JUDGMENT : Harish Tandon, J. The point involved in the writ petition assumes significance on the interpretation of the various provisions contained in Chapter V of the Central Excise Act pertaining to the Settlement Commission. 2. The incorporation of the said Chapter was perceived for rampant colossal evasion of duties and/or tax effecting the health and wealth of the nation. The Wanchoo Committee was appointed to opine and make recommendations against those evils. In acceptance of the partial recommendations, the provision of Settlement Commission was introduced and Chapter 19A was brought in the Income Tax Act, 1961 containing the provisions for Settlement Commission. Subsequently the Chapter V was inserted in Central Excise Act by Section 110 of the Finance Act, 1998, which was suitably amended from time to time. With an intention to make it more workable and for speedy recovery of the revenue rather than from the cumbersome provision of the recovery proceedings, the object and purpose of the Settlement Commission can be culled out from Section 32E of the said Act where an assessee may make an application for settlement before adjudication upon making true and full disclosure of his duty liability which has not been disclosed before the Central Excise Officer provided the ingredients required therefore are satisfied. Proviso inserted thereto laid down the requisite ingredients for maintaining the said application, I would delve to deal with different provisions contained in Chapter V of the said Act but before I do so, it would be relevant to quote the foundational facts which are, more or less, admitted. 3. The Petitioner-Company is an assessee registered under the Central Excise Act and allotted the registration no. AACB4235DXN001. A search was conducted by the Director General of Central Excise Intelligence (DGEI) and seizes various documents, papers and the statement and started the investigation of the duty evasion. A show cause notice cum demand was issued on 28.12.2012 against the Company and two of its Directors, alleging the violation of several provisions of the said Act and the rules framed thereunder and raising a demand with further contemplation to impose penalty and interest. The Company approached the Settlement Commission and the order passed on that application is challenged in this writ petition. By the impugned order, the Company was directed to pay an additional amount of Rs. 10,26,478/- and further imposed a penalty of Rs. The Company approached the Settlement Commission and the order passed on that application is challenged in this writ petition. By the impugned order, the Company was directed to pay an additional amount of Rs. 10,26,478/- and further imposed a penalty of Rs. 22 Lakh on the Company and personal penalty of Rs. 15 lakhs each on two of its directors. 4. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner at the very outset submits that when a penalty is imposed upon the Company, there is no justification in imposing the personal penalty on each of the directors. Alternatively it is submitted that there is no recording of reasons for imposition of penalty on each of the directors in the impugned order. 5. The learned Advocate appearing for the department submits that because of the concealment of the tax liability, the Settlement Commission have found the directors responsible for the same and the imposition of personal penalty on them is not improper, invalid and illegal. The learned Advocate vehemently submits that the conscious and deliberate attempt to evade the duties is manifest which can be deciphered from the facts recorded in the impugned order. It is strenuously argued that though the power to grant the immunity is provided in the said Act but it is within the discretion of the Settlement Commission either to grant wholly or in part immunity against the full penalty. It is submitted that the exception may is always interpreted as directory and not mandatory as held in case of Govind Lal Chaggan Lal Patel v. The Agriculture Produce Market Committee & Ors; reported in AIR 1976 SC 263 . By relying the division bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in case of Indorama Synthetics (India) Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 2013 (290) ELT 208, an argument is advanced that if the admission relating to the duty liability is evident from the application made before the Settlement Commission which lead to the imposition of penalty in part, the same does not violate the substantive provision. 6. Having considered the respective submissions, the dispute hinges as to whether the Settlement Commission is within its powers to impose penalty on each of the directors in addition to the imposition of penalty upon the Company. 6. Having considered the respective submissions, the dispute hinges as to whether the Settlement Commission is within its powers to impose penalty on each of the directors in addition to the imposition of penalty upon the Company. In the event, the answer is positive as to whether there was a sufficient material before the Settlement Commission which is reflected in the impugned order justifying such imposition of penalty. 7. The provision relating to the Settlement Commission was subsequently introduced in the year 2007 after its successful workability and yielding the favourable result in generating the revenue under the Income Tax Act, in the Central Excise Act. The application can be made by an assessee who is liable to pay the duty under Section 32E of the Central Excise Act. There is no definition assigned to the word "assessee" in the definition clause i.e. Section 2 of the said Act. The assessee appears to have been used in different provisions of the said Act assigning different meaning. It would not be incorrect to say that when a meaning is given in different provisions of the same Act, the meaning provided in a particular provision should be accepted and any importation from the meaning provided in the other provision, is not permissible. In Section 31 of the said Act which is in an integral part of Chapter V thereof defines assessee to mean any person liable for payment of excise duty assessed under that Act or any other Act and includes any producer or manufacturer of excisable goods or a registered person under the rules made under this Act or a private wire house in which excisable goods are stored. In relation to Section 4 of the Central Excise Act which contains the preamble valuation of excisable goods for purposes of charging of duty of excise, the assessee is defined to mean the person who is liable to pay the duties of excise under the acts and includes his agents. The interpretation of a particular word should be made in the context of applicable provision without borrowing the expression used in other section assigning the meaning of the said word as it would violate the intention of the legislature. Section 32E entitles the assessee to make an application for settlement before the Settlement Commission upon making a true and full disclosure of the tax liability. Section 32E entitles the assessee to make an application for settlement before the Settlement Commission upon making a true and full disclosure of the tax liability. Before proceeding further, it would relevant to quote 32E which runs thus: "Section 32E. Application for settlement of cases.