JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, Judge. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31. 12.2013 rendered by District Judge (Forest), Shimla in Civil Appeal No.31-S/13 of 2012/10. 2. “Key facts” necessary for the adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal are that appellants-plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the “plaintiffs” for convenience sake) filed a suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondents-defendants (hereinafter referred to as the “defendants” for convenience sake). According to the plaintiffs, land comprised in Khata Khatauni Nos. 40/74, 41/75, 42/76, 43/77, 60/100, 36/51, 37/54, 55, 56, 58, 38/59, 39/60, 61, 62, 64, 65 and 67, Khasra Nos. 2, 711, 138, 136, 7, 19, 29 and 53 at one given time was owned by Sh. Janki Ram. Plaintiffs have reproduced pedigree table in the plaint. According to the plaintiffs, land was inherited from time to time by the legal heirs. Sh. Khushi Ram died in the year 1970. His share was mutated in the name of his widow late Smt. Janki Devi alongwith defendant No.3 Parwati vide mutation No.157 dated 10.11.1970. Defendant No.3 has wrongly been shown to have succeeded to the share of late Sh. Khushi Ram. Entire 1/3rd share of late Sh. Khushi Ram was to be inherited by late Smt. Janki Devi. Sh. Khushi Ram has died issueless. Defendant No.3 is daughter of late Sh. Dutt. Revenue entries showing defendant No.3 to be owner of 1/2 share of the estate of Khushi Ram are wrong, illegal and void. Smt. Janki Devi died on 23.9.2004 at village Kanhenchi. Smt. Janki Devi, during her life time, has executed a gift deed on 27.12.1990 in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of her share. The mutation to this effect was attested in their favour vide mutation No.255 on 25.2.1991. Smt. Janki Devi executed a registered will in favour of plaintiffs on 25.6.1993 whereby she has bequeathed all her movable and immovable property in favour of the plaintiffs situated at Mauza Kanhenchi, Pargana Kalhanj, Tehsil and District Shimla. Smt. Janki Devi at the time of her death was owner in possession of the land, which was wrongly shown in the name of defendant No.3. She was also owner in possession of 1/2 share left behind by Smt. Sanehru widow of Ram Saran. Smt. Sanehru died on 5.12.1985 at village Seri. Smt. Janki Devi at the time of her death was owner in possession of the land, which was wrongly shown in the name of defendant No.3. She was also owner in possession of 1/2 share left behind by Smt. Sanehru widow of Ram Saran. Smt. Sanehru died on 5.12.1985 at village Seri. After the death of Smt. Sanehru, her share was inherited by Smt. Janki Devi to the extent of 1/2 share and the defendants to the extent of 1/2 share, whereas the mutation of inheritance of late Smt. Sanehru, which was attested in the year 1996 wrongly showed the defendants to be only persons entitled to inherit the share of late Smt. Sanehru. At the time of death of late Smt. Sanehru, Smt. Janki was alive. Plaintiffs under the ‘will’ of late Smt. Janki have become owners in possession of 1/2 share of late Smt. Sanehru and also the share of defendant No.3 wrongly shown to have been inherited after the death of late Sh. Khushi Ram. In the revenue entries, plaintiffs have been shown to be the co-owners of the property to the extent of the share of late Smt. Janki Devi, which was gifted by her to them. After the death of late Smt. Janki Devi, i.e. 23.9.1994, plaintiffs also inherited from late Smt. Sanehru and 1/2 share of her husband late Sh. Khushi Ram wrongly shown in the name of defendant No.3. Defendants are heirs of late Sh. Dutt. They have inherited the share of late Sh. Dutt and 1/2 share of late Smt. Sanehru. During the life time of Smt. Janki Devi, plaintiffs have been put in possession of the share of Janki Devi. Defendants have recently started threatening the plaintiffs to dispossess them from the land on the pretext that the plaintiffs are entitled only to the share of land gifted to them by late Smt. Janki Devi. 3. Suit was contested by the defendants. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have filed separate written statement. According to them, after the death of Ram Saran, his estate devolved upon other heirs of Sh. Dila Ram. Smt. Sanehru widow of Ram Saran expired in the year 1985 and Smt. Puranu widow of Sh. Dutt had also expired. Sh. Khushi Ram expired and his estate devolved upon Smt. Janki and Smt. Parwati, adopted daughter of Khushi Ram. After the death of Sh. Dila Ram. Smt. Sanehru widow of Ram Saran expired in the year 1985 and Smt. Puranu widow of Sh. Dutt had also expired. Sh. Khushi Ram expired and his estate devolved upon Smt. Janki and Smt. Parwati, adopted daughter of Khushi Ram. After the death of Sh. Khushi Ram, mutation was entered and attested in favour of Smt. Janki and Smt. Parwati. According to them, Parwati was adopted by Sh. Khushi Ram, when she was 2-3 years of age according to the customs. The marriage of Smt. Parwati was also solemnized by Sh. Khushi Ram and Smt. Janki Devi. The share in the property, which was left by Sh. Khushi Ram has rightly devolved upon Smt. Janki and Parwati. It is denied that the entire 1 Khushi Ram was inherited by Smt. Janki Devi. It is also alleged that after about 30 years the plaintiffs cannot challenge the inheritance which was effected in the year 1970. Smt. Janki Devi has not challenged the inheritance or entering mutation in the name of defendant No.3. It is denied that Smt. Janki Devi executed a ‘will’ in favour of the plaintiffs. Their possession has become open, continuous peaceful to the knowledge of all concerned and hostile to the rights of Smt. Janki Devi. She has never claimed any right in the property left by Smt. Sanehru during her life time and defendants are owners in possession of same by efflux of time being in adverse possession. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are heirs of Sh. Dutt and defendant No.3 is adopted daughter of Sh. Khushi Ram. The revenue entries showing the share are correct and binding against the plaintiffs. It is denied that during the life time of Smt. Janki Devi, plaintiffs were put in possession of her share. Smt. Janki Devi was not in possession of any land in village Kanhenchi and the land was in possession of defendants and Sh. Prem Prakash, husband of defendant No.2. 4. Defendant No.3 also filed separate written statement. According to her, plaintiffs have rightly admitted the share of Sh. Khushi Ram in the suit land. According to her, share of Sh. Khushi Ram has rightly been mutated in her name. Smt. Parwati Devi was the natural born daughter of Sh. Dutt son of Sh. Dila Ram son of Janki Ram. 4. Defendant No.3 also filed separate written statement. According to her, plaintiffs have rightly admitted the share of Sh. Khushi Ram in the suit land. According to her, share of Sh. Khushi Ram has rightly been mutated in her name. Smt. Parwati Devi was the natural born daughter of Sh. Dutt son of Sh. Dila Ram son of Janki Ram. She was adopted when she was 2 1/2 years of age by her real uncle Sh. Khushi Ram and his wife Smt. Janki Devi. She was given in adoption by her natural parents Sh. Dutt and his wife Smt. Puranu to Sh. Khushi Ram and his wife Smt. Janki Devi on the day of Shivratri on 18.2.1966. Divorce took place between her and her first husband in the year 1980-81. She performed second marriage with Sh. Devi Dutt Sharma. The execution of ‘will’ dated 25.6.1993 is denied. She is legal heir of Smt. Sanehru by virtue of adoption by Sh. Khushi Ram. The revenue entries are correct. Presumption of truth is attached to these entries. The succession of late Sh. Khushi Ram opened in the year 1970. 5. The replication was not filed by the plaintiffs. Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) framed issues on 23.9.2005. He dismissed the suit on 7.6.2008. Plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge (Forest). He dismissed the same on 31.12.2013. Hence, the present Regular Second Appeal. 6. Mr. G.D. Verma, learned Senior Advocate, on the basis of substantial questions of law framed, has vehemently argued that the entries made in favour of defendant No.3 do not create any title in her favour. Presumption of truth attached to the revenue entries has been rebutted by the plaintiffs by leading cogent and reliable evidence. Defendant No.3 has not been legally adopted. Learned courts below have come to a wrong conclusion that only defendants succeeded to the estate of Smt. Sanehru. He has also referred to the judgment of learned Sub Judge 1st Class dated 9.8.1999, which was affirmed by the Additional District Judge on 6.8.2002 and also to RSA No. 473 of 2002 decided on 13.3.2003. 7. Mr. Ashok Sood has supported the judgment and decrees passed by both the courts below. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 9. 7. Mr. Ashok Sood has supported the judgment and decrees passed by both the courts below. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 9. PW- 1 Keshav Singh has proved the copy of gift deed Ex.PW-1/A and copy of ‘will’ Ex.PW-1/B. 10. PW-2 Y.P. Sood has testified that Smt. Janki Devi has executed ‘will’. He has identified Smt. Janki Devi in the office of Registrar, Shimla vide Ex.PW-1/B. He has signed in circle ‘A’. He has admitted in his cross- examination that Janki Devi was known to him. He has further testified that in Ex.PW-1/B in circles ‘B’ and ‘D’, Janki Devi has not appended her signatures. 11. PW-3 Gayatri Sharma has deposed that on 27.12.1990, Smt. Janki Devi has executed a gift deed Ex.PW- 1/A and the same has been registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, Shimla and in circle ‘A’, she signed the same. She has admitted that Ex.PW- 1/B was not typed in her presence. She has further deposed that when Janki Devi executed Ex. PW-1/B at that time, she was 70 years old. 12. PW-4 Lekh Ram has testified that Janki Devi has executed one ‘will’ in favour of plaintiffs Ex.PW- 1 /A. Smt. Janki Devi has put her thumb impression in circle ‘B’. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that plaintiff No.3 is his brother-in-law. He was not aware about the relations between Parwati Devi and Janki Devi. He did not know how many thumb impressions were put by Smt. Janki Devi on the document. 13. PW-5 Roshan Lal has deposed that the ‘will’ was scribed by Sh. Gupta, Document Writer. He and PW4 Lekh Ram had put their signatures in the ‘will’ as attesting witnesses. Janki Devi put her thumb impression in circle ‘B’. In his cross-examination, he has testified that at that time, age of Janki Devi was 70-75 years. He was not aware whether any gift deed was also executed by Smt. Janki Devi. He was not aware who identified Janki Devi before the Tehsildar. 