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2014 DIGILAW 8 (AP)

Anjana Taggarse Motupalli v. Sreenivas Motupalli

2014-01-02

L.NARASIMHA REDDY, M.S.K.JAISWAL

body2014
JUDGMENT L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J - This application is filed with a prayer to review the order, dated 29.3.2012, passed by a Division Bench of this Court in FCA No.80 of 2011. 2. The brief facts, that gave rise to the filing of the application, are as under: The marriage between the 1st petitioner and the 1st respondent took place on 1.1.2000, and the petitioners 2 and 3 were born out of their wedlock. The respondents 2 and 3 are the parents of the 1st respondent. The petitioners filed OP No.1551 of 2010 in the Family Court, Hyderabad, under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act (for short 'the Act') read with Section 26 of CPC, against the respondents, with a prayer to declare the documents in relation to two items of property, namely, a house in Road No.10, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad, constructed in 680 square yards, and Acs.5.00 of land in Survey Nos.253 and 255 of Shadnagar Village, as sham and inoperative in law and to cancel them. Relief of injunction to restrain the respondents 1 to 3 from executing any documents, that would have the effect of conferring title on others in respect of the suit schedule properties was claimed. Direction was also sought against the 1st respondent requiring him to provide adequate security for the petitioners 2 and 3 to meet the anticipated reasonable expenditure. 3. The manner in which the 1st petitioner and the 1st respondent got acquainted with each other and the developments that have taken place thereafter are narrated in detail in the O.P. It was pleaded that the 1st respondent, who was the absolute owner of the property, has executed the documents in question. The various incidents that have taken place between the parties are also narrated. In the O.P., the petitioners filed IA No.993 of 2010, under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC, with a prayer to restrain the respondents from transacting, alienating or encumbering the suit schedule properties. The petitioners also filed IA No.994 of 2010, under the same provision, with a prayer to restrain the respondents from inducting third parties into the possession of the properties. The trial Court passed orders of status quo on 24.11.2010. 4. After receiving notices in the I.As. The petitioners also filed IA No.994 of 2010, under the same provision, with a prayer to restrain the respondents from inducting third parties into the possession of the properties. The trial Court passed orders of status quo on 24.11.2010. 4. After receiving notices in the I.As. and summons in the suit, the respondents 2 and 3 filed IA No.1068 of 2010, under Order VII Rule 10 of CPC, with a prayer to return the petition. The reason pleaded by them was that Section 7 of the Act can be invoked by a spouse only in respect of the properties held by either of the spouses, and since none of the suit schedule properties were owned by the 1st respondent, as on the date of filing of the O.P., it is not maintainable. 5. The petitioners opposed the I.A., by filing a counter. According to them, the properties were held by the 1st respondent, as on the date of his marriage with the 1st petitioner, and the very grievance in the suit is about the transactions that have taken place thereafter. The petitioners further pleaded that at one stage, they intended to file a suit and the concerned Court rejected the plaint, by observing that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts stands taken away, once the matter is governed by the provisions of the Act. 6. Through its order, dated 28.3.2011, the trial Court allowed the I.A. and returned the O.P., for presentation before the proper Court. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioners filed FCA No.80 of 2011 before this Court. A Division Bench of this Court dismissed the FCA through order, dated 29.3.2012, and upheld the order passed by the trial Court. This application is filed with a prayer to review the order passed by the Division Bench. 7. The petitioners contend that the view taken by the Division Bench regarding the purport of Section 7(1) of the Act does not accord with the spirit of the provision and the interpretation placed upon it, by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. This application is filed with a prayer to review the order passed by the Division Bench. 7. The petitioners contend that the view taken by the Division Bench regarding the purport of Section 7(1) of the Act does not accord with the spirit of the provision and the interpretation placed upon it, by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. According to them, it would be sufficient, if an item of property was held by any of the spouses at the time of their marriage and for raising a dispute in relation thereto before a Family Court, it is not necessary that the property must be held by any of them, on the date of filing of the O.P. The petitioners further plead that if the property is required to be held by the spouse as a condition precedent for filing of the O.P., it would render the provision nugatory and substantial part of genuine disputes would stand excluded from the purview of the Act. They contend that the order passed by this Court on 29.3.2012 runs contrary to the very objective, underlying the relevant provisions and the judgment of the Supreme Court. 