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2014 DIGILAW 828 (GAU)

Kamrul Ikbal Hasan v. State of Assam

2014-09-01

PRASANTA KUMAR SAIKIA

body2014
JUDGMENT Prasanta Kumar Saikia, J. 1. This proceeding has been initiated u/s. 397 read with section 401 of the Cr.P.C., questioning the order dated 30.09.2013 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri, in GR (MKCR) No. 213/2012 arising out of Mankachar P.S. Case No. 213/2012 refusing, amongst other things, to order further investigation in Mankachar P.S. Case No. 213/2012. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 30.09.2013, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri, in GR (MKCR) No. 213/2012, the petitioner has come up with this proceeding contending that such order is not in tune with law as well as various decisions, rendered by the Apex Court of the country as well as the High Courts. 2. I have heard Mr. A.M. Buzarbaruah, assisted by Ms. M. Bora and Mr. N. Islam and also heard Mr. K. Munir, learned Addl. P.P., Assam and Mr. D. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2. 3. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the present proceeding are that the informant herein had lodged an FIR with O/C, Mankachar P.S., on 26.05.2012, alleging that one Kamrul Ikbal Hassan @ Mamin (petitioner in this proceeding) had been maintaining illicit/illegal physical relationship with the petitioner over a long period of time. In the FIR, it has also been stated that on 28.05.2012 at about 12 night, said Mamun had entered into her house and committed rape on her against her will. 4. The volunteers from VDP became aware of such incident for which they apprehended the accused person and took him with them. In that connection, an FIR has been lodged with O/C, Mankachar P.S., against accused (a) Kamrul Ikbal Hassan @ Mamun, i(b) Haji Abdul Kashem Sarkar, (e) Rofik Ikbal Hasan, (d) Muksedul Hoque and (e) Moynal Hoque alleging that accused person at serial No. (a) above committed the rape on the victim whereas other persons aforesaid helped the accused Kamrul Ikbal Hassan @ Mamun to flee the scene. 5. On the receipt of such FIR, police registered a case vide Mankachar PS. Case No. 213/2012, u/s. 454/376 of the IPC. Police examined the witnesses including the victim, did other needful and on conclusion of investigation, I/O submitted charge-sheet u/s. 454/376 of the IPC against the accused person kamrul Ikbal Hassan @ Mamun. Ultimately, the case came to be transferred to the file of JMFC, Dhubri. Case No. 213/2012, u/s. 454/376 of the IPC. Police examined the witnesses including the victim, did other needful and on conclusion of investigation, I/O submitted charge-sheet u/s. 454/376 of the IPC against the accused person kamrul Ikbal Hassan @ Mamun. Ultimately, the case came to be transferred to the file of JMFC, Dhubri. On the receipt of the case on transfer, the learned JMFC, Dhubri issued summons to the accused person requiring him to appear before the court and to face the charge and subsequent trial, if any. 6. It may be stated that during the course of investigation, the victim submitted an affidavit-cum-declaration dated 18.01.2013 before the I/O stating therein that she lodged the FIR which gave rise to Mankachar P.S. Case No. 213/2012 due to some misunderstandings and also under the influence of her friends and as such, she needs to be allowed to withdraw the FIR. Thereafter, on 25.01.2013, she also filed another application making similar prayer before the O/C. Mankachar P.S. 7. In spite of filing such affidavit/application the police did take no notice of such affidavit/application and had submitted the charge-sheet against the accused petitioner as stated above. Thereafter, vide representation at Annexure-7 to the petition, the father of the accused petitioner submitted another representation before the O/C, Mankachar P.S., requesting him to send the affidavit dated 18.01.2013 and petition dated 25.01.2013 to the Magistrate for his taking decision on the application/affidavit filed by the victim contending that some subsequent developments require that the petitioner may be allowed to withdraw the FIR. 8. Since no action was taken on the application at Annexure-7, on 30.09.2013, father of the accused/petitioner filed another application before the JMFC, Dhubri. Such application was also accompanied by affidavit dated 18.01.2013, the application dated 25.01.2013 and copies of some other documents/Said application was filed seeking following reliefs:-- "It is therefore, prayed that the Learned Court may be pleased to admit the application, issue process upon the police authority of Mankachar Police Station and direct them to forward the further evidence(s) in the form of the affidavit dated 18.01.2013 and the application dated 25.01.2013 of the informant for its due consideration/proper adjudication of the case and/or pass such order/or orders as the Learned court deem fit and proper." 9. The learned court considered such application and rejected the same by his order dated 30.09.2013 on the grounds more than one, they being 1) that the offences u/s. 454/376 IPC is not compoundable, 2) that there is no provision under the law for withdrawal of FIR and 3) that no direction can be given to the Investigating Agency to conduct the case in a particular manner. 