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2014 DIGILAW 826 (BOM)

Deputy Regional Transport Officer v. Yeshwant

2014-03-27

A.P.BHANGALE

body2014
JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated 9.7.2007 passed by the District Judge-II, Akola in Regular Civil Appeal No. 431 of 2000 whereby appeal of the present respondent was allowed and judgment & decree passed by the trial Court dismissing the suit was set aside. 2. Plaintiff (present respondent) filed RCS No. 829 of 1997 before the Civil Judge, SD, Akola claiming following reliefs: “(1) Pass a decree in favour of plaintiff and against the defendants restraining them from not registering the vehicle of plaintiff permanently. (2) It may kindly be declared that the act of the defendants in not registering the vehicle as a transport vehicle is an injustice upon the plaintiff and therefore, direction may kindly be issued to register the vehicle as transport-vehicle forthwith. (3) Compensation may kindly be awarded to plaintiff and same be saddled on both the defendants jointly and severally. (4) .... (5) .....” 3. Plaintiff was desirous to purchase Mini-Door three-wheeler of Bajaj make and he approached District Industries Centre, Akola for loan on 11.2.1997. DIC recommended grant of loan to the tune of Rs. 1,44,875/- in favour of plaintiff. Vehicle was delivered to the plaintiff through Dealer Khandelwal Automobiles, Akola on 28.10.1997. Plaintiff then on 29.10.1997 approached Regional Transport Office. However, appellant/defendant no. 1 refused to register the vehicle as a transport vehicle on the ground that plaintiff had approached after expiry of 180 days. According to plaintiff, he was not at all responsible for delay. He put the blame on District Industries Centre for delay. Even his fresh application was not accepted by the Regional Transport Office. He alleged that for want of registration of vehicle as a transport vehicle, he could not ply the vehicle for business purposes; vehicle was stationary and was even dashed by one truck due to which he sustained damages. He was required to pay instalment of Rs. 110/- per day and he loss income of Rs. 200/- per day from the vehicle. Plaintiff thus filed suit claiming the reliefs as stated above. 4. Present appellants (original defendants) opposed suit by denying all adverse allegations and mainly on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction and the order of refusal could have been challenged before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai. 5. 200/- per day from the vehicle. Plaintiff thus filed suit claiming the reliefs as stated above. 4. Present appellants (original defendants) opposed suit by denying all adverse allegations and mainly on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction and the order of refusal could have been challenged before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai. 5. Learned trial Court held that the plaintiff failed to make necessary compliances and dismissed the suit also on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the suit. 6. Plaintiff Yeshwant preferred Regular Civil Appeal (being RCA No. 431 of 2000). Learned 1st appellate Judge allowed the appeal and decreed suit of plaintiff. Learned 1st appellate Court held that plaintiff was entitled to registration of vehicle as a transport vehicle and that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the suit. 7. Present appeal was admitted on 10th September 2009 on the following substantial question of law – “Whether the first appellate court fell in error in holding that the vehicle can be produced for registration even beyond period of 180 days and it can be still registered under Rule No. 73 of Maharashtra Motor Vehicle Rules?” 8. My attention has been invited to Section 94 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1994 regarding bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain suit regarding grant of permit. Section 94 of the Act reads as under: “94. Bar on jurisdiction of Civil Courts. - No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to the grant of a permit under this Act, and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the duly constituted authorities under this Act with regard to the grant of a permit, shall be entertained by any Civil Court.” The provision would thus indicate that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit relating to grant of a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act and also that no injunction in respect of any action or to be taken by the duly constituted authorities shall be granted. Thus, there is mandatory provision which bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matters relating to grant or refusal of permit and consequential relief of injunction. 9. Thus, there is mandatory provision which bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matters relating to grant or refusal of permit and consequential relief of injunction. 9. In the present case, learned trial Judge has dealt with the issue as to whether Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide and suit and it has answered the issue in the negative. Learned trial Judge has observed that under rule 43 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, the authority to hear appeal against any appellate order passed by the registering authority under Chapter IV of the Act, shall be the Transport Commissioner. In view of the provisions of rule 43, in the matter of grant or refusal of transport permit, it is revealed that the appeal is required to be made before the statutory forum i.e. the State Transport Tribunal, Mumbai. Jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain and try civil suit in this regard is mandatorily barred under Section 94 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, issue no. 3 framed by the trial Court was discussed and answered where the trial Court concluded that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. 