MUNGESHWAR SAHOO, J.:–The defendants have filed this First Appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated 27th March, 2004 passed by the learned 6th Subordinate Judge, Samastipur in money Suit No.19 of 1999 whereby the learned trial Court decreed the plaintiff-respondent’s money suit. 2. The plaintiff respondent Mukti & Company filed the aforesaid money suit for recovery of Rs.1,09,507/- the principal amount with interest @ 15 per cent alleging that the plaintiff is registered contractor in the Irrigation Department of the State of Bihar. His work is always satisfactory. The defendant No.4 by the letter No.2437 dated 30.07.1986 allotted work of Rs.1.5 lakh. On the same day, agreement was executed. The said agreement was with respect to the work relating to scheme of flood control. According to the terms and conditions of the appellant, the plaintiff completed the work and after measurement, the value of the work done was estimated to Rs.1,29,456/-. Out of that Rs.19,949/- was paid by the defendants. The remaining amount of Rs.1,09,507/-could not be paid by the defendant because of paucity of fund and subsequently, the defendants alleged that there was no technical sanction. The plaintiff further alleged that at the time of payment of Rs.19,949/-, no objection was raised by the Department and verification of the work done by the plaintiff was done in the measurement book. When the balance amount was not paid, the plaintiff repeatedly demanded the payment but in futile. The plaintiff then filed C.W.J.C. No.7102 of 1996 before the High Court which was dismissed with observation that the plaintiff may approach Civil Court then the plaintiff gave notice under Section 80 CPC. Thereafter, the present suit was filed. 3. The plaintiff valued the suit for Rs.6,97,918/- and claimed interest @ Rs.15 per cent. 4. The defendants appellants filed written statement contending that the plaintiff’s suit is barred by law of limitation. Besides taking other legal and ornamental please, the appellants admitted that the plaintiff is registered contractor and agreement was entered into between them being No.304-F-2-86-87. After the work, the verification should have been done immediately by the Assistant Engineer and Executive Engineer and because of non-cooperation of the plaintiff, the verification was done after two and a half month of the work. Earlier the measurement was done and bill was produced on 22.08.1986 which was correct, therefore, it was paid. After the work, the verification should have been done immediately by the Assistant Engineer and Executive Engineer and because of non-cooperation of the plaintiff, the verification was done after two and a half month of the work. Earlier the measurement was done and bill was produced on 22.08.1986 which was correct, therefore, it was paid. The work for second bill for Rs.1,09,507 was neither verified in time nor the measurement was correct. Therefore, no payment was made. The defendants also denied that because of paucity of funds, the payment was not made. The matter was referred to Liability Committee which also rejected the claim of the plaintiff. 5. The learned Court below on the basis of the aforesaid pleadings framed various issues. Out of the same issue No.3 relates to the question of limitation and issue No.4 and 5 relates to the entitlement of the plaintiff of the amount claimed and as to whether he completed his work satisfactorily according to agreement or not. 6. The trial Court recorded the finding that the plaintiff has been able to prove that he has completed the work satisfactorily and, therefore, is entitled for the amount claimed. The trial Court also held that the suit is not barred by law of limitation because the plaintiff was writing letter repeatedly and lastly the High Court in C.W.J.C. No.7102 of 1996 and L.P.A. No.847 of 1997 observed that the plaintiff may file the suit. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s suit was decreed. 7. The learned S.C.16 appearing for the appellant submitted that the agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and the appellants on 30th July, 1986 and the work was completed in October. The bill was also submitted in the year 1986 the first bill was paid and the second bill was refused. The plaintiff has filed the present suit in the year 1999, i.e., after 13 years of the completion of the work. Therefore, the plaintiff’s suit is hopelessly barred in view of Article 18 of the Limitation Act. The learned standing counsel further submitted that there is no acknowledgement for payment of the second bill by the appellant at any time during this period but the Court below without considering the provision as contained in Article 18 of the Limitation Act held that the suit is not barred. The learned standing counsel further submitted that there is no acknowledgement for payment of the second bill by the appellant at any time during this period but the Court below without considering the provision as contained in Article 18 of the Limitation Act held that the suit is not barred. According to the leaned counsel, the observation of the High Court in either writ or L.P.A. will not extend the statutory period of limitation for filing the suit. In fact the plaintiff has never