10. Being aggrieved, the accused/petitioner approached this court by way of application u/s. 397/401 IPC seeking the following reliefs:-- "It is therefore, prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to admit the petition, call for the records, issue Rule calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why the impugned order dated 30.09.2013 passed in Misc. Case being No. 4367 dated 30.09.2013 under Section 173(8) of the Cr. P.C., in GR (MKCR) 213/2013 by the learned Court, Dhubri should not be set aside and/or quashed, and upon perusal of the records and considering the show cause, if any, and upon hearing the parties be pleased to set aside and/or quashed the impugned order dated 30.09.2013 passed in Petition being No. 4367 dated 30.09.2013 under Section 173(8), Cr. P.C. in GR (MKCR) 213/2013 by the learned court, Dhubri and/or pass such order/or orders as the Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case." 11. According to the petitioner, order dated 30.09.2013 is totally illegal and same is liable to be quashed and set aside. In regard to the contention of the Magistrate that under the law, there is no provision for the informant to withdraw the FIR, it has been submitted that though there is no express provision in the law authorizing the informant to withdraw the FIR, there is no inhibition either in the law debarring the informant from withdrawing the FIR, he/she lodged. 12. Since there is nothing in the law prohibiting the informant from withdrawing his/her FIR, it needs to be concluded that in appropriate case, the informant may be allowed to withdraw the FIR, and if necessary, even when the investigation, so initiated on the basis of the FIR, sought to be withdrawn, still underway. 12. Since there is nothing in the law prohibiting the informant from withdrawing his/her FIR, it needs to be concluded that in appropriate case, the informant may be allowed to withdraw the FIR, and if necessary, even when the investigation, so initiated on the basis of the FIR, sought to be withdrawn, still underway. Since the police officer did not allow the informant to withdraw the FIR, she lodged, despite there being genuine and valid reason to do so, the decision of the Magistrate that there is no provision in law allowing the informant to withdraw the FIR is untenable in law and as such, order in question is liable to be set aside. 13. In regard to contention of the Magistrate that offences u/s. 454/376 IPC are not compoundable and as such, the informant cannot be allowed to compound such offences, it has been contended that in appropriate cases, such as, where the informant/victim filed the case due to some mis-understanding or where the parties genuinely want to live in peace burying their hatchets etc., the parties may be allowed to compound cases despite such cases relate to non-compoundable offences. 14. In that connection, it has been stated that in the case in hand, the informant has repeatedly told the Investigating Officer that she lodged the case in question owing to misunderstanding and also on being influenced by some of her friends and as such, she may be allowed to withdraw the FIR Such factors, coupled with circumstances which lead to filing of case in hand unmistakably, show that there is no possibility of accused being convicted of the offences alleged against him. 15. On this court also, the concerned police officer should have allowed the informant to withdraw the case. For the same reasons, the court below too ought to have allowed the cases between the parties to be settled amicably on compounding the aforesaid offences. In support of such a claim, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision of the Meghalaya High Court in the case of the Aditya Goenka vs. The State of Meghalaya & Ors., reported in 2013 (4) GUT (ML) 304. 16. The relevant part is reproduced below:-- "The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that initially there were a dispute between the petitioner namely Shri Aditya Goenka and the complainant Shri. Tashi Dolma in Crl. Petn. 16. The relevant part is reproduced below:-- "The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that initially there were a dispute between the petitioner namely Shri Aditya Goenka and the complainant Shri. Tashi Dolma in Crl. Petn. (SH) No. 19 of 2013 and Shri. Rajen Chetri in Crl. Petn. (SH) No. 20 of 2013 who filed FIRs with the police which were registered as Shillong Sadar PS Case No. 34(3) 2010 in Crl. Petn. (SH) No. 19 of 2013 and Shillong Sadar PS Case No. 35(3) of 2010 in Crl. Petn. (SH) No. 20 of 2013 respectively. There was also a Civil Suit filed before the Asst. District Judge, Shillong. In the meantime, the petitioner and the complainants came to a settlement outside the Court and settled the matter amicably and also pointed out the Settlement Deeds which are at Annexure-2 (Page-16) in Crl. Petn. (SH) No. 19 of 2013 and Annexure-2 (Page-12) in Crl. Petn. (SH) No. 20 of 2013. The learned counsel further argues that since the matter has already been settled between the parties and the offences are not serious in nature, the matter may be quashed. (3). Mr. N. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 in support of the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. K. Paul and prays that the proceeding may be quashed for the interest of justice. (4) On the other hand, Mr. R. Gurung, learned Addl. P.P., submits that before quashing the proceeding, nature of the offences may be examined. (5) After hearing the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as for the complainants and on perusal of the Compromise Deeds, I find that during pendency of this proceeding, the parties have resolved their differences amicably outside the court and the matter has been compromised. If so, I do not see any reason on my part to encourage the parties to drag the case further, rather it will create a burden on the parties unnecessarily when the parties themselves do not want to proceed with the proceeding. Section 380 IPC is non-compoundable. Section 482 Cr. P.C. has given wide power to the High Court to apply it as and when necessary for the end of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of law. Section 380 IPC is non-compoundable. Section 482 Cr. P.C. has given wide power to the High Court to apply it as and when necessary for the end of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of law. (6) In spite of the compromise made by the parties and prayer for quashing of the proceeding, if I reject the petition, I feel that injustice will be cause to the parties. Therefore, by invoking the power u/s. 482 Cr. P.C., I hereby quash both the proceeding." 