JUDGEMNT A.G.URAIZEE, J. The petitioner has filed this petition under Articles 14, 16, 226, 309 and 311 of the Constitution of India to claim the following reliefs:- “10. JUDGEMNT A.G.URAIZEE, J. The petitioner has filed this petition under Articles 14, 16, 226, 309 and 311 of the Constitution of India to claim the following reliefs:- “10. The petitioner respectfully prays that, on the basis of the facts and circumstances as mentioned hereinabove and which may be urged at the time of hearing, the Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent authorities and may be pleased to :- (A) quash and set aside the Final Decision of the Honourable High Court of Gujarat (on its administrative side) dated 12.12.2008, as culminated into office order dated 20.12.2008, Annexure-A to this petition, whereby the petitioner is dismissed from Judicial Service, and (B) quash and set aside the consequential order dated 13.1.2009, passed by the Government of Gujarat, Legal Department, Annexure-B to this petition, and (C) declare and hold that the finding recorded by Shri D.T. Soni, the Inquiry Officer, holding the petitioner guilty of the charges, is illegal, arbitrary and perverse, and consequently quash and set aside the same, and all subsequent proceedings, and (D) direct the respondent authorities to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits, and (E) further be pleased to hold that the action of the Honourable High Court of Gujarat, on its administrative side, as the Disciplinary Authority, of placing the petitioner under suspension on 25.10.2002, was illegal and arbitrary, and consequently quash and set aside the same, and further be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to treat the suspension period of the petitioner from 25.10.2002 till date of reinstatement, as duty period for all purposes, with all consequential reliefs, and (F) award the cost of this petition, and (G) pending admission and final disposal of this petition, the Honourable Court may be pleased to grant the mandatory injunction against the further implementation and operation of the Final Decision of the Honourable High Court of Gujarat (on its administrative side) dated 12.12.2008, as culminated into office order dated 20.12.2008, Annexure-A to this petition, and consequential order dated 13.1.2009, Annexure-B to this petition, and (H) pending admission and final disposal of this petition, the Honourable Court may be further pleased to direct the respondent authorities to reinstate the petitioner in service, and (I) grant any other relief or pass any other order, which the Honourable Court consider just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2 The background of the facts in which the above reliefs are prayed for can be summed as as under: 2.1 The petitioner came to be appointed as the Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate First Class on 18th June 1980. She earned promotions at regular intervals and came to be promoted as Civil Judge (Senior Division) in the year 1990 and as an Assistant Sessions Judge in May 1992. She came to be tansferred as Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad by way of Notification dated 29th April 2000. She was made Joint District Judge (Fast Track Court) in the year 2002. 2.2 The petitioner came to be placed under suspension vide order No.A 1234/02 dated 25th October 2002 passed by the High Court of Gujarat as the departmental proceedings were initiated against her on the charges of grave misconduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. A charge-sheet dated 3rd November 2003 was served on her for the misconduct committed by her while working as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ahmedabad for the period from 3rd August 2000 to 25th August 2002 on the following imputations: “Imputations:-I:-That Mrs.S.V. Shah was working as Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad from 30-8-2000 to 25-1-2002 and during this tenure as such, and discharge of her duties as such, it is found that:- Four Criminal Cases No.1089/99 to 1092/99 filed by the Assistant Registrar of Companies were pending and it was within her knowledge that her husband Shri Vijay Jayantilal Shah was Accused No.2 as Managing Director of the Company accused No.1 viz. Comfort Knit Wears Ltd., Surat and as an experienced Judicial Officers she ought to have transferred those cases from the file of her court, as it is mandatory and foremost duty of a Judicial Officer not to entertain cases by or against near and dear relatives but however, with malafide intention and oblique motive, not only she dealt with those four cases but they were brought on board dtd.8-8-2000 though they were listed on board on 24-8-2000 and called upon witness Mr.M.S. Hamik, for complainant and Registrar of Companies and directed him to join another Director one Mr.Niral V. Shah which he did by filing application with the address of said newly added accused No.3 Niral Shah, of Surat and she unauthentically gave his second address of Bombay from her personal knowledge, which Mr.Hakim wrote by hard writings in the said applications in all the four cases and though registered A.D. were brought on the files of all the cases showing summonses are issued to accused No.3, it is found that they bear no stamps or any marks of