JUDGMENT : A.G. Uraizee, J. The appellants along with acquitted accused - original accused no. 9 - Ravi Viraj Chavda stood trial in Sessions Case No. 51 of 2007 before the learned Sessions Judge, Bhuj for offences punishable under sections 302, 143, 144, 147, 149, 120(B), 395, 397 and 201 of Indian Penal Code as well as section 135 of B.P. Act. The learned Sessions Judge vide impugned judgment and order dated 19.05.2009 convicted the appellants and directed them to suffer imprisonment as under: Ori. Accused No. Section Particulars of sentence 1 143 of Indian Penal Code R.I. For 3 months and fine of Rs.300/- I.D. S.I. For 15 days. 147 of Indian Penal Code R.I. For 1 year and fine of Rs. 1000/- I.D. S.I. For 2 months. 302 r/w 149 of Indian Penal Code R.I. For life and fine of Rs. 25,000/-, I.D. S.I. For 1 year. 2 to 8 144 of Indian Penal Code R.I. For 1 year and fine of Rs. 1000/- I.D. S.I. For 1 month. 148 of Indian Penal Code R.I. For 1-1/2 year and fine of Rs. 1500/- I.D. S.I. For 3 months. 302 r/w 149 of Indian Penal Code R.I. for life and fine of Rs.25,000/-, I.D. S.I. For 1 year. 1.1. Being aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, original accused nos. 1 to 7 have preferred this appeal. Original accused no. 8 - Ravi Viraj Chavda was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the trial court. 2. The brief spectrum of the prosecution case against the appellants was that the appellants because of a business rivalry with deceased Rameshbhai Mavjibhai Dodiya hatched a conspiracy and formed an unlawful assembly and armed with deadly weapons like sword, iron pipes, dhariya and gupti attacked deceased Rameshbhai Mavjibhai Dodiya and deceased Pravinbhai Mavjibhai Dodiya on 11.12.2006 at about 02.30 am in a room near Venus Petrol Pump, Anjar and caused various injuries on the head and other parts of body of the deceased persons and therefore committed offences punishable under sections 302, 143, 144, 147, 149, 120(B), 395, 397 and 201 of Indian Penal Code as well as section 135 of B.P. Act. 2.1. A complaint in respect of this incident was lodged by the complainant - Dilip Mavjibhai Dodiya (PW No. 1), brother of deceased with Anjar Police Station. 2.1. A complaint in respect of this incident was lodged by the complainant - Dilip Mavjibhai Dodiya (PW No. 1), brother of deceased with Anjar Police Station. In pursuance of this complaint, FIR vide Anjar Police Station CR No. I - 312 of 2006 came to be registered. 2.2. The investigation was taken up and after usual investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed against the appellants. The offences committed by the appellants were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. Therefore, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court at Kutch at Bhuj under Section 209 of the Code, where it was registered as Sessions Case No. 51 of 2007. Charge vide Ex. 17/C came to be framed against the appellants. They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.3. The trial was initiated against the appellants and during the course of trial the prosecution examined following witnesses as oral evidences: P.W. No. Name of Witness Exhibit No. 1. Dilipbhai Dodiya 44 2. Ishwarsinh Chaudhary 91 3. Khengarbhai Pachanbhai Parmar 95 4. Rameshbhai Kadvabhai Parmar 102 5. Naranbhai Radhavbhai Parmar 103 6. Sureshbhai Kadvabhai Parmar 105 7. Nilesh Bachubhai Gamesha 106 8. Gautam Amrutlal Sheelu 109 9. Mohsin Khoja 126 10. Govindbhai Hadiya 136 11. Pankaj Hadiya 137 12. Prakash Lalwani 138 13. Noorali Ramzanali 140 14. Mahendrabhai Hubda 142 15. Muljibhai Maheshwari 145 16 Rashubha Jadeja 146 17. Dayaram Vegad 147 18. Dr. Mrutyunjay Sharma 148 19. Kanjibhai Sorathia 159 20. Altaz Khoja 160 21. Ramdevsinh Jadeja 164 22. Rammilan Rao 165 23. Iqbal Aarab 166 24. Mayurdhwajsinh Jadeja 167 25. Laljiram Markadrai 168 26. Ramkumar Yadav 169 27. Mukeshbhai Makwana 170 28. Kadvabhai Devdasbhai Parmar 171 29. Jesang Shamlabhai 185 30. Bharat Halwa 187 31. Kishorsinh Gohil 189 32. Amarsinh Bhimavat 193 33. Bhupatbhai Parmar 200 2.4 The prosecution also relied upon the following documents as documentary evidences which have been perused by us: Sr. No. Name of Document Exhibit No. 1. FIR 45 2. Extract of station diary 92 3. Report 93 4. Yadi to lodge complaint 94 5. Recovery panchnama 107 6. Certificate by Vodafone u/s 65(B)(4) 110 7. Data of outgoing calls from mobile phone no. 99799160216 of deceased Rameshbhai 111 8. Data of incoming calls from mobile phone no. 9909281299 of deceased Pravinbhai 112 9. Details of mobile phones of deceased persons 113 10. Report 93 4. Yadi to lodge complaint 94 5. Recovery panchnama 107 6. Certificate by Vodafone u/s 65(B)(4) 110 7. Data of outgoing calls from mobile phone no. 99799160216 of deceased Rameshbhai 111 8. Data of incoming calls from mobile phone no. 9909281299 of deceased Pravinbhai 112 9. Details of mobile phones of deceased persons 113 10. Photocopy of application made by deceased Rameshbhai applying for a mobile connection 114 11. Photocopy of driving licence of deceased Rameshbhai 115 12. Photocopy of photograph of deceased Rameshbhai 116 13. Photocopy of application made by deceased Pravinbhai applying for a pre-paid mobile connection 117 14. Photocopy of ration card of deceased Pravinbhai 118 15. Witness summons 119 16. Panchnama of seizure of clothes of deceased 120 17. Panchnama of blood samples of deceased 121 18. Panchnama of blood samples of accused 122 19. Photocopy of notification of prohibition of weapons 123 20. Inquest panchnama 124 21. Panchnama of local place 127 22. Extract of register of Madhuvanti hotel 128 23. Extract of register of Aashiyana hotel 129 24. Extract of register of Kaka hotel 130 25. Extract of register of Joshi Palace hotel 131 26. Extract of register of Parekh Lodge 132 27. Extract of register of Central Hindu Lodge 133 28. Extract of register of Sriram Guest House 134 29. Arrest panchnama 139 30. Application for steps to be taken qua witness Altaz Khoja being under the influence of alcohol 141 31. Yadi for preparing map of local place 143 32. Map of local place 144 33. Yadi for conducting post mortem 149 34. Post-mortem report of Pravinbhai 150 35. Death certificate of Pravinbhai 152 36. Forwarding letter to FSL 153 37. Bail application by Altaz Khoja 161 38. Post-mortem report of Rameshbhai 173 39. Forwarding letter to FSL 174 40. Mechanical injuries - page no. 163 175 41. Essential of forensic medicine - page no. 208 176 42. Regional injuries - chapter 15- pg 305 177 43. Regional injuries - pg 225 178 44. Postmortem examination book - page 358 181 45. Precautions for medicolegal autopsy 182 46. Regional injuries - chapter 27- pg 795 183 47. P.M. Changes and Time since death - pg 427 184 48. Dispatch note to FSL, Junagadh 190 49. Authority certificate 191 50. Receipt of muddamal by FSL 192 51. Permission to chargesheet 194 52. FSL letter 195 53. Muddamal analysis 196 54. Precautions for medicolegal autopsy 182 46. Regional injuries - chapter 27- pg 795 183 47. P.M. Changes and Time since death - pg 427 184 48. Dispatch note to FSL, Junagadh 190 49. Authority certificate 191 50. Receipt of muddamal by FSL 192 51. Permission to chargesheet 194 52. FSL letter 195 53. Muddamal analysis 196 54. FSL letter 197 55. Serological analysis 198 56. Extract of Janvajog entry no. 339/06 201 57. Depute order 202 58. Panchnama of seizure of mobile phone 203 2.5 At the end of trial, after recording the statement of the accused under section 313 of the Cr.P.C and hearing arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellants of the charges levelled against them by judgment and order dated 19.05.2009. 3. Heard Mr. S.V. Raju, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Ashish Dagli, learned advocate assisted by Mr. Jayprakash Umot and Mr. DJ Solanki, learned advocates for appellants, Mr. A.Y. Kogje, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent - State and Mr. K.J. Panchal, learned advocate appearing for respondent - original complainant. We have been taken through the ocular and documentary evidence extensively by learned counsel appearing for either side. 4. Mr. Raju, learned Senior Counsel arguing for the appellants submitted that in all 33 witnesses are examined by the prosecution of which two witnesses P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai Pachanbhai (EX. 29) and P.W. 29 - Jesangbhai Shamlabhai (Ex. 185) are said to be eye witnesses. He submitted that P.W. 29 - Jesangbhai Shamlabhai has not supported the case of the prosecution and has been declared hostile. 