JUDGMENT 1. - This Income-tax reference is directed against the order dated January 3, 1994, passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur (in short, "the ITAT"), for the assessment year 1975-76. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal referred the following questions of law under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short "the Income-tax Act") : "(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to allow interest on payments of Rs. 15,16,166 deposited in the financial year (despite the fact that the payment of Rs. 15,16,166 made on December 26, 1974, was not in accordance with the prescribed date given in section 211 relevant for interest under section 214 allowable to the assessee ?" 2. Since the question so framed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, did not bring out the real controversy in question, on a perusal of the statement of facts, it was clearly borne out that the real controversy is as to "whether on an application under section 154 of the Income-tax Act interest under section 214 of the Income-tax Act could be granted on advance tax payments, made after the prescribed dates but within the financial year". Therefore, vide order of this court dated January 8, 2014, the real controversy was brought on record in the presence of counsel for the parties. 3. The brief facts, as emerging on the face of record, are that the respondent-assessee is a limited company. The respondent-assessee furnished a return of income on July 29, 1975, at Rs. 1,18,79,586. Total income was assessed at Rs. 1,25,32,040 under section 143(3)/144B of the Act, on September 7, 1978. The respondent-assessee paid an advance tax under section 210 amounting to Rs. 75,49,200. Further amount of Rs. 63,594 was deducted at source on securities/dividends, etc. Thus, the total tax paid came to the tune of Rs. 76,12,794. 4. Against the additions made by the Assessing Officer (for short, "the AO") an appeal came to be preferred by the assessee before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) (for short, "the CIT(A)"), who, vide order dated March 28, 1980, granted certain relief. The assessee became entitled to refund of the excess tax paid as aforesaid. 5. 76,12,794. 4. Against the additions made by the Assessing Officer (for short, "the AO") an appeal came to be preferred by the assessee before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) (for short, "the CIT(A)"), who, vide order dated March 28, 1980, granted certain relief. The assessee became entitled to refund of the excess tax paid as aforesaid. 5. An application under section 154 of the Income-tax Act dated August 12, 1980, was filed by the assessee pointing out that consequent to the appellate order, the assessee has become entitled to refund on account of excess payment which was made by the assessee under section 214 of the Income-tax Act. The application was disposed of by the Assessing Officer on January 18, 1989, after observing that the instalment of advance tax due on December 15, 1974, was deposited on December 26, 1974, beyond the due date statutorily fixed under section 211, therefore, the application under section 154 is rejected. 6. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, an appeal came to be preferred before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who upheld the findings of the Assessing Officer and in addition held that the matter is not covered under section 154 as there are divergent views of different High Courts and the issue was debatable. He, accordingly, dismissed the appeal. 7. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, after considering the arguments, allowed the claim of the respondent-assessee, in view of the fact that majority of the High Courts have held that where the advance tax though paid after the prescribed date but within the financial year, then interest is payable under section 214. In so far as the issue being debatable, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal observed that there was no application of mind by the Assessing Officer at the time of passing of assessment order and, thus, application under section 154 was maintainable and, accordingly, allowed the claim of the respondent-assessee. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal further relied upon its order in the case of Nathmal Gadia v. ITO reported in (1987) 28 TTJ 474 (Jaipur). 8. Learned counsel for the Revenue contended that section 211 prescribes the dates by which advance tax is required to be paid by various assessees. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal further relied upon its order in the case of Nathmal Gadia v. ITO reported in (1987) 28 TTJ 474 (Jaipur). 