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2014 DIGILAW 802 (HP)

Gurudwara Shri Akalidhar Singh Sabha v. Naroli Devi

2014-06-26

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

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Judgment : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge (Oral): The judgement-debtor has filed the present appeal against the judgement and decree dated 31.8.2013 passed by learned Addl. District Judge (1). Mandi in Civil Appeal No. 37 of 2012 affirming the judgement and decree dated 26.12.2011 passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sundernagar, whereby the courts below have rejected the objections of the appellant and directed the preparation of final decree. 2. The suit land comprised in Khewat No. 64, Khatauni No. 92, khasra No. 1030, 1031, 1032, 1035 Kitas 4 measuring 576 sq. mts. situate in Muhal Ropa/26/1, Tehsil Sundernagar District Mandi and was sought to be partitioned and preliminary decree was passed by the learned trial court on 11.4.1997. Since the appellant was minor, therefore, vide order dated 16.12.2000 Sh. B.S. Sen, Advocate was appointed as court guardian for the minor. On 26.6.2011, Tehsildar Sundernagar was appointed as Local Commissioner to suggest the mode of partition in pursuance of preliminary decree passed by the learned trial court. When the proceedings were pending, Brij Bhushan and Kanta Devi sought their impleadment in the case, which was allowed by the trial court on 27.5.2003. The objections to the report of the Local Commissioner were filed and as per order dated 21.4.2007, the same were accepted and fresh reference was made to the Local Commissioner to suggest the mode of partition. The report, in compliance to the order of the court, was received on 26.3.2008, against which objections were filed by the judgement debtor on 16.11.2009 and reply thereto was filed on 17.1.2010 and thereafter on 23.2.2010, the learned trial court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the latest report of local commissioner is liable to be set-aside, as alleged? OPD 2. Relief. 3. The appellant objected to the report of the local commissioner on the ground that respondents had been allotted khasra No. 1032/1, which in fact, was a Gurdwara and being a religious institution, the same could not be partitioned and only money in lieu thereof could be given to the plaintiff. Further, khasra No. 1030 was in the nature of shop rented to Shyam Lal and which was the subject matter of the suit pending before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Court No.2, Sundernagar. Further, khasra No. 1030 was in the nature of shop rented to Shyam Lal and which was the subject matter of the suit pending before the Civil Judge (Junior Division) Court No.2, Sundernagar. The shop allotted to the appellant had been rented to Harvender Singh Manchanda and existed over khasra No. 1030/2 and the tenants had not been impleaded as party to the case. 4. On the other hand in the reply to the objections, the decree holder (respondents herein) contended that the same were not maintainable and on merits it was stated that Gurdwara was situated over khasra No. 1035, which had not been allotted to the respondents. It was further averred that khasra No. 1030 had been rightly allotted to the respondents and that the appellant had no right to create tenancy over the premises and, therefore, the respondents (decree holders) were not bound by such tenancy. 5. To establish their claim, the respondents examined D.R. Chandel as PW 1, who was the local commissioner in the case and supported his report by claiming that partition proceedings had been conducted in presence of both the parties. However, the appellant had refused to sign the statement, while the respondent has signed the statement. To similar effect was the statement of Raju Ram Patwari (AW 2). 6. On the other hand, Manohar Singh president of the appellant was examined as DW 1, who had stated that in the partition khasra No. 1032/1, which had been allotted to the respondents, in fact, belong to Gurdwara and therefore, could not be partitioned. He further maintained that there were two shops which were in existence and are occupied by the tenants on the tenancy created by the Gurdwara. He though admitted that half of the land belongs to the respondents and further admitted that Gurdwara building existed over khasra No. 1035, while khasra No. 1032/1 is the courtyard of the Gurdwara. He further stated that the tenants are in possession of 110 sq.mts. of land. Lastly, he admitted that Tehsildar, during partition had marked half portion of the land to Naroli Devi and the remaining half to the appellant. The learned trial court accepted the report of the local commissioner and ordered the preparation of the final decree. The report of the local commissioner Ex. PW 1/A, Naksha Ex. PW 2/A, Ex. PW 2/B and Tatima Ex. The learned trial court accepted the report of the local commissioner and ordered the preparation of the final decree. The report of the local commissioner Ex. PW 1/A, Naksha Ex. PW 2/A, Ex. PW 2/B and Tatima Ex. PW 1/C were ordered to be form part of the decree. 7. Aggrieved by the judgement and decree, the judgement-debtor preferred an appeal before the learned lower appellate court, who dismissed the same and affirmed the order of the learned trial court and this is how the matter is before this court. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously and vehemently argued that the judgement passed by the courts below is not sustainable in the eyes of law inasmcuh as the shops are existed over the land in dispute for the last more than 30 years, which fact has not been taken into consideration by the learned courts below and admittedly the property in question belongs to the Gurdwara and therefore, cannot be partitioned. In so far as the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the shops being for more than 30 years old is concerned, this was the matter, which was required to be determined at the time when the preliminary decree had been prepared and therefore, at this stage the same cannot be raised. Even otherwise, these are pure findings of fact, which are not open to challenge in the present case. 9. In so far as the claim of the appellant that the appellant is a Gurdwara and cannot be partitioned, it would be necessary to mention that objector can only be availed of the benefit of such objection in case the Gurdwara in dispute has been declared to be a Sikh Gurdwaras under section 16 of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Section 16 reads as follows:- “16. Section 16 reads as follows:- “16. Issue as to whether a gurdwara is a Sikh Gurdwara to be decided first and how issue is to be decided.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law in force, if in any proceeding before a tribunal it is disputed that a gurdwara should or should not be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara, the tribunal shall, before enquiring into any other matter in dispute relating to the said gurdwara, decide whether it should or should not be declared a Sikh Gurdwara in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2). (2) If the tribunal finds that the gurdwara— (i) was established by, or in memory of any of the Ten Sikh Gurus, or in commemoration of any incident in the life of any of the Ten Sikh Gurus and (was) used for public worship by Sikhs, (before and at the time of the presentation of the petition under sub-section (1) of section 7); or (ii) owing to some tradition connected with one of the Ten Sikh Gurus (was) used for public worship predominantly by Sikhs, (before and at the time of the presentation of the petition under sub-section (1) of section 7); or (iii) was established for use by Sikhs for the purpose of public worship and (was) used for such worship by Sikhs, (before and at the time of the presentation of the petition under sub-section (1) of section 7) ; or (iv) was established in memory of Sikh martyr, saint or historical person and (was) used for public worship by Sikhs (before and at the time of the presentation of the petition under sub-section (1) of section 7); or (v) owing to some incident connected with the Sikh religion (was) used for public worship predominantly by Sikhs (before and at the time of the presentation of the petition under sub-section (1) of section); or the tribunal shall decide that it should be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara, and record an order accordingly. (3) Where the tribunal finds that a gurdwara should not be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara it shall record its finding in an order, and, subject to the finding of the High Court on appeal. (3) Where the tribunal finds that a gurdwara should not be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara it shall record its finding in an order, and, subject to the finding of the High Court on appeal. It shall cease to have jurisdiction in all matters concerning such gurdwara, provided that if a claim has been made in accordance with the provisions of section 8 praying for the restoration to office of a hereditary office-holder or person who would have succeeded such office-holder under the system of management prevailing before the first day of January, 1920 (or, in the case of the extended territories before the first day of November, 1956), the tribunal shall, notwithstanding such finding, continue to have jurisdiction in all matters relating to such claim; and if the tribunal finds it proved that such office-holder ceased to be an office-holder on or after the first day of January, 1920 (or, in the case of the extended territories, after the first day of November, 1956) it may by order direct that such office holder or person who would have so succeeded be restored to office.” 10. In Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandhak Committee, Amritsar vs. Mahant Kirpa Ram and others (1984) 2 SCC 614 , it was held that for holding any institution to be a Sikh Gurdwara, the requisites of section 16(2(iii) are to be mandatorily fulfilled and unless the same is established, an institution cannot be said to be a Sikh Gurdwara under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “It must be conceded that nearly a century after the setting up of the institution, Granth Sahib was venerated and read in this institution. Does it provide conclusive evidence that the institution was set up and used for public worship by Sikhs? In order to bring the case under Sec. 16(2) (iii) it must not only be established that the institution was established for use by Sikhs for the purpose of public worship but was used for such worship by the Sikhs before and at the time of the presentation of the petition. The use of the conjunctive `and' clearly imports that in order to attract Sec. 16(2) (iii), both the conditions must be cumulatively satisfied. The use of the conjunctive `and' clearly imports that in order to attract Sec. 16(2) (iii), both the conditions must be cumulatively satisfied. Not was only that it must satisfactorily established that the institution was established for `use' by Sikhs for the purpose of public worship but was used for such worship by the Sikhs before and at the time of the presentation of the petition. It was so held in Gurmukh Singh v.Risaldar Deva Singh & Ors.