14. PW-6 Thakur Dass is one of the plaintiffs. He has deposed that Khushi Ram was the husband of Janki Devi who was the son of Dila Ram. Ram Saran was brother of Dila Ram. Ram Saran and Sanehru Devi died issueless. Khushi Ram and Janki Devi were also issueless. He has proved copy of Shajara Ex.PX. 14. PW-6 Thakur Dass is one of the plaintiffs. He has deposed that Khushi Ram was the husband of Janki Devi who was the son of Dila Ram. Ram Saran was brother of Dila Ram. Ram Saran and Sanehru Devi died issueless. Khushi Ram and Janki Devi were also issueless. He has proved copy of Shajara Ex.PX. He has deposed that Parwati was the daughter of Sh. Dutt. He had solemnized her marriage. Khushi Ram has never adopted Parwati Devi as daughter. Khushi Ram died in the year 1970-71. Suit land was situated in village Kanhenchi. Prior to the death of Khushi Ram, it was in possession of Khushi Ram and after his death, his land was inherited by his wife Janki Devi. Janki Devi has executed gift deed in their favour vide Ex.PW- 1 /A. She has also executed a ‘will’ Ex.PW-1/B. According to him, Sanehru died in the year 1985. Janki Devi and Sh. Dutt inherited the property of Smt. Sanehru in equal shares. Plaintiffs became owners of the share of Khushi Ram and Sanehru vide Ex.PW-1/B. According to him, the revenue entries were wrong. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that Janki Devi and Parwati Devi inherited the land of Khushi Ram in equal shares. He has deposed that he has also challenged the wrong revenue entries before the revenue court. Janki Devi died in the year 1994. He has admitted that Janki Devi was not his close relative. 15. DW- 1 Parwati Devi has deposed that she was adopted when she was 2 1/2 years of age by her real uncle Khushi Ram and his wife Smt. Janki Devi on the day of Shivratri. She has deposed that share of Khushi Ram in the suit land and property has been inherited by her and Smt. Janki Devi in equal shares. She was brought up and lived with her adopted parents. She was continued to be treated as adopted daughter by Khushi Ram till his death. Khushi Ram died in the year 1978. After his death, she and Janki Devi inherited his property. Copy of mutation was Ex.P-2. She is owner in possession of half share. According to her, ‘will’ and gift deed were illegal, null and void. She was paying the land revenue. The receipts were marks X-2 and X-3. Khushi Ram died in the year 1978. After his death, she and Janki Devi inherited his property. Copy of mutation was Ex.P-2. She is owner in possession of half share. According to her, ‘will’ and gift deed were illegal, null and void. She was paying the land revenue. The receipts were marks X-2 and X-3. She has placed on record copies of jamabandi Ex.DW-1/A to Ex.DW-1/C and copy of rojnamcha mark X-4. 16. DW-2 Moti Ram has deposed Parwati Devi was adopted by Khushi Ram and his wife Smt. Janki Devi. DW-2 is Numberdar of the illaqua. He has issued revenue receipts Ex.DW-2/A to Ex.DW-2/C. 17. DW-3 Smt. Kanta Sharma has testified that Parwati Devi was natural daughter of Sh. Dutt. However, she was adopted by Khushi Ram and his wife. 18. Now, the Court will advert to the documentary evidence. According to Ex.P- 1, Shajara Nasab, Khushi Ram is shown as son of Dila Ram and Smt. Janki Devi is shown as wife of Khushi Ram. Parwati Devi is shown as daughter of Khushi Ram. According to Ex.P-2, Khushi Ram has inherited the estate of Dila Ram. According to Ex.P-3, Sanehru Devi has inherited the estate of Ram Saran. According to jamabandi for the year 1986-87 Ex.P9, Janki Devi is shown to be widow of Khushi Ram and Parwati Devi and Janki Devi are shown as owners in equal shares. According to jamabandi for the year 199 1-92 Ex.P-10, Sanehru Devi, Thakur Dass and others are shown as co-owners. The same position is reflected in the jamabandi for the year 1996-97, Ex.P-1 1 whereby Parwati and Janki Devi have been shown as owners. In Ex. P- 12, copy of Jamabandi for the year 1996-97, Parwati and Janki Devi are shown as owners of one share of Khewat/Khatauni No.60/100. In the copies of jamabandi Ex.P-13 and Ex.P-14 for the year 1996-97, Parwati and plaintiffs are shown as co-owners of the suit land. According to jamabandi for the year 2000-200 1 Ex.DW1/A, plaintiffs and defendants are shown as co-owners. In the jamabandi for the year 197 1-72 Ex.DW-1/B and Ex.DW- 1/C, Janki Devi and Parwati Devi have inherited the estate of deceased Khushi Ram. It transpired from the combined reading of revenue entries from the year 1971- 1972 that Janki Devi and Parwati inherited the share of Sh. Khushi Ram in equal share. In the jamabandi for the year 197 1-72 Ex.DW-1/B and Ex.DW- 1/C, Janki Devi and Parwati Devi have inherited the estate of deceased Khushi Ram. It transpired from the combined reading of revenue entries from the year 1971- 1972 that Janki Devi and Parwati inherited the share of Sh. Khushi Ram in equal share. Presumption of truth is attached to the revenue entries. However, the plaintiffs have never challenged the revenue entries. First mutation was attested in favour of Parwati and Janki Devi in the year 1970-71. The same was never challenged either before the civil court or before the revenue court. 