ORDER : Civil Appeal No. 5484 of 2002 1. This is an appeal arising out of the order of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Review WPMP No. 25956 of 2000 dated 20th October, 2001. The factual background is as follows. The Appellant herein is a Company carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of cement. For the purpose of said manufacturing activity, the Appellant Company secured certain mining leases of limestone and dolomite, the details of which may not be necessary for the present purpose. 2. The mineral extracted pursuant to such mining leases is made exigible to two imposts (1) a cess and (2) a tax levied under the A.P. (Telengana Area) District Boards Act, 1955 and Andhra Pradesh (Mineral Rights) Tax Act, 1975 respectively. 3. In the light of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in India Cement Ltd. and Others Vs. State Of Tamil Nadu and Others, (1990) 1 SCC 12 , the constitutionality of the abovementioned two imposts came to be challenged by various parties including the Appellant herein successfully before the High Court. 4. It is a matter of history now, that many a similar enactment in various other States came to be declared unconstitutional following the judgment of this Court in India Cements (supra). By virtue of the said Declaration, various States were faced with a situation where they had to refund huge amounts of illegally collected taxes. In order to salvage the situation, the Parliament enacted the Cess and other Taxes on Minerals (Validation) Act, 1992 (hereinafter being referred to as the "Validation Act"). 5. The constitutionality of the said Validation Act itself once again came to be challenged by the Appellant and Ors. before various High Courts as well as this Court also. During the pendency of the abovementioned litigation, initially the Appellant Company did not pay the abovementioned two imposts under the protection of interim orders of the High Court. With reference to the cess, such nonpayment pertains to the period between 29th April 1988 to 4th April 1991 and with reference to the mineral rights tax, for the period 8.2.1990 to 4.4.1991. With reference to the cess, such nonpayment pertains to the period between 29th April 1988 to 4th April 1991 and with reference to the mineral rights tax, for the period 8.2.1990 to 4.4.1991. Subsequently, in view of the vacation of the interim orders of the High Court, the amounts due for the abovementioned period came to be paid by the Appellant some time in the year 1995-1996 under protest reserving the right to seek recovery in the event of the Appellant succeeding in the challenge to the Validation Act. 6. This Court by its judgment dated 26.07.1996 reported in P. Kannadasan etc, etc. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others [OVERRULED], (1996) 5 SCC 670 , upheld the constitutionality of the said Act. 7. However, the writ petition of the Appellant along with a batch of others was pending for quite some time on the file of the High Court. Meanwhile, by the judgment dated 31st July 2001 in the District Mining Officer and Others Vs. Tata Iron and Steel Co. and Another, (2001) 7 SCC 358 , this Court declared that the judgment of this Court in Kannadasan's case (supra) is "not correct in law" and held that "the Validation Act to be valid, but such validated Acts do not authorize any fresh levy or collection in respect of liabilities accrued prior to 4.4.1991". 8. In other words, this Court in District Mining Officer's case (supra) held that any amount representing the tax liabilities (under any one of the validated Acts) accruing prior to 4.4.1991 but not collected by the State could not be collected. It was further held that if the amounts had already been collected, the tax payer is precluded from seeking the refund of the amount already paid to the State. 9. The writ petitions filed by the Appellant before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the constitutionality of the Validation Act came to be disposed of by the High Court by a judgment dated 12.9.2001. 9. The writ petitions filed by the Appellant before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the constitutionality of the Validation Act came to be disposed of by the High Court by a judgment dated 12.9.2001. The operative portion of the judgment reads as follows: "In the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Company, the challenge to the constitutional validity of the Cess and other Taxes on Minerals (Validation) Act should succeed and the Petitioner is entitled for a declaration that the Respondents legally cannot recover cess on royalty and MRT from the Petitioner from 28.4.1988 and 8.2.1990 respectively till 4.4.1991. In that view of the matter, we allow this writ petition and a direction shall issue to the 1st Respondent to refund the cess on royalty and MRT, if the same is collected from the Petitioner for the period from 28.4.1988 and 8.2.1990 respectively till 4.4.1991 to the Petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs." 10. Thereafter, the Respondents herein filed the review petition essentially on the ground that the direction for refund of the amount already paid by the Appellant herein by the judgment dated 12.9.2001 is inconsistent with the declaration of law made by this Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1997) 5 SCC 536 , The said review application came to be disposed of by the impugned judgment in substance holding that though the payment was made by the Appellant under protest towards the cess and mineral rights tax dues pertaining to the periods described earlier, the Appellant is not automatically entitled for the refund of the said amounts notwithstanding judicial declaration that the levy and collection of said amounts is unconstitutional unless the Appellant establishes before the concerned authority that the Appellant had not passed on the tax liability to the consumer. 11. Aggrieved by the abovementioned restriction on the right of the Appellant to seek refund, the instant appeal is filed. 12. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that this Court in Mafatlal's case (supra) did not really consider the legal effect of passing on of the tax liability by a person who is primarily responsible to pay the tax to the ultimate consumer. 12. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that this Court in Mafatlal's case (supra) did not really consider the legal effect of passing on of the tax liability by a person who is primarily responsible to pay the tax to the ultimate consumer. On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned senior Counsel that the judgment of this Court in Bhadrachalam Paperboards Ltd. and Another Vs. The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (1998) 6 SCC 250 , dealt with this aspect. 13. It was a case where the bamboo supplied from the Government Forest to the Appellant was assessed to sales tax. However, such a levy and collection was eventually found to be illegal by the High Court. The question arose whether the Bhadrachalam Paperboards could claim refund of the amounts illegally collected by the State. This Court noticing that the bamboo purchased by the Appellant was consumed by the Appellant in the production of paper and paper boards manufactured by the Company held that they were entitled on the facts of the case as the question of the passing on of the liability to the consumer did not arise. The operative portion of the judgment reads as follows: "We find that the High Court was not right in so presuming in the light of the case put forward by the Government Pleader as extracted above. The Appellants have reimbursed a tax liability which was on the Forest Department and the Appellants have consumed the goods for manufacturing paperboards, etc. Therefore, the question of the Appellants passing on the tax liability to the consumer, on the facts of this case, would not arise. Consequently, the Appellants are entitled to refund of the tax collected from them, not for the entire period but for the period commencing three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition." 14. It can be noticed from the above extract that it was a case where the decision turned on the facts of that case. 15. This Court in Union of India and others Vs. It can be noticed from the above extract that it was a case where the decision turned on the facts of that case. 15. This Court in Union of India and others Vs. Solar Pesticide Pvt. Ltd. and Another, (2000) 2 SCC 705 , once again had to deal with the question "whether the doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable in respect of raw material imported and consumed in the manufacture of a final product is a question which arises for consideration in these appeals". At para 20 of the judgment, this Court held as follows: "We are of the opinion that the aforesaid observations would be applicable in the case of captive consumption as well. To claim refund of duty it is immaterial whether the goods imported are used by the importer himself and the duty thereon passed on to the purchaser of the finished product or that the imported goods are sold as such with the incidence of tax being passed on to the buyer. In either case the principle of unjust enrichment will apply and the person responsible for paying the import duty would not be entitled to get the refund because of the plain language of Section 27 of the Act. Having passed on the burden of tax to another person, directly or indirectly, it would clearly be a case of unjust enrichment if the importer/seller is then able to get refund of the dirty paid from the Government notwithstanding the incidence of tax having already been passed on to the purchaser." 16. In substance, this Court held that a person who passes on the burden of tax to some other person, either directly or indirectly is not entitled to claim the refund of tax, the levy and/or collection of which by the State is declared to be illegal or unconstitutional. Though it appears from the said judgment, their Lordships relied upon the language of Section 27 of the Customs Act in support of their conclusion. Though it appears from the said judgment, their Lordships relied upon the language of Section 27 of the Customs Act in support of their conclusion. In our opinion, the existence or otherwise of such a provision makes no difference for the correctness of the above stated principle of law Any person carrying on the activity of manufacture of goods utilising some raw material which had already suffered some tax would normally include both the tax component and the cost of such raw material into the cost of the final product and pass on the same to the consumer of the manufactured product. Therefore, such a person would still not be entitled to claim refund of the tax which is otherwise illegally collected by the State unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the State that he had not passed on the tax liability whether directly or indirectly to some other person. 17. For the abovementioned reasons, we do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment under appeal. The appeal is dismissed. However, it is open to the Appellant to establish before the Respondents by adducing necessary evidence if the Appellant had not really passed on the liability to a third party. Such liberty we see is already given by the High Court by the impugned judgment. The Appellant, if so advised, may make such a claim before the competent authority within a period of six weeks from today and adduce necessary evidence in accordance with law. If such an application is made by the Appellant, the Respondents are directed to dispose of such application expeditiously. SLP (C) Nos. 10887-10888 of 2002, SLP (C) Nos. 10889-10891 of 2002, SLP (C) Nos. 10892-10894 of 2002 AND SLP (C) Nos. 10895-10896 of 2002 18. The issue involved in these matters is substantially the same as the issue involved in Civil Appeal No. 5484 of 2002, though there may be factual variations. Therefore, all these special leave petitions are also disposed of in terms of the order in Civil Appeal No. 5484 of 2002. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in all the matters.