17. Even if one assumes for the sake of argument that Magistrate has no authority to compound offences which are not made compoundable under section 320 Cr. P.C., yet then such prohibition cannot come in the way of this court invoking the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C., since in appropriate case, the High Court can allow the compounding of cases even if such offences are not otherwise compoundable under the law. 18. In support of connection, my attention has been drawn to the decisions in Shiji @ Pappu & Ors. vs. Radhika & Anr. reported in (2011) 10 SCC 705 has been referred to. 19. Relevant part is reproduced below:- "17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 Cr. P.C. is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under section 482 Cr. P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and the exercise of power by the High court to quash the prosecution under Section 482Cr.P.C. on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offence with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section, 320 Cr. P.C. 18. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section, 320 Cr. P.C. 18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C., by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that it is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked." 20. In regard to the contention that the Magistrate cannot give direction to the Investigating Officer to conduct investigation in a particular direction, it has been contended that in the present case, the informant or for that matter, the petitioner never prayed for conducting investigation in a particular direction. What the informant as well as the petitioner had prayed for was a direction requiring the I/O to take notice of developments, subsequent to the filing of the FIR and to act on such developments since those developments have enormous implications on the outcome of the case in hand. 21. According to the petitioner, the developments, subsequent to the filing of FIR, were of so important, so fundamental and so significant that such developments would totally wash way the very foundation of the FIR in question and so also the foundation of the prosecution case. 21. According to the petitioner, the developments, subsequent to the filing of FIR, were of so important, so fundamental and so significant that such developments would totally wash way the very foundation of the FIR in question and so also the foundation of the prosecution case. In that connection, it has also been stated that there were major variations in the stories which prosecutrix told and retold in various stages of the investigation. 22. That apart, the facts and circumstances which lead to filling of the Mankachar P.S. Case No. 213/2012 corresponding to G.R. (MKCR) Case No. 113/2012 are so unnatural and suspicious that it also casts serious doubt on the veracity of entire prosecution case. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, these are more and more reasons as to why the learned Magistrate ought to have directed the police to go for further investigation having regard to the developments which took place after the lodging of FIR aforesaid. 23. I have heard Mr. K. Munir, learned Addl. P.P., appearing for the State. While admitting that the Magistrate has the power under Section 173(8) Cr. P.C., to order further investigation, yet, according to learned Addl. P.P., under the law, after the submission of charge-sheet and after taking cognizance on such charge-sheet and after issuance of summons to the accused persons, his power to direct further investigation gets greatly circumscribed. 24. But that does not mean that he becomes totally helpless after submission of the charge sheet to take action against the person/persons, not sent up for trial but responsible for committing crime/crimes in league with person or persons who are already sent for trial. The code of Criminal Procedure has taken care of such situations by incorporating provisions like Section319 Cr. P.C. 25. His further case was that though in appropriate case, the court can direct further investigation, yet, it is beyond its authority to direct the Investigating Agency to conduct investigation in a particular direction since it is prerogative of the Investigating Agency as to how investigation conducted to find out person/persons responsible for commission of crime/crimes. In support of such connection, my attention has been drawn to the decisions rendered in Popular Muthiah vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police reported in (2006) 7 SCC 296 . 26. According to Mr. K. Munir, learned Addl. In support of such connection, my attention has been drawn to the decisions rendered in Popular Muthiah vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police reported in (2006) 7 SCC 296 . 26. According to Mr. K. Munir, learned Addl. P.P., when one reads the materials on record in their entirety, it would appear clear that present case is not one where Magistrate can order further investigation. This is because of the fact that in her FIR, the victim makes an allegation that the accused had committed rape on her and such statement in the FIR also stood affirmed in view of statements, made by the victim before the Magistrate during the course of investigation. 