8. Learned counsel for the Revenue contended that section 211 prescribes the dates by which advance tax is required to be paid by various assessees. In the instant case, while the due dates were June 15, September 15 and December 15, but the last instalment, which was to be paid on or before December 15, 1974, was deposited on December 26, 1974, i.e., beyond the prescribed due date but within the financial year cannot be said to be advance tax within the provisions of section 210 read with section 211. He further contended that it is only after the appellate order was passed, that an application under section 154 was moved with reference to grant of interest under section 214 of the Income-tax Act. He further contended that an order under section 154 can be passed only if there is mistake apparent or a glaring mistake on the face of record and, in the instant case, it could not be rectified particularly when the advance tax was not paid on or before the due dates. He further contended that if the amount was paid on or before the due date and interest not granted, then a mistake could be said to have occurred but when section 211 prescribes due dates and when due date has not been adhered to, then it cannot be said to be a mistake apparent on the face of record. He further contended that the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is unjust and bad in law as the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was made aware that judgments are there either way and since the issue was debatable, therefore, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, in the light of the judgment of the apex court, rendered in the case of T.S. Balaram, ITO v. Volkart Brothers (1971) 82 ITR 50 (SC) , ought to have not allowed the appeal. He contended that there may be majority of the judgments in favour of grant of interest but when there was a contrary view rendered in the case of Kangundi Industrial Works P. Ltd. v. ITO (1980) 121 ITR 339 (AP) , then the issue became debatable and once the issue having become debatable, it could not have fallen within the ambit of section 154. He further relied upon the judgment rendered by this court in the case of Associated Stone Industries v. CIT (1996) 217 ITR 246 (Raj) as also of this court rendered in the case of Jai Drinks P. Ltd. v. CIT (1996) 217 ITR 404 (Raj). He has further relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court, rendered in the case of CIT v. Moti Sagar Kapoor (1993) 200 ITR 743 (Delhi). He, accordingly, submitted that the reference needs to be answered in favour of the Revenue. 9. Learned counsel for the assessee submitted that admittedly the instalment of advance tax paid on December 26, 1974, amounting to Rs. 15,16,166, has been held to be advance tax even by the Assessing Officer and once the credit of the said amount having been allowed as advance tax, then the assessee was certainly entitled to interest under section 214 of the Income-tax Act. He further contended that the issue was not at all debatable as even at the time of disposal of the application under section 154 on January 18, 1989, majority of the High Courts had held that interest is to be allowed, even if the advance tax was deposited beyond the prescribed time but within the financial year. He further contended that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, after appreciating the judgments of various High Courts, has correctly allowed the appeal and no interference is required to be made. He further contended that refusal to grant interest under section 214 by specific order or otherwise is not appealable under section 246 and there was no other option before the assessee except to move application under section 154. He further contended that since interest was not granted automatically by the Assessing Officer though admittedly the assessee became entitled to refund with interest and after waiting for some time, there being no other alternate before the assessee except to move application under section 154, hence, application was moved. He also relied upon the judgments rendered in the case of Bharat Textile Works v. ITO (1978) 114 ITR 28 (Guj) ; CIT v. Traub (India) P. Ltd. (1979) 118 ITR 525 (Bom) ; Addl. He also relied upon the judgments rendered in the case of Bharat Textile Works v. ITO (1978) 114 ITR 28 (Guj) ; CIT v. Traub (India) P. Ltd. (1979) 118 ITR 525 (Bom) ; Addl. CIT v. Chitra Sagar (1980) 121 ITR 699 (Mad) ; Chandrakant Damodardas v. ITO (1980) 123 ITR 748 (Guj) ; Santha S. Shenoy v. Union of India (1982) 135 ITR 39 (Ker) ; Anup Engineering Ltd. v. ITO (1984) 145 ITR 105 (Guj) ; CIT v. T.T. Investments and Trades P. Ltd. (1984) 148 ITR 347 (Mad) ; CIT v. G.J. Fernandez (1986) 160 ITR 602 (Karn) ; Pfizer Ltd. v. K.N. Anantharama Aiyar, CIT (1987) 163 ITR 461 (Bom) and CIT v. Jaipur Udyog Ltd. (1987) 167 ITR 306 (Raj). 10. We have considered the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order so also the judgments cited by counsel for the parties. 