Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 826 (CAL)

Managing Committee Kanchrapara Indian Girls' High School v. Papiya Mukherjee

2014-08-28

JYOTIRMAY BHATTACHARYA, TAPASH MOOKHERJEE

body2014
JUDGMENT : This mandamus appeal is directed against the judgment and/or order passed by the Learned Single Judge of this Court on 13th December, 2013 in W.P. No. 12955 (W) of 2013 at the instance of the school authority. 2. The State-respondent has also filed an appeal challenging the very same order passed by the Learned Trial Judge, after taking leave of this court for filing such an appeal without the certified copy of the impugned order. 3. The present appeal being MAT No. 758 of 2014, was filed by the school authority beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Delay in filing the said appeal was condoned by this court on 25th August, 2014. The other appeal was filed by the State-respondents, within the period of limitation as per the provision contained in Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the said appeal was filed by the State authority within 30 days from the date of service of notice of appeal upon the State authority. 4. Since the common order, passed by the Learned Trial Judge is under challenge in both the aforesaid appeals, we thought it fit to dispose of both the aforesaid appeals simultaneously for avoiding conflict of decision. 5. Heard the Learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties and examined the materials on record including the order impugned. 6. Let us now consider the merit of the instant appeal in the facts of the instant case. 7. A vacancy in the post of Assistant Teacher reserved for Schedule Tribe occurred in the school sometime in 1993 i.e. prior to the introduction of the West Bengal School Service Commission Act, 1997. The concerned District Inspector of Schools (SE) granted prior permission to the school authority for filling up the said post of Assistant Teacher in Commerce in the higher secondary section from the Scheduled Tribe candidates. After such prior permission was granted by the concerned District Inspector of Schools (SE), the school authority requested the concerned Employment Exchange for sponsoring suitable candidates for the said post. The concerned Employment Exchange expressed its inability to sponsor the names of suitable candidates for the said post due to non-availability of such candidates from Scheduled tribe community. Thereafter, the school authority published an advertisement inviting applications from suitable candidates for the said post. The concerned Employment Exchange expressed its inability to sponsor the names of suitable candidates for the said post due to non-availability of such candidates from Scheduled tribe community. Thereafter, the school authority published an advertisement inviting applications from suitable candidates for the said post. Even in response to the said advertisement, no suitable candidate applied for the said post. In such circumstances, the school authority requested the concerned District Magistrate to convert the said post which was reserved for Scheduled Tribe to the post for general candidate. The concerned District Magistrate, instead of allowing such prayer of the school authority, advised the school authority to approach the concerned District Inspector of Schools (SE) for de-reservation of the said post. Pursuant to such advice given by the concerned District Magistrate, the school authority by its letter dated 1st September, 1997 requested the concerned District Inspector of Schools (SE) for de-reserving the said post so that a suitable candidate from the general category can be selected for such appointment. The District Inspector of Schools (SE) did not respond to the school's such request. 8. Under such circumstances, the Managing Committee of the said school selected the writ petitioner/respondent for her appointment as an Assistant Teacher in Commerce group on temporary basis. The writ petitioner accepted the offer of such appointment given by the school authority and joined her service. It is necessary to mention here that the writ petitioner is a general candidate. As such, it cannot be contended that she was given appointment on temporary basis against a permanent post. We have already indicated above that the permanent post was required to be filled up by Scheduled Tribe candidate as per the prior permission granted by the concerned District Inspector of Schools (SE). 9. Admittedly, the writ petitioner rendered her service as an Assistant Teacher in the said school continuously till 2012. On or about 18th October, 2011, the writ petitioner approached the school authority for regularising her service against the said permanent post. 9. Admittedly, the writ petitioner rendered her service as an Assistant Teacher in the said school continuously till 2012. On or about 18th October, 2011, the writ petitioner approached the school authority for regularising her service against the said permanent post. Since the school authority did not take any decision on the petitioner's such prayer for regularising her service as an Assistant Teacher in the said school, she by her advocate's letter dated 2nd February, 2012 requested the then Director of School Education to regularise her service in the post of an Assistant Teacher in the commerce stream in higher secondary section in the said school as she has been continuously rendering her service in the said school for a period of more than 10 years. 10. Since the petitioner's said representation remained unattended from the end of the concerned Director of School Education for a long time, the petitioner ultimately moved a writ petition before this court. The said writ petition which was registered as W.P. No. 5 of 2012, was disposed of by one of us (Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, J.) on 20th January, 2012 by permitting the writ petitioner to submit a comprehensive representation seeking regularisation of her service in the sanctioned vacancy in the said school before the Director of School Education, West Bengal within two weeks from date with this rider that in the event such representation is submitted by the writ petitioner before the Director of School Education within the time as aforesaid, the Director of School Education will consider the petitioner's said representation in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka & Ors. v. M.L. Kesari & Ors. reported in (2010)9 SCC 247 and take the ultimate decision thereon by passing a reasoned order after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner and the school authority. The concerned authority was directed to take the ultimate decision on the said representation of the writ petitioner within a time bound period. Status quo with regard to service of the writ petitioner in the post in question where she was working, was directed to be maintained till two weeks after such decision is taken by the concerned authority. 