27. However, subsequently, she changed her version to say that she had lodged the case on the influence of other persons and also due to some communication gaps. He submits that if the prayer of the father of the accused petitioner is allowed it would jeopardize the arrangement of things so made in the Code of Criminal Procedure and in such an eventuality, the people would be at liberty to file criminal case with extremely serious charge with ulterior and clandestine motive only to be withdrawn subsequently when such designs are attained. Mr. Munir, therefore, urges this court to dismiss the present proceeding. 28. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties having regard to the materials on record. Before we proceed further, I find it necessary to have a look at the provisions of law which holds the fields in the present proceeding. The provisions of law in question can be found in Section 173(8) Cr. P.C. For ready reference same is reproduce below:-- "Section 173(8)-Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-section (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2)." 29. A careful perusal of the Chapter XII of the Code reveals that (a) up to the stage of submitting of charge-sheet or filling report as the case may be u/s. 173(8) Cr. P.C., the Executive wing of the State has full power and control over the investigation of the case, (b) once report is submitted to the Magistrate u/s. 173(8) Cr. P.C., the Executive Wing of the State Government cannot interfere with the trial of the case. (Of course, there is power of the Executive Wing of the State Government to withdraw the case of course with the permission of the court) and (c) at the same time, the Executive Wing of the State Government has the power to direct further investigation even when the charge-sheet has already been filed and even when cognizance is already been taken by the Magistrate. 30. One may, therefore, conclude that even after filing of charge-sheet and even after Magistrate's taking cognizance of the offence/offences on the basis of such charge-sheet, the police have the power to go for further investigation and to submit supplementary charge-sheet, and that too, without taking formal permission from the court in seisin with the matter in charge-sheet already filed. But then, propriety requires the police authority to obtain permission before conducting further inquiry. 31. Now the question is whether the Magistrate can order further investigation even when the police submit the charge-sheet and even when he takes cognizance on such charge-sheet. Such matter has been come up before the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Jitendra Nath Ghosh & Anr., vs. The State reported in (1976) Crl. L.J. 1296 wherein it was held that once charge-sheet is filed and once Magistrate take cognizance on such charge-sheet and once he issued process, he cannot on his own direct further investigation. 32. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below:-- "4. Having heard the learned advocates of the respective parties and on a consideration of the materials before me I am led to the view that the impugned order must be set aside as it is unwarranted and without jurisdiction. It has already been pointed out that three of the accused persons have already been convicted and sentenced in this case. The learned Magistrate had accepted the report submitted by the police under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has already been pointed out that three of the accused persons have already been convicted and sentenced in this case. The learned Magistrate had accepted the report submitted by the police under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. No prayer is or was ever made by the police for further investigation into the case. It was only at the time of the consideration of the charge against the accused petitioners and another the learned Magistrate thought it fit to direct the police 3 to make further investigation into the case. Evidently the learned Magistrate was not satisfied on the materials on record that a charge of conspiracy was warranted against the accused persons or that issued of a process against Sunil Kumar Mukherjee was necessary. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the new Code which is a new one has not been inserted for the purpose of filling up lacuna if any in the prosecution case and for that purpose to empower the Magistrate to order for further investigation by the police. It has already been pointed out that learned Magistrate accepted the report submitted by the police under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code. Having done so and after having proceeded with the trial of the case he had no power under Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code to direct the police to make further investigation. It is also rather strange to find that in the present case the learned Magistrate before whom the matter is sub judice through it fit to make his findings touching upon the merits of the case and that also before framing of any charge against the accused persons. In all such circumstances the impugned order cannot be sustained and must be set aside. Having regard to the nature of the order and the findings made therein by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate it is considered to be fit and proper that the case should be heard by a Magistrate other than the one who passed the impugned order." 33. Similar view has been rendered by the Apex Court of the country in the case of Randhir Singh Rana vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported in AIR 1997 SC 639 . 