Judgment Dr. B.R.Sarangi, J. The petitioner, who was working as LNK/Constable in D/12 under Central Reserved Police Force has filed this application assailing the order dated 18.5.1994 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, namely, the Commandant, 12 Bn,CRPF, Zubza, Nagaland opposite party No.1 imposing on him major penalty of dismissal from service vide Annexure-3 and confirmation thereof in appeal by the appellate authority, namely, the DIGP,CRPF, Hyderabad, opposite party No.2 vide order dated 21.1.1995, Annexure-5. 2. The factual matrix of the case in hand is that the petitioner was on duty at Police Check Post on rotation basis from 1800 hrs. on 15.7.1993 to 0600 hrs. on 16.7.1993. At 0500 hrs. on 16.7.1993, the petitioner was relieved from his duty at the Check Post by one L/Nk. Bhaskar Boyote. At about 0520 hrs. on 16.7.1993 the said Check Post came under ground attack by the UGs terrorists. On the very same day, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the disciplinary authority in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 27 (A) of the CRPF Rules, 1955, vide Annexure-1, pending contemplation of disciplinary proceeding against him. On 17.12.1993, charges were framed against him and five others and a joint departmental inquiry was held by 1955 Rules under Section 11 (1) of CRPF Act, 1949, which reads as follows:- ARTICLE-I “That the said No.801130718 L/Nk Bhaskar Bhoyet and No.851260131 Ct. B.B. Jena of D/12 Bn CRPF, while functioning as LNK/Constable in D/12 Bn CRPF on 15.7.1993 and 16.7.1993 committed neglect on duty/remissness in the discharge of their duties and other misconduct in their capacity as members of the Force U/s 11 (1) of CRPF Act, 1949, in that while on duty at Police Check Post, Pfutsero left the post was not on duty on the early hours of 16.7.1993 when 2 UGs entered the retiring room of Check Post and taken away arms and ammunition by killing 2 persons of own Force without any resistance. Since the entire section was supposed to be on duty till 0600 hrs. Further, they also advised the other 3 Cts. Of the Check Post who were returning to the post after attending call of nature, not to proceed towards the post, as firing is on, which is attributed to gross negligence and remissness in discharge of duties and other misconduct and prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Force. Further, they also advised the other 3 Cts. Of the Check Post who were returning to the post after attending call of nature, not to proceed towards the post, as firing is on, which is attributed to gross negligence and remissness in discharge of duties and other misconduct and prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Force. ARTICLE-II That the said No. 911164563 Ct P.K. Chavan of D/12 CRPF, while functioning as constable in D/12 Bn CRPF on 16.7.1993 committed neglect of duty/remissness in the discharge of his duty and other misconduct, in his capacity as a member of the Force U/s 11 (1) of CRPF Act, 1949, in that while on sentry duty upto 0600 hrs. on 16.7.1993, he left the post without any relief, leaving his personnel open in the retiring room of the post. As a result 2 UG insurgents sneaked into the 1st floor of the balcony, entered the second room and taken away arms and ammunition by killing 2 persons of own force, which is prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Force. ARTICLE-III That the said No. 911164064 Ct K. Suresh, No. 911164411 Ct. B.V. Mathe and No. 911163842, Ct. G. Anand Kumar of D/12 Bn CRPF, while functioning as constables in D/12 CRPF on 15.7.1993 and 16.7.1993 committed remissness in the discharge of their duty in their capacity as members of the Force U/s 11 (1) of CRPF Act, 1949, in that they while on duty at Police Check Post, Pfutsero from 1800 hrs of 15.7.1993 to upto 0600 hrs. on 16.7.1993, left the post at 0515 hrs. on 16.7.1993 to attend the call of nature, when they were supposed to be duty along with entire section which is pre-judicial to good order and discipline of the Force.” 3. Thereafter, the Dy. Commandant 12th Bn, CRPF was appointed as the inquiry officer on 29.12.1993, who conducted the inquiry and submitted his report on 9.5.1994 without serving copy of the same to the delinquent officer. It is stated that prior to the order passed in Annexure-2 on 18.5.1994, the inquiry officer had submitted inquiry report on 9.5.1994 which has been referred to in paragraph-3 in Annexure-3 without serving copy thereof to the petitioner, the delinquent officer. Being aggrieved by the order of the disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred appeal before the appellate authority on 8.11.1994, but the same was rejected on 21.01.1995. Being aggrieved by the order of the disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred appeal before the appellate authority on 8.11.1994, but the same was rejected on 21.01.1995. Hence, this application. 