performed the contract work and did not cooperate in measurement of the work by the authorities as such the measurement could be done only after 2 ½ months which is also not signed by the parties. The learned counsel further submitted that their is no specific letter or requisition or acknowledgement by the appellant either for allotment of the fund for payment to Mukti & company or that the defendants ever wrote letter giving assurance to the plaintiff that because of paucity of fund, the payment will be made after obtaining the fund. The Court below in the Judgment referring the letters which are not helpful to the plaintiff held that because of paucity of fund, payment was not made. In fact it is error of record. On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned Judgment and Decree be set aside and the plaintiff’s suit be dismissed as barred by law of limitation. 8. The learned counsel, Mr. Jha, appearing for the plaintiff respondent submitted that the plaintiff was always meeting the authorities and perusing for the payment of the second bill. The defendants always assured him that payment will be made. When they did not pay the amount, the plaintiff filed the writ application in 1996 and the High Court while dismissing observed that the plaintiff may approach the Civil Court, therefore, there is no question of suit being barred by law of limitation arises. In 1993, the Department themselves admitted the fact that plaintiff has done the work for Rs.1,29,456/- and this document is ext.4, therefore, the learned Court below has rightly decreed the plaintiff’s suit. 9. In 1993, the Department themselves admitted the fact that plaintiff has done the work for Rs.1,29,456/- and this document is ext.4, therefore, the learned Court below has rightly decreed the plaintiff’s suit. 9. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsels for the parties, the pointes arises for consideration is as to whether the plaintiff’s suit for recover of amount for the work done by him according to the terms of the agreement is barred by law of limitation and whether he is entitled for recovery of the said amount or not? 10. It is admitted fact that the agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant No.5 on 30.07.1986 for the work for Rs.1,50,000/-. The plaintiff was allotted to work by the Executive Engineer, Flood Control Division, Rosera.. The plaintiff at paragraph 7 has stated that the plaintiff completed the work within the stipulated period and as per the said agreement and on verification, the cost of the work was found to be Rs.1,29,456/-. P.W.1 is one of the partner of the firm plaintiff. He has admitted this position that he completed the work according to the terms of the agreement within stipulated period. 11. The measurement took which has been produced and marked as ext.8/2 shows that the bill was submitted in the year 1986 itself. Therefore, now it becomes admitted fact that work was completed in the year 1986. 12. Article 18 of the Limitation Act provides that the suit for the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request where no time has been fixed for payment has to be filed within three years when the work is done. In view of this provision in the present case as the work was done by the plaintiff in the year 1986 itself the suit should have been filed within the year 1989, 3 years from the date of work done. There is nothing on record to show that during this 3 years, the defendants appellants ever acknowledged the liability of payment of second bill. Section 18 of the Limitation Act reads as follows :— “18. There is nothing on record to show that during this 3 years, the defendants appellants ever acknowledged the liability of payment of second bill. Section 18 of the Limitation Act reads as follows :— “18. Effect of acknowledgement in writing.—(1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he drives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgement is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time, when it was signed, but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation………… 13. Therefore, in view of the above provision in Order that an acknowledgement may give a fresh starting point, the acknowledgement must be of a subsisting liability and the acknowledgment of liability must be made before the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for the suit. The acknowledgement must be clear and unambiguous. Here, there is nothing produced by the plaintiff. In such circumstances, the limitation will start from the date of completion of the work. 14. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent submitted that he was repeatedly demanding amount from the defendants but the defendants were giving only assurance. So far this submission is concerned, the prescribed period for filing the suit will not be extended because the plaintiff was repeatedly demanding the amount from the defendants. The three years limitations have been prescribed by the statute. 