JUDGMENT 1. Rule. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners, at the outset, assailed the impugned judgments and orders on the ground that the tribunal rendered the impugned judgments and orders by notifying that it was deciding the appeals on the preliminary issue as contemplated in the case of Anna Manikrao Pethe ..vs.. The Presiding Officer, School Tribunal and ors.; 1997 (3) Mh. L. J. 687. He then submitted that it was wholly improper on the part of the tribunal to decide preliminary issue particularly in the light of the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Sadhana Janardhan Jadhav ..vs.. Pratibha Mahila Mahamanda and ors.; 2013 (2) Mh. L. J. 484which came after the impugned judgments were delivered by the tribunal. Mr. Kulkarni, learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, submitted that it does not mean blame to the tribunal for deciding the matters only on the preliminary issue but the impugned decisions recorded by the tribunal run counter to the Division Bench Judgment of this court, which has been upheld by the apex Court. He then argued that though there is reference to some of the facts for deciding on merits, the exercise is halfhearted one. According to him, therefore, the tribunal ought to have decided the appeals on merits. 3. Per contra, Mr. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the respondents-Management, supported the impugned judgments and orders made by the tribunal in all those cases. He argued that the decisions recorded by the tribunal are on the law existing in the case of Anna Manikrao Pethe (supra) and, therefore, the tribunal is not at all at fault. According to him, even otherwise, perusal of the orders of the tribunal shows that the Presiding Officer has applied his mind to the facts and evidence on record for deciding the issues on merits and, therefore, even if the orders impugned are titled as preliminary order, the same can very well be read as orders on merits upon hearing both the sides with satisfactory adjudication in respect of the claim of both the sides. Therefore, the petitions are required to be dismissed. Mr. Therefore, the petitions are required to be dismissed. Mr. Dharmadhikari, further took me through one of the orders and also pointed out the reasons for finding out that the appointments of the petitioners are illegal and submitted that the decisions in question rendered by the tribunal can well be supported even on merits. Finally he prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 4. I have gone through the impugned judgments and orders made by the tribunal. At the outset, I find that the tribunal has notified at the beginning of the impugned order that he was recording an order on preliminary issue and, thereafter, finally he dismissed the appeals recording its findings on the preliminary issue. It is clear that the Presiding Officer decided to hear and decide the appeals only on preliminary issue and he decided accordingly. There is no reason to read something else in the said orders. Mr. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the respondents-Management, pointed out to me some observations purportedly to be on merits of the matter. However, it is not possible for this Court to hold that the Presiding Officer decided the cases on merits, particularly when there is a clear notification by the tribunal for deciding the appeals only on preliminary issues. This Court cannot substitute what is stated on record by Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal, which stands reflected in the impugned orders. It is for this reason that this Court holds that the learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal categorically disposed of the appeals on the preliminary issues only. 5. Equally, this court does not find that the tribunal could be blamed for doing so. The reason is that the decision in the case of Anna Manikrao Pethe (supra) clearly stated that the case should be decided on preliminary issues. 6. The submissions made by Mr. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the respondents-Management, to say that the decision in question is also on merits and, therefore, this Court should not interfere with the impugned judgments and orders, does not appeal to me. 6. The submissions made by Mr. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the respondents-Management, to say that the decision in question is also on merits and, therefore, this Court should not interfere with the impugned judgments and orders, does not appeal to me. Reading of the reasons given by the learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal shows that the discussion on the merits of the matter has not been made as required by law upon appreciation of the evidence and the tenets of law for deciding an appeal which is under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Service Regulation), Act, 1977. The Full Bench of this Court has held nomenclature 'appeal' to be the misnomer and the proceedings of the appeals have been held to be the plenary proceedings before the tribunal. 7. I, therefore, do not agree with the submissions made by Mr. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the respondents-Management, that the decisions rendered by the tribunal are also on merits. At any rate, this Court would not like make any comment on merits of the case of either of the parties since following the decision rendered by this Court in Sadhana Janardhan Jadhav (Per: A. B. Chaudhari, J.) (supra) this Court is inclined to send the appeals back to the tribunal for consideration afresh. In the said decision, this Court has held that the preliminary issue, if at all it really arises, should be tried and decided along with the issues on merits, in the light of the law laid down by the apex court right from the decision in the case of Cooper Engineering Limited ..vs.. Shri P. P. Mundhe, 1975 AIR 1900 way back in the year 1975 and consistently followed thereafter by the apex Court. In Sadhana Janardhan Jadhav ..vs.. Pratibha Mahila Mahamanda and ors.; (supra), this Court held thus in the following paragraphs: 13) Under the civil jurisprudence in the adversary litigation, a Court of law is required to decide the issues or the disputes arising between the parties and as projected by the parties before the Court. The issue whether the appointment of the concerned teacher was made in accordance with Section 5 of the MEPS Act and the Rules