JUDGMENT : ” This second appeal by plaintiff is directed against the concurrent findings of two courts below. Present appellant as plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 99/2002 in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 3, Kamrup at Guwahati praying for a decree declaring her right, title and interest over suit land measuring 15 lechas and also for permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their employees etc. from dispossessing her from suit land described in Schedule-B to the plaint. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that she being the second wife of Late Radhanath Borah started living in the suit premises along with her husband while defendant No. 1 the daughter of her husband from the First wife was reared up in the house of the brother of her husband and then given in marriage to one Krishna Das Ojha. She and her husband got possession of the suit premises from one Mallika who was the tenant under the original owners, Satyanath Borah and others. They subsequently started paying rent to the owner but Krishna Das Ojha obtained signature of Radhanath Borah on a piece of paper and converted the same into a Will to claim that Radhanath Borah had bequeathed the same to him. He also got the Will probated. Thereafter, Krishan Das Ojha sought to evict the plaintiff by force. However, the attempt was foiled by intervention of the neighbours. Under such circumstances plaintiff continued to pay rent to Rajib Borah, the Manager of Bipin Borah Estate and obtained receipt. The original owner and his wife wanted the plaintiff to purchase the suit land on payment of consideration but the plaintiff could not afford. Krishna Das Ojha took the opportunity and claimed to have purchased the title of the suit land at Rs. 4,000/- from the original owner. He, thereafter sought to evict the appellant-plaintiff. There was a proceeding before the Revenue Authority against mutation granted in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of possession with respect to 15 lechas of land described in the Schedule-B. Apprehending that the defendant may forcibly evict her from the land she instituted this suit for declaration of right, title and interest and injunction for restraining the defendants from evicting her from the suit land. 3. On being summoned, the defendants appeared and submitted their written statement denying the case of the plaintiff. 3. On being summoned, the defendants appeared and submitted their written statement denying the case of the plaintiff. The defendants pleaded that the suit land originally belonged to Satyanath Borah who gave 1 katha 10 lechas of land to one Satyanandra Chandra Dey by executing a lease deed for 10 years. Satyanandra Chandra Dey constructed six (6) thatched house over the suit land and thereafter sold the tenancy right of the land with 6 thatched houses to Radhanath Borah at a consideration of Rs. 350/- and a deed to that effect was executed in favour of Radhanath Bora on 19.04.1943. On 18-12-1966, Radhanath Bora executed a will in favour of Krishna Das Ojha which was probated in the Court of learned District Judge No. 2 at Guwahati vide order dated 16.09.1968 in Misc.(Probate) Case No. 92/1967. Thus having acquired the lease hold right of the suit land, Krishan Das Ojha also purchased the title of the land by registered sale deed dated 30.07.1975 and thereafter obtained mutation in his name vide mutation Case No. 189/77-78 vide order dated 27.01.1979. Defendants totally and specifically denied the claim of the plaintiff as to paying of rent to the original land owner. However, defendants claimed that there was no proposal to sell by Premalata to the plaintiff and rather Premalata proposed to sell the suit land to Krishna Das Ojha pursuant to which the sale did actually take place on receipt of valuable consideration. Application of force to oust the plaintiff from the suit land was denied by the defendants in the written statement. However the plea of the plaintiff that there is entry in the records of rights as to her right of occupation of the land has been challenged by the defendants saying that the same was collusively obtained. With all these pleadings on fact defendants contested the prayers made by the plaintiff. 4. On the basis of the rival contentions of the parties, the learned trial Court framed as many as six issues. Subsequently, an additional issue as to maintainability was also framed. All these 7 issues are quoted below: ' 1. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 2. Whether the suit is properly valued and proper court fee has been paid thereon? 3. Whether the plaintiff has acquired title over the suit land by right of adverse possession? 4. All these 7 issues are quoted below: ' 1. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 2. Whether the suit is properly valued and proper court fee has been paid thereon? 3. Whether the plaintiff has acquired title over the suit land by right of adverse possession? 4. Whether the husband of the defendant No. 1 purchased the suit property by registered sale deed? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any relief as prayed for? 6. What other relief / reliefs the parties are entitled to? Additional Issue: 1. Whether the suit is maintainable?' Œ 5. The plaintiff examined as many as 4 witnesses while defendants examined three witnesses. After perusal of the materials available on record the learned trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff has not acquired any right, title and interest over the suit land by right of adverse possession and that Krishna Das Ojha husband of the defendant No. 1 purchased the suit land by registered sale deed No. 8068/75. As against this judgment of the learned trial Court, appellant preferred Title Appeal No. 13/2003 in the Court of learned District Judge at Kamrup, Guwahati. Learned First Appellate Court having considered the materials on record and after hearing the parties did not find any error in the judgment of the High Court and accordingly dismissed the appeal by his judgment and decree dated 11.10.2004. 