- (1) An assessee may, in respect of a case relating to him, make an application, before adjudication, to the Settlement Commission to have the case settled, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed and containing a full and true disclosure of his duty liability which has not been disclosed before the Central Excise Officer having jurisdiction, the manner in which such liability has been derived, the additional amount of excise duty accepted to be payable by him and such other particulars as may be prescribed including the particulars of such excisable goods in respect of which he admits short levy on account of mis-classification, undervaluation, inapplicability of exemption notification or Cenvat credit and any such application shall be disposed of in the manner hereinafter provided: Provided that no such application shall be made unless,- (a) the applicant has filed returns showing production, clearance and Central Excise Duty paid in the prescribed manner; (b) a show cause notice for recovery of duty issued by the Central Excise Officer has been received by the applicant; (c) the additional amount of duty accepted by the applicant in his application exceeds three lakh rupees; and (d) the applicant has paid the additional amount of excise duty accepted by him along with interest due under Section 11AB:" 8. One of the essential ingredients to maintain the application is that a show cause notice is issued by the Central Excise Officer for recovery of the duty and received by the applicant. Section 32F of the said Act does not provide unfettered, unbrinded right upon the assessee to have his application heard as the Settlement Commission can reject the said application, in the event, the Settlement Commission is not satisfied from the explanation provided by the assessee-applicant. If the application is allowed to be proceeded with, the Settlement Commission, shall call for the report from the Commissioner of Central Excise having jurisdiction after making further inquiry or investigation in the matter and shall take into account the records and the report so submitted. If the application is allowed to be proceeded with, the Settlement Commission, shall call for the report from the Commissioner of Central Excise having jurisdiction after making further inquiry or investigation in the matter and shall take into account the records and the report so submitted. The immunity against the criminal proceeding as well as penalty and fine either wholly or in part may be granted upon being satisfied that the assessee has cooperated with the Settlement Commission and made full and true disclosure of duty liability. Section 32O which now stands after several amendments forecloses the right of the assessee to approach the Settlement Commission again after having approached earlier where the penalty is imposed on a person on the ground of concealment of particulars of his duty liability or the said assessee is convicted of any offence after passing of an order of settlement or where the Commissioner has referred the matter to the Central Excise Officer under Section 32L of the said Act. The power to impose penalty can be traced from Section 32I of the said Act providing an additional power vested in the Central Excise Officers under the said Act upon the Settlement Commission. 9. The conjoint reading of the different provisions contained in Chapter V of the said Act leaves no doubt that the Settlement Commission can not only impose the penalty and fine in exercise of powers as Central Excise Officers but bestowed with further powers to grant immunity against the same either wholly or in part. Though the expression shall and may connotes different meanings but for the purpose of considering its nature whether directory or mandatory, the legislative intention should be kept in mind. Sometimes both the words are treated as interchangeable but for the purpose of provision be mandatory or directory, it should be looked into in relation to the provision with general object intended to be secured. The aforesaid proposition can be fortified from a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Govindlal (supra) wherein it is held: "12. Plainly, "shall" must normally be construed to mean "shall" and not "may", for the distinction between the two is fundamental. Granting the application of mind, there is little or no chance that one who intends to leave a leeway will use the language of command in the performance of an act. Plainly, "shall" must normally be construed to mean "shall" and not "may", for the distinction between the two is fundamental. Granting the application of mind, there is little or no chance that one who intends to leave a leeway will use the language of command in the performance of an act. But since, even lesser directions are occasionally clothed in words of authority, it becomes necessary to delve deeper and ascertain the true meaning lying behind mere words. 