any post offices to presume the business of postings and service of such A.D. to accused No.3 Niral Shah and then the cases were disposed off lately by another Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 27-7-2001 convicting only accused No.1 company and accused No.3 Niral V. Shah. Her oblique motive and malafide intention are more clear from the fact that though these cases were listed on board dtd.24-7-2000, she brought them on board suo-moto without any such application either by complainant or any accused and directed the officer Mr.Hakim from the office of the complainant to join Niral V. Shah as additional accused No.3 and providing personally his address of Bombay and further on 8-8-2000 she obtained undated Vakil Patra of Himanshu Thakorbhai Patel signed by her husband Shri Vijay Shah Exh.3 and undated purshis Exh.4 pleading shortly, in all the four cases and though it was joint trial against 3 accused persons, she recorded these documents without putting date of recording the same. Then, again, those cased were brought on board suo-moto on 9-8-2000 and she passed orders in all these four cases holding the accused Managing Director and her husband V.J. Shah, being accused No.2 guilty of the alleged offences and imposed nominal fine of 50 paise for each day’s default without passing any orders against accused No.1 Company and without awaiting service of process on accused No.3 newly impleaded on her direction while illegally separating the trial against her husband accused No.2 illegally. Thus, she have acted in most illegal favourable and blatantly misusing her powers against the faith of Judicial institution with an oblique motive and malafide intention and for consideration otherwise than Judicial. II:-It is further found that during her tenure as the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate CBI/R.C.4(E)/2001 Crime was pending with her Court in which accused were alleged to have dishonestly misappropriated 800 crores of Rupees of the Madhavpura Mercantile Co-op. Bank and offences were U/s. 405, 406, 408, 409 and read with Sec.120(b) and Sec.35(A) of the Banking Regulation Act. In that case, as it was known to her, Special C.A. No.2617/2011 was filed by one Jayshree Marketing and others against Madhavpura Mercantile Co-op. Bank Ltd., and 8 other and opponent Nos.8 & 9 were Ramesh Parikh and Devendra Pandya and Hon’ble the High Court directed to keep under attachment all the movable properties of the opponent Bank as well as opponent Nos.8 & 9 Ramesh Parikh and Devendra Pandya, with properties of their sister concerns and their relatives. Said Ramesh Parekh with others were arrested on 2-5-2001 and Devendra Pandya on 26-4-2001 whereas one Ketan Parekh was arrested 11-8-2001 as they were found involved in Criminal breach of trust in respect to deposits worth Rs.800 Crores of the depositors of Madhavpura Mercantile Co-op. Said Ramesh Parekh with others were arrested on 2-5-2001 and Devendra Pandya on 26-4-2001 whereas one Ketan Parekh was arrested 11-8-2001 as they were found involved in Criminal breach of trust in respect to deposits worth Rs.800 Crores of the depositors of Madhavpura Mercantile Co-op. Bank Ltd. She, with ulterior motive and malafide intention and for consideration otherwise than judicial released accused Ramesh Nandlal Parikh and Devendra Bhagwanji Pandya on bail, illegally and against the mandatory settled principles of law for grant of the bail in default of filing the charge-sheet within 90 days u/s.167(2) Cr.P.C, while granting the applications filed on 6-8-2001 by Ramesh Parikh who was arrested on 9-5-2001 and application filed by Devandra Pandya on 26-7-2001 who was arrested on 8-5-2001 inspite it was within her knowledge that on the day of filing applications, 90 days were not over for filing the charge-sheet by the C.B.I investigating agency, and thus, she released both the above accused on bail U/s.167(2) Cr.P.C by passing orders illegally on prayers for which right to be on bail had not accrued to them and thereby she have intentionally acted against the settled principles of law with malafide and oblique motive and for the consideration otherwise than judicial. Further in the above crime of C.B.I one more accused Ketan Parekh was arrested on 11-8-2001 and he was remanded in police custody by her upto 24-8-2001 considering very much involvement of the said accused for the offence U/s.409 IPC granting while prayers by police for remand prima-facie considering the need of interrogation of that accused while in police custody, but his bail application U/s.437 was filed on 23-8-2001 and she granted the bail on 24-8-2001 without jurisdiction as the offence U/s.409 provided imprisonment for life or for ten years and fine, and in orders of bail the considered grounds otherwise than judicial, while accepting the undertaking in simple piece of paper to deposit Rs.16,41,69,000=00 and she illegally granted bail without authority keeping aside the provision made for the punishment for offence U/s.409 of IPC and the public interest involved, with malafide object and oblique motive, for the consideration otherwise than judicial. It is thus found that she dealt with and disposed off the above bail applications and such applications of other accused persons in the said crime without any jurisdiction and