15. The learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent next submitted that when Liability Committee refused for the first time, he filed the writ application before the High Court. So far this submission is concerned, it may be mentioned here that the C.W.J.C. No.7102 of 1996 was filed by the plaintiff which was dismissed by terms of order dated 20.05.1997. In the said writ application, a counter affidavit was filed by the State of Bihar alleging that the Liability Committee was constituted in the year 1990. So far this submission is concerned, it may be mentioned here that the C.W.J.C. No.7102 of 1996 was filed by the plaintiff which was dismissed by terms of order dated 20.05.1997. In the said writ application, a counter affidavit was filed by the State of Bihar alleging that the Liability Committee was constituted in the year 1990. Now, therefore, it becomes admitted fact that Liability Committee also rejected the claim of the plaintiff in the year 1990. 16. The learned counsel next submitted that in ext.4, it is admitted that the plaintiff has done the work of Rs.1,29,486/-. So far this submission is concerned, from perusal of ext.4, it appears that this is a certificate issued by the Executive Engineer on 21.12.1994. What was the occasion for issuing this certificate is not clear. It may be mentioned here that the Liability Committee has already rejected the claim of the plaintiff earlier then there is no question of admitting the claim. As stated above, this certificate cannot be said to be acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Moreover, this ext.4 is of the year 1994 and not within the period of limitation according to Section 18 of the Limitation Act. In my opinion, therefore, this ext.4 will also not extend the period of limitation prescribed under Article 18 of the Limitation Act. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent next submitted that the High Court in writ application directed the plaintiff to file civil suit and the plaintiff thereafter filed this present money suit is concerned, it may be mentioned here that Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides that ‘in computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature, is unable to entertain it.’ Here in the present case at our hand, the writ application was filed in the year 1996, i.e., 10 years after the completion of the work. Moreover, the plaintiff was not prosecuting civil proceeding before the High Court and further the writ was filed much after expiry of stipulated period. In such circumstances, any observation or direction which was made by the High Court will always be subject to the law of limitation. Further Section 14 speaks about exclusion of time of proceeding bonafide in Court without jurisdiction. This period of time which was being spent by filing writ application as has been spent much after the stipulated period, therefore, there is no question of exclusion of this time arises. The order passed by the High Court in writ application will not give rise a fresh cause of action or that from this date, the limitation will never start running. The limitation which started on the date of completion of the work expired in the year 1989. Any observation or direction or even acknowledgement thereafter although there is no acknowledgement here will not give rise a fresh cause of action or the limitation period which has already been expired cannot be extended further. The Court below without considering these aspects of the matter and without referring to the provision of law only has stated that the suit is not barred by law of limitation. 18. So far the question regarding as to whether the plaintiff has done his work or not, it appears that Liability Committee constituted in the year 1990 itself held that the agreement was executed without technical sanction and that the measurement was not done properly. In the measurement book itself, it is mentioned that the bill submitted by the plaintiff is not passed. The measurement produced by the plaintiff was defective. This question of fact was denied as far back as in the year 1990 by the Liability Committee. Now, therefore, there is nothing on record in support of the fact that in fact actually the work was done for the second bill. It is admitted fact that the measurement was done after 2 ½ months. Moreover since I have already recorded the finding that the suit itself is barred by law of limitation, it is not desirable to consider in detail the evidences with regard to as to whether the witnesses and the letters intersee Department are sufficient to prove the fact of work done by the plaintiff or not. 19. Moreover since I have already recorded the finding that the suit itself is barred by law of limitation, it is not desirable to consider in detail the evidences with regard to as to whether the witnesses and the letters intersee Department are sufficient to prove the fact of work done by the plaintiff or not. 19. In view of my above discussion, I find that the plaintiff’s suit is barred by law of limitation. The Court below wrongly held that the suit is not barred by law of limitation. Accordingly, the finding of the lower Court on this question is hereby reversed. I, therefore, find that the plaintiff is not entitled for the amount claimed by him. 20. In the result, this First Appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment and Decree are set aside. The plaintiff’s suit is dismissed as barred by law of limitation. No order as to cost. ?