4. Mr. D.R. Pattnayak, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously urged that the incident occurred after the duty hours of the petitioner. Therefore, he was no way connected with the issue and he was falsely implicated for no reason. It is stated that the disciplinary authority imposed major penalty of dismissal of the petitioner from service without supplying Xerox copy of the inquiry report to him. As a result, due opportunity of hearing was not given to him. It is further submitted that the inquiry report was submitted by the inquiry officer, vide Annexure-3 on 9.5.1994, in which it was specifically mentioned that the petitioner had to reply to that in writing to the disciplinary authority within 15 days of receipt of the same, though it was candidly stated that copy of such inquiry report had not been supplied to him. Assuming such a report was supplied to the petitioner when 15 days time granted was yet to elapsed, the disciplinary authority with undue haste passed the order of punishment on 18.5.1994 vide Annexure-3 dismissing the petitioner from service. Therefore, the entire proceeding was vitiated due to non-supply of the inquiry report and non-compliance with principles of natural justice. It is further stated that, the appellate authority also did not apply his mind while rejecting the petitioner’s appeal stating to be devoid of merit. With regard to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, it is stated that since a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain this application. In order to substantiate his contention, Mr. Patnaik has relied upon judgment of the apex Court in Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 and judgment of this Court in (Sri) Janardan Mohanty v. Union of India and 3 others, 2000 (II) OLR 126. 5. Mr. A.K. Bose, learned Asst. Solicitor General, strenuously disputed the contention raised by Mr. Patnaik and referring to paragraph-6 of the counter affidavit submitted that the duty hours of the petitioner as Centry at the Check Post was from 1945 hrs. 5. Mr. A.K. Bose, learned Asst. Solicitor General, strenuously disputed the contention raised by Mr. Patnaik and referring to paragraph-6 of the counter affidavit submitted that the duty hours of the petitioner as Centry at the Check Post was from 1945 hrs. of 15.07.1993 to 2130 hrs on 15.7.1993 as per the duty register and after completion of his duty, he handed over charge of Centry duty to Ct. P.D. Bhai. The Check Post duty is performed on shift basis and all personnel were required to be present during the shift time i.e. 1800 hrs. on 15.7.1993 to 0600 hrs. on 16.7.1993, till relieved by other Section. Referring to paragraph-10 of the counter affidavit he further submitted that copy of the inquiry report was furnished to the petitioner vide letter dated 9.5.1994, by which principles of natural justice had been complied with and this Court should not interfere with the order passed by the disciplinary authority confirmed by the appellate authority. He further submits that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this application as the cause of action arose outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 6. Countenancing the submission of Mr. Bose, Mr. Patnaik submitted that a part of the cause of action verily arose within the State of Orissa, as the petitioner belongs to State of Orissa and the orders passed by the authorities were communicated to him in the State of Orissa, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. To substantiate his contention Mr. Patnaik referred to the decision of this Court in Janardan Mohanty (supra), wherein this Court held that if a part of the cause of action having arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the writ petition was maintainable. After perusing the said decision, this Court is of the considered view that since all correspondences were made with the petitioner by the opp. Parties in his address in State of Orissa, the cause of action in the present case did arise within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ application. 7. As if appears from the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the records available, it is admitted fact that the petitioner was on duty from 1800 hrs. on 15.7.1993 to 0600 hrs. on 16.7.1993 which was on rotation basis. He had handed over charge of the check post in question at about 0500 hrs., of 16.07.1993. 7. As if appears from the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the records available, it is admitted fact that the petitioner was on duty from 1800 hrs. on 15.7.1993 to 0600 hrs. on 16.7.1993 which was on rotation basis. He had handed over charge of the check post in question at about 0500 hrs., of 16.07.1993. Therefore by the time the ground attack was made by the terrorists at 0520 hrs. of 16.07.1993, the petitioner was not on duty. No allegation of his negligence of duty could therefore be made or attributed to him on that count. 