authority at law and also on extraneous grounds and for considerations otherwise than judicial. III:-That during the Month of June, July and August 2000, she worked as the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and it is found that following cases under the Companies Act, 1956 orders are passed against the statutory provisions U/s.23(2A) read with Sec.23 (2B) of the Companies Act (i) In Cri. Case No.168/96 Advocate filed purshis pleading guilty and she passed order imposing fine of Rs.2000=00 without passing any order of imposing any imprisonment against the accused. (ii) In Cri. Case No.327/97 plea of guilt filed by the Advocate is accepted by her and irrespective of default of the accused company for more than 6’ months, from th the expiry of day from the date on which the company had become liable to pay the money back to the investors, she imposed fine of Rs.1,000=00 without order of sentence to the Accused and the provisions of Sec.73 (2A) have been kept away by her whole passing the sentences with malafide intention and oblique motive for consideration otherwise than judicial. It is also found that during her tenures as above in following cases filed by the Registrar of Companies for offences U/s.113(1) read with Section 113(2) she imposed illegally lump-sum amount of fine keeping aside the provision of law which provided that company and every officer of the Company on default will be liable to the punished with fine which may extend to Rs.500/-for every day of default till the default is continued. (1) Cri. Case No.169/96 (2) Cri. Case No.175/96 (3) Cri. Case No.321/97 (4) Cri. Case No.326/97 (5) Cri. Case No.277/98 (6) Cri. Case No.554/99 (7) Cri. Case No.783/99 (8) Cri. Case No.938/99 She with malafide intention and for the consideration otherwise than judicial, imposed lump sum fines without making calculation of days of default as required by law in total violation of the provisions of Sec.113(2) of the Companies Act, and unminding the object of the provision in the interest of public at large to get money back. Case No.938/99 She with malafide intention and for the consideration otherwise than judicial, imposed lump sum fines without making calculation of days of default as required by law in total violation of the provisions of Sec.113(2) of the Companies Act, and unminding the object of the provision in the interest of public at large to get money back. She failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and entertained the matter in utter disregard to settled principles of law with an oblique motive and thereby, keeping aside all the ethical standards, and thereby; (a) Mrs.S.V.Shah is guilty of the aforesaid acts of grave misconduct; (b) Mrs.S.V.Shah is guilty of dereliction in her judicial functions. (c) Mrs.S.V.Shah acted in a manner unbecoming of a judicial officer.” 2.3 The petitioner denied the charges levelled against her vide her statement of defence dated 15th March 2004 on receipt whereof the Enquiry Officer was appointed and after conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 9th May 2007 and came to the final conclusion as under: “1. Imputation No.1 is fully established. 2. In Imputation No.2, there are two allegations one regarding default bail which is not proved and regarding jurisdiction u/s 409 of I.P.C., the delinquent has no jurisdiction in spite of this, she has decided the matter, therefore, this allegation is established. Hence, imputation No.2 is established to the extent stated in this report. 3. Imputation No.3 is not established.” 2.4 The enquiry report dated 9th May 2007 was given to the petitioner along with show-cause notice dated 17th September 2008 and tentative decision dated 30th August 2008 whereby the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why she should not be dismissed from the service. The petitioner submitted her reply to the said show-cause notice on 28th November 2008. The High Court, on its administrative side, took a final decision on 12th December 2008 and she came to be dismissed from service under Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) for the acts of gross misconduct of unbecoming of judicial officer . The Government of Gujarat, vide Notification dated 13.01.2009 dismissed the petitioner from service with immediate effect. The Government of Gujarat, vide Notification dated 13.01.2009 dismissed the petitioner from service with immediate effect. 3 The petitioner is aggrieved by her dismissal from service and therefore she has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge her dismissal from the service. 4 Learned counsel Mr Vyas for the petitioner has vehemently urged that the order releasing Mr Ketan Parekh on bail is confirmed by the High Court. It is his further contention that the Ministry has no jurisdcition to release an accused if the offence is punishable by death or life, but if the offence is punishable with life only, then, the Magistrate has got jurisdiction to release the accused on bail. In this premise, it is contention of the learned counsel Mr Vyas for the petitioner that the decision of initiating departmental enquiry on the basis of granting bail to Ketan Parekh, which is confirmed by the High Court was misconceived. It is his further contention that so far as handing criminal cases in which the petitioner’s husband was interested being accused No.2 could not have been made basis for initiating the departmental enquiry inasmuch as no favour is shown to the husband and heavy fine than the petitioner normally used to impose in any other case was imposed on her husband and therefore also the decision of initiating the departmental enquiry was not warranted. Mr Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended that major punishment of dismissal from service is too harsh looking to the nature of imputations against the petitioner and therefore he has urged that the petition may be allowed and petitioner may be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. 