6. This judgment of the First Appellate Court is under challenge in this second appeal. This Court while admitting the second appeal on 02.02.2007 framed the following substantial question of law: ' Whether the learned Court of Appeal below is justified in holding that appellant cannot acquire right, title and interest of the suit land by prescriptive right?' Œ 7. I have heard Mr. S.P. Deka, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. P. Thakuria, learned counsel for respondents. 8. Mr. S.P. Deka, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant-plaintiff has been in possession of the land since 1943 and by such long possession she has acquired right under Section 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned counsel submits that finding of the learned courts below holding that plaintiff failed to establish the claim of adverse possession is not deducible under the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned counsel submits that finding of the learned courts below holding that plaintiff failed to establish the claim of adverse possession is not deducible under the facts and circumstances of the case. The basic thrust of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant entered into possession of the land in the year 1943 on being inducted as a lessee by one Satyanandra Chandra Dey. Since thereafter she has been in uninterrupted possession. Defendant No. 1 being her step-daughter was married to Krishna Das Ojha who managed to obtain sale deed from the original owner but even thereafter she has been enjoying 15 lechas of suit land at her own right. In the process valuable right, title and interest has been clouded, Mr. Deka argued. Per contra, Mr. P. Khatoniar, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the substantial question of law framed in this case does not arise from the facts and circumstances. The plaintiff having claimed adverse possession cannot bank on section 25 of the Limitation Act which relates to Easementary Right. If a person holds a land by his own title and enjoys easement over another plot of land for a period over 20 years in case of private owner and 30 years in case of Government, Easementary Right by way of prescription devolves for such use but this does not hold good in case of possession of a plot of land other than easement. As per his own pleading, the plaintiff was a permissive occupier under the original owner. There is no question as to acquisition of any right to light or air to any building by long user over period of limitation. On the other hand, plaint does not show anywhere since when her possession became adverse to the real owner. Even there was no recital in the plaint evidencing that at any point of time the possession of the plaintiff had become adverse to the original owner. With these submissions, learned counsel for the respondents would argue that plaintiff has miserably failed to establish her case by appropriate pleadings and proof. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the materials available on record what is conspicuous is that the plaintiff entered into the suit land in the year 1943 along with her husband as a lessee. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the materials available on record what is conspicuous is that the plaintiff entered into the suit land in the year 1943 along with her husband as a lessee. One Satyandra Chandra Das was holding the suit land from the original owner as a lessee and he had transferred his lease hold right in favour of Radhanath Borah by executing a registered deed. Upto this part there is no dispute between the parties. While defendants claim that the lease of right of Radhanath Borah devolves on Krishna Das Ojha on the basis of Probate of a Will, the plaintiff has failed to challenge the validity of the probate in any way. This being the position the order granted by the Probate Court has attained finality. The plea taken by the defendants, therefore, is that he acquired the leasehold right of Radhanath Bora though Will is established. 10. As per her own pleading, plaintiff was offered to purchase the suit land by wife of the original owner. But she had no money to purchase the land and the opportunity was availed by Krishna Das Ojha. Such purchase by the defendants associated by overt claim made by the defendants that there was registered sale deed in his favour by the wife of the original owner establishes that Krishna Das Ojha acquired valid right, title and interest to the suit land. The findings of the learned court below, therefore, that defendants acquired right, title and interest is not vitiated in any way. The next question comes as to whether plaintiff has succeeded to establish a case of adverse possession. It is settled law that to establish adverse possession one has to set-up essential facts like specific dates when possession became hostile, whether such possession was open and to the knowledge of the original owner etc. 11. Law relating to claim of adverse possession is well settled by umpteen number of judgments of the Hon” ble Supreme Court. To bring a long possession of immovable property within the definition of adverse possession the plaintiff has to plead and prove that his possession is hostile to the owner from a particular date beyond prescribed period of limitation. 