19. Defendants have also led cogent evidence to prove that Parwati Devi was adopted by Khushi Ram and Janki Devi. According to DW-2 Moti Ram and DW-3 Kanta Sharma, Khushi Ram and Janki Devi have always treated, Parwati Devi as their adopted daughter. In the revenue record, as discussed hereinabove, Parwati Devi has been shown as daughter of Khushi Ram. 20. Case of the plaintiffs is that the land was earlier gifted to them in the year 1990 on the basis of Ex.PW- 1 /A. In these circumstances, there was no occasion for execution of alleged will on 25.6.1993 by Smt. Janki Devi in favour of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are not related to Janki Devi. Plaintiffs have only feigned ignorance about the adoption of Parwati Devi by Khushi Ram and Janki Devi. 21. The ‘will’ dated 25.6.1993 has not been proved in accordance with law. PW-2 Y.P. Sood has admitted in his cross-examination that in circles ‘B’ and ‘D’, Janki Devi has not appended her signatures. PW-4 Lekh Ram is also closely related to one of the plaintiffs, i.e. plaintiff No.3. PW-5 Roshan Lal was not aware who has identified Janki Devi before the Tehsildar. He was not aware whether earlier gift deed was executed by Janki Devi. 22. Learned first appellate court has rightly relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in L. Debi Prasad (dead) by L.Rs. vs. Smt. Tribeni Devi and others, AIR 1970 SC 1286 and Balinki Pradhano and another vs. Gopakrishna Padhano and others, AIR 1964 Orissa 117, while dismissing the appeal of the plaintiffs. CMP Nos.6374/2014 & 6711/2014 23. 22. Learned first appellate court has rightly relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in L. Debi Prasad (dead) by L.Rs. vs. Smt. Tribeni Devi and others, AIR 1970 SC 1286 and Balinki Pradhano and another vs. Gopakrishna Padhano and others, AIR 1964 Orissa 117, while dismissing the appeal of the plaintiffs. CMP Nos.6374/2014 & 6711/2014 23. Plaintiffs have also filed an application under order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure by relying upon attested copy of judgment dated 9.8.1999 passed by Sub Judge 1st Class, Court No.1, Shimla, copy of judgment dated 6.8.2002 passed by Additional District Judge, Shimla and copy of judgment dated 13.3.2003 passed in RSA No.473/2002. 24. Plaintiffs have also moved an application under section 100 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for framing additional issues in order to seek benefit of earlier litigation between the parties. The Court has gone through the plaint and written statements. Plaintiffs have not referred to these judgments sought to be relied upon by them in the plaint. There is also no reference of the judgments in the statements of the witnesses of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cannot be permitted to fill up lacunae in the evidence. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that they were not aware of these judgments. Applications are filed belatedly. In the earlier litigation between the parties there was only reference to the gift deed dated 27.12.1990. Defendant No. 3 was only arrayed as proforma defendant. The issue whether Parwati Devi was adopted daughter of Khushi Ram and Janki Devi was never raised in the earlier litigation. It is well settled law that lacuna cannot be permitted to be filled by way of application under order 41 rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat Vs. Mahinder Kumar AIR 2006 SC 1864 have held as under: “10. We shall first deal with the appeals preferred against the judgment and order of the High Court rejecting Civil Application Nos. 964 and 1150 of 2002 filed by the appellants herein for adducing additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The documents sought to be produced were contained in Annexure I to the applications. The applications were opposed by the respondents. 964 and 1150 of 2002 filed by the appellants herein for adducing additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The documents sought to be produced were contained in Annexure I to the applications. The applications were opposed by the respondents. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the applications may be treated as one under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, apparently because the other provisions or the rule did not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. The High Court noticed that a similar Civil Application being No. 4849 of 2000 had been filed earlier when this appeal had been placed for hearing before another Division Bench of the High Court, but the said application was rejected by order dated June 22, 2000. The High Court further found that Rule 27(1)(b) of Order XLI can be invoked only if the Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause. In the instant case it was not as if the additional evidence was required by the Court to enable it to pronounce judgment and, therefore, additional evidence was sought to be adduced for "substantial cause" since serious prejudice would be caused to the appellants if the additional evidence was not permitted to be adduced. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Lala Pancham and others : AIR 1965 SC 1008 wherein this Court held that though the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision did not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in the case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for purposes of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way. This provision did not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in the case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for purposes of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way. The High Court referred to the earlier proceedings before various authorities and came to the conclusion that though the appellants had sufficient opportunity to bring the evidence on record,, for reasons best known to it, the State did not produce the entire evidence before the trial court and it was only 8 years after the dismissal of the suit that the applications were filed for adducing additional evidence in the appeal. The High Court, therefore, dismissed the applications for adducing additional evidence. 11. We find no error in the approach of the High Court. We have earlier noticed the long history of litigation which preceded the filing of the suit. The documents sought to be brought on record are not documents which were discovered later or came into existence after the filing of the suit. The documents are part of the Government records and they could have been produced in the suit. 12. Mr. Sorabjee appearing on behalf of the respondents rightly submitted that Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked by a party to fill up the lacunae in his case. The State found itself in a dilemma when confronted with two sets of documents conflicting with each other. There was no plea that the documents sought to be produced by way of additional evidence could not be produced earlier despite efforts diligently made by the State or that such evidence was not within its knowledge. In fact no ground whatsoever was made out for adducing additional evidence, and the sole purpose for which the State insisted upon adducing additional evidence was to persuade the Court to accept the point of view urged on behalf of the State, since the evidence on record did not support the case of the appellants/State. Having considered all aspects of the matter we are satisfied that the High Court rightly rejected the applications filed by the State for adducing additional evidence at the stage of appeal which was intended only to fill up the lacunae in its case. 26. Having considered all aspects of the matter we are satisfied that the High Court rightly rejected the applications filed by the State for adducing additional evidence at the stage of appeal which was intended only to fill up the lacunae in its case. 26. Similarly, in Karnataka Board of Work Vs. Govt. of India 2004 (10) SCC 779 , their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that a party is not entitled to produce additional evidence unless it is shown that evidence could not be produced before the learned trial Court despite exercise of due diligence. Their Lordships have explained the scope of additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 as under: “6. In the circumstances, the learned counsel for the appellant, reiterated the claim made before the High Court that they should be permitted to adduce further evidence before the court to substantiate their claim but when the matters were pending before the Trial Court and the High Court they had ample opportunity to do so. If they had to produce appropriate documents, they could have done so and also it is not clear as to the nature of the documents which they seek to produce which will tilt the matter one way or the other. The scope of Order XLI, Rule 27, CPC is very clear to the effect that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, unless they have shown that in spite of due diligence, they could not produce such documents and such documents are required to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. In this view of the matter, we do not think there is any justification for us to interfere with the orders of the High Court. However, in view of the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant, we have also gone into various aspects of the matter and have given another look at the matter and our findings are that the view taken by the High Court is justified. However, one aspect needs to be noticed. The High Court need not have stated that the first respondent is entitled to the relief even on the basis of adverse possession. We propose to examine this aspect. 27. However, one aspect needs to be noticed. The High Court need not have stated that the first respondent is entitled to the relief even on the basis of adverse possession. We propose to examine this aspect. 27. It is settled law by now that party guilty of remissness in not producing evidence in trial court, cannot be allowed to produce it in appellate court. There must be satisfactory reasons for non-production of the evidence in trial court seeking production thereof in appellate court. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Union of India versus Ibrahim Uddin and another, (2012) 8 SCC 148 have held as under: “36. The general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram & Anr. v. Rameshwaralal & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 479 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 553 ). 37. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Co., AIR 1978 SC 798 ). 38. Under Order XLI , Rule 27 CPC, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. [Vide: Lala Pancham & Ors. (supra)]. 