4.1. Mr. Raju submitted that so far as P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai Pachanbhai is concerned, his testimony cannot be relied upon. He submitted that P.W. 3 is a chance witness and his presence at the scene of offence is doubtful. He is an interested, related and set up witness as his reason for coming to Venus petrol pump is doubtful and concocted. It is submitted that despite having a mobile, he travels about 30 km to Venus petrol-pump only for the purpose of finding out whether oil is to be filled in the JCB or not. He submitted that the fact that P.W. 3 is working on the JCB itself is not established except for his oral statement. It is submitted that despite having a mobile, he travels about 30 km to Venus petrol-pump only for the purpose of finding out whether oil is to be filled in the JCB or not. He submitted that the fact that P.W. 3 is working on the JCB itself is not established except for his oral statement. He submitted that it is stated that at around 02.24 am on the date of incident, P.W. 3 receives a call from one of the deceased which is not possible if he was put up in a small room with the deceased. In this context Mr. Raju has drawn the attention of this Court to Ex. 111 which is the data of outgoing calls from mobile phone no. 99799160216 belonging to deceased Rameshbhai. 4.2. Mr. Raju submitted that the conduct of P.W. 3 at the time of incident and after the incident in not informing anyone clearly shows that he was not present at the place of incident and is instead a set up witness. He did not inform anyone at the tea stall. He did not inform the police, call the doctor or ambulance. He does not inquire the fact as to whether his uncles are alive despite the fact that the assailants had run away in an opposite direction. 4.3. Mr. Raju further submitted that the version of incident given by this witness is different from the version given by P.W. 1 in the FIR and the deposition of P.W. 1. His version regarding the nature and number of blows given by the accused is contrary to the medical evidence and as per his evidence all the eight accused gave more than one blow from the weapons with them and were constantly beating for ten minutes whereas one of the deceased had three injuries and the second deceased had two injuries which does not support his version. Therefore, Mr. Raju submits that P.W. 1 is a chance witness and therefore his evidence is not worthy of credence. He submitted that no documents were produced to show that the deceased Rameshbhai had purchased a JCB. In this regard, Mr. Therefore, Mr. Raju submits that P.W. 1 is a chance witness and therefore his evidence is not worthy of credence. He submitted that no documents were produced to show that the deceased Rameshbhai had purchased a JCB. In this regard, Mr. Raju has relied upon the following decisions of the Apex Court: (a) Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2009) 9 SCC 719 ; (b) Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2004) 10 SCC 632 ; (c) Ramsewak and others v. State of M.P. reported in (2004) 11 SCC 259 ; (d) State of Punjab v. Rajinder Singh reported in (2009) 15 SCC 612 . 4.4. Mr. Raju further contended that so far as complainant Dilipbhai Dodiya (P.W. 1, Ex. 44) is concerned, he claims to have received information about the assailants on the telephone which is treated by the prosecution as dying declaration, but no reliance can be placed on his deposition. It is submitted that this witness at some places have said that he talked to the deceased Rameshbhai on mobile phone of P.W. 4 whereas he says that he talked on the landline at different places. In the FIR he says that he talked on the mobile whereas in the cross examination it is stated that he talked on landline. 4.5. Mr. Raju submitted that P.W. 1 stays at Kothariya village which is 30 km away from Rajkot whereas P.W 4 stays at Rajkot and therefore his having talked on mobile phone of P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar is not possible because of the distance of 30 km. It is submitted that P.W. 1 says that he went to sleep at the house of Pravinbhai, his brother at Rajkot but no reason is given as to why he had gone to Rajkot to stay at his brother’s place which is unnatural especially when Pravinbhai is not at his house and is at Venus Petrol pump. 4.6. Mr. Raju further contended that the conduct of P.W. 1 after receiving the so-called phone call from his deceased brother Rameshbhai in not trying to contact Rameshbhai either through deceased Pravinbhai’s phone or through P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai’s phone. 4.6. Mr. Raju further contended that the conduct of P.W. 1 after receiving the so-called phone call from his deceased brother Rameshbhai in not trying to contact Rameshbhai either through deceased Pravinbhai’s phone or through P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai’s phone. It is submitted that the conduct of P.W. 1 in not contacting the police or not informing anyone and instead just going to sleep is doubtful and therefore this entire conduct of P.W. 1 smacks of doubt as to whether he actually received any such phone call wherein any details were given by deceased Rameshbhai. It is submitted that P.W. 1 in his deposition states that he did not contact Pravinbhai as he did not have his mobile number and this version has to be viewed from an angle of doubt as he claimed to have been staying at Pravinbhai’s house that night. He submitted that therefore the evidence of this witness is seriously unnatural, doubtful and untrustworthy. 4.7. Mr. Raju has drawn the attention of this Court to the evidence of Rameshbhai Parmar - P.W. 4 (Ex. 102) who says that he gave his mobile to P.W. 1 - Dilipbhai for a talk whereas P.W. 1 says it was landline. He submitted that the incoming call register of deceased Rameshbhai is not produced on record to show that P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai had made a call to him. The conduct of this witness in not informing the police or anyone else including Saileshbhai and his conduct in not telling P.W. 1 to contact the police or anyone else creates doubt regarding his reliability. He submitted that if Ex. 112 is looked at, it shows that P.W. 4 made three calls to deceased Pravinbhai from his mobile no. 9825311624 but denies making such calls. It is submitted that this witness is lying and therefore cannot be believed. 4.8. Mr. Raju submitted that the outgoing call details of P.W. 4 is not produced. He submitted that if a call is received on landline of P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar at 02.24 am from deceased Rameshbhai then there is no reason why Girishbhai would answer the call because Girishbhai and P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar were not residing separately. It is submitted that Girishbhai has not been examined by the prosecution though cited as a witness. He submitted that the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the mobile phone no. It is submitted that Girishbhai has not been examined by the prosecution though cited as a witness. He submitted that the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the mobile phone no. 9427731202 belongs to P.W. 6 - Sureshbhai. 4.9. Mr. Raju further submitted that P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai Parmar (Ex. 95) has not made any call or received any call except incoming call from his father in the morning but the same gets falsified on two counts firstly by looking to the deposition of P.W. 8 - Gautam Shil it is clearly admitted that Khengar Parmar received a call from deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya at 02.24 am which ran continuously for 43 seconds. He submitted that P.W. 4 - Ramesh Parmar has admitted that he had made a phone call to P.W. 3 - Khengar Parmar at around 05.30 am on the date of incident. 4.10. Mr. Raju submitted that there has been suppression on the part of the prosecution inasmuch as no incoming call details of deceased Rameshbhai are produced on record when it is the case of the prosecution that P.W. 4 - Ramesh Parmar made a phone call to deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya at 02.15 am and P.W. 4 had again made two phone calls to deceased Rameshbhai at 02.15 am and 02.25 am. He submitted that P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar has admitted in his cross examination that he has not made calls to deceased Pravinbhai between 10.12.2006 and 11.12.2006, however, looking to the deposition of P.W. 8 as well as the call details of deceased Pravin Dodiya, it has become crystal clear that P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar had called thrice to deceased Pravinbhai between 10.12.2006 and 11.12.2006. 