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2014 DIGILAW 810 (JHR)

Manoranjan Prasad Sinha v. Managing Committee of Vivekanand Vidya Mandir, Jagarnathpur through its Secretary

2014-07-30

D.N.UPADHYAY

body2014
ORDER : D.N.Upadhyay,J. This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 08.07.2010/10 passed by the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi in Case No.12/2010 (JET) whereby the petition filed by the appellant has not been taken up for consideration in terms of Section 10 (i) (a) and Section 10 (i) (b) of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act and it was dismissed without deciding the merit involved. 2. The facts available on record are that the appellant was appointed as P.G.T. (Chemistry) by the School Managing Committee of Vivekanand Vidya Mandir, Ranchi in the month of July, 1992 on regular basis through proper advertisement followed by interview but the Managing Committee did not issue appointment letter to the appellant nor salary was paid to him in regular manner as according to C.B.S.C. Rules and Bye-laws. Since the appellant had been repeatedly making demand for regular and timely payment of his salary with revised D.A. along with due increment from the Managing Committee and also from the Principal of the School, they became annoyed and orally terminated him from service from 1.3.1994 without giving show-cause notice. The petitioner being aggrieved by with his termination from service, filed a case vide B.S. Case No. 3/1994 before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi and challenged his oral termination order. The appellant succeeded in the litigation and by order dated 20.1.1997 respondent was directed to treat the petitioner in service, allowed him to resume his duty with full back wages along with incidental and consequential benefits and further directed the respondent to pay all dues along with interest @ 6% p.a. Thereafter the respondent filed writ petition being C.W.J.C.No.721/1997 before this Hon’ble Court challenging the finding of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi passed in B.S. Case No. 3/1994. The writ petition was accordingly allowed on the ground that Presiding Officer, Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide the issue. The writ petition was accordingly allowed on the ground that Presiding Officer, Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide the issue. The petitioner then filed L.P.A.No. 224/2008 before this Hon’ble Court challenging the order of the learned Single Judge passed in C.W.J.C.No. 721/1997 but the Division Bench dismissed the L.P.A. on 18.11.2009 affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge but with the liberty on the following terms:- “But we deem it appropriate in the interest of justice to observe that the appellant would be at liberty to approach the Educational Tribunal for redressal of his grievance and the Tribunal would not be influenced in any manner by the order passed by the Labour Court and the dispute shall be decided on its own merit. However, it will be open for the Tribunal to consider whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the question of limitation is fit to be condoned. The appeal thus is dismissed.” In view of the liberty given to the petitioner, he approached Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi and filed an application for redressal of his grievance and the application was registered as Case No. 12/2010 but the learned Tribunal without deciding the issue under the garb of Section 10 (i) (a) of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005 refused to entertain the grievance by the impugned order. 3. The appellant appeared in person and submitted that he has been running from pillar to post for redressal of his grievances since the year 1994 but instead of getting lawful remedy, he has been made remediless either for want of jurisdiction or on account of limitation in presenting the application before appropriate forum. The appellant has relied on the judgment dated 17.06.2011 passed by the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in connection with L.P.A.No. 440/2009. It is pointed out that his case is fully covered by the judgment passed in L.P.A.No. 440/2009 but the learned Tribunal has misconstrued the direction given in L.P.A.No. 224/2008. The Tribunal should have relied upon the judgment passed in L.P.A.No. 440/2009 and should have given opportunity to the parties to plead their case for deciding the issue on merit. 4. It is pointed out that his case is fully covered by the judgment passed in L.P.A.No. 440/2009 but the learned Tribunal has misconstrued the direction given in L.P.A.No. 224/2008. The Tribunal should have relied upon the judgment passed in L.P.A.No. 440/2009 and should have given opportunity to the parties to plead their case for deciding the issue on merit. 4. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has vehemently opposed the argument and submitted that the issue raised by the appellant has well been discussed and decided by this Hon’ble Court in L.P.A.No.141/2010 on 26.07.2011 “Shailendra Kumar Jha Vrs. The Regional Director, D.A.V. Public School, Bariatu, Ranchi & Anr.” Learned Counsel has relied upon para 8, 9 and 10 of the said judgment and submitted that cause of action accrued to the petitioner in the year 1994 and the Tribunal has admittedly been established in the year 2005 and Section 10 (i) (a) puts a clear bar to invoke jurisdiction in case in which cause of action arose more than three years prior to the date of establishment of Tribunal. “Para 8-In view of the above facts, whatever cause of action accrued to the petitioner that accrued on the day when he was denied to do the work on the post which according to the petitioner himself was denied in the year 1993, and therefore, the cause of action independently to criminal case, accrued to the petitioner in the year 1993 and reason may be that the petitioner himself did not report to duty under the fear of said criminal case against the petitioner.” “ Para 9-For the reasons stated above, we do not find any just reason to permit the petitioner to keep the litigation pending by approaching the Tribunal for the relief on the ground which has no connection with the termination of the services of the petitioner.” “ Para 10-In view of the above reasons, we do not find any merit in the L.P.A. and for the reasons mentioned above, apart from the reasons given in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge wherein it has rightly been held that the grievance of the aggrieved party could have been redressed by the Education Tribunal without there being any specific order passed by the Education Tribunal and the question of limitation as raised by the petitioner-appellant has no relevance in view of the facts that accrual of the cause of action to the petitioner is in the year 1993.” This Hon’ble Court in the judgment reported in 2010 (3) JLJR 346 Smt. Kalpana Bharti and Dr. Rajendra Prasad Vrs. President, School Managing Committee of Adarsh Vidya Mandir & Ors. has held. “Section 10 (i) (a) puts an embargo on the power of tribunal from entertaining any case in which the impugned order has been issued prior to three years from the date of the establishment of Tribunal. It is an admitted position that Act came into force in the year 2005.” By referring aforesaid judgment, it is submitted that the appeal is devoid of any merit and the same is likely to be dismissed. 5. Having heard both sides and after perusing the relevant provisions, order and judgments referred to above, it appears that appellant was terminated from his service orally in the year 1994 whereafter he challenged his removal from service before the Labour Court and succeeded to obtain favourable order. 5. Having heard both sides and after perusing the relevant provisions, order and judgments referred to above, it appears that appellant was terminated from his service orally in the year 1994 whereafter he challenged his removal from service before the Labour Court and succeeded to obtain favourable order. The aforesaid order was challenged by the School Management Committee ( respondent ) before this Court vide C.W.J.C. No. 721/1997 and the learned Single Judge has been pleased to set aside the order dated 20.1.1997 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court in B.S. Case No. 03/1994. The petitioner then preferred L.P.A. No. 224/2008 in which liberty, as indicated above, was given to the appellant and in view of that he approached Jharkhand Education Tribunal for redressal of his grievance but it was not entertained in view of Section 10 (i) (a) of the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act. 6. I have carefully gone through the judgment dated 17.06.2011 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A.No. 440/2009 Harsh Vardhan Mathur Vrs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. The facts available in that very case could be ascertained from para 3 of the said judgment:- “ The appellant initially has challenged the order dated 15.04.1994 passed by the Managing Committee of the Xavier Labour Relations Institute, Bistupur, Jamshedpur, before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, by which the Petitioner-Appellant was removed from the service. The Labour Court, Jamshedpur dismissed the claim of the Petitioner on 29.3.2005 holding that the Educational Institutions are not Commercial Institutions, and therefore, the proceeding initiated before the Labour Court by the Petitioner-Appellant under the Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 was not maintainable. The Petitioner-Appellant aggrieved by the order of the Labour Court dated 29.3.2005, preferred the writ petition being W.P. (L) No. 4917 of 2005, which was dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 17.1.2006, whereby the order passed by the Labour Court dated 29.03.2005 has been upheld and now, it is conclusively decided against the Petitioner-Appellant that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the writ petitioner.” In the present case too, the appellant approached the Labour Court and got favourable order. It was challenged by respondent School Managing Committee by filing C.W.J.C.No. 721/1997 in which it was held that Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide the issue because school does not come under the purview of establishment and therefore, Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 is not applicable. Thereafter, the appellant preferred L.P.A. No. 224/2008 in which he was directed to appear before the Jharkhand Education Tribunal for redressal of his grievance but it was not entertained and disallowed by the impugned order. The judgment of the Division Bench passed in L.P.A.No. 440/2009 covers almost all the points involved in the present case and for better understanding, I would like to quote paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the said judgment:- “Para 14-After coming into the force of the Act of 2005 as apparent from Sub-Section 1 of Section 8 of the Act of 2005, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts vests in the Tribunal, therefore, as held above, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is excluded by the Act of 2005 and not only excluded but is vesting in the Tribunal and particularly, “Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts” is now vested in the Tribunal specifically by operation of law. Therefore, a combined reading of Section 8 and Section 10 (i) (a), we can hold that the Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction under Section 8 can entertain the cases for which cause of action accrued even before three years from coming into force of the Act of 2005 as the Civil Courts and there is no provision of exclusion of the Indian Limitation Act made in the Act of 2005, and therefore, Sub-Section 2 of Section 29 of the Act of 1963, certainly can take care of applicability of the Sections 4 to 24 of the Indian Limitation Act for the application under the Act of 2005, which includes Section 14 also as well as Section 5.” “Para 15-Otherwise than this harmonious construction of Section 8 and Section 10 (i) (a) will render such person like Petitioner remedy-less because of the reason that by operation of the Act of 2005, the Civil Courts shall not have jurisdiction to entertain any suit of the Petitioner, and by operation of Sub-clause a of Sub-Section 1 of Section 10, the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction and since the Respondent Educational Institution is not instrumentality of the State, the Petitioner cannot approach the High Court directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, thereby the petitioner, who approached the Court in time, would be rendered remedy-less because he was pursuing his cause before the wrong forum and in spite of the fact that Section 14 has been enacted in the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 to take care of such situation for the party pursuing remedy before the wrong court.” “ Para 16-In view of the above reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 13.12.2007 cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. The order passed by the Educational Tribunal dated 30.11.2006 is also set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Educational Tribunal and both the parties are directed to appear before the Educational Tribunal on 11th July, 2011.” Since the aforesaid paragraphs of the said judgment squarely covers the issues involved in the case at hand and therefore, following the principles laid down by the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 440/2009 the order impugned dated 08.07.2010/10 passed by the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi in connection with Case No. 12/2010 (JET) is hereby set aside. The appellant as well as the respondent are directed to appear before the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi within one month from today and after their appearance the Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi shall dispose of all the issues, which may be raised, on merit preferably within one year from the date on which appearance of parties would complete. Accordingly appeal stands allowed with the directions given above.