34. The relevant part is reproduced below:- "8. Similar view has been rendered by the Apex Court of the country in the case of Randhir Singh Rana vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported in AIR 1997 SC 639 . 34. The relevant part is reproduced below:- "8. The decision pressed into service by Shri Vasdev in support of the aforesaid submission is the one rendered in D. Lakshminarayana v. V. Narayana Reddy 1976 Cri. L. J. 1361. Our attention has been, invited in particular to what has been stated in para 17 of the judgment, which reads as below:-- 17. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption: "Information to the police and their powers to investigate"; while section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading "Of complaints to Magistrate". The power to order police investigation under section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by section202(1). The two operate is distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence u/s. 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the stage and avail of section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation u/s. 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under section 156 and ends with a report or charge-sheet u/s. 173. On the other hand, section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. On the other hand, section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section, an investigation "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding." Thus the object of an investigation under section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceeding already instituted upon a complaint before him. 9. Shri Walia, who worked hard to assist the court, referred us to the relevant part of the 41st Report of the Law Commissions of India pursuant to whose recommendation Sub-section (8) of section 173was inserted in the new Code. But that also does not throw light of the question with which were are seized. Further, the learned counsel brought to our notice the Statement of Objects and Reasons, so also the Notes on the Clause of the new Code; but there also we find no light. Of the decisions cited by Shri Walia, the one nearest to the point is of a learned Judge of Calcutta High Court in State v. Sankar Haider 1976 Cri. L.J. 1361, in which it was held that a court is not debarred from making any order for further Investigation under the provisions of section 173(8) of the Code. But then, that was not a case where cognizance had been taken and accused had appeared in pursuant to the process issued. Thus, the decision does not assist us to answer the question under examination. 11. The aforesaid being the legal position as discernible from the various decisions of this court and some of the high Courts, we would agree, as presently advised, with Shri Vasdev that within the grey area to which we have referred the Magistrate of his own cannot order for further investigation. As in the present case, the learned Magistrate had done so, we set aside his order and direct him to dispose of the case either by framing the charge or discharge the accused on the basis of materials already on record. As in the present case, the learned Magistrate had done so, we set aside his order and direct him to dispose of the case either by framing the charge or discharge the accused on the basis of materials already on record. This will be subject to the caveat that even if the order be of discharge, further investigation by the police on its own would be permissible, which could even end in submission of either fresh charge-sheet." 35. However, the matter regarding Magistrates authority to direct the police to go for further investigation after the submission of charge-sheet has again come up for consideration of the Apex Court in the case of Vinay Tyagi vs. Irsah Ali @ Deepak & Ors., reported in (2013) 5 SCC 762 . The Apex court on considering the various decisions including the decisions rendered in the case of Randhir Singh Rana (supra), held that the Magistrate can order further investigation even after submission of charge-sheet. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below:- "37. In some judgments of this court, a view has been advanced, [amongst other in Reeta V. State of W.B., Ram Naresh Prasad V. State of Jharkhand and Randhir Singh Rana V. State (Delhi Administration)] that a Magistrate cannot suo motu direct farther investigation under Section 173(8) of the Code or direct reinvestigation into a case on account of the bar contained in Section 167(2) of the Code, and that a Magistrate could direct filing of a charge-sheet where the police submits a report that no case had been made out for sending up an accused for trial. The gist of the view taken in these cases is that a Magistrate cannot direct reinvestigation and cannot suo motu direct further investigation. 38. However, having given our considered thought to the principles stated in these judgments, we are of the view that the Magistrate before whom a report under Section 173(2) of the Code is filed, is empowered in law to direct "further investigation" and require the police to submit a further or a supplementary report. A three-judge Bench of this Court in Bhagwant Singh has, in no uncertain terms, stated that principle, as aforenoticed. 39. The contrary view taken by the Court in Reeta Nag and Randhir Singh do not consider the view of this court expressed in Bhagwant Singh. A three-judge Bench of this Court in Bhagwant Singh has, in no uncertain terms, stated that principle, as aforenoticed. 39. The contrary view taken by the Court in Reeta Nag and Randhir Singh do not consider the view of this court expressed in Bhagwant Singh. The decision of the Court in Bhagwant Singh in regard to the issue in hand cannot be termed as an obiter. The ambit and scope of the power of a Magistrate in terms of Section 173 of the Code was squarely debated before that court and the three-Judge Bench, concluded as afore-noticed. Similar views having been taken by different Benches of this court while following Bhagwant Singh, are thus squarely in line with the doctrine of precedent. To some extent, the view expressed in Reeta Bag, Ram Naresh and Randhir Singh, besides being different on facts, would have to be examined in light of the principle of stare decisis. 40. Having analyzed the provisions of the Code and the various judgments as aforenoticed, we would state the following conclusions in regard to the powers of a Magistrate in terms of Section 173(2) read with Section 173(8) and Section 156(3) of the Code: 40.1. The Magistrate has no power to direct "reinvestigation" or "fresh investigation" (de novo) in the case initiated on the basis of a police report. 40.2. A Magistrate has the power to direct "further investigation" after filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code. 40.3. The view expressed in Sub-para 402 above is in conformity with the principle of law stated in Bhagwant Singh case by a three-Judge Bench and thus in conformity with the doctrine of precedent. 40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly in fact of the provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have to be read into the language of Section 173(8)." 36. From the above, it appears that the Magistrate can order further investigation in appropriate case even when charge-sheet has been laid before the court. In fact, such power would have to be read into the language of Section 173(8)." 36. From the above, it appears that the Magistrate can order further investigation in appropriate case even when charge-sheet has been laid before the court. However, in the same judgment, the court has further held that such power needs to be invoked only in extraordinary case to meet the ends of justice. In that connection the relevant part is reproduced below:-- "41. Having discussed the scope of power of the Magistrate under Section 173 of the Code, now we have to examine the kinds of reports that are contemplated under the provisions of the Code and/or as per the judgments of this Magistrate is the first information report. Then, upon completion of the investigation, the police is required to file a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will be appropriate to term this report as a primary report, as it is the very foundation of the case of the prosecution before the court. It is the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, with are considered by the court and then the court of the Magistrate is expected to exercise any of the three option afore-noticed. Out of the stated options with the court, the jurisdiction it would exercise has to be in strict consonance with the settled principles of law. The power of the Magistrate to direct "further investigation" is a significant power which has to be exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to achieve the ends of justice. To provide fair, proper and unquestionable investigation is the obligation of the investigating agency and the court in its supervisory capacity is required to ensure the same. Further investigation conducted under the orders of the court, including that of Magistrate or by the police of its own accord and, for valid reasons, would lead to the filing of a supplementary report. Such supplementary report shall be dealt with as part of the primary report. This is clear from the fact that the provisions of Section 173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to such reports in terms of Section 173(8)of the Code." 37. Now, one needs to know if such an extraordinary situation has been made out requiring the Magistrate to direct further investigation. This is clear from the fact that the provisions of Section 173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to such reports in terms of Section 173(8)of the Code." 37. Now, one needs to know if such an extraordinary situation has been made out requiring the Magistrate to direct further investigation. We have already found that the informant filed an FIR against the accused Kamrul Ikbal Hasan @ Mamun alleging that she being defiled by the accused aforementioned. She also repeated such allegation before the Magistrate too while her statement was recorded u/s. 164 Cr. P.C., during the course of investigation. 38. Taking into consideration all those evidence and statement, the I/O submitted the charge-sheet u/s. 454/376 of the IPC against the accused/petitioner. However, as the investigation progress, she started giving another story to show that the accused did not commit any offence. She projected such story only to show that the accused/petitioner was not guilty of the offence, alleged to have been committed by him. 39. In my very considered opinion, the conduct of the informant in filing FIR against the accused/petitioner alleging that he had committed an offence of extremely serious in nature and her conduct in trying to withdraw such FIR stating that she filed the aforesaid case due to some wrong advice and misunderstanding are fraught with serious danger. Such conducts, if approved, may jeopardize the arrangement made in Cr.P.C., regarding investigation and subsequent trial if any. 40. These apart, the informant or for that matter father of the accused petitioner wants that the further investigation needs to be conducted in a particular manner to secure a particular result. It has been held again and again that the Magistrate cannot direct the police authority to go for further investigation in a particular direction. The decision, rendered in Popular Muthiah (supra) is one of such decisions. On this count also, the Magistrate could not have ordered for further investigation in the case aforementioned. 41. So situated, let us consider if Magistrate or for that matter the I/O concerned had committed any error in refusing to allow the withdrawal of FIR as prayed for by the informant. On the perusal of the relevant provisions of law, I have found that there is nothing in law which enables the informant to withdraw the FIR he lodged. So situated, let us consider if Magistrate or for that matter the I/O concerned had committed any error in refusing to allow the withdrawal of FIR as prayed for by the informant. On the perusal of the relevant provisions of law, I have found that there is nothing in law which enables the informant to withdraw the FIR he lodged. It is true that there is no prohibition either preventing the informant to withdraw the FIR he/she filed. 42. But then, under the arrangement made in Cr. P.C., there is provision for compounding of some of the offences, by the victim, withdrawal of cases by the State or stoppage of proceeding in certain cases by the Magistrate. In the teeth of above provisions, absence of provisions for withdrawal of FIR by the informant carries enormous meaning. 43. It only shows that the withdrawal of FIR by the informant would be repugnant to the arrangement of things so made in the Cr. P.C. It is a matter different altogether that on conclusion of investigation, Investigating Officer of a particular case can file either F/R or charge-sheet depending on the materials collected during the course of investigation. 44. Above being the situation, learned Magistrate or for that matter concerned police officer having refused informant to withdraw the FIR, she lodged, had committed no error whatsoever and as such, I have no hesitation in upholding the decision rendered by Magistrate on the point aforementioned as well. 45. Coming to the allegations that in the facts and circumstances of the case under consideration, having rejected the prayer for compounding non-compoundable offences, the learned Magistrate has committed serious error, I have found that such argument is also without any foundation. This is because of the reason that offences which involved in the case in question are non-compoundable under the law. 46. Since law makes those offences non-compoundable, it is beyond the competence of the Magistrate to allow the parties to compound such offences. Therefore, I am to hold that the rejecting the prayer of petitioner on holding that offences in G.R. (MKCR) Case No. 213/2012 are not compoundable, learned Magistrate committed no error at all. 47. Now, the question is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this court needs to invoke the provisions of Section 482 Cr. P.C., to quash the proceeding. 47. Now, the question is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this court needs to invoke the provisions of Section 482 Cr. P.C., to quash the proceeding. In Shiji @ Pappu (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held that High Court cannot refuse to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr. P.C., simply because offences are non-compoundable. 48. The Meghalaya High Court too held in Aditya Goenka (supra) that if a prayer for quashing of proceeding is not allowed in spite of dispute between the parties being already compounded, then it may, at times, result in injustice. In the teeth of above legal position I examine the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner seeking quashing of proceeding in question. 49. We have found that the informant approached the I/O repeatedly seeking permission to withdraw the FIR stating that she had filed the case out of misunderstanding and also on wrong advice of her friends. She also filed an affidavit before this court urging the later to grant the accused/petitioner the benefit of pre arrest bail in the event of his arrest in connection with aforementioned case stating on oath that she had filed the case due to some misunderstanding and ill advice. 50. These apart, a perusal of the FIR reveals that the prosecutrix filed the case only when on the night in question, the VDP came to know about accused having an illicit relation with the prosecutrix and only when the VDP people encircled her house to capture the culprit meaning thereby that prosecutrix would not have filed any case against the accused person if he was not caught in the house of prosecutrix on the night of 25.12.2012. This is also testimony of prosecutrix who is admittedly a major girl on the date of incident, being a consenting party to what had occurred to her on the all eventful night. 51. In view of above revelations, I am the opinion that in the interest of justice, the proceeding in question needs to be quashed by this court on invoking its power under Section 482 Cr. P.C., since allowing the continuance process would mean abuse of process of law. 52. Here, it needs to be stated that this proceeding has been filed under the provision of Section 397 read with 401 of the Cr. P.C., since allowing the continuance process would mean abuse of process of law. 52. Here, it needs to be stated that this proceeding has been filed under the provision of Section 397 read with 401 of the Cr. P.C. But then, in my considered opinion, in the interest of justice, this proceeding needs to be treated as a proceeding u/s.482 Cr. P.C., which I accordingly do. In the result, this proceeding is allowed and the G.R. (MKCR) Case No. 213/2012 including the order dated 30.09.2013 is accordingly quashed and set aside.