4.11. In support of his aforesaid submissions regarding oral dying declarations, Mr. Raju has relied upon the following decisions: (e) Waikhom Yaima Singh v. State of Manipur reported in (2011) 13 SCC 125 ; (f) Arun Bhanudas Pawar v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2008) 11 SCC 232 ; (g) Roop Ram and Another v. State of M.P reported in (2011) 14 SCC 577. 4.12. Mr. Raju has argued the point of motive on the part of the accused behind the alleged offence. He submitted that there is no motive established against Pravinbhai and that there is no document to show that deceased Rameshbhai was working for accused no. 1 or that the partnership was dissolved. 4.12. Mr. Raju has argued the point of motive on the part of the accused behind the alleged offence. He submitted that there is no motive established against Pravinbhai and that there is no document to show that deceased Rameshbhai was working for accused no. 1 or that the partnership was dissolved. He submitted that there is no document produced on record to show that deceased Rameshbhai had started a business with Govind Sorathiya after he stopped business with accused no. 1. He submitted that oral evidence shows partnership with son of Govindbhai i.e. Pankaj but no document thereof is produced on record. He submitted that there is no proof of ownership of any JCB machine as claimed and no joint account in bank as well. 4.13. Mr. Raju has further submitted that not a single document has been placed on record by the prosecution to show that accused no. 1 and Rameshbhai were doing similar business. He has drawn the attention of this Court to the evidence of P.W. 3 more particularly paras 5 and 27 to show that the machines of accused no. 1 were at different places around 40 km away. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to para 27 of evidence of P.W. 3 and para 6 of evidence of P.W. 10 and submitted that these evidence show that many other persons were also involved in the business of JCB machines. He submitted that P.W. 10 - Govind (Ex. 136) states that JCB machines used by deceased Rameshbhai were registered under the name of Dipesh Construction owned by one Shri Kanji Kachra who has been examined as P.W. 19 by the prosecution. He submitted that this witness is silent in his evidence. He submitted that P.W. 6 has stated that he has no information about the so called rivalry between accused no. 1 and deceased Rameshbhai. It is submitted that in view of these, the prosecution has badly failed to prove motive behind the alleged incident beyond reasonable doubt. 4.14. Mr. Raju further submitted that so far as discovery of muddamal weapons is concerned, the relevant witness is Nileshbhai Bachubhai - P.W. 7 (Ex. 106). His evidence shows that the police told him and the accused that if they proceed further to Ambavadi, two four wheelers are there. If panchnama Ex. 4.14. Mr. Raju further submitted that so far as discovery of muddamal weapons is concerned, the relevant witness is Nileshbhai Bachubhai - P.W. 7 (Ex. 106). His evidence shows that the police told him and the accused that if they proceed further to Ambavadi, two four wheelers are there. If panchnama Ex. 107 is perused, it is clear that it is a joint discovery of 9 accused. It is submitted that the panchnama shows that the accused were present along with the police japta in the wadi and that the panchnama does not show that the accused were taken to Ambawadi where the vehicles were there and the accused were told to remove the clothes and weapons from the jeep. Instead this witness states that he came to know that the clothes and weapons were in the vehicle because the police told them. 4.15. Mr. Raju contended that in the deposition of the Investigating Officer, it is borne out that on seeing the two vehicles from inside, he saw the clothes and weapons and thereafter he called the panchas. He further states that Wadi place was shown by Dilipbhai and not by others. It is submitted that therefore discovery can be attributed to accused no. 1 Dilipbhai and not to others. 4.16. Mr. Raju has placed reliance of Clause 140(2) of Gujarat Police Manual, 1975 Vol-III, Powers and Duties, and submitted that as per the provisions of law a dog squad is to be called where there is no tangible clue to commence the investigation whereas a dog squad was called in the present case as is admitted by the Investigating Officer - P.W. 33 - Bhupat Vira Parmar. 5. Mr. A.Y. Kogje, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent - State has strongly supported the prosecution case. He submitted that the charge in the present case has been duly proved by the prosecution and that from the evidence of witnesses, call detail records, circumstantial evidences as well as documentary evidences, the presence of accused persons is fully established. He submitted that considering and looking to the nature of injuries and also the factum of double murder, it appears that the evidence against the accused is inseparable and that all the accused persons have jointly assaulted and killed the deceased persons. 5.1. Mr. He submitted that considering and looking to the nature of injuries and also the factum of double murder, it appears that the evidence against the accused is inseparable and that all the accused persons have jointly assaulted and killed the deceased persons. 5.1. Mr. Kogje submitted that the witnesses have no reason to lie and let go the real culprits and that there is no reason as to why all of a sudden all the witnesses would falsely implicate the accused persons. He submitted that in fact the accused persons were absconding for a long time and this conduct of the accused is also a relevant circumstance which would pint that only the accused are guilty. 5.2. Mr. Kogje further submitted that so far as the motive behind the alleged offence is concerned, the same has been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. He submitted that as per the evidence of P.W. 1 - Dilipbhai Dodiya the deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya was serving with accused no. 1 - Dilipbhai and thereafter he left the job. He has stated that accused Dilipbhai had kept deceased Rameshbhai as ten paisa partner in his business because of his competence and ability. However, about a year prior to the alleged incident, the deceased separated from the business and started a separate business in partnership with one Govindbhai which was going well and because of this there was a rivalry with the accused. He submitted that because of this reason the accused committed the alleged murder and this aspect gets ample corroboration from the FIR which is at Ex. 45. 5.3. Mr. Kogje submitted that this aspect also gets corroboration from the evidence of P.W. 4 who has stated in his deposition that in past an attempt was made to get the dispute resolved/settled by the elder members of society but accused no. 1 insisted and cited a condition that deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya should leave Kutch district and start business elsewhere. He submitted that as the condition was not acceptable to the deceased Rameshbhai, the compromise did not take place and that because of the business rivalry such attempts/threats of assault were frequent. He submitted that P.W. 6 has also referred to the grudge borne by the accused persons and that thus the prosecution has proved the motive of the accused by leading cogent and unimpeachable evidence. 5.4. Mr. He submitted that P.W. 6 has also referred to the grudge borne by the accused persons and that thus the prosecution has proved the motive of the accused by leading cogent and unimpeachable evidence. 