JUDGMENT : Subrata Talukdar, J. This appeal arises out of judgment and order dated 30th January, 2006 passed by the Learned Civil Court (Senior Division), Alipore in Money Suit no. 5 of 2004. By the said impugned judgment the Learned Trial Court was pleased to dismiss the suit on contest without any cost. 2. The appellant, who was the plaintiff before the Learned Trial Court appears in person before us. The suit was for realisation of a sum of Rs. 1,96,959.62p. in respect of works executed under a contract for repairs of existing office buildings at Falta in the district of 24 Parganas (now South 24-Parganas) belonging to the respondent, the Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta. 3. The appellant contends that pursuant to a tender notice dated 12th June, 1991 he responded to the same by letter dated 8th October, 1991 and he accepted the tender upon completion of all formalities. 4. The appellant further contends that he completed the works under the contract which included, inter alia, construction of two new bathrooms, kitchen with all fittings and RCC platform for cooking. The appellant also carried out works pertaining to repair of four damaged rooms, verandah shed and replacement of damaged wooden beams with iron rail. 5. He also executed works pertaining to doors and windows - both ways around the office complex - repairing of sun sheds and construction of sewerage and rain water drain around the office building. 6. According to the appellant even the GI mosquito nets in the rooms of the officers were changed along with repair of broken furniture. The appellant states that he had to complete additional works not envisaged in the original contract on the verbal orders of the Executive Engineer of the respondent from time to time. Although time was extended periodically for completion of the works without imposition of any penalty by the respondent, including the extra works, such works were ultimately completed on 22nd June, 1992. Notice of such completion was served on the respondent. 7. The appellant also contends that the respondent failed and or neglected to make on-the-spot verification of the works and did not carry out the joint measurement of all the works including the extra work. The appellant therefore was left with no option but to submit his final bill on 17th September, 1993 for a sum of Rs. 1,64,699. 55p. 7. The appellant also contends that the respondent failed and or neglected to make on-the-spot verification of the works and did not carry out the joint measurement of all the works including the extra work. The appellant therefore was left with no option but to submit his final bill on 17th September, 1993 for a sum of Rs. 1,64,699. 55p. against which on 28th October, 1993 the respondent made an on account payment of only Rs. 20,239.93p. thereby leaving a sum of Rs. 1,44,459.62p. outstanding. The appellant therefore prayed before the Rs.earned Trial Court for a decree upon the respondent to pay the said outstanding sum of Rs. 1,44,459.62p. along with damages, further damages and interest at 12% p.a. on the aforesaid sum till actual realization. 8. The said Money Suit was resisted by the respondent before the Learned Trial Court by filing its written statement. In the written statement the respondent has denied all material allegations and contended that the appellant was only asked to carry out a few extra works not included in the tender for successful completion of the job as per the "General Conditions of the Contract" (for short GCC). 9. The respondent has further stated that the completion of all works including the extra works by the appellant on 22nd June, 1992 is not factually correct because on that date the work was still in progress. The respondent states that the bill of Rs. 1,64,699.55p submitted by the appellant is baseless and does not tally with the actual measurement. 10. The respondent points out that the gross amount of the bill for the works executed by the appellant and paid to him was Rs. 71,676.21p from which certain amounts needed to be deducted under the contract. The respondent therefore prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. 11. The Learned Trial Court by order no. 32 dated 9th November, 1998 rejected an application filed on behalf of the respondent challenging the maintainability of Money Suit no. 5 of 2004. 71,676.21p from which certain amounts needed to be deducted under the contract. The respondent therefore prayed for dismissal of the suit with costs. 11. The Learned Trial Court by order no. 32 dated 9th November, 1998 rejected an application filed on behalf of the respondent challenging the maintainability of Money Suit no. 5 of 2004. Raising the point of maintainability the respondent had argued that under the provision of 68(a) of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) the dispute between the parties was referable to arbitration in terms of the said provisions of the GCC.The Learned Trial Court, having regard to Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 arrived at the finding that the respondent had already filed its written statement and had not taken the point of non-compliance with the provision of 68(a) of the GCC. The Learned Trial Court therefore held that the respondent not having raised the issue of maintainability at the earliest opportunity and in accordance with the provisions of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the application on maintainability must be decided in favour of the appellant - plaintiff. 12. The said order dated 9th November, 1998 does not appear this Court, on perusal of the records as well as from the pleadings made before this Court to have been challenged. 