11. On a perusal of section 210 read with section 211 of the Income-tax Act, it is clear that the due dates are prescribed to mean that advance tax is required to be paid by an assessee within the prescribed dates and credit is given of the amount paid as advance tax. Tax can be paid up to the end of the financial year, i.e., 31st March and is also to be treated as an advance tax. Any tax paid after 31st March shall be self-assessment tax. The controversy in the present matter is narrow and we are required to answer the question of allowance of interest under section 214 in a case where the instalment of advance tax though paid after the due date but before the close of the financial year, i.e., March 31, 1975. It is true that majority of the judgments have held that interest in a case like this would be allowed under section 214, however, we are considering the case with regard to an application having been moved under section 154. If we peruse the phraseology of section 154, then it is clear that only a mistake apparent on the face of record can be said to be rectifiable. A debatable issue cannot be said to be rectifiable. 12. We have gone through the judgments cited by learned counsel for the assessee. If we peruse the phraseology of section 154, then it is clear that only a mistake apparent on the face of record can be said to be rectifiable. A debatable issue cannot be said to be rectifiable. 12. We have gone through the judgments cited by learned counsel for the assessee. However, we also agree with the first contention of the learned counsel for the assessee on the basis of the judgments relied upon by him and which have by and large held that any amount paid after the dates prescribed under section 211 but paid within the financial year would certainly be treated as advance tax. The Gujarat High Court in the case of Chandrakant Damodardas v. ITO (supra) has held that the Legislature intended to provide that irrespective of the dates on which the instalments of the advance tax are paid, interest will be payable on the excess advance tax if two conditions are satisfied (i) the entire amount of advance tax is paid up ; (ii) it is paid up before the end of the financial year. There is no further condition that the instalments of the advance tax must have been paid on or before the due dates mentioned in section 211. The Kerala High Court in the case of Santha S. Shenoy v. Union of India (supra) held that the very scheme of the Income-tax Act shows that the obligation of the assessee is to pay tax in advance during the previous year and if he fails to make an estimate in accordance with his income, he invites the liability to pay interest under section 217. Similarly, if he pays more, he has necessarily the right to get interest on the excess amount paid and that interest is payable from the 1st of April next succeeding. Naturally so, because payment has to be made during the previous financial year. There is no rhyme or reason in limiting the payment of interest to excess paid before the specified dates and not in the financial year. Naturally so, because payment has to be made during the previous financial year. There is no rhyme or reason in limiting the payment of interest to excess paid before the specified dates and not in the financial year. The Bombay High Court in the case of Pfizer Ltd. v. K.N. Anantharama Aiyar (supra), while dealing with interest under section 215, held that when the due date of payment was December 15, 1971, and the amount having been paid on December 22, 1971, was to be treated as advance tax and in view of the same, interest under section 215 was not leviable. The same view has been expressed as observed by us herein above and by the other High Courts in the judgments, relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee but the question, in the present case, is grant of interest in a case where an application under section 154 has been moved and the Assessing Officer as also the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) holds the issue is debatable. In one of the judgments cited on behalf of the assessee in the case of CIT v. TT Investments and Trades P. Ltd. (supra), we notice reference of an application under section 154 but has not gone into the issue whether it was debatable or not and whether two views are possible or not. However, this court in the case of Associated Stone Industries v. CIT (supra) was considering this very issue on an application under section 154 and by referring to certain judgments came to the conclusion that in the proceedings under section 154 the claim of interest in respect of instalments after due date is an arguable point and cannot be allowed. The relevant observations read ad infra (page 249 of 217 ITR) : "We have considered over the matter. The amount of Rs. 75,000 was deposited beyond the period prescribed under section 210, but was deposited within the financial year. The relevant observations read ad infra (page 249 of 217 ITR) : "We have considered over the matter. The amount of Rs. 75,000 was deposited beyond the period prescribed under section 210, but was deposited within the financial year. The belated payment, if it has been paid during the financial year has been held to be eligible for interest under section 214 by a majority of the High Courts in the cases of CIT v. Traub (India) P. Ltd. (1979) 118 ITR 