5.4. Mr. Kogje contended that the conduct of the eye witness and also the conduct of other witnesses is most natural and it inspires confidence. He submitted that P.W. 1 is the real brother of the deceased persons and that his evidence has remained unshaken in the cross-examination and therefore the basic substratum of the prosecution case is not effected. He submitted that as per the evidence given by this witness, he was informed by none other than his real brothers on phone about the deadly assault. He submitted that evidence of P.W. 1 establishes the presence of accused at the scene of offence. It is submitted that evidence of P.W. 1 is corroborated by evidence of P.w. 3- Khengarbhai, P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar and P.W. 5 - Naranbhai Parmar. Mr. Kogje has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions: (i) Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and another reported in AIR 2012 SC 37 ; (ii) Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy and others reported in AIR 2013 SC 3681 ; (iii) Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 100; (iv) Kanhaiya Lal and others v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 2013 SC 1940 . 5.5. Mr. Kogje submitted that P.W. 3 is the eye witness to the alleged incident and he gives explanation about his presence at the petrol pump at night on the date of incident. He submitted that this witness has identified the accused before the Court. He submitted that as per the evidence of this witness all the accused persons had jointly assaulted the deceased and that in his presence the deceased made frantic phone calls to different witnesses to get help. He submitted that the evidence of this witness is corroborated by the medical evidence. He submitted that as per the evidence of this witness all the accused persons had jointly assaulted the deceased and that in his presence the deceased made frantic phone calls to different witnesses to get help. He submitted that the evidence of this witness is corroborated by the medical evidence. It is also submitted that the aspect of deceased Rameshbhai making a call to this witness for 43 seconds might be because of the atmosphere of fear created by the accused persons at that point of time and that when a person is frightened and is put under threat, there are chances that when the calls are made in quick succession, by mistake the deceased might have made this call. 5.6. Mr. Kogje further submitted that as regards remembering the number of motorcycle, P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai has stated that the motorcycle belonged to P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar. As regards his presence, P.W. 3 has specifically stated that he used to stay and spend night/time at the place where the JCB machines were kept as he was alone and no other person was staying with him. Mr. Panchal submitted that thus, going at the petrol pump and spending night along with the deceased persons is not unnatural. 5.7. Mr. Kogje submitted that the reason given by P.W. 3 that because of fear he did not tell the incident to anyone as he was afraid/scared and therefore did not turn up till next morning sounds probable. It is submitted that how a witness would react to particular situation would depend on many factors and that there is no straight jacket formula of universal application so far as the conduct and behaviour of witness is concerned. 5.8. Mr. Kogje submitted that as regards the submission qua contradiction with medical evidence, though the witness has exaggerated that the incident went on for ten minutes and that all accused used their respective weapons, evidence of this witness is not liable to be discredited on the hypothetical submission of defence. It is submitted that the medical evidence does not totally contradict the ocular version of prosecution witnesses. 5.9. Mr. Kogje further submitted that P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar and P.W. 5 are also truthful and reliable witnesses and that evidence of these two witnesses are in the nature of corroboration with FIR as well as evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 3. 5.9. Mr. Kogje further submitted that P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar and P.W. 5 are also truthful and reliable witnesses and that evidence of these two witnesses are in the nature of corroboration with FIR as well as evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 3. He submitted that even these witnesses have deposed about receiving calls by the deceased which is again corroborated by the call record details. 5.10. Mr. Kogje has drawn the attention of this Court to the mobile call record details and as regards the submission of defence that the complete call record details of incoming and outgoing for both the deceased is deliberately not produced, he submitted that from the available details and material whether the complicity of the accused is established or not is relevant and not the incomplete details. It is submitted that if the defence or the accused felt that their case is prejudiced, they ought to have made a grievance and ought to have requested the trial judge to ask the witness to produce the complete details. He submitted that no such application is preferred by the accused in the case and therefore without making any such application to call for the details of the call record, the accused cannot request this court to draw an adverse inference. He submitted that this is a telling circumstance that deceased in presence of eye witness repeatedly called up P.W. 4 to P.W. 6 for getting help. 5.11. Mr. Kogje has drawn the attention of this Court to the medical evidence, more particularly the post mortem notes and the deposition of the doctor who conducted the post mortem - P.W. 18 - Dr. Mrutyunjaykumar Sharma (Ex. 148) and submitted that it has been stated by P.W. 18 that the cause of death of deceased Pravinbhai is cardio respiratory failure due to infliction of sharp edged weapon and hard and blunt weapon. It is stated that these external injuries are possible by way of muddamal article no. 28, 38, 22 & 36 being dhariya, sword, gupti and knife respectively. This witness has also stated that the multiple fractures are possible by more than one blows. 5.12. Mr. Kogje has submitted that so far as injuries on deceased - Rameshbhai are concerned the doctor has opined that the said injuries are possible by way of muddamal article nos. 28, 38, 22 & 36 being dhariya, sword, gupti and knife respectively. This witness has also stated that the multiple fractures are possible by more than one blows. 5.12. Mr. Kogje has submitted that so far as injuries on deceased - Rameshbhai are concerned the doctor has opined that the said injuries are possible by way of muddamal article nos. 26, 22, 36, 24, 38 & 28 and that the fractures sustained by the deceased Rameshbhai are possible by three blows. He submitted that in the opinion of this witness, the injuries on the person of both the deceased were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. 5.13. Mr. Kogje submitted that the primary idea of drawing inquest is to find out as to whether the death was suicidal, homicidal or accidental and that the same is not drawn by experts and therefore variation in number of injuries is bound to be there. He submitted that therefore on that count it cannot be said that medical evidence totally belies the say of the witnesses. He submitted that the Apex Court has held in a catena of decisions that inquest report and medical evidence are by themselves not substantial pieces of evidence. 5.14. Mr. Kogje submitted that the talk which took place between the deceased persons and the witnesses shortly before the incident when they were alive would fall under section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. He submitted that it is a principle of res gastae which means that it is an exception to the general rule of hearsay evidence and whatever is said or done by the witness or the accused before or after the incident would be a relevant fact. He submitted that the factum of calls being made which is proved by scientific method is an important piece of evidence and therefore the evidence of witnesses to that effect is fully corroborated. 