13. Crawford on Statutory Construction (Edn. 1940, Article 261, p. 516) sets out the following passage from an American case approvingly: "The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other." Thus, the governing factor is the meaning and intent of the Legislature, which should be gathered not merely from the words used by the Legislature but from a variety of other circumstances and considerations. In other words, the use of the word "shall" or "may" is not conclusive on the question whether the particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory. But the circumstance that the Legislature has used a language of compulsive force is always of great relevance and in the absence of anything contrary in the context indicating that a permissive interpretation is permissible, the statute ought to be construed as peremptory. One of the fundamental rules of interpretation is that if the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature. Section 6(1) of the Act provides in terms, plain and precise, that a notification issued under the section "shall also" be published in Gujarati in a newspaper. The word also provides an important clue to the intention of the legislature because having provided that the notification shall be published in the Official Gazette, Section 6(1) goes on to say that the notification shall also be published in Gujarati in a newspaper. The word also provides an important clue to the intention of the legislature because having provided that the notification shall be published in the Official Gazette, Section 6(1) goes on to say that the notification shall also be published in Gujarati in a newspaper. The additional mode of publication prescribed by law must, in the absence of anything to the contrary appearing from the context of the provision or its object, be assumed to have a meaning and a purpose. In Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan it was observed that: "The term shall in its ordinary significance is mandatory and the court shall ordinarily give that interpretation to that term unless such an interpretation leads to some absurd or inconvenient consequence or be at variance with the intent of the Legislature, to be collected from other parts of the Act. The construction of the said expression depends on the provisions of a particular Act, the setting in which the expression appears, the object for which the direction is given, the consequences that would flow from the infringement of the direction and such other considerations." The same principle was expressed thus in Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui: "Several tests have been propounded in decided cases for determining the question whether a provision in a statute, or a rule is mandatory or directory. No universal rule can be laid down on this matter. In each case one must look to the subject-matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured." Recently in the Presidential Election case, the learned Chief Justice speaking on behalf of a seven-Judge Bench observed: "In determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, the subject-matter, the import of the provision, the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory., It is the duty of the courts to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the provision to be construed. The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is the animus imponentis, the intention of the law-maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole." 10. The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is the animus imponentis, the intention of the law-maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole." 10. Keeping in mind, the object and the intendment behind incorporation of Chapter V of the said Act, the expression may appear in Section 32K is discretionary and not mandatory. Though the object of incorporating the said Chapter is for speedy recovery of the duty but granting of immunity depends upon not only the cooperation in the settlement proceeding and making of true and full disclosure of the duty liability but also upon other attending facts including the conduct of the parties. While exercising the discretion which is no way to be exercised whimsically or arbitrarily, a onerous duty is cast upon the Settlement Commission to record the reasons which should be rational, reasonable and inconsonance with the spirit, object and the provision of the statute. 11. The Settlement Commission in the impugned order have recorded the elements of mens rea in concealing the duty liability and exercised its discretion properly in imposing the particular penalty not only on the company but also upon each of the directors. 12. It is argued by the department that Section 9AA of the Central Excise Act is explicit in the context where the offence is committed by the Company which brings within itself. The person, who at the time of Commission of offence, was in charge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business. It is sought to be contended that when an offence is committed by the Company, it imbibed within itself the directors or other persons responsible. It would be two bold propositions to be accepted. A right is given to an assessee defined in Section 31 A of the said Act to apply before the Settlement Commission and adjudication is to be made thereupon. The power to grant immunity is restricted to a person who made an application for settlement and, therefore, bringing any other person by invocation of the other provisions would frustrate the object and intendment for which it is incorporated. The power to grant immunity is restricted to a person who made an application for settlement and, therefore, bringing any other person by invocation of the other provisions would frustrate the object and intendment for which it is incorporated. The provisions contained in Chapter V of the Act can be pressed into action after the conditions laid down in proviso to Section 32E of the said Act where one of the conditions is that the show cause for recovery of the duties is issued by the Central Excise Officer and received by the assessee. 13. This Court feels that no further discussion and deliberation is required in the present case, as the applications were not only made by the Company but also each of the directors. In view of the facts recorded in the impugned order and the reasons for imposing the penalty on each of the directors, it can be said with certainty that such order is not based on the materials available with the record and there is no improper exercise of the discretion by the Settlement Commission. 14. Since the petitioner has already furnished the Bank Guarantee for the differential amount of the duty as assessed by the Settlement Commission, the Department is at liberty to invoke the Bank Guarantee and if any shortfall is still there, the petitioner shall deposit the same within four weeks from date. In addition to the same, the petitioner shall also deposit the penalties so imposed together with the interest to be calculated in terms of the impugned order within the aforesaid period. 15. This Court, therefore, does not find any grounds warranting the interference with the impugned order. 16. The writ petition fails. 17. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 18. Urgent photostat certified copy of the judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis. Petition dismissed.