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2014 DIGILAW 83 (KER)

Livingston v. Sathyamma

2014-01-31

K.ABRAHAM MATHEW, T.R.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR

body2014
JUDGMENT : P.N. Ravindran, J. The appeal is against the common order passed in E.A.No.148/2005 in E.P.No.21/2005 in O.S.No.33/1998 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Nedumangad. The appellant herein is one of the decree holders. It is stated that there are several items of properties covered by the partition decree. The appellant filed E.A.No.148/2005 invoking the provisions of Order 21, Rule 97 C.P.C., to remove obstruction and to effect the delivery, when certain persons obstructed the Amin to effect delivery on 30.10.2005. The same was in respect of the property demarcated in Ext.C1(b) plan to the final decree for partition. Apart from the application filed by the appellant as E.A.No.148/2005, there were several claim petitions which have been numbered as E.A.Nos.141/2005, 2/2009, 4/2009 and 5/2009 and all these were disposed of by the common order. 2. Apparently the view taken by the court below is that in a decree for partition, the application to remove obstruction filed by the decree holder and the other claim petitions cannot be gone into by the court. While considering the matter, from paragraph 27 onwards, the court has considered the nature of decree passed in a partition suit. The court was of the view that, any attempt to evict a tenant or licensee or a tress passer purporting to be in execution of a decree for partition is not justified. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant Sri.P.S.Appu submitted that in the light of a recent judgment of a Division Bench of this Court, the petition under Order 21, Rule 97 C.P.C. is maintainable at the hands of the decree holder. Reliance is thus placed on Vasudeva Menon v. K.J.Plantation, 2012 (3) KLT 730 . The learned counsel relied upon paragraph 19 of the judgment wherein the Division Bench was of the view that the decree obtained by the appellant therein for partition is a decree for possession and therefore the petition under Order 21, Rule 97 is maintainable. Our attention was also invited to the decision of the Madras High Court in Gopala and Another v. Fernandes, ILR Madras (XVI) 127. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent Sri.Ram Mohan.G submitted that, this is a case where the first respondent and similarly placed parties had claims to be established and without conducting an enquiry for going into the merits of their contentions, their applications were also dismissed. 5. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent Sri.Ram Mohan.G submitted that, this is a case where the first respondent and similarly placed parties had claims to be established and without conducting an enquiry for going into the merits of their contentions, their applications were also dismissed. 5. As far as the question whether a decree for partition is a decree by possession is concerned, we find that the Division Bench in Vasudeva Menon's case, 2012 (3) KLT 730 paragraph 19, after referring to relevant provisions of the C.P.C, laid down the following principles. "(8): Whether the decree obtained by the appellants is not a decree for possession. One of the contentions of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents is that a decree for partition is not a decree for possession. O.XXI R.35 C.P.C. refers to a decree for delivery of immovable property. O.XXI R.97 contemplates, inter alia, resistance or obstruction against a decree holder who has obtained a decree for possession of immovable property. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel on the Judgment of the Madras High Court in D.Nataraja Achari v. Balambal Ammal, AIR 1980 Mad. 222 . There, the Court drew a distinction between a decree for possession passed under O.XX R.12 C.P.C. and a decree for partition and separate possession under O.XXR.18 C.P.C.. The Court was really concerned with the question whether the grant of mesne profits could be challenged. In this case, as noted in the impugned order, under the final decree the appellants were allowed to get separate possession of their share. Therefore, the reference by the respondents to O.XX R.12 C.P.C. and R18 may not bear any significance as far as the crucial question whether the decree is one for recovery of possession. The decree is indeed for recovery of possession. No doubt, the party respondents may not be party to the decree and in that sense they may not be bound by it. But, for the purpose of O.XXI R.97 or R.99 C.P.C., there is indeed a decree for recovery of possession. Equally, it could be said that for the purpose of O.XXI R.35 C.P.C., there is a decree for delivery of property. But, for the purpose of O.XXI R.97 or R.99 C.P.C., there is indeed a decree for recovery of possession. Equally, it could be said that for the purpose of O.XXI R.35 C.P.C., there is a decree for delivery of property. We cannot overlook the effect of such an interpretation on the decree holder in a suit for partition and separate possession, in that, anybody set up by the judgment debtor can compel the decree holder to resort to a separate suit, depriving the decree holder of the benefit of O.XXI Rules 35 and 97 C.P.C." (Emphasis supplied by us) Therefore, the Bench was of the view that the decree is one for recovery of possession and for the purpose of Order 21, Rule 97 or 99 C.P.C., there is indeed a decree for recovery of possession. We respectfully agree with the above view. In an earlier judgment of the Madras High Court in the decision Gopala and Another v. Fernandes, ILR Madras (XVI) 127 the same view was taken. In the concurrent judgment Muttusami Ayyar, J has explained the legal position in explicit terms and we extract the same below : "Passing on to the merits, the Subordinate Judge is in error in holding that a decree for partition is not a decree for possession of immoveable property, and, as such, it is not within the purview of section 331. It is not denied that in the present case a partition was decreed as well of immoveable as of moveable property. It may be that the share awarded by the decree has first to be set out by metes and bounds before it can be placed in the possession of the decree-holder, but when the share is so set out, the decree becomes at once a decree for the possession of specific immoveable property to which section 331 is admittedly applicable." A similar provision as in the present case was considered by the Madras High Court. 6. In the light of the above, the order passed by the court below that the court cannot consider an application under Order 21, Rule 97 , in respect of a decree which is only for partition, cannot be sustained. 7. 6. In the light of the above, the order passed by the court below that the court cannot consider an application under Order 21, Rule 97 , in respect of a decree which is only for partition, cannot be sustained. 7. Since the claim petitions filed by the respective parties including the first respondent have also not been considered by the court it is only proper that all disputes between the parties are adjudicated de novo. Therefore we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. Learned counsel Sri.Ram Mohan, who appears for the first respondent seeks an opportunity to file a proper petition stating his claims, and we permit the first respondent to do so. The court below will take upon E.A.148/2005 as well as E.A.No.141/2005 and other petitions and dispose of the same expeditiously. No costs.