5.15. Mr. Kogje submitted that in the midst of night when two deceased persons are done away in most ghastly and barbaric manner, the availability of independent witnesses cannot be expected and even otherwise also when any person is assaulted by deadly weapons, he would try to call and inform persons of confidence only. He submitted that merely because a witness is related to the deceased, that by itself is no ground to disbelieve them. 5.16. Mr. He submitted that merely because a witness is related to the deceased, that by itself is no ground to disbelieve them. 5.16. Mr. Kogje has drawn the attention of this court to the panchnama of scene of offence (Ex. 127) and submitted that from the same it is borne out that a wrist watch belonging to accused no. 8 was found. This fact is also corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 22 - Rammilan Rao (ex. 165) and P.W. 12- Prakash Lalwani (Ex. 138) and also the arrest panchnama (Ex. 139). He submitted that this proves the presence of accused no. 8 at the scene of offence. He submitted that likewise from the panchnama of discovery of mobile phone (Ex. 206) at the behest of accused no. 1, the fact that he had thrown away the mobile phone of deceased after committing the alleged crime is proved. 5.17. Mr. Kogje has also drawn the attention of this Court to the FSL Report at Ex. 196 and submitted that blood of deceased Pravinbhai is found on shirt of accused no. 8 and blood of deceased Rameshbhai is found on shirt of accused no. 4. He submitted that the dhariya which was carried by accused no. 3 is also found to have been stained with blood of Pravinbhai. Likewise the muddamal tami allegedly used by accused no. 5 also is found to have been stained with blood. He submitted that as regards the finding of blood on the clothes of accused as well as the weapons is not explained at all by the accused in their respective statements under section 313 of Cr.P.C. He submitted that even accused no. 8 has not explained as to how and under what circumstances his wrist watch was found lying from the scene of offence. 5.18. Mr. Kogje submitted that in view of the above referred circumstances and submissions, the conviction of accused persons may be maintained as their involvement and complicity is duly proved and established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and therefore the appeals filed by them may be dismissed by this Court. 6. 5.18. Mr. Kogje submitted that in view of the above referred circumstances and submissions, the conviction of accused persons may be maintained as their involvement and complicity is duly proved and established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and therefore the appeals filed by them may be dismissed by this Court. 6. Having heard learned advocates arguing for both the sides at length and as per the latest decision of the Apex Court, we have appreciated, re-appreciated and re-evaluated the evidence led before the trial court in its entirety but we are unable to persuade ourselves to take a different view than the one taken by the trial court that the appellants are the perpetrator of the alleged offence. We think it fit to discuss our evaluation of the evidence on record as follows: Conduct of Witnesses 7. The contention of learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, that the conduct of witnesses of the prosecution is doubtful and they are chance, interested and got up witnesses with a sole object of framing the appellants in the present case is concerned, if we examine the testimonies of the material witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, it is found that their conduct cannot be labelled as unnatural and they cannot be said to be chance or got up witnesses. The prosecution has examined P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai Pachanbhai Parmar at Ex. 95. This witness is said to be present in the room where both the deceased persons were staying on the fateful night. This witness has stated in his evidence before the Court that he had gone to see his uncle Rameshbhai Mavjibhai to get oil in the JCB machine. He further states that at about 02.30 pm someone started banging the door of the room therefore he woke up and saw his uncles Rameshbhai and Pravinbhai talking on mobile phones. These two opened the door and found Pravin Chavda - original accused no. 3, Dilip Chavda - original accused no. 1, Ajit Chavda - original accused no. 2, Jayesh Chavda - original accused no. 6, Kishore Chavda - original accused no. 5, Vikas Chavda - original accused no. 4, Vashram Chavda - original accused no. 7 and Ashok Dodiya - original accused no. 8. He has stated that all these people attacked his uncles outside and that these persons were armed with sword, dhariya, pipes and Kattta. 2, Jayesh Chavda - original accused no. 6, Kishore Chavda - original accused no. 5, Vikas Chavda - original accused no. 4, Vashram Chavda - original accused no. 7 and Ashok Dodiya - original accused no. 8. He has stated that all these people attacked his uncles outside and that these persons were armed with sword, dhariya, pipes and Kattta. These persons assaulted his uncles as a result of which they fell down and these persons went away in two jeeps. 7.1. Much is tried to be made out of the conduct of this witness in not informing about the incident to anyone promptly. Likewise it is submitted that the conduct of Dilipbhai Mavjibhai - P.W. 1 - original complainant is also unusual inasmuch as when he receives a call from his brother Ramesh Dodiya and was told about the arrival of appellants with deadly weapons he does not do anything or take any steps to extend any help to the deceased persons and therefore according to learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, the evidence of this witness is also doubtful. Likewise, P.W. 6 - Sureshbhai Parmar also received phone call from deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya who was in distress. This witness also does not reach out to the deceased persons to save them from the appellants and instead he advised the deceased Ramesh Dodiya to keep cool for the time being and that next day morning they would try for a compromise. 7.2. The contentions advanced by learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, do not impress us so far as P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai Parmar is concerned. His presence at the place of incident cannot be said to be unusual and unnatural. Both the deceased persons were his uncles. He was working with deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya and it was very natural that he had gone to see his uncle for getting oil for the JCB machine. Moreover, at this juncture it is necessary to take note of a very important fact that during the course of the investigation, he identifies the clothes worn by the deceased persons and he stated in his oral evidence as under: “9. If shown, I can identify the clothes worn by the deceased Rameshbhai and Govindbhai Mavjibhai at the time of the incident. Pravinbhai Mavjibhai, at the time of incident, had worn a full sleeved round neck brown coloured sweater. If shown, I can identify the clothes worn by the deceased Rameshbhai and Govindbhai Mavjibhai at the time of the incident. Pravinbhai Mavjibhai, at the time of incident, had worn a full sleeved round neck brown coloured sweater. And Pravin Mavjibhai had worn a full sleeved white - green coloured checks shirt and greyish coloured pant. Deceased Ramesh Mavhibhai had worn a v-neck brown coloured sweater and grey coloured shirt as well as grey coloured pant. Rameshbhai,at the time of incident had worn a black colour leather shoes and Pravinbhai had worn Chappal. If show these articles, I can identify them. Muddala article no. 1 and 2 which are in a sealed condition are opened and shown to him. The same is Pravinbhai Mavjibhai’s sweater and shirt. Muddamal articles no. 3, 4, 5 which are in a sealed condition are opened in the court and shown to me and they are deceased Rameshbhai’s sweater, shirt, pant and shoes. The accused persons are from our village and happen to be relatives.” (sic) 7.3. Had P.W. 3 been not present at the time of commission of offence he would not have identified the clothes and the footwear of the deceased persons. So far as the submission of learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, that this witness though claims to the be present in the same room as the deceased persons had been, he would not have made the phone call of the duration of 43 seconds to deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya is concerned, the only reason we can offer is that nothing turns on this circumstance in favour of the appellants. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that in presence of this witness, who was hardly aged 20 years at the time of the incident, his two uncles were brutally attacked with deadly weapons by the appellants at night at 02.30 am from whom he was earning his livelihood. He would certainly get baffled and become nonplus. Moreover, this witness has categorically denied in his cross examination that he had made any phone call from his mobile to anyone much less to the deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya. There can be variety of reasons for the phone call from his phone being connected to the phone of deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya. Therefore, we do not find any substance in this submission of learned Senior Counsel, Mr. There can be variety of reasons for the phone call from his phone being connected to the phone of deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya. Therefore, we do not find any substance in this submission of learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju to view the evidence of this witness with tinted eyes and discard his evidence being untruthful and his presence being doubtful. The conduct of this witness in running away on his motorbike instead of informing anyone is also not unusual or unnatural because he would have feared for his own life as the appellants were armed with deadly weapons. The appellants had already killed his uncle before his eyes. 7.4. Similarly, the two important witnesses namely Dilipbhai - P.W. 1 and Sureshbhai - P.W. 6 who also received the distress calls from the deceased persons, according to us, exhibited absolutely natural conduct. Merely because they did not take any steps to ensure safety of the deceased persons, it cannot be said that their conduct was unnatural and there are not truthful witnesses, set up by prosecution to frame the appellants in a false case. The oral evidence of these two witnesses reveals that they received phone calls and were informed by deceased persons that the appellants had come with deadly weapons and that they were knocking on the door. From this much information it was not sufficient for these two witnesses to comprehend that anything worst would happen and therefore they chose to wait till morning so as to see that the dispute between Rameshbhai and appellant no. 1 is settled. 7.5. The contention that on getting phone calls from the deceased persons seeking help, these witnesses exhibited strange behaviour and did not take any step to help out the deceased persons and therefore these witnesses are got up, chance and set up witnesses rendering their testimonies doubtful cannot be countenanced. It could be seen from the oral evidence of these witnesses that the prosecution has examined Kadvabhai Parmar - P.W. 18. This witness is the Ex-Sarpanch of the village and he is considered to be a respected person in the village. It transpires from his oral evidence that it was within this witness’ knowledge that the deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya and accused no. 1 Dilip Chavda were doing business together in partnership. He further submits that twelve months prior to the alleged incidence, deceased Rameshbhai parted company with accused no. It transpires from his oral evidence that it was within this witness’ knowledge that the deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya and accused no. 1 Dilip Chavda were doing business together in partnership. He further submits that twelve months prior to the alleged incidence, deceased Rameshbhai parted company with accused no. 1 - Dilip Chavda and started his own business of JCB because of which there was a business rivalry between the deceased Rameshbhai and accused no. 1 - Dilipbhai. He submitted that because of this rivalry there used to be frequent squabbling between these two people and this witness used to intervene to cool down the tempers. Around 2 to 2½ months before the alleged incident this witness tried to amicably settle the dispute between the deceased Rameshbhai Dodiya and accused no. 1 - Dilipbhai Chavda but the efforts did not fructify as accused no. 1 - Dilipbhai insisted that deceased Rameshbhai should leave Kutch and do business of JCB elsewhere. The evidence of P.W. 1 - Dilipbhai Dodiya, P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar, P.W. 5 - Naranbhai Parmar, P.W. 6 - Sureshbhai Parmar is required to be considered in juxtaposition with the evidence of P.W. 28 - Kadvabhai Parmar as is borne out from the evidence of Kadvabhai that there was a business rivalry and there used to be frequent squabbling between the deceased Rameshbhai and accused no. 1 Dilipbhai. These witnesses on receiving phone calls from the deceased persons would have thought that this is one of such calls in respect of business rivarly and next morning they would see that the matter is settled between the two and therefore they would not have anticipated that something worst would happen. Therefore they would not have taken any steps to immediately approach the police and also to inform the kith and kin of the deceased persons regarding receipt of distress calls. 7.6. There cannot be any cavil about the proposition expounded by the Apex Court in the case of Jarnail Singh (supra), Shankarlal (supra), Ramsewak & Others (supra) and Rajinder Singh (supra) as to the principles regarding chance witnesses. We have in detail discussed the evidence of most of the witnesses sought to be projected as chance witnesses by Mr. 7.6. There cannot be any cavil about the proposition expounded by the Apex Court in the case of Jarnail Singh (supra), Shankarlal (supra), Ramsewak & Others (supra) and Rajinder Singh (supra) as to the principles regarding chance witnesses. We have in detail discussed the evidence of most of the witnesses sought to be projected as chance witnesses by Mr. Raju, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in the foregoing paragraphs and for the reasons recorded by us here in above we are of the opinion that none of the witnesses can be said to be chance witnesses and therefore the judgments relied upon by learned Senior counsel Mr. Raju are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 7.7. So far as the so called discrepancy in the oral evidence of witnesses and the medical evidence is concerned, we are of the opinion that the discrepancy pointed out by Mr. Raju, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant are not fatal and do not render the prosecution case doubtful. An attempt is made to create a doubt on the ground of inconsistency between the oral and medical evidences on the basis of judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Rajinder Singh (supra) but we are of the opinion that this judgment will also not help the appellants because the facts of the case before the Apex Court was that the doctor’s evidence did not support the use of shotgun and the gun shot wound was in consonance with the use of rifle. Under these circumstances the Apex Court upheld the findings of the High Court that the inconsistency between the medical and oral evidence is fatal to the prosecution. In the present case such a fatal inconsistency is not there and therefore we are unable to countenance the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel on this count. 7.8. In fact the ratio expounded by the Apex Court in the cases of Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh (supra), Gangabhavani (supra), Namdeo (supra) and Kanhaiya Lal and Others (supra) is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be scrutinized before placing reliance on other evidence which we have done very minutely. 8. We are therefore of the view that for the reasons recorded as aforesaid the conduct of these material witnesses cannot be labelled as unnatural one rendering their evidence doubtful. 