11. The concerned authority was directed to take the ultimate decision on the said representation of the writ petitioner within a time bound period. Status quo with regard to service of the writ petitioner in the post in question where she was working, was directed to be maintained till two weeks after such decision is taken by the concerned authority. 11. The said writ petition was thus, disposed of with the above direction issued upon the Director of School Education who was subsequently re-designated as Commissioner of School Education. Thereafter, the writ petitioner submitted a comprehensive representation before the Commissioner of School Education which was disposed of by the Commissioner of School Education on 12th March, 2013. The Commissioner of School Education held that the writ petitioner does not deserve to be considered for regularisation in terms of the solemn judgement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.L. Kesari's case and/or Uma Devi's case. Elaborate reasons were given by the Commissioner of School Education in support of his conclusion. 12. Immediately after passing of the aforesaid order by the Commissioner of School Education on 12th March, 2013, the service of the writ petitioner was discontinued by the school authority. 13. The legality and/or propriety of the said order of the Commissioner of School Education dated 12th March, 2013 was challenged by the writ petitioner in the writ petition filed by her which was registered as W.P. No. 12955 (W) of 2013. 14. The Learned Trial Judge held that since the writ petitioner was appointed through the regular process of recruitment undertaken by the school, she was required to be regularised in view of the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and ors. v. Uma Devi and ors. reported in (2006)4 SCC page 1. Such conclusion was drawn by the Learned Trial Judge by referring to paragraph 53 of the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case. For the sake of convenience of understanding the legality of the order impugned, paragraph 53 of the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case is set out hereunder:- "53. One aspect needs to be clarified. For the sake of convenience of understanding the legality of the order impugned, paragraph 53 of the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case is set out hereunder:- "53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa, R.N. Nanjundappa and B.N. Nagarajan and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recuritments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wages are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme." 15. The said judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case was further considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a subsequent case reported in (2010)9 SCC page 247 State of Karnataka & Ors. v. M.L. Kesari & Ors. The said judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case was further considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a subsequent case reported in (2010)9 SCC page 247 State of Karnataka & Ors. v. M.L. Kesari & Ors. wherein the exception contained in paragraph 53 of Uma Devi's case for regularisation of irregular appointment as a one-time measure was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was held therein that the process of regularisation as a one-time measure should be taken up so that all eligible persons who had the right to be considered for regularisation in terms of the para 53 of Uma Devi's case, are considered by the authority within a time bound period. 16. Accordingly, direction was given upon the concerned authority for consideration of the candidates who deserve to be regularised in terms of Uma Devi's case within six months from the date of the order as a general one-time regularisation exercise. 17. Thus, if we consider the subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.L.Kesari's case, we find that only the time limit which was fixed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case for regularisation of the deserving candidates, was further extended by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its subsequent decision in M.L.Kesari's case. However, while issuing direction upon the concerned authority for doing such exercise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court made it clear that it is only those candidates who deserve to be considered for regularisation in terms of the paragraph 53 of Uma Devi's case will be considered for regularisation under the said extended one-time regularisation exercise. 18. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the yardstick laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case regarding regularisation of service of the temporary employees, was relaxed by the subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.L.Kesari's case. 19. As such, we are now required to consider as to whether the writ petitioner can be regularised in her service in terms of paragraph 53 of Uma Devi's case. 20. Undisputedly, the writ petitioner had requisite qualification for the post of an Assistant Teacher of a Higher Secondary School in Commerce stream, but she was not appointed against a duly sanctioned vacant post. 21. 20. Undisputedly, the writ petitioner had requisite qualification for the post of an Assistant Teacher of a Higher Secondary School in Commerce stream, but she was not appointed against a duly sanctioned vacant post. 21. This conclusion we draw, as we have already mentioned above that the vacant post for which prior permission was granted by the concerned District Inspector of Schools was reserved for the Scheduled Tribes. The writ petitioner was a general candidate. As such, the vacant post could not have been filled up by the writ petitioner. In fact, her appointment was also not given by the school authority against the sanctioned vacant post. At least, the appointment letter which was issued to her does not indicate as such. Though the school authority selected her for appointment as an Assistant Teacher in the Commerce stream in the Higher Secondary Section for the said school, but no selection test was taken by the school authority before selecting her as an Assistant Teacher in the said school. 22. Since the writ petitioner was not appointed against any sanctioned vacancy and she was not selected through the recruitment process, she cannot be held to be a deserving candidate in terms of Uma Devi's case, particularly when, she did not render her service in the said school for a continuous period of ten years without intervention of the order of the Court or Tribunal as on the date of passing of the order by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case, i.e. 10th June, 2004. This conclusion was drawn by us as she was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the said school on purely temporary basis on 15th June, 2000. 23. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that despite the writ petitioner had requisite educational qualification for the post of an Assistant Teacher in Commerce stream in Higher Secondary School, she cannot be considered for regularisation of her service in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, either in the case of Uma Devi, or in the case of Keshri for the reason as mentioned above. 24. Accordingly, we cannot agree with the ultimate conclusion which was drawn by the Learned Trial Judge in the impugned order. 25. Before parting with, we like to discuss here the contention of Mr. 24. Accordingly, we cannot agree with the ultimate conclusion which was drawn by the Learned Trial Judge in the impugned order. 25. Before parting with, we like to discuss here the contention of Mr. Chatterjee, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the writ petitioner/respondent that the appeal is not maintainable at the instance of the school authority. According to him, the direction which was given by the Learned Trial Judge, for regularisation of the petitioner's service was enforceable against the State respondent. He contends that at least the first part of the direction of the Learned Trial Judge, i.e, the regularisation of the writ petitioner's service cannot be held to be an order passed adverse to the right and/or interest of the school authority as such direction was not directed against the school authority. He, however, submits that the school authority may be affected by the later part of the direction of the Learned Trial Judge whereby direction was given upon the school authority to allow the writ petitioner to join her duties so that she can discharge her duties as a Commerce Teacher in the said school. Mr. Chatterjee, further submits that if the ultimate direction which was given by the Learned Trial Judge does not in any way affect the interest of the school authority, the school authority cannot be held to be a party aggrieved against the impugned order and as such the appeal at the instance of the school authority is not maintainable. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the following cases :- i) In the case of Cyril E. Fernandes v. Sr. Maria Lydia & Ors., reported in 1977(4) SCC 94 , and ii) In the case of The Chairman, Adhoc Committee, Calcutta District Primary School Council v. Nagendra prasad Sing & Ors., reported in 2007(2) CHN 503 . 26. In this context, we have considered the submission of Mr. Chatterjee regarding maintainability of this mandamus appeal at the instance of the school authority. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee, as recorded hereinabove, shows that the mandamus appeal is maintainable, as at least a part of the impugned order affects the right of the school authority. As such, we cannot hold that this mandamus appeal is not maintainable at the instance of the school authority. 27. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee, as recorded hereinabove, shows that the mandamus appeal is maintainable, as at least a part of the impugned order affects the right of the school authority. As such, we cannot hold that this mandamus appeal is not maintainable at the instance of the school authority. 27. As such, we cannot hold that this mandamus appeal is not maintainable at the instance of the school authority. 28. We want to elaborate by further recording that as a matter of fact, if the entire order is considered as a whole, then we have no hesitation to hold that the school authority is affected by the entire order passed by the Learned Trial Judge. 29. In the first part of the impugned order, the Learned Trial judge issued direction for regularisation of the writ petitioner's service. It is no doubt true that the school authority is not the authority to regularise the service of the writ petitioner, but it is equally true that in case the service of the writ petitioner is regularised ultimately, the school authority which does not want to give appointment to the writ petitioner will have to retain her in the school until her retirement. Thus, it cannot be held that the school authority is not aggrieved if the service of the writ petitioner is regularised. 30. As such, we hold that the mandamus appeal is maintainable at the instance of the school authority. 31. That apart, we have already indicated above that the State respondent has also preferred an appeal challenging the very same impugned order and the said appeal which was registered as MAT 1584 of 2004 State v. Ms. Papiya Mukherjee is also being considered along with this appeal filed by the school authority. The maintainability of the appeal at the instance of the State has not been challenged. If the said appeal is maintainable at the instance of the State respondent, this Court can very well hold that even without filing the instant appeal the school authority may challenge the legality of the impugned order in the appeal filed by the State authority in view of the provision contained in Order41 Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code. As such, the locus of the school authority to challenge the impugned order cannot be denied. The decisions cited by Mr. Chatterjee have no application in the facts of the instant case. As such, the locus of the school authority to challenge the impugned order cannot be denied. The decisions cited by Mr. Chatterjee have no application in the facts of the instant case. 32. As such, we do not find any substance in this part of the contention of Mr. Chatterjee. We hold that both the appeals are maintainable. 33. In view of the findings already arrived at by this Court hereinbove, we set aside the judgment and/or order of the Learned Trial Judge which is impugned in this appeal. 34. Both the appeals, thus, stand allowed. 35. The writ petition stands rejected. 36. The appeal filed by the State authority being MAT 1584 of 2014 is also disposed of by treating the same as on the day's list. 37. In view of the disposal of the appeal itself, no further order need be passed on the stay application which is deemed to be disposed of. 38. The application for stay being CAN 5328 of 2014 is thus, deemed to be disposed of. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the learned advocate for the appellant immediately. Appeals are allowed.