4.1 In support of his various contentions, Mr Vyas has relied upon the following decisions: (1) Ramesh Chander Singh vs. High Court of Allahabad & Anr., JT 2007 (4) SC 135 (2) Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr.LJ 515 (3) State of Punjab vs. V.K. Khanna, Air 2001 SC 343 . (4) P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P., 2001 (3) GLR 2642 (SC) Union of India and others vs. J. Ahmed 5 Per contra, Mr Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Hemang Shah has supported the impugned decision of the High Court dismissing the petitioner from the service. (4) P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P., 2001 (3) GLR 2642 (SC) Union of India and others vs. J. Ahmed 5 Per contra, Mr Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Hemang Shah has supported the impugned decision of the High Court dismissing the petitioner from the service. He has submitted that the petitioner could not have tried criminal cases in which her husband was an accused. It is his further contention that releasing Ketan Parekh on bail by the petitioner was highly improper when the accused was involved in a huge financial scam. It is his further contention that non interference of the High Court in the bail order is of no consequence as the consideration for granting bail and cancelling the bail are different. He has further contended that the petitioner has not denied that she did not try the criminal case in which her husband was one of the accused persons. That by itself is sufficient to visit the petitioner with a major penalty of dismissal. 5.1 His further contention is that looking to the gravity of misconduct by the petitioner, her dismissal from service is not disproportionate or too harsh and hence he has urged that the petition may be dismissed. Mr Shalin Mehta has relied upon the following decisions: (1) A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat, AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 257; (2) State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak, AIR 1998 SC 2050 (3) J Mohapatra and Co., v. State of Orissa, AIR 1984 SC 1572 (4) Rajesh Kumar v. DCIT, AIR 2007 SC 181 (5) Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417 (6) Amar Nath Chowdhary v. Braithwaile & Co. Ltd. AIR 2002 SC 678 (7) Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, AIR 2003 SC 2041 6 The contention of the learned counsel, Mr Vyas for the petitioner that the petitioner has not committed any irregularity or impropriety in releasing Ketan Parekh on bail cannot be accepted. It was a matter of public knowledge that Ketan Parekh was involved in a large scale financial scam as a result of which a cooperative soicety had gone bus. If the High Court has not interfered in the order granting bail by the petitioner cannot be a ground to contend that the bail order of the petitioner was in conformity with the settled law. If the High Court has not interfered in the order granting bail by the petitioner cannot be a ground to contend that the bail order of the petitioner was in conformity with the settled law. It is trite to state that the factors for bail and factors for cancelling bail are very different and therefore the order of the High Court refusing interference in grant of bail in favour of Ketan Parekh by the petitioner in itself would not strengthen the case of the petitioner that she did not commit any impropriety or irregularity. The contention of the learned counsel, Mr Vyas for the petitioner that the Magistrate has jurisdiction to release an accused person on bail if the offence is punishable with life only is devoid of any substance. Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with power of Magistrate to grant bail, which reads as under: "437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence.-(1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer-in-charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be re leased on bail, but- (i) such person shall not be so released if, there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; (ii) such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death,imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence: Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in Cl. (i) or Cl. (i) or Cl. (ii) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm: Provided further that the Court may also direct that a person referred to in C (ii) be released on bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to do for any other special reason: Provided also that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an undertaking that he shall comply with such directions