11. Law relating to claim of adverse possession is well settled by umpteen number of judgments of the Hon” ble Supreme Court. To bring a long possession of immovable property within the definition of adverse possession the plaintiff has to plead and prove that his possession is hostile to the owner from a particular date beyond prescribed period of limitation. In the absence of specific date since when possession became adverse it is not possible to calculate the period of such possession to see as to whether such possession stretches over the statutory period of 12 years as against a private person and 30 years as against Government. In the case of State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar reported in (2011) 10 SCC 404 : ( AIR 2012 SC 559 ) the Hon” ble Supreme Court has held that since a right of adverse possession is a negative right, a person pleading such right has to establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. No equity would arise in favour of the claimant of adverse possession. In the case of Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle Venkata Subaa Rao reported in (2010) 14 SCC 316 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1480 ) the Hon” ble Supreme Court found that the claimant did not clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession and so dismissed the claim of adverse possession. In the case of Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengaibhai Harijan, AIR 2009 SC 103 , the Hon” ble Supreme Court held that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivoval evidence that his title was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. The ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be :- ' nec vi, nec clam, nec precario' Œ which means peaceful, open and continuous. In paragraph 11 of the judgment of the Hon” ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India reported in (2004) 10 SCC 779 , the Hon” ble Supreme Court has laid down that a person claiming adverse possession must plead and prove the following elements: (a) On what date he came into possession? (b) What was the nature of his possession? (c) Whether the factum of possession was known to the other party? (b) What was the nature of his possession? (c) Whether the factum of possession was known to the other party? (d) How long his possession has continued and (e) His possession was open and undisturbed. 12. Applying the principle that a person pleading adverse possession has no equity in his favour and he is rather trying to defeat the rights of the true owner and so it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession, it is to be seen as to whether in the case in hand the plaintiff has succeeded to set up a valid case of adverse possession. The plaint is thoroughly gone through to examine the nature and quality of pleading in this regard. In present case, plaint does not disclose any averment as to open, hostile and adverse possession against the real owner. The only challenge of the plaintiff is as to alleged attempt of the defendant to oust her from the suit land. Claiming herself to be in possession of the land, the plaintiff asserts that she has right to adverse possession without disclosing against whom and since when her possession became adverse. The ingredients required to set up adverse possession as enumerated in the preceding paragraph do not exist in the plaint. This being the position the finding of the learned Courts below that the plaintiff failed to establish the claim of adverse possession cannot be said to be perverse or without any basis. In the absence of essential pleadings so as to constitute adverse possession, claim of the plaintiff in this regard has no basis. Learned courts below have not committed any error in holding that the plaintiff could not establish a case of adverse possession. 13. The claim adverse possession of the plaintiff which otherwise also is not duly set up, has been sought to be projected by the learned counsel of the appellant as a prescriptive right under section 25 of the Limitation Act. Claim of adverse possession and that of prescription under section 25 of the Limitation Act are not the same. Section 25 is limited to the case of easementary right. It is not the case of the plaintiff that she peaceably acquired any right to access and use of light or air to and for any building. Claim of adverse possession and that of prescription under section 25 of the Limitation Act are not the same. Section 25 is limited to the case of easementary right. It is not the case of the plaintiff that she peaceably acquired any right to access and use of light or air to and for any building. A right of prescription can accrue to a dominant heritage for easement over statutory period. Here, the case is entirely different. There is no question of easement here. The plaintiff actually claimed adverse possession over the land on the basis of long possession and not easementary right. No such plea was ever taken before the learned courts below. For the first time in second appellate stage such stand has been taken without there being any supporting pleadings on facts. It is settled law that a new case cannot raised at second appellate stage. In any view of the matter the sole substantial question of law as referred to above does not arise from the facts and pleadings of the present case. The objection raised by the respondent that this appeal does not involve such substantial question of law as framed by this court is a valid submission under section 100(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The objection has force. The plaintiff not having made any pleading as to accrual of right under section 25 of the Limitation Act, the sole substantial question of law is not involved in this case. Consequently, second appeal is dismissed. 14. No order as to costs. 15. Draw up decree and send down the records. Appeal dismissed.