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Gauhati High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 8 (GAU)

Silchar Municipal Board v. State of Assam

2014-01-03

TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI

body2014
JUDGMENT Tinlianthang Vaiphei, J. 1. The first writ petition directed against the refusal of the respondent authorities to release the current and past salaries of the petitioner was disposed of by this Court on 20.1.2004 with the following directions: .......This petition is disposed of with the direction to the Commissioner, Urban Development Department i.e. respondent No. 2 to look into the matter and issue appropriate direction to the concerned authority i.e. Silchar Municipal Board for payment of the arrear as well as current salaries in accordance with the appellate order dated 15th November, 2003. The Executive Officer, Silchar Municipal Board is also directed to implement the order of the appellate authority within a period of six months from the day when a copy of this order is furnished. Interestingly, notwithstanding the disposal of the writ petition, the case came to be listed out of nowhere on 29.1.2013 when this Court passed the following order: 28.01.2013 Though the records of WP(C) No. 2239/2004 is with the records of this case, names of the counsel appearing for the writ petitioner in WP(C) No. 2239/2004 are not reflected. Name of the counsel appearing for the respondent is also not shown in the cause list in respect of W.P.(C) No. 433/2004. Registry will list this case also reflecting in the cause list in WP(C) No. 2239/2004 along with the names of appearing counsel. List on 01.02.2013. JUDGE Thus, in view of the above order dated 20.1.2004, the writ petition i.e. WP(C) No. 433 of 2004 no longer survives for consideration. 2. In WP(C) No. 2239 of 2004, the Silchar Municipal Board ("the Board" for short) is the petitioner and is challenging the legality of the order dated 15.11.2003 passed by the appellate authority i.e. Commissioner/Secretary, Urban Development Department, Government of Assam setting aside the order dated 12.3.2001 dismissing the delinquent/respondent No. 2 from service. According to the Board, there is a standing order issued by the Executive Officer of the Board dated 11.12.96 which requires each of the collecting staff receiving donations for the Chairman's/Executive Officer's Relief Fund to maintain a Register to record the date and reference of the deposits etc., and produce the Register before the Executive Officer through the Head Assistant once in a week. The Standing Order also requires the Head Assistant to report the total fund position to the Executive Officer from time to time and no donation should be received without issue of money receipt to the donor. The collecting staff is also required to preserve payment vouchers properly for internal audit to be conducted every year and should not involve themselves in the payment of bills and proposals. 3. According to the Board, from para 5 of the audit report submitted by the Auditor on 16.3.2000, for the period commencing from 29.10.1998 to 29.2.2000, it was stated therein that the practice adopted so far for receiving donation is that the donation to the Chairman's Relief Fund is accepted in the branches, namely, Tax Branch, License Branch, Water Supply Branch and Market Branch whereafter the dealing assistant over handed the daily amount so collected under proper receipt to the Tax Daroga who receives the amount handed over to him by putting his signature in the Collection Register of the Branch against such receipt. The Tax Daroga thereafter records these receipts in the Interim Register called Daily Collection Register and the total collection of the day is remitted to the Bank the next day. However, the Auditor during the audit observed deviations and a net amount of Rs. 2,23,324.20p had not been taken into account from the daily Collection register of the branches to the Daily Collection Register of Tax Daroga or remitted to the Bank, but the same was retained by the delinquent. This prompted the Board to place the delinquent under suspension with effect from 22.3.2000. This was followed by a departmental enquiry against the delinquent, who was ultimately charge-sheeted on 10.7.2000 by the Chairman of the Board, who had acted as both the Enquiry Officer as well as the disciplinary authority. 4. The case of the petitioner-Board is that the delinquent was charged with (i) not maintaining the relevant records of Accounts like Collection Register, Cash Book, etc. for the period from 29.4.1998 to 29.2.2000 thereby intentionally violating all office procedures/orders and Municipal Accounts Rules, which he had admitted in his note dated 18.2.2000, (ii) of not maintaining Stock register of Receipt Books of Chairman's Relief Fund of Silchar Municipal Board, etc., (iii) of not remitting to Bank Account a sum of Rs. for the period from 29.4.1998 to 29.2.2000 thereby intentionally violating all office procedures/orders and Municipal Accounts Rules, which he had admitted in his note dated 18.2.2000, (ii) of not maintaining Stock register of Receipt Books of Chairman's Relief Fund of Silchar Municipal Board, etc., (iii) of not remitting to Bank Account a sum of Rs. 2,27,446.20p being a part of the Municipal revenue received and collected during the period from 29.4.1998 to 29.2.2000 against the Chairman's Relief Fund of Silchar Municipal Board, which he had admitted in his notes dated 18.2.2000 and dated 21.2.2000 by depositing an amount of Rs. 1,02,000/- on