as may be given by the Court. (2) If it appears to such officer or Court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be, that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall, subject to the provisions of Section 446-A and pending such inquiry be released on bail or, at the discretion of such officer of Court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided. (3) When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit any such offence is released on bail under sub-section (1) the Court may impose any condition which the Court considers necessary (a) in order to ensure that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter;or (b) in order to ensure that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or (c) otherwise in the interests of justice. (4) An officer or a Court releasing any person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), shall record in writing his or its reasons or special reasons for so doing. (4) An officer or a Court releasing any person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), shall record in writing his or its reasons or special reasons for so doing. (5) Any Court which has released a person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2),may if it considers it necessary so to do direct that such person be arrested and commit him to custody. (6) If in any case triable by Magistrate the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs. (7) If, at any time after the conclusion of the trial of a person accused of a non-bailable offence and before judgment is delivered, the Court is of opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of any such offence, it shall release the accused, if he is in custody, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance to hear judgment delivered." It is abundantly clear from the above provision of the Code that a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to release an accused person on bail if the offence is punishable with death or life imprisonment. The Magistrate assumes jurisdiction to release an accused person on bail only if the offence punishable with life or any other lesser punishment. Therefore, mere fact that the bail order granted by the petitioner was not interfered by the High Court would not help the case of the petitioner because, she has failed to exercise circumspection and restraint, which was expected of a Judicial Officer while dealing with a bail application involving serious implications on the financial health of a bank. As noted in the foregoing, Ketan Parekh was involved in a multicrore financial scam. As noted in the foregoing, Ketan Parekh was involved in a multicrore financial scam. The CBI had moved the High Cour for cancellation of his bail, but the bail was not cancelled as Mr Ketan Parekh gave an undertaking to deposit the amount of defalcation in the court which, ultimately, he did and therefore when the interests of the affected persons was secured, the bail order was not interfered with by the High Court. The judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr.LJ 515 relied upon by learned counsel, Mr Vyas for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of the case. On the contrary, the ratio enunciated in this judgment was against the petitioner inasmuch as great haste was shown by the petitioner in dealing with the bail application of Mr Ketan Parekh as was done by the learned Magistrate in the case before the Bombay High Court, which was considered to be an act amounted to impropriety. Reliance by the learned counsel, Mr Vyas for the petitioner on the case of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad & Anr., JT 2007 (4) SC 135 (supra) is misplaced. It appears that in the case before the Supreme Court the Magistrate had granted the bail to an accused person who was a student on the ground that his father was seriously ill by accepte illegal gratification, but in the departmental enquiry there was no charge that the Magistrate had granted bail after accepting illegal gratification. Here, in the present case, the charge against the appellant is not that she released Mr Ketan Parekh on bail after accepting illegal gratification, but the charge is that she granted the bail though she lacked the jurisdiction to grant bail. Hence, the judgment of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the present case on facts. Here, in the present case, the charge against the appellant is not that she released Mr Ketan Parekh on bail after accepting illegal gratification, but the charge is that she granted the bail though she lacked the jurisdiction to grant bail. Hence, the judgment of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the present case on facts. 9 The next judgment relied upon by Mr Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner is of the Supreme Court in the case of P.C. Joshi v. State of UP (supra) would not help the petitioner inasmuch the ratio of this judgment is that a departmental enquiry in respect of bail application should be initiated if there was no mala fide or extraneous consideration on the part of Judicial Officer otherwise the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken while in the present case as noted hereinabove the charge against the petitioner was that she lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the bail application. 