8. A detailed counter-affidavit is filed opposing the review petition. It is pleaded that the review petition is not maintainable, since the Act, under which the O.P. as well as the F.C.A. were filed, does not confer any power of review upon this Court. It is stated that when the matter is governed by a special enactment, a Court, dealing with such matter, cannot be said to be having any inherent power. Their another contention is that the right of review is a substantive one, and unless it is conferred by any specific provision of law, it cannot be inferred. On merits also, the respondents contend that even if it is possible that there exists a different view on a particular aspect, it would not constitute a basis for review. 9. Sri L. Ravichander, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submits that the review petition is very much maintainable, under Section 114 read with Order XLVII CPC. On merits also, the respondents contend that even if it is possible that there exists a different view on a particular aspect, it would not constitute a basis for review. 9. Sri L. Ravichander, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submits that the review petition is very much maintainable, under Section 114 read with Order XLVII CPC. He submits that the principle that the power of review cannot be exercised, unless it is conferred by relevant provision of law, is mostly in relation to administrative and quasi-judicial authorities, and that the CPC, which governs the proceedings before the civil Courts and the appellate Courts, specifically confers such powers through the provisions referred to above. He contends that even Section 10 of the Act makes it amply clear that the procedure, in relation to the proceedings initiated under the Act, would be governed by the provisions of the CPC to the extent that it is not provided for differently, by the Act, or the Rules made thereunder. 10. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the Division Bench of this Court, which passed the order on 29.3.2012, proceeded on the assumption that an item of property must be held by a spouse as on the date of filing of the O.P., and the same runs contrary to not only the specific language employed in Section 7(1)(c), but also the interpretation placed upon it, by the Supreme Court. He submits that the very purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the Family Court, in relation to the property disputes between the spouses, is defeated, as a result of the hyper-technical view, taken by the Division Bench. 11. Sri K. Ramakrishna Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3, on the other hand, submits that the O.P. was filed with an objective of defeating the rights of the respondents in the concerned properties. He submits that the review itself is not maintainable, since the special enactment, under which the proceedings are instituted, does not contain any provision conferring the power of review. He submits that on merits also, the basic requirement to be stated in a O.P. filed under Section 7(1)(c) of the Act is that the property was held by the concerned spouses, as on the date of filing of the proceedings. He submits that on merits also, the basic requirement to be stated in a O.P. filed under Section 7(1)(c) of the Act is that the property was held by the concerned spouses, as on the date of filing of the proceedings. He further submits that if the petitioners are of the view that the order passed by the Division Bench on 29.3.2012 is not correct, they have to avail the remedy of appeal, and that the review petition is not maintainable. 12. Sri J. Prabhakar, learned Counsel for the 1st respondent, has addressed, almost the same arguments. 13. The learned Counsel appearing on both sides have relied upon several precedents, in support of their respective contentions. 14. Before the matter is discussed on merits, the objection raised, as to the maintainability of the review petition, needs to be considered. The petitioners filed the O.P. before the Family Court, by invoking Section 7(1)(c) of the Act, with the prayers, the gist of which has already been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The respondents 2 and 3 filed IA No.1068 of 2010, under Order VII Rule 10 of CPC, with a prayer to return the O.P. for being presented in a proper forum, obviously a civil Court. The trial Court allowed the I.A. and the appeal filed against the same was rejected. The review petition is filed, by invoking Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC. The objection of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that Order XLVII, or for that matter, Section 114 of CPC does not apply to the proceedings instituted under the special enactment. 15. It is no doubt true that the Act was brought into existence, by the Parliament with an objective of streamlining the procedure for resolution of matrimonial disputes between the parties who reside in urban areas and to reduce the rigor and stringency of certain procedural aspects. At the same time, the Parliament never intended to put a complete and comprehensive code for resolution of such disputes in the place of the existing one. Section 7 of the Act is devoted to delineate the jurisdiction of the Family Courts. The procedural aspects are dealt with under a separate chapter. At the same time, the Parliament never intended to put a complete and comprehensive code for resolution of such disputes in the place of the existing one. Section 7 of the Act is devoted to delineate the jurisdiction of the Family Courts. The procedural aspects are dealt with under a separate chapter. Section 10 thereof reads: "Procedure generally.-(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and of any other law for the time being in force shall apply to the suits and proceedings (other than the proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), before a Family Court and for the purposes of the said provisions of the Code, Family Court shall be deemed to be a civil Court and shall have the powers of such Court. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or the rules made thereunder, shall apply to the proceedings under Chapter IX of that Code before a Family Court. (3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or subsection (2) shall prevent a Family Court from laying down its own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or proceedings or at the truth of the facts alleged by the one Party and denied by the other." From this, it becomes clear that unless any specific aspect is governed by the Act itself, the provisions of CPC would apply in relation thereto. Unlike certain enactments, which restrict the application of CPC for limited purposes, such as, summoning of witnesses and receiving of documents, the application of CPC for the proceedings under the Act is not limited. In fact, it covers the entire residuary field, after excluding the one that is covered by the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. 16. As a matter of fact, it is the respondents, who are clear and conscious about this legal position. Knowing fully well that the Act and the Rules made thereunder do not provide for return of the O.P., they invoked Order VII Rule 10 of CPC and filed IA No.1068 of 2012. 16. As a matter of fact, it is the respondents, who are clear and conscious about this legal position. Knowing fully well that the Act and the Rules made thereunder do not provide for return of the O.P., they invoked Order VII Rule 10 of CPC and filed IA No.1068 of 2012. No provision of the Act or the rules made thereunder was mentioned, at least, as a supplementary one. The I.A. filed by them was an application filed under CPC, pure and simple, may be in a O.P. filed under the Act. The order that emanated from the trial Court in IA No.1068 of 2010 in OP No.1551 of 2010 cannot be governed by any other provision of law, except the relevant one in CPC. Invariably, it is Order XLVII read with Section 114 of CPC, in the context of review. 17. It is true that in number of judgments, the Supreme Court, or for that matter, various High Courts held that the power of review unless conferred, cannot be exercised, or assumed through implication. Those, however, are cases that are in the realm of administrative law. One hardly comes across such a ruling, in relation to the proceedings that are pending before, or dealt with by a civil Court. That the Family Court partakes all the characters of a civil Court, is kept beyond any pale of doubt, by Section 10 of the Act itself. The differentiating factor between a civil Court and a Family Court, if at all, is that in addition to holding the powers of a civil Court, the Family Court possess the powers of criminal Courts also in certain matters. The principle that governs the administrative and quasi-judicial matters cannot be applied to pure and simple civil matters. 18. Another way of looking at the issue is that irrespective of the provision that is involved for filing a suit or a petition in a civil Court, once it is instituted, it is bound to be regulated by the provisions of CPC. In case the special enactment, by invoking which, suits or petitions are filed, makes any deviation from the general procedure prescribed in CPC, only to that extent, the difference would be visible. While some statutes may be purely substantive in nature conferring rights upon the persons, others may deal exclusively with procedure to be followed for enforcing the rights. In case the special enactment, by invoking which, suits or petitions are filed, makes any deviation from the general procedure prescribed in CPC, only to that extent, the difference would be visible. While some statutes may be purely substantive in nature conferring rights upon the persons, others may deal exclusively with procedure to be followed for enforcing the rights. Third category is the one that deals with substantive as well as procedural aspects. For instance, the Specific Relief Act, under which the relief of specific performance can be claimed or the Transfer of Property Act, that inter alia, provides for different kinds of transfer of immovable properties are substantive in nature without any traces of procedural gamut. The second category comprises of statutes like CPC and Cr.PC. Even these enactments contain certain provisions, which are partly substantive. The enactments, such as, Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Succession Act, Indian Divorce Act and Indian Succession Act fall into the 3rd category. Though they contain several substantive provisions, dealing with the rights of the parties, they also prescribe some special procedures in adjudication thereof. For example, an O.P. under the Hindu Marriage Act can be filed before a Court not less than that of a Subordinate Judge and an O.P. under the Indian Divorce Act can be filed only in a Court of District Judge. The divorce granted under the Indian Divorce Act is required to be affirmed by a Division Bench. To this extent, there is deviation from CPC. However, rest of the procedure is governed by CPC. 19. Viewed in this context, the Family Courts Act can be said to be a further improvement or reproduction of the existing enactments dealing with the family matters, but not a complete substitution for the substantive and procedural laws that were holding the field earlier to its enactment. Irrespective of the provision, under which a proceeding is instituted before a civil Court and landing in that forum, it continues to be governed by the provisions of the CPC. 20. An appeal against an order passed by a family Court is filed not under Section 104 read with Order XLVII of CPC, but under Section 19 of the Act, because the Act contained a special provision for appeal. 20. An appeal against an order passed by a family Court is filed not under Section 104 read with Order XLVII of CPC, but under Section 19 of the Act, because the Act contained a special provision for appeal. By the same reasoning, had there existed a separate provision for filing of review in the Act, Order XLVIII of CPC could certainly have been treated as excluded vis-a-vis such matters. Just as the petitioners have invoked Order VII Rule 10 of CPC for filing the petitions, obviously because there is no corresponding provision in the Act, the petitioners invoked Order XLVIII of CPC for filing the review. 21. More than all, the contentions, advanced by the respondents would apply to a review petition, if filed before a Family Court. The present review is before this Court. By no stretch of imagination or logic, the Act and the rules made thereunder would regulate the proceedings before this Court. Section 117 of CPC makes it clear that CPC applies to the proceedings before High Courts. Irrespective of the provision under which an appeal or review is filed before a High Court, procedure in relation to the appeal or review is regulated by CPC. This includes the one of seeking review. Therefore, the objection cannot be sustained. 22. Coming to merits; we are conscious of the fact that the mere existence of a possibility for taking a different view on an already decided matter; is not a ground for review. It is only on limited grounds, such as, where a patent error of fact or law has crept into the proceedings, or where the view taken by the Court in the order under review runs contrary to a manifest provision of law or the judgment of a superior Court, that the feasibility of entertaining the review can be considered. Otherwise, it should be left open to the party to avail the remedy of appeal. It is not necessary to refer to the catena of decisions on this aspect. Therefore, it needs to be seen as to whether the view taken by this Court comes within the parameters referred to above. 23. The trial Court was mostly guided by the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. G. Pentamma and others v. G. Anjali and another, 2010 (5) ALD 332 = AIR 2010 AP 224 . 23. The trial Court was mostly guided by the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. G. Pentamma and others v. G. Anjali and another, 2010 (5) ALD 332 = AIR 2010 AP 224 . In that case, an O.P. was filed by a female spouse, for declaration that the petition schedule property therein is jointly owned by her and her husband, and for a consequential relief of declaration to the effect that the sale deed, dated 15.5.1998, executed by her husband, is not binding upon her. The respondents in that O.P. filed an application, under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, with a prayer to reject the plaint, on the ground that the O.P. does not fall within the purview of Section 7(1) Explanation (c) of the Act, and thereby, the Family Court does not have jurisdiction. The trial Court rejected the O.P. Thereupon, a revision was filed. 24. The learned Judge took note of the observation of the Kerala High Court in Shyni v. George, AIR 1997 Ker. 231 , but distinguished the same. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Ganu @ Ganu v. Jalabai, ILR 2009 Karn. 612. The Karnataka High Court expressed the view that clause (c) of explanation to Section 7(1) can be invoked, when (1) the dispute is between the parties to the marriage, and (2) the dispute is in respect of the property of the parties or either of them. With great respect to the learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court, who delivered the said judgment, it was too narrow an interpretation placed upon the provision and it would amount to reading something into a special enactment. 25. Paragraph 8 of the judgment in Pentamma's case (supra), impressed the trial Court and it is reproduced in its entirety: "Therefore, the answer as to whether the present suit falls within the ambit of Section 7(1) Explanation (c) would have to be culled out from the express language of the provision itself and no tortuous hermeneutic exercise is called for. A bare perusal of Explanation (c) indicates that a suit or proceeding between the husband and wife with respect to their property or the property of either of them is covered thereunder. A bare perusal of Explanation (c) indicates that a suit or proceeding between the husband and wife with respect to their property or the property of either of them is covered thereunder. In the present case, the property, being the petition schedule house, stood in the name of the husband though the wife claims that she contributed a half share towards its construction. This house was sold in the year 1998 by the husband to his sisters, the petitioners herein. It is manifest from the record that the husband sought a divorce only in the year 2002, i.e., long after the execution of the sale deed. Thus, by the time the wife instituted the subject suit the petition schedule property had long ceased to be the property of the husband. The question is whether property of the spouses or either of them as mentioned in Explanation (c) can be held to include property which had belonged to them earlier and which ceased to be theirs by the time the suit was instituted. The answer, in my considered view, must be in the negative. The clear language of the provision lends itself to only one interpretation that the property should belong to the spouses or either of them as on the date of institution of the suit. It is not for this Court to legislate and add something extra to the provision thereby bringing within its ambit not only the property possessed as on the date of the suit but also the properties owned by the spouses or either of them in the past and alienated/disposed of prior to the institution of the suit." This, in a way would amount to adding something to clause (c) of Section 7(1) of the Act. The relevant clause of the Explanation reads as under: "Sec. 7 - Jurisdiction.-(1) subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall- (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a District Court or, as the case may be, such Subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation - The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely- (a) ...... (b) ...... (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them." With the interpretation placed on the provision therein, the phrase "property of the parties" occurring in the clause (c) of Explanation has to be read as "property belonging to the spouses or either of them as on the date of institution of the suit". 26. When the trial Court did not indicate such restrictions, be it as to the nature of rights or the point of time, it is not for this Court to burden the provision with such restrictions. 27. The learned lodges of this Court, who heard the FCA, which arose against it, took the same view. After extracting the provision, their Lordships observed in Para 11 as under: "The language used in Explanation (c) to Section 7(1) of the Act, 1984 limits the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court to suits pertaining to the properties of the spouses or either of them as on the date of the institution of the suit and the same cannot be enlarged to include properties which had been held by the spouses or either of them prior to the institution of the suit." The underlined portion was supplemented the provision, that too, for the purpose of ousting the jurisdiction of the Court. Here itself, it is relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida, 2003 (3) ALD 114 (SC) = AIR 2003 SC 2525 , wherein it is held as under: 'The wordings 'disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith' in the view of this Court must be given a broad construction. The Statement of Objects and Reasons, as referred to hereinbefore, would clearly go to show that the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends, inter alia, in relation to properties of spouses or of either of them which would clearly mean that the properties claimed by the parties thereto as a spouse of other, irrespective of the claim whether property is claimed during the subsistence of a marriage or otherwise. The submission of the learned Counsel to the effect that this Court should read the words "a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage as parties to a subsisting marriage, in our considered view would lead to miscarriage of justice. The Family Court was set up for settlement of family disputes. The reason for enactment of the said Act was to set up a Court which would deal with disputes concerning the family by adopting an approach radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings. The said Act was enacted despite the fact that Order 32A of the Code of Civil Procedure was inserted by reason of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 which could not bring about any desired result. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a Court created specially for resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be construed liberally. The restricted meaning if ascribed to Explanation (c) appended to Section 7 of the Act, in our opinion, would frustrate the object wherefor the Family Courts were set up." Two propositions emerge from this. The first is that for filing of O.P., it is not necessary that a party to the marriage must hold rights vis-a-vis property as on the date of institution of the proceedings. The second is that the provisions of the Act must be construed liberally and the effort must be to sustain the jurisdiction of the Family Court than to oust the jurisdiction. We are confident that had the judgment of the Supreme Court been brought to the Lordships, who decided the Pentamma's case (supra), or who passed the order in the F.C.A., a total different view would have emerged. It is fairly settled proposition of law that if an order passed by a Court is contrary to an express provision of law or a binding precedent, it would certainly constitute a ground for review. 28. If a statute has conferred jurisdiction upon a Court or Forum in relation to a particular category of matters, the Forum or Court, as the case may be, must be loath to forego its jurisdiction, even if a second view on that aspect is possible. It is a different matter that if a particular matter brought before a Court or Forum is totally outside its jurisdiction, it must refuse to entertain the same. It is a different matter that if a particular matter brought before a Court or Forum is totally outside its jurisdiction, it must refuse to entertain the same. However, where a doubt arises as to whether adjudication of a particular matter is within its jurisdiction, the Court or Forum must show inclination in favour of retaining the jurisdiction than to abdicate the same, on the basis of a doubt or suspicion. Questions of this nature generally arise in relation to the conferment of jurisdiction on special Courts or Tribunals, by denuding the regular civil Courts, of such jurisdiction. Even in such cases, emphasis is to assert jurisdiction by the concerned Forum. 29. There is also a line of thought, which suggests that the provisions excluding the jurisdiction of a civil Court and conferring the same on authorities and Tribunals other than civil Courts must be construed strictly. Reference in this context may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhavani, AIR 1966 SC 1718 . In the context of the present case, such a dichotomy does not exist. This is not a case where jurisdiction of an ordinary civil Court is sought to be conferred upon a specialized Tribunal which does not partake any characteristics of civil Court. Family Courts are constituted under the Act, almost as a matter of convenience, that too, for the benefit of the people, who reside in urban areas. The same provisions of law are enforced by the civil Court as well as the Family Courts. Any doubt that exists in the minds of the people as to the nature of the family Court is taken away by Section 10 which makes it clear that the Family Court is also a civil Court. The judgment of the Supreme Court in S.D. Joshi and others v. High Court of Judicature of Bombay and others, 2011 (3) ALD 1 (SC) = AIR 2011 SC 848 , relied upon by the respondents is in a totally different context. In the State of Maharashtra, the Family Judges are appointed through a procedure which is different from the one, for appointment of District Judges. The question before the Supreme Court was as to whether the family Judges can be treated on par with District Judges, in the context of appointment as Judges of High Court. In the State of Maharashtra, the Family Judges are appointed through a procedure which is different from the one, for appointment of District Judges. The question before the Supreme Court was as to whether the family Judges can be treated on par with District Judges, in the context of appointment as Judges of High Court. It was not at all about the purport of Section 7 of the Act. 30. In the instant case, the trial Court as well as this Court sought to restrict the scope of Section 7(1)(c). The view taken by the trial Court and this Court would have been possible, if only the expression "in their possession as on the date of filing of the petition" were to have been, added to Section 7(1)(c). 31. Reliance is placed upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in World Tanker Carrier Corporation v. SNP Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd., (1998) 5 SCC 310 and Tamilnadu Mercantile Bank Share Holders Welfare Association v. S.C. Sekar and others, (2009) 2 SCC 784 , alleging that the filing of O.P. amounts to forum shopping. When the Act clearly confers jurisdiction on a Court, the question of forum shopping does not arise. 32. Though the learned Counsel for the parties cited some more precedents, we are not referring to them, since they may not be of immediate relevance to the facts of this case. 33. Whether or not the petitioners are able to prove their case before the Family Court is a different aspect altogether. While examining the application filed under either under Rule 10 or Rule 11 of Order VII of CPC, the Court has to take the averments in the plaint or the O.P., as the case may be, on their face value, and it cannot express any view on the merits at the stage, and then decide whether or not to return or reject the plaint. 34. We, therefore, allow the review petition and recall the order under review. In view of the reasons mentioned above, we allow the FCA No.80 of 2011 and set aside the order, dated 28.3.2011, passed by the trial Court in IA No.1068 of 2010 in OP No.1551 of 2010. As a result, the IA No.1068 of 2010 shall stand dismissed. The trial Court shall proceed with the O.P., on merits. There shall be no order as to costs. 35. As a result, the IA No.1068 of 2010 shall stand dismissed. The trial Court shall proceed with the O.P., on merits. There shall be no order as to costs. 35. The miscellaneous petitions filed in the review petition shall stand disposed of.