instalment out of the total amount of Rs. 2,27,446.20 after detection, thereby misappropriating public money and (iv) of not handing over to his successor the inner-foils of the receipts bearing No. 4901-5000 from Book No. 50(Old Stock) during he period from 29.4.1998 to 29.2.2000. As noted earlier, the Enquiry Officer, who also acted as the disciplinary officer, found the delinquent guilty of all the charges levelled against him. The enquiry report was submitted by him on 7.3.2001, and was communicated to the delinquent. The enquiry officer found the delinquent guilty of all the charge levelled against him. The disciplinary authority, however, gave an opportunity to the delinquent to submit his explanation as to why punishment of dismissal should not be inflicted upon him within three days of the receipt of the enquiry report. According to the Board, the delinquent in his show cause complained many irregularities in the disciplinary proceedings. However, dissatisfied with the explanation, the disciplinary authority issued the order dated 12.3.2001 imposing a penalty of dismissal from service and for recovery of the dues of the Board from him. On appeal by the delinquent, the appellate authority by the impugned order quashed the departmental proceedings and directed the reinstatement of the delinquent/-respondent 2 to service with immediate effect by treating the period of his suspension as on duty. Aggrieved by this, the Board is filing this second writ petition through its Chairman. 5. The respondent 2/delinquent official contested the writ petition and filed his op-position-in-opposition. Aggrieved by this, the Board is filing this second writ petition through its Chairman. 5. The respondent 2/delinquent official contested the writ petition and filed his op-position-in-opposition. The case of the delinquent is that the writ petition filed by the Board is not maintainable as the Chairman is not authorized by the Board to file the writ petition on behalf of the Board and that the Board is not an aggrieved person to challenge the order passed by the appellate authority. On merit, it is contended by the answering delinquent that the so-called Chairman's Relief Fund was opened by the then Chairman without approval of the State Government nor is the fund covered by any rule issued by the Urban Development (Erstwhile Municipal Administration Department). The order dated 11.12.96 was subsequently modified by the Chairman so that the funds could be misused. The amounts collected were neither incorporated in the budget estimate nor were any entries being made in the principal cash book as per the existing rule. According to the delinquent, on 10.6.99, he had put up a note before the Chairman of the Board intimating him that there were times when the amounts collected under the Chairman Relief Fund were paid directly out of the amounts as per the instruction of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, and these payments were made directly for emergency work with the approval of the Chairman on that very day, a fact conveniently suppressed by the Board to harass him and to save the skin of certain vested interest including the then Chairman. 6. It is asserted by the delinquent that there was no bank account in the name of the 'Chairman's Relief Fund from 29.4.98 to 28.10.98, and the account was opened only on 11.11.1998, and, as such, the question of depositing the same in the Bank did not arise. The delinquent had kept and preserved all the vouchers i.e. the Katcha receipts/slips, etc. against the pay order of the Executive Officer/Chairman in the Relief Fund file, and the same were, however, taken away by the Chairman. The delinquent had kept and preserved all the vouchers i.e. the Katcha receipts/slips, etc. against the pay order of the Executive Officer/Chairman in the Relief Fund file, and the same were, however, taken away by the Chairman. It is the case of the delinquent that under Section 94 of the Rules on Municipal Accounts and Budget Estimates, it is clearly provided that any internal audit has to be done by the Government Agency, and the audit relied upon by the Board having been done by private person of the choice of the Chairman in contravention of statutory provision cannot be acted upon. Moreover, the auditor who conducted the audit was only shown those records as per the convenience of the Chairman and without the vital documents. It is pointed out by the delinquent that the Chairman, in the proceedings of the meeting of the Board held on 22.3.2000, had stated in his reply that there was no account in the Bank in the name of the Chairman's Relief Fund. 7. In so far as the deposit of Rs. 2,23,324.20 is concerned, proper facts were not placed before the auditor and, as such, the audit report did not reflect the true and correct picture. The delinquent flatly denies that he ever retained the said amount and asserts that it was the Chairman who had taken away certain amounts against his slips and katcha vouchers, etc. which disabled him from depositing the amount. As directed by the Chairman in his order dated 18.2.2000, he had handed over all relevant records including 31 counterfoils of receipt books to the Chairman, and the same were duly received by the Office of the Chairman. The request made by the delinquent by his communication dated 21.10.2000 for inspection of certain documents for the purpose of preparation of his written statement were rejected on the pretext that these documents were irrelevant: the enquiry conducted under that circumstances was, therefore, a sham, biased and was initiated to protect certain vested interest, for which he is being made the scapegoat to protect certain vested interest. According to the respondent 2, it was after a local daily "Dainik Sonar Cachar" published several news items concerning the Chairman's Relief Fund that he was immediately placed under suspension in order to divert the attention of all concerned from the issues and to victimize him. According to the respondent 2, it was after a local daily "Dainik Sonar Cachar" published several news items concerning the Chairman's Relief Fund that he was immediately placed under suspension in order to divert the attention of all concerned from the issues and to victimize him. As for the so-called admission letter dated 21.2.2000 of the respondent 2, it is his case that he was forced to sign the same as evident from the fact that the same was typed in the Office of the Chairman and from the name of the typist which appeared below the letter. The respondent 2 contends that the enquiry was a sham, and is vitiated by bias inasmuch as the then Chairman who had committed all the irregularities without the approval of the Board appointed himself as the enquiry officer, which was objected by him in his letter dated 19.2.2001 with a request that some other officer be appointed as the enquiry officer, but the same was rejected. Finally, he contends that no reasonable opportunity was given to the delinquent for all these acts of commission or omission by the Board. These are the sum and substance of the contentions of the respondent 2 while countering the writ petition. 8. After hearing Mr. M.K. Choudhury, the learned senior counsel for the delinquent officer/respondent 2, and Mr. S. Dutta, the learned counsel for the Board, it becomes apparent that the sole question which falls for consideration in both the writ petitions is, whether the appellate authority is correct in interfering with the order of dismissal of the delinquent passed by the Board. If the appellate order is upheld, the reliefs claimed by the delinquent in the first writ petition can be granted by this Court and if the impugned appellate order is quashed, the first writ petition has no legs to stand on and will, therefore, liable to be dismissed. At the commencement of the hearing, Mr. MK Choudhury, the learned senior counsel, has raised preliminary objection against the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the Chairman has no authority to file the writ petition, and it is only the Board which can file the writ petition: the writ petition having not been filed by an authorized person is, therefore, liable to be dismissed at the very threshold. Assuming but not admitting that the Chairman has the competence to file the second writ petition, argues the learned senior counsel, the Municipal Board which is functioning under the State cannot challenge the action of the State Government. In my opinion both the contentions, though attractive at the first blush, do not stand closer scrutiny. In first place, the writ petition is filed by the Municipal Board and is merely represented by its Chairman. Moreover, Section 37 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 ("the Act" for short) empowers the Chairman to exercise all the powers vested by the Act in the Board for transaction of connected with the Act. All that he is required to do is not to exercise any power which shall be exercised under the rules by the Executive Officer where such officer is appointed under Section 53 of the Act and not to act in opposition to or in contravention of any order of the Board at a meeting or exercise any power which is directed to be exercised by the Board at a meeting. No rule is pointed out by the learned senior counsel to debar the Chairman from representing the Board for prosecuting or defending a case. 9. The second contention of the learned senior counsel has also no force. After all, if the Municipal Board cannot assail in Court the legality of the decision of the State Government quashing its decision, who will do so? It cannot be overlooked that the Municipal Board is an autonomous body constituted under Section 10 of the Act and can sue and be sued in its name. Both the preliminary objections, therefore, fail. The decision cited by him, namely, Director of Enforcement, Madras v. Rama Arangannal, AIR 1981 Mad 80 , I am afraid, cannot come to his rescue. In that case, the order of adjudication passed by the Director of Enforcement was set aside by the Appellate Board. When the Director of Enforcement took the matter to appeal before the High Court, the appeal was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that he is not an aggrieved person. In that case, the order of adjudication passed by the Director of Enforcement was set aside by the Appellate Board. When the Director of Enforcement took the matter to appeal before the High Court, the appeal was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that he is not an aggrieved person. This is what the High Court said: On the question on the maintainability of the appeal, it is seen that the Explanation to Section 54 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 treats only the Central Government as an aggrieved party for the purpose of filing an appeal to the High Court in respect of orders passed by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board under that section. Therefore, only the Central Government can file and prosecute an appeal against the order of the Appellate Board, and not any other authority. In this case, the appeal has been filed by the Director of Enforcement, who is the initial authority who passed he adjudication order against the respondents and whose order has been set aside by the Appellate Board on appeal filed by them. Therefore, the Director of Enforcement cannot be said to be aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Board merely because its order of adjudication has been set aside by the Appellate Board. If that were to be possible, every subordinate Tribunal can file an appeal against the order of the Appellate Tribunal reversing its decision, o a further appellate forum. The Director of Enforcement cannot be treated as an aggrieved party, for while passing the order of adjudication, he has acted only as a quasi-judicial Tribunal, and such a quasi Tribunal cannot have a grievance when its order is set aside by a higher appellate forum. If he entertains a grievance when the appellate forum sets aside its order, then he should be taken to have had a bias in the dispute which had been adjudicated by him. Therefore, it will be against the principles of natural justice if we assume that the Director of Enforcement who is a quasi judicial tribunal adjudicating the matter between the Government and the person sought to be proceeded against for violation of the provisions of the Act, had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the matter which was the subject of the dispute which he adjudicated. It would have been a different matter if the statute authorised the Director of Enforcement to file an appeal. But, admittedly, in this case, the Director of Enforcement has not been statutorily authorised to file an appeal against the order of the appellate Board at the instance of the Government of India or otherwise. If the quasi judicial Tribunal is expected to question the orders of the appellate bodies, a specific power has to be given to the initial tribunal tinder the relevant statute. 10. In the paragraph extracted above, the initial order was undoubtedly passed by the Director of Enforcement, and when his order was set aside by the Appellate Tribunal, he proceeded to file the appeal without authorization by the Central Government, which is the competent authority to file the appeal. He is merely one of the subordinate officials of the Central Government under the disciplinary control of the Central Government. Unlike Board, the Director of Enforcement is not a juristic person which can sue and be issued in its name: he is the official of the Central Government, and is not given a statutory power to file an appeal or, for that matter, the authority to sue for and on behalf of the Central Government. On the other hand, the Board is a juristic person and can sue and be issued in its name, which is being done here. That makes all the difference. 11. Before coming to the merit of the case, one crucial issue, which is likely to strike at the root of matter, is confronting this Court, namely, the legality of the Chairman of the Silchar Municipal Board to conduct the enquiry and impose the impugned penalty by himself The appellate authority has given his findings on this aspect of the matter in the following manner: It also appears from the copy of the Minutes of the Board meeting held on 22.3.2000 the Chairman himself conducted the enquiry as an enquiry officer and dismissed Shri Biswash by himself being the prosecutor and Judge by himself. This is a major violation of rules and procedures laid down under Assam Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1964. It appears from the record available that the Chairman of the Board never appointed any Sr. impartial officials or any other Member of the Board as enquiry officer. This is a major violation of rules and procedures laid down under Assam Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1964. It appears from the record available that the Chairman of the Board never appointed any Sr. impartial officials or any other Member of the Board as enquiry officer. The Board should have appointed either one member or a two Member Committee or an official under the control of the DC as the Enquiry Officer so that a fair enquiry is conducted impartially giving due opportunity to the delinquent official for inspection of the official documents and to defend himself during the pendency of the enquiry. Denial of this opportunity is a gross irregularity and violation of the rules laid down in such case and violation of natural justice. 12. On perusal of the charges levelled against the respondent 2, which are at Annexure-5 to the writ petition, it is obvious that all the four charges are concerned with misappropriation/defalcation by respondent 2 with respect to the money collected by him for and on behalf of the Chairman's Relief Fund. The stance taken by the respondent 2 in his written statement (Annexure-N to the affidavit-in-opposition) is that there is no provision under the Assam Municipal Rules or Municipal Accounts Rules authorising the creation of the Chairman's Relief Fund and that the Chairman's Relief Fund is an extra fund, that is to say, a private fund not concerned with the provisions of law. According to the respondent 2, there were times when the amounts collected under this Fund were paid directly out of the accounts as per the instructions of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. These payments were made directly for some emergency work and as such the approvals of the Chairman were sought for and were obtained on the next day vide the office notes dated 10.6.1999. Some of his replies to charge No. 3 (at internal page 20 of the written statement) are enlightening, which read thus: .....:... Therefore no question can arise regarding deposit of Chairman Relief Fund money into any Bank account at the earliest before 11.11.98 - the date of opening of Bank amount as stated by your goodself before the Board meeting. Before that all payments were made on cash under Chairman's written or verbal order according to the urgency of the situation. Therefore no question can arise regarding deposit of Chairman Relief Fund money into any Bank account at the earliest before 11.11.98 - the date of opening of Bank amount as stated by your goodself before the Board meeting. Before that all payments were made on cash under Chairman's written or verbal order according to the urgency of the situation. The file concerning Chairman Relief Fund containing all correspondences including Chairman's pay order, slips, notes and vouchers of payment made out of the Chairman Relief Fund up to the period until 1 handed over the file to your goodself, when you personally asked me some time in February, 2000 to show you the payment vouchers your slips for payment ARPS, etc. in respect of C.R.F. and then 1 produced a file containing the vouchers, slips, etc. in respect of verbal orders of payment on seeing the pages vouchers, notes, pay orders and your slips contained in the file. Your goodself retained the file with you and told me that the file would be returned after a few days and in fact the file was not returned to me at all when I have mentioned in my note dated 18.2.2000. After going through the file of voucher slips etc. your goodself asked me whether there was any more proof of direct payments made by me on your order from the fund, I honestly with all sincerity replied that all the slips and orders are in the file. And then you received the file......... 13. True, the above version of the respondent 2 about the charges levelled against him cannot be a gospel truth as they are yet to be proved like any other allegations in a depart mental enquiry. Nevertheless, the Chairman conducting the enquiry was himself a potential witness, if not a witness. The question to be determined then is whether Chairman of the Silchar Municipal Board, who had initiated the departmental enquiry, framed the charges under his own signature, conducted the enquiry by himself and imposed the impugned penalty could be said to be free from bias? The legal maxim nemo debet case judex in propria cause (no man shall be a judge in his own cause) is required to be observed even in administrative proceedings as non-observance thereof is treated a violation of the principles of natural justice. The legal maxim nemo debet case judex in propria cause (no man shall be a judge in his own cause) is required to be observed even in administrative proceedings as non-observance thereof is treated a violation of the principles of natural justice. No person should adjudicate a dispute which he or she has dealt with in any capacity. The failure to observe this principle creates an apprehension of bias on the part of the said person. Therefore, law requires that a person should not decide a case wherein he is interested. The existence of an element of bias renders the entire disciplinary proceedings void. - See Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of UP, (2010) 10 SCC 539 . 14. In my opinion, the legal position on bias is succinctly explained by the Apex Court in Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School, (1993) 4 SCC 10 . This is what it said: .....One of the cardinal principles of natural justice is nemo debet case judex in propria cause (no man shall be a judge in his cause). The deciding authority must be impartial and without bias. It has been held by this Court in Secretary to the Government, Transport Department v. Munuswamy Mudalia: 1988 Supp SCC 651 that a predisposition to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. Personal bias is one of the three limbs of bias, pecuniary bias, personal bias and official bias. A classic case of personal bias was revealed in the decision of this Court in State of UP v. Mohd. Nooh 1958 SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC 86 . In the said case, a departmental inquiry was held against an employee. One of the witnesses against the employee turned hostile. The officer holding the inquiry then left the inquiry, gave evidence against the employee and thereafter resumed to complete the inquiry and passed the order of dismissal. This Court quashed the order of dismissal by holding inter alia that the rules of natural justice were grievously violated. 15. One of the witnesses against the employee turned hostile. The officer holding the inquiry then left the inquiry, gave evidence against the employee and thereafter resumed to complete the inquiry and passed the order of dismissal. This Court quashed the order of dismissal by holding inter alia that the rules of natural justice were grievously violated. 15. As already noticed elsewhere, the Chairman of Silchar Municipal Board had a dispute with the respondent No. 2 over the very lawful existence of the fund under the name and style of Chairman Relief Fund, over the utilization of those funds and over the issuing of instructions by him verbal or otherwise for payment and over a host of other issues. In other words, it is as much about the respondent 2 as about the Chairman of the Silchar Municipal. By initiating, conducting and concluding the inquiry by the Chairman, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, it can be safely concluded that he had the predisposition to decide against the respondent 2 without proper regard to the true merit of the dispute. In my judgment, there is undoubtedly an element of bias in this case. The Chairman has acted both as the prosecutor and the judge. He wittingly or unwittingly became a judge in a dispute in which he himself is involved. By choosing to conduct the departmental inquiry by him, a real apprehension was thus created in the mind of the respondent 2 that he would not get fair justice from the Chairman. 16. This case reminds me of the decision of the Apex Court in Cantonment Executive Officer & Anr. v. Vijay D. Want & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 230 . In that case, the members of the Committee who conducted a disciplinary inquiry were also members of the Cantonment Board where the report was to be considered, decided and whether to accept or not to accept the report finding the respondent guilty. It was held that participation of these three members in the Committee had given rise to real apprehension in the mind of the respondent that he would not get a fair justice in the matter because the three members who had submitted the report would be interested to see that their report should be accepted. It was held that participation of these three members in the Committee had given rise to real apprehension in the mind of the respondent that he would not get a fair justice in the matter because the three members who had submitted the report would be interested to see that their report should be accepted. The bias in this case cannot be said to be unreal: it is very much real and substantial and the respondent was not likely to get a fair deal by such disciplinary committee. The Apex Court, after reviewing its earlier decisions and some English decisions, concluded as follows: 13. Therefore, the ratio of all these cases is that a person cannot be a Judge in his own cause. Once the disciplinary committee finds the incumbent guilty, they cannot sit in the judgment to punish the man on the basis of the opinion formed by them. Objectivity is the hallmark of a judicial system in our country. The very fact that the disciplinary committee which found the respondent (herein) guilty participated in decision-making process for finding the respondent (herein) guilty and to dismiss him from service is bias which is apparent and real. Consequently, the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be faulted. 17. In that case, the direction of the High Court barring fresh inquiry was upheld as more than 16 years had passed in the meantime. Furthermore, as the departmental inquiry was found to be vitiated, the respondent therein was directed to be reinstated with 50% back wages. Incidentally, even if no plea of bias was raised before the tribunal, the Apex Court in Rattan Lal Sharma (supra), held that such plea could be raised for the first time in a writ proceeding as such plea was going to the root of the matter. After careful consideration of the controversy in this writ petition, I am also of the opinion that the impugned order of dismissal and the connected departmental inquiry stand vitiated by bias. As the appellate authority has rightly quashed the impugned order and the connected departmental inquiry on the ground of bias, I do not think it necessary to deal with the other contentions of the parties on the principle that Courts do not decide more than what is necessary. 18. As the appellate authority has rightly quashed the impugned order and the connected departmental inquiry on the ground of bias, I do not think it necessary to deal with the other contentions of the parties on the principle that Courts do not decide more than what is necessary. 18. For what has been stated in the foregoing, this writ petition [WP(C) No. 2239 of 2004] stands dismissed. As more than 13 years have passed from the date of dismissal of the respondent No. 2, the petitioner-Board is hereby restrained from holding fresh or further departmental inquiry against the respondent No. 2 (the delinquent). No costs. Before parting, I am constrained to make the following observations. Section 53 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 provides for appointment of Executive Officer to be appointed by the Municipal Board with the approval of the State Government. The second limb of Section 53 mandates the State Government to make rules regarding the appointment, salaries, conditions of service, powers, duties and functions of the Executive Officers and other relevant matters connected therewith and also providing that disciplinary action shall be taken against the Executive Officer, except with the approval of the State Government. I am surprised to know from Mr. D. Saikia, the learned Additional Advocate General of Assam, dealing with Municipal matters that the State Government has not framed such rules till now. Many Executive Officers in the Municipalities of Assam must have been appointed and retired from service by now. How, in the absence of such crucial rules, the business of the various Municipalities in Assam could have been properly transacted by them heretofore, is absolutely incomprehensible to me. I only hope that this judgment will act as an eye-opener for the State Government and frame the rules without further delay. A copy of this judgment will be delivered to Mr. D. Saikia, the learned Additional Advocate General for Assam for communication to the concerned Head of the Department for information and necessary action.