framed there-under or not, is a mixed question of facts and law and is not a question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The issue whether the appointment of the concerned teacher was made in accordance with Section 5 of the MEPS Act and the Rules framed there-under or not, is a mixed question of facts and law and is not a question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The issues on mixed questio7n of facts and law are framed by the Court of law or the Tribunals in accordance with the pleas raised by the contesting parties in their respective pleadings. The issues arise when they are pleaded according to the law. By raising a oneline pleading without any substantiation thereof, that the appointment of the appellant was not in accordance with Section 5 of MEPS Act and the Rules, cannot give rise to an issue to that effect. The issues must be framed confined to facta probanda, i.e. With respect to material questions of fact or law and not to facta probantia, i.e. on subordinate facts. Court should not decide an issue not arising out of pleadings of parties (See AIR 1968 SC 534 ). Similarly, no issue can be framed on a point not pleaded (see 1999 (8) SCC 692 ). The Tribunal is guided by the pleadings raised by the contesting or other parties before it and the Tribunal does not have any personal knowledge about the case of the parties before it. The issue about validity of the appointment, as contemplated by Section 5 of MEPS Act and the Rules framed there-under, cannot be said to be an issue of jurisdiction of a Tribunal. 14) The decision in the case of Anna Pethe (cited supra) was considered by the larger Bench in the case of St. Ulai High School and Anr. Vs. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh 2007 (1) Mh. L.J. 597, following clause (iv) of para 13 of the Conclusions, relevant portion of which, we quote as under: "13. CONCLUSIONS: (i).................................... (ii)................................... (iii).................................. (iv) The judgments of the Division Benches of this Court in Anna Manikrao Pethe Vs. Presiding Officer, and Shailaja Ashokrao Walse Vs. Ulai High School and Anr. Vs. Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh 2007 (1) Mh. L.J. 597, following clause (iv) of para 13 of the Conclusions, relevant portion of which, we quote as under: "13. CONCLUSIONS: (i).................................... (ii)................................... (iii).................................. (iv) The judgments of the Division Benches of this Court in Anna Manikrao Pethe Vs. Presiding Officer, and Shailaja Ashokrao Walse Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) to the extent that they hold that an appeal is not maintainable before the Tribunal at the behest of an employee whose appointment has not been approved do not reflect the correct position in law and are overruled." 15) The issue regarding validity of appointment as per Section 5 of the MEPS Act and the Rules there-under, was not thus touched by the Full Bench. Catching the said string from the said Para 15 of the judgment in the case of Anna Pethe, it is found by this Court that, old habit of the management to raise a preliminary issue and get the appeal decided only on the preliminary issue, has again surfaced, resulting into multiplicity of litigation. 16) In cases where employees of private school have been terminated after holding departmental enquiry or otherwise, when such employees have become permanent in service or have completed requisite number of years of service, the said issue regarding appointment is being casually raised by the management and framed by the Tribunal. It has been found that large number of appeals have been dismissed by the Tribunals on the said preliminary issue when the same was not at all justified and this Court was required to send back the appeals for decision on merits. Thus, the school Tribunals have been adopting a shortcut method of dismissing the appeals on the ground that the appointment was not made as per Section 5 of the MEPS Act and the Rules, to earn disposal of cases at their credit, which not only causes serious injustice to the litigating parties but give rise to multiplicity of litigations between the parties. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Manohar Mahadeo Bhajikhaye Vs. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Chandrapur and Ors. 2011 (4) Mh. L.J. 312, also faced the similar situation. The case at hand is of similar nature.” 8. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Manohar Mahadeo Bhajikhaye Vs. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Chandrapur and Ors. 2011 (4) Mh. L.J. 312, also faced the similar situation. The case at hand is of similar nature.” 8. In the wake of the above findings recorded by me, the only alternative now is to make the following order: ORDER (i) Writ Petition Nos.5778/2011, 5779/2011, 5780/2011, 5781/2011, 5782/2011, 5783/2011, 5784/2011, 5785/2011 and 5786/2011 are partly allowed. (ii) The impugned judgments and orders dated 07.09.2011 in Appeal No. STC28/ 2006, dated 07.09.2011 in Appeal No. STC11/ 2011, dated 07.09.2011 in Appeal No. STC30/ 2006, dated 07.09.2011 in Appeal No. STC29/ 2006, dated 07.09.2011 in Appeal No. STC35/ 2006, dated 07.09.2011 in Appeal No. STC34/ 2006, dated 07.09.2011 in Appeal No. STC27/ 2006, dated 07.09.2011 in Appeal No. STC33/ 2006 and dated 07.09.2011 in Appeal No. STC31/ 2006, passed by Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Chandrapur are set aside. (iii) Proceedings of Appeal Nos. STC28/ 2006, STC11/2011, STC30/ 2006, STC29/ 2006, STC35/ 2006, STC34/ 2006, STC27/ 2006, STC33/ 2006 and STC31/ 2006 are remitted to the School Tribunal, Chandrapur for hearing and fresh disposal on preliminary issue, if at all arises, in appreciation of decision in the case of Sadhana Janardhan Jadhav (supra) and also on merits simultaneously after giving full opportunity to both the sides to advance their pleadings and file such evidence as are advised, before the tribunal. (iv) The parties shall appear before the tribunal in all these appeals on 10.02.2014 and shall then abide by further directions of the School Tribunal. (v) Since the matters relate to the year 2006, the School Tribunal shall endeavour to decide the appeals within a period of one year from the date of appearance of the parties before it. Rule made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.