525 (Bom) ; Chandrakant Damodardas v. ITO (1980) 123 ITR 748 (Guj) ; Santha S. Shenoy v. Union of India (1982) 135 ITR 39 (Ker) and CIT v. Jagannath Narayan Kutumbik Trust (1983) 144 ITR 526 (MP). The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Kangundi Indus trial Works P. Ltd. v. ITO (1980) 121 ITR 339 (AP) and the Kerala High Court in A. Sethumadhavan v. CIT (1980) 122 ITR 587 (Ker) have held that the assessee is not entitled to interest on advance payment if such payment is not made on the due dates. The point, there fore, could be said to be an arguable point which requires elaborate discussion. In CIT v. Jagannath Narayan Kutumbik Trust (1983) 144 ITR 526 (MP) while deciding the issue that where the advance tax is paid before the end of the financial year, the assessee is entitled to interest on the excess over the assessed tax, it was held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court that the issue cannot be considered non-controversial or free from debate and, therefore, could not be rectified under section 154. In CIT v. Parmanand Bhai Patel and Smt. Jyotsnadevi Patel (1983) 144 ITR 871 (MP) the Madhya Pradesh High Court have again considered this one as a debatable issue and not rectifiable under section 154. The law on this point is settled by the decision of the apex court in the case of T.S. Balaram, ITO v. Volkart Brothers (1971) 82 ITR 50 (SC) and Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale (1960) 1 SCR 890 : AIR 1960 SC 137 , wherein the apex court has considered that the mistake must be self-evident, and it must be an obvious and patent mistake and not one which can be established by a long drawn process of reasonings. In view of the law propounded by the apex court, since there could have been two opinions, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the claim of the assessee that in the proceedings under section 154, the claim of interest in respect of instalments is an arguable point and cannot be allowed." 13. This court again in the case of Jai Drinks P. Ltd. v. CIT (supra) had also expressed the same view. This view has also been expressed by other High Courts apart from this court and we may refer to some of the judgments in this regard. 14. The Delhi High Court, in the case of CIT v. Moti Sagar Kapoor (supra), has observed (page 745 of 200 ITR) : "It is now well-settled that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of T.S. Balaram, ITO v. Volkart Brothers (1971) 82 ITR 50 (SC) , that, if there is a debatable question involved, then the provisions of section 154 cannot be invoked because, under section 154, it is only a mistake apparent on the face of the order which can be rectified." 15. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. CIT (1979) 116 ITR 383 (Cal) had held that the law is well settled that proceedings under section 154 cannot be initiated if two opinions may possibly be taken on the legal issue involved in it. Thus, it declined to grant interest under section 214. 16. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the case of CIT v. T.N. Viswanatha Reddy (1991) 190 ITR 266 (AP) , held that the controversy regarding interpretation of section 214 had not been resolved and the issue remained debatable and, therefore, rectification proceedings were held not valid. 17. The Bombay High Court in the case of Surat Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills P. Ltd. v. CIT (1991) 191 ITR 209 (Bom) has held that the question whether the assessee is entitled to interest under section 214 of the excess of advance tax payment over the liability is a debatable question and that being so, it has to be further held that withdrawal of such interest by taking recourse to the proceedings under section 154 is not justified. 18. 18. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, in the case of CIT v. Parmanand Bhai Patel and Smt. Jyotsnadevi Patel, (1983) 144 ITR 871 (MP) , also considered the issue and held that grant of interest under section 214 is still a debatable question and different views have been expressed by different High Courts. It further held that the view has been taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Kerala High Court and in view of the sharp divergence of opinion, it is clear that there could be no mistake on record on such a question and, therefore, held that the order of rectification would be invalid and without jurisdiction. 19. The Delhi High Court, in the case of J.M.A. Industries Ltd. v. CIT (1993) 200 ITR 210 (Delhi) has held so and also the Allahabad High Court, in the case of CIT v. Modi Industries (1999) 235 ITR 464 (All). 20. Accordingly, we would choose to follow the view expressed by this court and, accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the respondent-assessee and it is held that the assessee was not entitled to interest under section 214 as the issue was debatable. The reference is answered accordingly. 21. Consequently, the tax reference stands allowed. We make no order as to costs. *******