8. We are therefore of the view that for the reasons recorded as aforesaid the conduct of these material witnesses cannot be labelled as unnatural one rendering their evidence doubtful. These witnesses have according to us given a truthful version of the incident as it had happened and these witnesses have withstood the cross examination which has not yielded anything which would help the appellants. Dying Declaration 9. The next contention of learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, that the telephonic calls made by the deceased persons to witnesses would not fall within the ambit of section 32 of Evidence Act and therefore they cannot be treated as dying declaration. He submitted that the information given by the deceased to the witnesses cannot be considered as a dying declaration as the information given by the deceased persons would not come within the sweep of section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act and therefore the information given by deceased to the witnesses is not a dying declaration in the eye of law. This argument though appears attractive is devoid of substance. Both the deceased persons as is revealed from the evidence of witnesses had made telephonic calls from their mobile phones about the arrival of the appellants and their vigorously banging on the door. This act on the part of the appellants rendered the deceased persons scary and the deceased persons had in very clear terms informed these witnesses that they are scared and they genuinely apprehend that the appellants would assault them. 9.1. The reliance placed by Mr. Raju, learned Senior Counsel in the case of Waikhom Yaima Singh (supra), Arun Bhanudas Pawar (supra) and Roop Ram and Another (supra) are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the cited judgments the author of the dying declarations had made the declaration either to the interested or related witnesses or certain words uttered by the deceased were not understood and therefore the Apex Court has held in the aforesaid cited judgments that such dying declarations could not be relied upon to record findings of conviction without there being other corroborating evidence. Here in the present case, the concerned witnessed have in clear terms stated before the court as to what was told to them by the deceased and therefore the dying declaration cannot be doubted. Here in the present case, the concerned witnessed have in clear terms stated before the court as to what was told to them by the deceased and therefore the dying declaration cannot be doubted. Even otherwise apart from the dying declaration, there is sufficient evidence against the appellants about their complicity in the crime and therefore the dying declaration cannot be brushed aside. In the present case it is clear from the evidence of the above witnesses that they were informed on phone by the deceased persons that they were frightened on seeing the appellants armed with deadly weapons and banging the door of the room vigorously. Therefore the statement of the deceased persons would squarely fall within the four corners of section 32 of the Act. Phone Calls 10. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, has vehemently submitted that the details of phone calls made by the deceased persons as revealed in the evidence of P.W. 1 - Dilipbhai, P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai, P.W. 4 - Rameshbhai Parmar and the call details at Ex. speaks of the duration of the calls made. It is his further contention that P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai was very much there in the room in which the deceased persons were put up and therefore there was no reason whatsoever to make a call which lasted for 43 seconds. Moreover, the incoming call details of deceased Rameshbhai is also not made available during the course of the trial and therefore there is material suppression on the part of the prosecution. The prosecution has also withheld the complete details of incoming calls of the deceased Pravinbhai and therefore according to his submission, the phone calls were in fact not made to the witnesses as deposed by them but since certain details of out going calls of the deceased persons and P.W. 3 - Khengarbhai are available they are being shown as phone calls made by the witnesses without there bing any cogent supporting evidence. 10.1. This argument cannot be accepted for the simple reason that simply by harping that outgoing call details of the deceased persons do not disclose the details of the persons who received the phone calls by itself would not render the evidence of the witnesses untruthful. It is not that the appellants were not afforded any opportunity to test the oral and documentary evidence of the prosecution during the course of trial. It is not that the appellants were not afforded any opportunity to test the oral and documentary evidence of the prosecution during the course of trial. All the witnesses were to put to very rigorous cross examination with a view to dislodge the say on oath that they had received the distress phone calls from the deceased persons but these witnesses have withstood such stiff cross examination and we do not find any discrepancy or any unnaturalness in the evidence of these witnesses which is coupled with documentary evidence in the form of call details. 10.2. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, has tried to create a cloud of doubt in respect of phone calls made by the deceased persons and the location of the deceased persons by drawing our attention to the change in the mobile tower numbers between the calls made by the deceased persons. This argument is also fallacious inasmuch as it is very clear from Ex. that the change in the mobile tower number is not consistent but it has changed intermittently and therefore if the location of the accused persons had not been in the room from which the calls were made, the continuity of the tower number would have remained consistent but that is not so in the present case and therefore this argument is also devoid of substance. These submissions of learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, are without merits and deserve to be rejected. Conduct of the Accused Persons after the Crime 11. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, has harped too much on the so called unnatural conduct of the witnesses but as submitted by learned Special Public Prosecutor, Mr. Kogje that the conduct of the accused persons after the commission of the crime is also very relevant material. Mr. Kogje submitted that the incident had happened on 11.12.2006 and thereafter the accused persons were not though attempts were made by the investigating officer to apprehend them. It is only on 02.01.2007 that the accused persons were arrested. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, has tried to justify the conduct of the accused persons in absconding after the commission of crime by submitted that even an innocent person apprehending arrest in false case would try to avoid his arrest and therefor this conduct cannot be termed as unnatural. In support of his contention, Mr. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, has tried to justify the conduct of the accused persons in absconding after the commission of crime by submitted that even an innocent person apprehending arrest in false case would try to avoid his arrest and therefor this conduct cannot be termed as unnatural. In support of his contention, Mr. Raju has relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 2010 SC 3638 and Rahman v. The State of U.P. Reported in AIR 1972 SC 110 (1). The Apex Court in the case of Bipin Kumar Mondal (supra) has observed in para 22 as under: “Abscondance by Accused : 22. In Matru @ Girish Chandra v. The State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 1050 , this Court repelled the submissions made by the State that as after commission of the offence the accused had been absconding, therefore, the inference can be drawn that he was a guilty person observing as under: "The appellant's conduct in absconding was also relied upon. Now, mere absconding by itself does not necessarily lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even an innocent man may feel panicky and try to evade arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave crime such is the instinct of self-preservation. The act of absconding is no doubt relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence but its value would always depend on the circumstances of each case. Normally the courts are disinclined to attach much importance to the act of absconding, treating it as a very small item in the evidence for sustaining conviction. It can scarcely be held as a determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence which must admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. In the present case the appellant was with Ram Chandra till the FIR was lodged. If thereafter he felt that he was being wrongly suspected and he tried to keep out of the way we do not think this circumstance can be considered to be necessarily evidence of a guilty mind attempting to evade justice. In the present case the appellant was with Ram Chandra till the FIR was lodged. If thereafter he felt that he was being wrongly suspected and he tried to keep out of the way we do not think this circumstance can be considered to be necessarily evidence of a guilty mind attempting to evade justice. It is not inconsistent with his innocence." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Rahman v. State of U.P. AIR 1972 SC 110 ; and State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah and ors. AIR 2005 SC 733 . Abscondance by a person against whom FIR has been lodged, having an apprehension of being apprehended by the police, cannot be said to be unnatural. Thus, in view of the above, we do not find any force in the submission made by Shri Bhattacharjee that mere absconding by the appellant after commission of the crime and remaining untraceable for such a long time itself can establish his guilt. Absconding by itself is not conclusive either of guilt or of guilty conscience.“ 11.1. It could be seen that the very abscondance of the accused after registration of FIR against him is not in itself a factor pointing to his guilt. But in the present case as we have observed here in above that the Investigating Officer had launched a man-hunt to nab the appellants. The evidence of P.W. 26 - Ramkumar, I.O shows that after commission of the crime, the appellants had fled and they had gone to various places such as Nasik, Jinar village, Himmatnagar, Dhulila in Maharashtra, Vadodara where they stayed in hotels under assumed names. If the appellants were in fact innocent and falsely implicated in the presence case as claimed by them there was no reason for them to run away after the incident had happened. The Apex Court in the case of Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in AIR 2010 SC 2352 (1) has made certain observations as under: “The conduct of Absconding: (99) From the testimony of PW-20 and PW-24, it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused Sidharth Vashisht @ Manu Sharma after committing the murder of Jessica Lal fled away from the scene of occurrence. It is further proved from the testimony of PW-100, PW-101, PW-87 Raman Lamba, PW-85 and PW-80 that from afternoon of 30.04.1999 search was made for the black Tata Safari bearing Regn. No. CH-01-W-6535 and for Sidharth Vashisht @ Manu Sharma, Director of Piccadilly Sugar Industries at Bhadson, Kurukshetra, Chandigarh, his farmhouse at Samalkha and Okhla Delhi. It is also proved that even after the seizure of vehicle on 02.05.1999 the search for accused Sidharth Vashisht @ Manu Sharma continued and search was made at Piccadilly Cinema, Piccadilly Hotel, his residence at Chandigarh, PGI Hospital where his father was subsequently admitted. However, accused Sidharth Vashisht @ Manu Sharma was not found nor anybody informed his whereabouts and it is only on 06.05.1999 that accused Sidharth Vashisht @ Manu Sharma surrendered at Patiala Guest House, Chandigarh in the presence of Shri Harish Ghai, advocate and Sh. Vinod Dada. The above evidence of the witnesses clearly establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Manu Sharma absconded after committing the crime and surrendered on 06.05.1999 after extensive searches were made. (100) A criminal trial is not an enquiry into the conduct of an accused for any purpose other than to determine whether he is guilty of the offence charged. In this connection, that piece of conduct can be held to be incriminatory which has no reasonable explanation except on the hypothesis that he is guilty. Conduct which destroys the presumption of innocence can alone be considered as material. In this regard, it is useful to refer Anant Chaintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 500 :- "Circumstantial evidence in this context means a combination of facts creating a network through which there is no escape for the accused, because the facts taken as a whole do not admit of any inference but of his guilt.... this conduct of the accused was so knit together as to make a network of circumstances pointing only to his guilt......his methods was his own undoing; because even the long arm of coincidence could not explain the multitude of circumstances against him, and they destroyed the presumption of innocence with which law clothed him." Thus, it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused Manu Sharma absconded after the incident which is a very relevant conduct u/s 8 of Evidence Act. Disclosure statements of the accused persons and their admissibility u/s 27 Evidence Act.” As per the above proposition of law expounded by the Apex Court the conduct of the accused persons after commission of crime is also reliable factor and has held by the Apex Court it points to the culpability of the accused persons in the crime. Dog Squad 12. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, contended that normally dog squad is required in case of dacoity, loot, murder etc where the identity of the assailants is not known. He has drawn out attention to Clause/Rule 140(2) of the Police Manual, Vol. II, Powers and Duties which is extracted below: “140. * * * (2)The Dog squads may be utilised for serious crimes only, such as murders, dacoities, robberies with arms, highway robberies and big housebreaking & thefts wherein porpoerty involved is more than Rs. 5000/- and where there is not tangible clue to commence the investigation. However, at the places where the Dog Squads are stationed, they may be utilised locally even for smaller offences. * * *” 12.1. This submission is also devoid of merits. It could be seen from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that the police had reached the spot of incident before the preliminary complaint disclosed the details giving the details, name of the accused person and weapons used in the commission of the crime was lodged by Dilip Dodiya. Therefore it cannot be argued that the dog squad was called because the names of the assailants were not known and some unknown assailants had attacked the deceased persons that thereafter the present appellants are falsely roped in the umbrage of business rivalry. FSL Report 13. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, has vehemently submitted that Articles 3, 4 and 6 and clothes of the appellants do not have blood stains as per the FSL report. It is submitted that it is highly unlikely that a person who attacked another person with deadly weapons like sword, knife etc would not have blood stains on his clothes and therefore the case of the prosecution that the appellants were the actual assailants who committed the murder of deceased persons cannot be believed. This argument is also without merits. Learned SPP Mr. This argument is also without merits. Learned SPP Mr. Kogje has drawn our attention to the FSL and Serological report and has pointed out that clothes of the assailants and some of the weapons used by them is shown to have traces of blood, the group of which matched with that of deceased persons. We have examined the FSL report and it is borne out that the blood stains were found on the weapons and clothes of appellants. Therefore nothing turns on this submission of learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Raju, and this submission is also dehors merits. 13.1. A close scrutiny of the material evidence, examination on behalf of the prosecution buttressed by the documentary evidence make it explicitly clear that the appellants were involved in the crime. We do not find any germane reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of conviction rendered by learned Sessions Judge. 14. Accordingly, appeal is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order dated 19.05.2009 passed by the Sessions Judge, Kutch at Bhuj in Sessions Case No. 51 of 2007 is confirmed. However, life imprisonment as awarded by the trial court would not be till last breath and the case of the appellants may be reviewed by the appropriate authority after 14 years of their serving sentence considering the decision of Apex Court in the case of Bhaikon @ Bakul Borah (supra). Since the original accused no. 1 - Dilip Laxmanbhai Chavda, original accused no. 2 - Ajit Laxmanbhai Chavda, original accused no. 5 - Kishor Ajitbhai Chavda, original accused no. 6 - Jayesh Ajitbhai Chavda and original accused no. 7 - Vashrambhai Gagjibhai Chavda are on bail, they shall surrender before the jail authorities within a period of twelve weeks from today. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled qua original accused nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 & 7. R & P, if lying with this court, to be sent back forthwith. Appeal dismissed.