13. Thereafter, upon framing issues in the suit and taking evidence of the parties, the said suit was finally decided on 30th January, 2006. The Learned Trial Court, upon a discussion of the evidence, the exhibits and the materials on record found that the measurement book was not correctly maintained in the instant case. It also found that no site order book was maintained and neither the papers connected to handing over of the site were produced on behalf of the respondent. 14. The Learned Trial Court has recorded that out of 42 items of works mentioned in the contract the respondent has admitted to completion of 33 items. Therefore the plea of the respondent that the appellant abandoned the work cannot be accepted and the appellant having completed major portion of the work which he was required to do under the contract is entitled to get remuneration for the same. The Learned Trial Court accordingly found the appellant - plaintiff fit to receive remuneration including his claim to damages. 15. The Learned Trial Court accordingly found the appellant - plaintiff fit to receive remuneration including his claim to damages. 15. However, the Learned Trial Court while deciding the issue of limitation as provided under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 found against the appellant - plaintiff on the point that no notice as required by law was served upon the respondent by the appellant - plaintiff prior to filing of the suit. The Learned Trial Court therefore held that the said suit was barred under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act and hence, for want of compliance of the said Section the suit was found not maintainable and therefore was dismissed on contest without costs. 16. The basic contentions pleaded on behalf of either parties before the Learned Trial Court and recorded hereinabove were reiterated before this Court at the time of hearing. The appellant, appearing in person took this Court through pages 113 and 36 of the Paper Book detailing the works and the extra works completed by him. The appellant contended during arguments that unless the progress of the work was satisfactory the respondent would not have extended the time for completing the same without imposing any penalty. 17. On the specific issue of the measurement book kept with the respondent and endorsement made by the respondent in the measurement book, he argues that the measurement book was signed by him under protest and since the measurement book is always in the custody of the respondent, the allegation that he signed the measurement book without protest when produced is mischievous. 18. The appellant further fortifies his factual stand by pointing out to the fact that if the progress of the work was not satisfactory then the respondent would not have extended time for completing the same and neither would have supplied cement in four instalments to the appellant. 19. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has taken us to several pages of the Paper Book in FA 250 of 2010 and particularly pages 38, 39, 51, 76, 74 & 78 thereof to fortify the stand of the respondent that there was no evidence on record to substantiate the claim of the appellant on merits. He further contends that it was not within the powers of the Learned Trial Court to arrive at a conclusion pertaining to the quantum of work. He further contends that it was not within the powers of the Learned Trial Court to arrive at a conclusion pertaining to the quantum of work. 20. Sri Roy Chowdhury relied upon (2005) 4 SCC 613 (B. M. Salgaonkar & Brothers v. The Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and another) on the point of notice under the Major Port Trusts Act. Relying upon para 34 of the said judgment he argues that the Major Port Trusts Act entrusts the port authorities with duties and functions for providing port facilities and equipment necessary for handling goods of seagoing vessels. Therefore having regard to such multifarious functions Section 120 has been incorporated in the statute providing for time to the officers of the respondent for meeting litigation generated out of such functions. 21. He also relied on (2013) AIR Bombay 161 (Keval Kishore Aggarwal and Ors. v. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Mumbai and Ors.). Relying upon Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act he points out that the same requires the giving of one months notice to the respondent Board for anything to be done under the Act. The special law of limitation under a special statute must be considered prior to adjudication of any claim against the respondent Board. In this regard, he further submits that the ratio of an Hon'ble Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in AIR 1971 Calcutta 17 (Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta v. M/s. Agarpara Co. Ltd. and Anr.) be usefully referred to. He therefore prays that the appeal be dismissed. 22. The respondent Port Trust Authority has also filed a cross appeal being COT no. 69 of 2013 impugning the judgment and order dated 30th June, 2006 of the Learned Trial Court. The thrust of the cross objection is in respect of issues nos. 2, 3 & 5 which, according to the cross objector, were wrongly decided by the Learned Trial Court in favour of the appellant - plaintiff by allowing his claim on merits. 23. The thrust of the cross objection is in respect of issues nos. 2, 3 & 5 which, according to the cross objector, were wrongly decided by the Learned Trial Court in favour of the appellant - plaintiff by allowing his claim on merits. 