what was the sense in it. Learned trial Court although on the basis of the uncontroverted statement of the prosecutrix held that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her, but without assigning any reasons further held that the appellant had intercourse with her consent. Learned trial Court has merely held that perusal of entire statement of prosecutrix indicates that the intercourse was with her consent. If a finding of fact is given by the Court without assigning reasons and without pointing the evidence available on record merely by saying that the entire statement of the prosecutrix is indication of her consent, such finding is held to be perverse and is to be reversed by the appellate Court. Similarly, the finding of consent on the ground that the prosecutrix was found to be habitual to intercourse is also contrary to law and facts. Learned trial Court has ignored the fact that the appellant committed rape upon her more than once. There is no evidence available on record or case of the appellant to the effect that the prosecutrix had sexual intercourse with any person prior to the present incident. In the present case, the prosecution has abled to prove not only the fact that the appellant had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, but also it was without her consent, but against her will. From the evidence available on record it cannot be said there was voluntarary participation by the prosecutrix to the sexual act after fully exercising the choice in favour of assent. 45. From the evidence available on record it cannot be said there was voluntarary participation by the prosecutrix to the sexual act after fully exercising the choice in favour of assent. 45. In so far as Section 366 IPC is concerned, it provides that whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. In the present case, it is clear from the statement of the prosecutrix that the appellant took her away alongwith him not only on a false pretext to have a meeting with his “Bhabhi” who was known to the prosecutrix before the incident, but also by threatening her to dire consequences if she raised cries and also on a false promise of marriage and lateron had sexual intercourse with her more than once without her consent and against her free-will. The finding of the trial Court in respect of offence under Section 366 IPC is also being contrary to the evidence available on record is required to be reversed. 46. Now, the only question which remains to be considered is about quantum of punishment to be awarded for the offences under Sections 366 and 376 IPC. 47. The law on the issue of sentence can be summerised to the effect that punishment should always be proportionate/commensurate to the gravity of offence. Religion, race, caste, economic or social status of the accused or victim or the long pendeny of the criminal trial or the victim is married and settled in life cannot be construed as special factors for reducing the sentence prescribed by the statute. The measure of punishment in a case of rape cannot depend upon the social status of the victim or the accused. It must depend upon the conduct of the accused, the state and age of the sexually assaulted female and the gravity of the criminal act. Crimes of violence upon women need to be severely dealt with. The measure of punishment in a case of rape cannot depend upon the social status of the victim or the accused. It must depend upon the conduct of the accused, the state and age of the sexually assaulted female and the gravity of the criminal act. Crimes of violence upon women need to be severely dealt with. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to be achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence. The sentencing Courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstance bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by the society in cases of heinous crimes of rape on innocent helpless girls of tender years as in this case, and respond by imposition of proper sentence. Public abhorrence of the crime needs reflection through imposition of appropriate sentence by the Court. To show mercy in the case of such a heinous crime would be travesty of justice and the plea for leniency is wholly misplaced. The punishment prescribed by the Penal Code reflect the legislative recorgnition of the social needs, the gravity of the concerned offence, its impact on the society and what the legsilature considers as a punishment suitable for the particular offence. It is necessary for the courts to imbibe that legislative wisdom and to respect it. 48. Section 376 IPC as it was applicable at the relevant time although did not provide for minimum sentence, but it provided for sentence for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and also for fine whereas Section 366 IPC provides for sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and also for fine. 49. 49. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly looking to the age of the prosecutrix at the time of the incident and taking into consideration present age of the accused-appellant (respondent in the Appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan), sentence of rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default thereof to further suffer simple imprisonment for one year is awarded for the offence under Section 366 IPC and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years and fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default thereof to further undergo simple imprisonment for two years is awarded for offence under Sec. 376 IPC. The sentence awarded by the trial Court for offence under Sec. 363 IPC is affirmed and maintained. All the substantive sentences would run concurrently. The period of sentence already served/undergone by the accused-appellant shall be set-off u/Sec. 428 Cr.P.C. 50. Consequently, S.B.Criminal Appeal No.355/1984-filed by the accused-appellant is dismissed and that filed by the State of Rajasthan being S.B.Criminal Appeal No.42/1985 is allowed. The appellant is presently in Central Jail, Jaipur. Fresh warrant of sentence be prepared and sent to the concerned Jail.