(1) and it our opinion that represents the correct interpretation of Sec. 16(2) (iii). In this case there is no evidence to show that the institution was established for use by Sikhs for the purpose of public worship. It must be conceded that the institution may be established by anyone, may be a Sikh or follower of any other faith, but it must be established for use by Sikhs for the purpose of worship. One can therefore, ignore the fact that the original grantor was a Muslim ruler Rai Kalha but there is nothing to show that when Gulab Dass Faquir of Udasi sect established the institution, he did it for use by Sikhs for the purpose of public worship. Later on as the majority of the population of the village was follower of Shikh religion and as Udasis also Venerate Granth Sahib, reading of Granth Sahib may have commenced and therefore, generally speaking people may describe and revenue record may show it to be Gurdwara but that would neither be decisive of the character of the institution nor sufficient to bring the institution within Sec. 16(2)(iii) of the Act.” 11. Similarly, in Mahant Jawala Singh (dead) Chela of Mahant Bishan Singh through LRs. Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandhak Committee, Amritsar (2011) 2 SCC 457 , it was held that onus to prove that institution is a Sikh Gurdwara lies on the person who asserts the same and under section 7(1) he must satisfy the Tribunal that particular institution is a Sikh gurdwara and liable to be declared as such under section 16(2(iii) of the Act. This would be clear from the following:- “36. This would be clear from the following:- “36. Section 16 of the Act has received fair amount of judicial consideration and it has been repeatedly held by the Courts that before the Tribunal can declare an institution to be a Sikh Gurdwara under Section 16(2)(iii), it must be satisfied that (a) the institution was established for use by Sikhs for the purpose of public worship, and (b) was used for such worship by Sikhs before and at the time of presentation of the petition under Section 7(1). These two conditions are required to be fulfilled separately and conjointly and unless that is done, the Tribunal cannot declare an institution to be a Sikh Gurdwara. 37. In other words, a person seeking a declaration that the particular institution is a Sikh Gurdwara, he must satisfy the Tribunal that the institution was established for use by Sikhs for the purpose of public worship and that the same was used as such before and at the time of presentation of the petition under Section 7(1) of the Act. If he fails to prove either of the conditions, the Tribunal cannot declare the institution as a Sikh Gurdwara. In this connection, reference may be made to the judgments of the Lahore High Court in Lachhman Dass and others v. Atma Singh and others AIR 1935 Lah. 666 and of this Court in S.G.P.C. v. M.P. Dass Chella (1998) 5 SCC 157 , Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar v. Bagga Singh (2003) 1 SCC 619 , Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee v. Mahant Harnam Singh (2003) 11 SCC 377 and Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee v. Mahant Prem Dass (2009) 15 SCC 381 . 38. It is also a settled law that the onus to prove that an institution is a Sikh Gurdwara lies on the person who asserts the same. If Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee comes forward to support the plea or espouse the cause of the one who files petition under Section 7(1) that the particular institution is a Sikh Gurdwara and is liable to be declared as such under Section 16(2)(iii) of the Act, then the burden to prove the two conditions is on the Committee. If Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee comes forward to support the plea or espouse the cause of the one who files petition under Section 7(1) that the particular institution is a Sikh Gurdwara and is liable to be declared as such under Section 16(2)(iii) of the Act, then the burden to prove the two conditions is on the Committee. If it fails to fulfill either of the conditions, the Tribunal does not get the jurisdiction to declare the institution as a Sikh Gurdwara S.G.P.C. v. M.P. Dass Chella (supra) and Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee v. Mahant Prem Dass (supra).” 12. The word Gurdwara is a conjunction of word “Guru” which means “spiritual leader” and “Dwara”, which means “Door Step”. Thus Gurdwara literally means the door step of the spiritual leader and suggests the place where the spiritual leader resides or his preachings are kept which is nothing but the sanctum sanctorum of the religious institution, which in the instant case has admitted by the appellant himself exists over khasra No. 1035. The aforesaid findings being pure findings of fact cannot be interfered with in the present appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed, however, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.