39. It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 ; and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors., AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 41. The words "for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires" in the beginning of sentence, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court requires additional evidence, that this rule will apply, e.g., when evidence has been taken by the lower Court so imperfectly that the Appellate Court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment. 42. Whenever the appellate Court admits additional evidence it should record its reasons for doing so. (Sub-rule 2). It is a salutary provision which operates as a check against a too easy reception of evidence at a late stage of litigation and the statement of reasons may inspire confidence and disarm objection. Another reason of this requirement is that, where a further appeal lies from the decision, the record of reasons will be useful and necessary for the Court of further appeal to see, if the discretion under this rule has been properly exercised by the Court below. The omission to record the reasons must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. But this provision is only directory and not mandatory, if the reception of such evidence can be justified under the rule. 43. The reasons need not be recorded in a separate order provided they are embodied in the judgment of the appellate Court. A mere reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case, or mere statement that the evidence is necessary to pronounce judgment, or that the additional evidence is required to be admitted in the interests of justice, or that there is no reason to reject the prayer for the admission of the additional evidence, is not enough comp1iance with the requirement as to recording of reasons. 44. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. 44. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative order, but also judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the Court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice – delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the Court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. Recording of reasons is principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, AIR 2004 SC 1794 ; State of Uttaranchal & Anr. v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, AIR 2008 SC 2026 ; The Secretary & Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 1285 ; and Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited & Ors., (2010) 13 SCC 336 ). 45. In The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore v. H. Narayanaiah etc. etc., AIR 976 SC 2403, while dealing with the issue, a three judge Bench of his Court held as under: “We are of the opinion that the High Court should have recorded its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its insistence by leading other evidence.” (Emphasis added). And if it found it necessary to admit it an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its insistence by leading other evidence.” (Emphasis added). A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Basayya I. Mathad v. Rudrayya S. Mathad and Ors., AIR 2008 SC 1108 . 46. A Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Venkataramiah (Supra), while dealing with the same issue held: “It is very much to be desired that the courts of appeal should not overlook the provisions of cl. (2) of the Rule and should record their reasons for admitting additional evidence The omission to record reason must, therefore, be treated as a serious defect. Even so, we are unable to persuade ourselves that this provision is mandatory.” (Emphasis added) In the said case, the court after examining the record of the case came to the conclusion that the appeal was heard for a long time and the application for taking additional evidence on record was filed during the final hearing of the appeal. In such a fact-situation, the order allowing such application did not vitiate for want of reasons. 47. Where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it may be allowed to be permitted on record such application may be allowed. 48. To sum up on the issue, it may be held that application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite condition incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. The discretion is to be exercised by the court judicially taking into consideration the relevance of the document in respect of the issues involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence could not be led in the court below and as to whether the applicant had prosecuted his case before the court below diligently and as to whether such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment by the appellate court. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage. Stage of Consideration : 38. An application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the Court. (Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 193 ; and Natha Singh & Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1053 ).” 28. Accordingly, both the applications are dismissed being devoid of merit. 29. Consequently, in view of the analysis and discussion made hereinabove, no question of law much less to say substantial of law is involved in the Regular Second Appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.