10 The next judgment relied upon by Mr Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner is of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. J. Ahmed (supra) to contend that mere act of ignorance does not fall within the sweep of misconduct and therefore even if the grant of bail by the petitioner to Mr Ketan Parekh is considered to be an act of negligence, then also, the disciplinary proceedings could not have been initiated. There is no substance in this submission, There is difference between negligence and impropriety. The petitioner was experienced Judicial Officer who had put in substantial years of judicial service. It was expected of her to be aware of her jurisdiction and limitations of exercise of jurisdiction, which was vested in her. In utter disregard of a judicial discipline and propriety, she cannot take any shelter behind the plea that her act granting bail to Mr Ketan Parekh lacked mala fide on her part and if such an act is considered to be negligence would not constitute misconduct. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that at the most her act of granting bail to Mr Ketan Parekh was negligence on her part, is a worst negligence on the part of a Judicial Officer who has put in substantial judicial service. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that at the most her act of granting bail to Mr Ketan Parekh was negligence on her part, is a worst negligence on the part of a Judicial Officer who has put in substantial judicial service. Such negligence cannot be condoned on the ground that it does not tantamount to misconduct more particularly when the case she was handling had far reaching ramifications on the financial health of bank. 11 The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has shown no favour to her husband when she tried two criminal cases in which her husband was one of the accused persons and therefore this could not have been made basis for dismissing the petitioner from service is also de hors the merits. The petitioner could not deny the fact that she did try the criminal cases in which her husband was an accused person. The defence that she imposed higher penalty than what she used to impose on other accused persons of similar criminal cases is of no consequence. The act of conducting the cases in which her husband was an accused person in itself a mischief on the part of the petitioner. Such an act, on the part of the petitioner, cannot be said to be a negligent act, but it is an outright misconduct on the part of the petitioner. She cannot take an umbrage to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Kashinath Rai (supra) or State of Punjab v. VK Khanna (Supra). It is a well settled proposition of law that a person cannot be a Judge in his own cause. 12 Mr Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat (supra), State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak (supra) in support of his contention. 13 The ratio and principle expounded by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat (supra), Rajesh Kumar v. DCIT (supra), State of West Bengal v. Shvananda Pathak (supra), J Mohapatra and Co., v. State of Orissa (supra) relied upon by learned counsel Mr Mehta for respondent No.2 – High Court are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 14 The High Court on judicial side does not sit in appeal over the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is well settled by a catena of judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court that it is not within the competence of the High Court to substitute or interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority merely on the ground that the High Court feels that it is on higher side. The scope of judicial review in matters involving challenge to the disciplinary action taken by the employer is very limited. The Courts are primarily concerned with the question whether the enquiry has been held by the competent authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure and whether the rules of natural justice have been followed. The Court can also consider whether there was some tangible evidence for proving the charge against the delinquent and such evidence reasonably supports the conclusions recorded by the competent authority. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was held in consonance with the prescribed procedure and the rules of natural justice and the conclusion recorded by the disciplinary authority is supported by some tangible evidence, then there is no scope for interference with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority to impose the particular punishment except when the same is found to be wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found proved or shocks the conscience of the Court. The present case is not the one where it can be said that the punishment inflicted on the petitioner is too harsh or it shocks the conscience of the Court. Therefore, in our opinion, there is no justifiable or germane reason to interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority removing the petitioner from the service. 15 For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the petition and hence the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs.