Judgment K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.9042/2002 dated 18.07.2012, the appellant herein, original petitioner, has preferred the present appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner-company had to issue suspension orders to two workmen for their misconduct, which suspension order was sought to be served on those workmen on 23.11.1992 and, therefore, those workmen were summoned in the office of the Office Manager who was desirous of serving those suspension orders. The workmen were accompanied with one Shri Vana Patil, Union Leader, and they did not accept the suspension orders on the ground that their suspension orders were illegal and on their support the fellow workmen who had gathered outside the Cabin of said Manager also started protesting, which was viewed to be unruly behaviour and act of indiscipline. Hence, the said Manager informed the Managing Director and reduced the entire thing into writing vide letter dated 23.11.1992 to the Commissioner of Labour. The workmen, thereafter, left the office and on company premises shouted slogan when the demand of dropping the suspension of two workmen was not acceded to. Thereafter, workmen have never turned up to perform their duties in the company premises. The workmen contended that the lock out was illegal. The said dispute which was referred to competent Court where under it is numbered as Reference (I.T.) No.9/95 for deciding as to whether the lock out of 25.11.1992 was illegal and workmen were required to be paid their wages for the entire period. 2.1 The reference order was dated 07.03.1995. It is pertinent to note at this stage that after 25.11.1992, that is the date on which the workmen and company have exchanged allegations of illegal lock out and illegal strike, the company did not permit workmen from working, as per the say of the company and did not turn up for doing work. 2.2 The statement of claim filed by the workmen contend that the company is in existence since years. The company had imposed illegal lock out on 25.11.1992 and the same shall be declared illegal and the workmen be paid their wages for the entire period. 2.2 The statement of claim filed by the workmen contend that the company is in existence since years. The company had imposed illegal lock out on 25.11.1992 and the same shall be declared illegal and the workmen be paid their wages for the entire period. The company did not have any valid reason in law to prevent the workmen from working and hence it was prayed that the lock out be declared illegal and workmen be paid and workmen be permitted to discharge their duties. The petitioner-employer company filed reply, exhibit-17, however, on account of default on the part of the company, the Industrial Tribunal was constrained to pass an order dated 08.08.1998 for deciding the reference ex-parte. Only after the said order was passed, the petitioner company filed its written statement controverting the statement of claim. The Tribunal after taking into consideration that reply as well as the evidence led on behalf of the workmen came to the conclusion that the lock out was illegal and the workmen be permitted to discharge their duties and be paid their wages for the entire period. This award was passed on 31.12.1998. The petitioner company, as per the say of the company, received the same in the month of June, 1999 and, therefore, filed Miscellaneous Application (I.T. 1/99) in Reference (I.T.) No.9/95, inter alia praying that the award in question be suspended and applicant be granted an opportunity to lead evidence in the interest of justice, as for the reasons stated in the application, the default occurred on the part of the company, though, there is no specific prayer to quash and set aside the ex-parte award. The tenor of the application indicate that it was essentially an application for setting aside the ex parte award and availing an opportunity of leading evidence to establish its stand before the Court. This application came to be filed on 22.06.1999. The said application was heard and ultimately, the Court recorded its finding that the applicant could not prove that he was restrained from appearing or leading his evidence before the Court from any valid or sufficient reason and rejected the said application vide order dated 29.09.2000. 2.3 Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant-company preferred S.C.A. No.9042/2002 before this Court on 28.08.2002, which came to be rejected by way of the impugned judgment and order. Hence, this appeal. 3. Ms. 2.3 Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant-company preferred S.C.A. No.9042/2002 before this Court on 28.08.2002, which came to be rejected by way of the impugned judgment and order. Hence, this appeal. 3. Ms. Japee learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was sufficient cause that prevented the appellant from appearing before the Tribunal and leading evidence. She submitted that the company was confronted with numerous litigations on different fronts and that its very survival was at stake. Since 1992 the company was closed on account of illegal strike resorted to by the workmen. She, therefore, submitted that proper opportunity was not given to the appellant to present its case and ex-parte award came to be passed. 3.1 Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant-company had submitted an application within the prescribed time-limit for setting aside the ex-parte award. However, the Tribunal restrained to exercise powers though the appellant had shown sufficient cause for non-appearance in the reference proceedings. Therefore, the matter deserves reconsideration by the Tribunal. She submitted that the learned Single Judge did not appreciate the above aspects and dismissed the petition. 4. We have heard learned counsel for both sides and have perused the records of the case. While rejecting the captioned petition, the learned Single Judge made the following observations in Paras – 21 & 22 of the judgment; “21. Learned advocate for the petitioner company could not indicate as to how the matter could have been maintained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when there was no ground made out for seeking exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction on account of any illegality or breach of any right or performance of any duty on the part of the respondents. In short, though the petitioner company has styled this petition to have been petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, essentially this is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as there is no prayer which would justify it to be a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, nor was there any submission which would justify maintaining of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, now this lead the Court to consider the petition, as if, it is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, bearing those jurisdictional aspects available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, now Court is examining the challenge to the two orders impugned in this petition. 22. The order dated 29.09.2000 and the ex parte award dated 31.12.1998, in my view cannot be said to be resulted into any miscarriage of justice or illegal in any manner for the following reasons namely; (i) The petitioner company admittedly has not even admitted to pay any retrenchment compensation or have the unit legally closed as per the provision of Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, on account of non availability of these grounds, the counsel for the petitioner company was not justified in submitting that the petitioner company is closed so as to avoid saddling company with the liability. The petitioner company has not even indicated anywhere as to what was its stand before the conciliation authority and as stated herein above there was no notice or warning to the workmen that they are on strike and company has not lock out them out and they will have to suffer the consequences of their so called illegal strike. The non functioning of the company after 25.11.1992 and the testimony of the witnesses go to show that the company's stand has rightly not been accepted by the Industrial Tribunal. (ii) The award which is passed ex parte cannot be said to be passed without application of mind. On the contrary, the detailed discussion with regard to the company's lack of interest in the litigation and company's apathy to the existing litigation where the workmen involved was noted expressly by the Industrial Tribunal. In that view of the matter, the Court was left with no choice, but to proceed ex parte which it did ex parte, as it cannot keep it waiting for the company to appear and define itself. (iii) While proceeding ex parte, the written statement filed by the company after the order of 08.08.1998, is also taken into consideration, but that written statement did not contain any material which would out weigh the evidence in the form of testimony of Government Labour Officer and representation of the workmen who were examined before the Court. (iii) While proceeding ex parte, the written statement filed by the company after the order of 08.08.1998, is also taken into consideration, but that written statement did not contain any material which would out weigh the evidence in the form of testimony of Government Labour Officer and representation of the workmen who were examined before the Court. Therefore, in my view, the ex parte award which is based upon the testimony of the Government Labour Officer cannot be said to have resulted into miscarriage of justice in any manner. (iv) This brings the Court to consider the orders passed on 29.09.2000, rejecting the application seeking opportunity of leading evidence by setting aside the ex parte award. This application, as it is elaborately discussed herein above, also did not contain any details with regard to the genuine impediment in the way of the company in defining its case before the Court, which was ultimately concerned to pass ex parte award. (v) The entire application appears to have been filed in a general terms and those general terms and counsel's narration with regard to the financial crises, advocate's difficulty in appearing etc. without naming even the advocate or without adducing any evidence to substantiate the same have rightly not been considered worth accepting. Therefore, on this count also, the Court is of the considered view that order rejecting the application cannot be said to have been passed without proper consideration.” 5. Having gone through the impugned judgment, we find that the learned Single Judge has not only observed about the lack of interest displayed by appellant in the litigation before the Tribunal but also apathy towards the workmen. Even in the conciliation proceedings, the appellant-company had not clarified its stand. 6. It appears that no Notice or warning was issued to the workmen regarding the strike or that the company has not locked them out or that they will have to suffer the consequences of their so called illegal strike. The reference was filed in the year 1995 and the ex-parte award came to be passed on 31.12.1998. After rejection of the application for setting aside ex-parte award on 29.09.2000, the appellant filed the captioned petition after almost two years, i.e. on 28.08.2002, without providing any satisfactory explanation for the said delay, which has been elaborately discussed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. 7. After rejection of the application for setting aside ex-parte award on 29.09.2000, the appellant filed the captioned petition after almost two years, i.e. on 28.08.2002, without providing any satisfactory explanation for the said delay, which has been elaborately discussed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. 7. The entire sequel of events display the intention of the appellant-company to avoid liability in the nature of legitimate dues of the workmen. Though sufficient opportunity was not afforded to the appellant, the same was not availed. The manner in which the entire proceedings were handled by the appellant shows that it has made every attempt to shirk away its responsibility and liability. 8. In view of the above reasons, we find no reasons to entertain this appeal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.