10. Substantial question of law formulated in this appeal and reproduced hereinabove, is based on rule 73 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 which reads thus – “73. Entry of Registration mark on permit. - (1) Where the registration mark of the vehicle is to be entered on the permit, and the applicant is not the registered owner of the vehicle on the date of application, shall, within one month of the sanction of application by the Regional Transport Authority, or such longer period as such Transport Authority may specify, produce before that Authority the certificate of registration of the vehicle registered in his name in order that particular of the registration mark may be entered in the permit. (2) No permit shall be issued until the registration mark of the vehicle to which it relates has been entered therein, and in the event of any applicant failing to produce the certificate of registration within the period specified in sub-rule (1) or the extended period, as the case may be, the Regional Transport Authority may withdraw its sanction of the application.” The provision incorporated in rule 73 of the Rules basically contains legal procedure as to how registration mark is to be entered on permit for the motor vehicle. It is in relation to period during which an application by registered owner of the vehicle is to be sanctioned by the Regional Transport Authority. Sub-rule (2) is in relation to grant of permit till certain condition is complied, as stated, for sanctioning the permit by the production of certificate of registration. 11. Remedy available under the Statute must be exhausted first before ordinary forum of Civil Court can be approached. Chapter-IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the procedure for registration of motor vehicle specifying provisions as to how, where registration is to be made as also refusal of registration or renewal thereof; assignment of new registration mark, no objection certificate, transfer of ownership, suspension of registration, cancellation of registration and certificate of fitness for transport vehicles. Section 57 of the Act provides for appellate authority when any person is aggrieved by an order passed by the registering authority in Chapter-IV under Sections 41 to 43, 45, 47, 50, 52, 53, 55 and 56. Remedy is available for any aggrieved person who receives notice of such order to file an appeal to the prescribed appellate authority. Under Section 57 such appellate authority can hear the appeal and pass an appropriate order as it may thinks fit. Thus, against any order passed by the registering authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, the aggrieved person can approach the prescribed appellate authority and seeks redressal of his grievance. Thus, when appellate forum – Regional Transport Authority/State Transport Authority is provided and furthermore, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is also constituted to hear appeals or revisions, as the case may be, in accordance with the Rules. Thus, when appellate forum – Regional Transport Authority/State Transport Authority is provided and furthermore, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is also constituted to hear appeals or revisions, as the case may be, in accordance with the Rules. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 89(2) of the Act as an appellate authority can be approached in cases where State or Regional Transport Authority refuses to grant transport permit or revoke or suspend the permit in an appeal or by revision under Section 90 of the Act. Thus, Section 94 by express term prohibits Civil Court from exercising jurisdiction to entertain any such question relating to grant or refusal of permit and prohibit any injunction order by the Civil Court in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the duly constituted authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with regard to grant or refusal of permit for motor vehicle etc. Thus, in view of express bar under Section 94 of the Act which the trial Court in this case had rightly considered by refusing to exercise jurisdiction to entertain the suit, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there was clear error on the part of 1st appellate Court to interfere with the question of registration of the motor vehicle which requires interpretation of the provisions in rule 73 of the Maharashtra Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. 12. I have already observed that there is clear bar for the Civil Court to entertain a suit in relation to grant or refusal of a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as also an injunction relation to action taken or to be taken by the duly constituted authority under the Motor Vehicles Act regarding grant or refusal of permit. That being so, when there is clear bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit, more-so, when special statutory forum is made available for to prefer appeal and to obtain final decision in this regard. The substantial question of law as formulated at the time of admission of appeal, to my mind, would not really survive when there was clear statutory bar for the Civil Court to entertain the suit relating to registration of the vehicle, grant or refusal of permit to ply vehicle for permitted user as special Appellate forum is created under the Act and is available. 13. 13. Learned 1st appellate Judge ignored the statutory bar contained in Section 94 read with relevant rules under the Act and erred in law to set aside the judgment and order of the trial Court by which the suit was dismissed. In my opinion, the plaintiff could not have instituted suit with prayers as made therein relating to refusal of registration, grant or refusal of permit under the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules framed thereunder when there is statutory bar for the Civil Court to entertain the suit. There is clear objective of the Legislature to avoid unnecessary litigation and also to avoid unnecessary expenses. When language of the provision is clear and unambiguous, it is duty of the Civil Court to give effect to such provision. In such cases, consideration of hardship will not be a legitimate ground for not faithfully implementing the mandate of the Legislature. Hence, appeal has to succeed. 14. In the result, impugned judgment and order dated 9.7.2007 passed by the District Judge-II, Akola in RCA No. 431 of 2000 is hereby quashed and set aside and judgment and decree dated 14.9.2000 passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Akola in Regular Civil Suit No. 824 of 1997 is restored. Appeal stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.