23. The short point which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the Learned Trial Court upon having decided in favour of the appellant - plaintiff that he is entitled to receive remuneration for the works completed by him along with damages, the remaining issues namely 1, 4, 6 & 7 on the point of notice under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act were correctly decided against the appellant. Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act reads as follows:- "Limitation of proceedings in respect of things done under the Act No suit or other proceeding shall be commenced against a Board or any member or employee thereof for anything done, or purporting to being done, in pursuance of this Act until expiration of one month after notice in writing has been given to the Board or him stating the cause-of-action or after six months after the accrual of the cause-of-action" 24. Section 35 under Chapter V of the Major Port Trusts Act provides for powers of the Board to execute works and provide appliances. From a plain reading of the provisions of Section 35(1) and Section 35(2) (a to l) of the said Act it is apparent that the functions of the Board pertain to its primary purpose of handling port work. It is also apparent that such port work relates to works of running and maintaining jetties, piers, docks etc. and works pertaining and incidental to the loading and unloading of goods to and from seagoing vessels. 25. Section 42 of the said Act provides for performance of services by the Board or other persons in aid of its primary works. Such services include landing, shipping or transporting passengers and goods between vessels in the port and the piers, docks etc. belonging to or in possession of the Board and doing such other infrastructural work necessary to execute its primary works. 26. Such services include landing, shipping or transporting passengers and goods between vessels in the port and the piers, docks etc. belonging to or in possession of the Board and doing such other infrastructural work necessary to execute its primary works. 26. It is apparent from the contracted works undertaken by the appellant and referred to earlier in this order that he was not called upon to execute any such work or render any service contemplated under Section 35 or under Section 42 of chapter V of the Major Port Trusts Act. It is an admitted position that the appellant was awarded a contract for simple fittings and repair which included kitchen, bathrooms, roof of damaged rooms, doors, windows, furniture and even replacement of mosquito nets in the officers rooms. 27. By no stretch of imagination can it be contemplated that such works fall within the purview of works or things done under the Major Port Trusts Act and therefore the plea of limitation by applying Section 120 of the said Act by the respondent to the facts of this case is wholly untenable. 28. In the opinion of this Court, Section 120 would apply only to those suits which are directly related to things done by Major Port Trusts under the provisions of the act, such as loading and unloading of goods, storing of goods, providing port facilities, statutory leasing out of godown space and the like and not to suits arising out of an ordinary contract for construction and/or repair of office buildings and guest houses. 29. This Court therefore finds that the Learned Trial Court did not correctly appreciate this aspect of the matter and applied the bar of limitation under the special statute in spite of the fact that the appellant was merely to perform simple repair, reinforcement and decorative jobs to the officers rooms, kitchen and privy. Such jobs, in the opinion of this Court, do not attract the provisions of Section 120 of the said Act. This Court also notices that reference to anything done under the Act requiring notice under Section 120 should mean such works and services that pertain to the primary functions and responsibilities of the Port Trust Authority. 30. Such jobs, in the opinion of this Court, do not attract the provisions of Section 120 of the said Act. This Court also notices that reference to anything done under the Act requiring notice under Section 120 should mean such works and services that pertain to the primary functions and responsibilities of the Port Trust Authority. 30. Furthermore, useful reference may be drawn in this regard to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International by its proprietor V.Venkatadri (dead) by L.R.s AIR 1979 SC 1144 wherein it has been held that with regard to a technical plea of limitation under the Port Trusts Act it is the duty of such authority like the Port Trust to consider fairly whether such a technical plea is well-founded and not simply intended to defeat the just claim of a citizen. 31. For the reasons aforesaid the decision impugned of the Learned Trial Court dated 30th June, 2006 holding against the plaintiff on the point of notice being issue nos. 1, 4, 6 & 7 is set aside. 32. The Money Suit no.5 of 2004 is remanded back to the Learned Trial Court for considering the claim of the appellant - plaintiff on merits and assess the same. Having regard to the long lapse of time it is desirable that the Learned Trial Court conclude the suit within a period of 6 months from the date of communication of this order. 33. FA 250 of 2010 with COT 69 of 2012 are disposed of accordingly on contest. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 34. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties upon compliance of all formalities. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.