8. As it appears from the records, the inquiry officer submitted his report on 9.5.1994 where after the disciplinary authority granted 15 day’s time to the petitioner to give his reply to the accusation against him by the inquiry officer, from the date of communication to him but copy of such inquiry report was never served on him. Even before expiry of that 15 day’s period, the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order dismissing the petitioner from service on 18.5.1994 just after 9 days of service of copy of the inquiry report. Therefore the time shown to have been granted to the petitioner to file his reply to the inquiry report was an empty formality and that too before compliance of the same, the impugned order of punishment had already been passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the petitioner from service. Even though such objection was raised before the appellate authority, the same fell in the deaf ears of the said authority who confirmed the order of punishment in gross non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. Such aspect was considered by the apex Court in Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 . 9. In State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 : AIR 1996 SC 1669 a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, after an elaborate discussion has summarized the position in relation to disciplinary proceeding as follows: “We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 . 9. In State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 : AIR 1996 SC 1669 a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, after an elaborate discussion has summarized the position in relation to disciplinary proceeding as follows: “We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee) : (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this : procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4) (a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived if, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived if, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar, (1994 AIR SCW 1050). The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice - or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action - the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and not adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fair hearing." (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it "void" or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the stand-point of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.) (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of state or public interest may call for a curtailing or the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision. Similar view has also been taken by the apex Court in Marwar Gramin Bank v. Ram Pal Chouhan, (2006) 9 SCC 691 : AIR 2006 SC 2324 . In Union of India v. Prakash Kumar Tandon, (2009) 2 SCC 541 : AIR 2009 SC 1375 , the apex Court has laid down a fair and simple proposition which states that if disciplinary proceedings were not conducted fairly, presumption could be drawn that the same caused prejudice to the charged employee. 10. Keeping the above proposition of law laid down by the apex Court in mind and applying the same to the present context, the action taken by the authority in dismissing the petitioner from service was clearly hit by principles of natural justice as no opportunity of hearing had been given to the petitioner to give effective reply to the inquiry report, as copy thereof was never served on the petitioner and even before expiry of the time 15 days’ granted 15 days shown to have been granted to the petitioner to give reply, the major punishment was imposed by the disciplinary authority. 11. Therefore, taking a totality of the circumstances into account, this Court is of the view that punishment of dismissal from service of the petitioner was bad in law as the same was in violation of principles of natural justice and the order of confirmation thereof by the appellate authority is also not sustainable being without application of mind. 12. 11. Therefore, taking a totality of the circumstances into account, this Court is of the view that punishment of dismissal from service of the petitioner was bad in law as the same was in violation of principles of natural justice and the order of confirmation thereof by the appellate authority is also not sustainable being without application of mind. 12. For the aforesaid discussion, both the order dated 18.5.1994 vide Annexure-2 and order dated 21.1.1995 vide Annexure-5 passed by the disciplinary authority and appellate authority, opposite parties No. 1 & 2, respectively, are hereby quashed and the matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority opposite party No. 1 with a direction to him to consider the matter from the stage of giving opportunity to the petitioner-delinquent officer to give his reply to the finding of the Enquiry Officer vide Annexure-1 copy thereof being served him and by affording opportunity of hearing to him in compliance with the principles of natural justice and pass appropriate order within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order. 13. With the above observation and direction, the writ petition is disposed of. No order to costs.