JUDGMENT 1. The appeal arises out of the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Adhoc District Judge-I, Fast Track at Panaji in Civil Suit No.304/2004 on 30/7/2008, by which the civil suit filed by the original plaintiffs is partly decreed and it is declared that the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991 executed by the original defendants no.1, 2, 6 and 7 and the award passed by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Panaji, in Case no. ABN/DRCS/31/95 on 26/12/1995 and the auction proceedings dated 2/4/1998 and the Certificate of Sale dated 29/10/1998 are null and void abi-initio. By the impugned Judgment and Decree it is directed that the Sub Registrar of Registration should cancel the registration of the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991. This appeal is filed by (i) The Chief Executive Officer, Goa State Co-operative Bank Ltd. and (ii) the Branch Manager, Goa State Co- operative Bank Ltd., who were the original defendants no.6 and 7. 2. The relevant facts necessary for consideration of the controversy in issue are as follows: The property known as “Avanal” situated at Colvale, Benaulim bearing survey no.276/1 admeasuring 27,800 square metres belonging to Shri Yeshwant Babulo Naik Mainkar who expired on 20/7/1985 leaving behind him, his wife (plaintiff no.1), 4 daughters (plaintiffs nos.2,4 and 6 and defendant no.3) and one son (defendant no.1). The original plaintiff no.3 is the husband of original plaintiff no.2. The original plaintiff no.5 is the husband of the original plaintiff no.4. The original plaintiff no.7 is the husband of original plaintiff no.6 and the original defendant no.4 is the husband of original defendant no.3. The Original defendant no.2 is the wife of the original defendant no.1. 3. After death of Shri Yeshwant Babulo Naik Mainkar, Inventory Proceedings bearing no.35/99/A were taken up before the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division, Mapusa and they were pending at the time of filing of the present civil suit, that is, Civil Suit No.304/2004 on 30/1/2004. It is the case of the plaintiffs that after the death of Shri Yeshwant Mainkar, the suit property along with the other properties and assets devolved upon the original plaintiff no1. (wife) as half sharer and in favour of the daughters and son to the extent of 1/10th share in favour of each of the heirs and their spouses. It is the case of the plaintiffs that after the death of Shri Yeshwant Mainkar, the suit property along with the other properties and assets devolved upon the original plaintiff no1. (wife) as half sharer and in favour of the daughters and son to the extent of 1/10th share in favour of each of the heirs and their spouses. According to the plaintiffs, after the death of Shri Yeshwant Mainkar, the suit property was enjoyed jointly and peacefully by the original plaintiffs and the defendants no.1 to 4 in proportion of their shares along with the other properties left by Shri Yeshwant Mainkar. 4. The plaintiffs have stated that the original plaintiff no.1 had executed a Will dated 22/1/1999 bequeathing her share in favour of her four daughters, that is, the original plaintiffs no.2, 4, 6 and defendant no.3 and on her death on 20/12/2004, during the pendency of the civil suit, her share has devolved upon the plaintiffs no.2, 4, 6 and defendant no.3. 5. According to the plaintiffs, they had received a notice dated 14/3/2000 from the office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer informing that an award was passed for compensation pursuant to the acquisition of part of the suit property to the extent of an area of 21530 sq. mtrs. and further pointing out that an amount of Rs.7,99,903/- was deposited in the District Court, North Goa, Panaji. According to the plaintiffs, on receipt of this notice, they came to know that the Goa State Co-operative Bank Ltd., the Syndicate Bank and the Bank of Maharashtra through their Branches at Mapusa had forwarded their claims for the compensation awarded in respect of the part of the suit land. According to the plaintiffs, they issued notice through their Advocate for inspection of the documents and requiring the banks to produce the documents on which they relied in support of their claim for the amount of compensation. According to the plaintiffs, they issued notice through their Advocate for inspection of the documents and requiring the banks to produce the documents on which they relied in support of their claim for the amount of compensation. It is the case of the plaintiffs that defendant no.6 had supplied xerox copies of the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991, General Power of Attorney dated 7/9/1985, General Power of Attorney dated 17/1/1991, General Power of Attorney dated 3/9/1985 and General Power of Attorney dated 15/1/1991, Copy of the award dated 26/12/1995, copy of notice dated 14/3/2000, copy of the auction proceedings held on 2/4/1998, copy of proclamation and copy of notice of sale of immovable properties and Certificate of Sale dated 29/10/1998. The plaintiffs have stated that on receiving these documents they got knowledge that illegal acts and mischief has been committed by the defendants no.1 and 2, in connivance with the defendants no.6 and 7 and they had misused the authority given to the defendants no.1 as the Attorney and in furtherance of the evil and mischievous designs the suit property was illegally mortgaged as security for the loans taken by the defendants no.1 and 2. It is the case of the plaintiffs that they had never authorized the defendant no.1 to execute the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991 and therefore, the are not bound by the above referred Mortgage Deed. In these facts, the plaintiffs have sought the decree for declaration that the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991 and the consequential actions/transactions are null and void ab- initio. 6. The defendants no.1 and 2 filed their written statement and opposed the claim made by the plaintiffs. They disputed the claim of the plaintiffs as the legal heirs of Yeshwant Mainkar and according to these defendants, the plaintiffs no.6 and 7 had executed Renunciation Deed in 1992 in respect of their share before the Sub-Registrar, Panaji. According to these defendants, they enjoyed the suit property after the death of Shri Yeswant Mainkar. The defendants no.1 and 2 relied on the Powers of Attorney dated 7/9/1985, 17/1/1991, 3/9/1985 and 15/1/1991 and submitted that as per Clause-12, the defendant no.1 has the authority to execute the Deed of Mortgage in respect of the suit property. 7. The defendants no. The defendants no.1 and 2 relied on the Powers of Attorney dated 7/9/1985, 17/1/1991, 3/9/1985 and 15/1/1991 and submitted that as per Clause-12, the defendant no.1 has the authority to execute the Deed of Mortgage in respect of the suit property. 7. The defendants no. 6 and 7 (appellants) filed their written statement and stated that the original defendant no.2 had approached the Goa State Co-operative Bank Ltd. for securing loan and the bank had sanctioned loan in the form of hypothecation Cash Credit Facility of Rs.4.00 lakhs vide sanction letter dated 31/1/1991 to the defendant no.2 in the form of working capital. The defendants no.6 and 7 stated that the amount of loan was to be repaid along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. According to these defendants, the defendants no.1 and 2 had mortgaged the suit property as security towards the above referred loan and the mortgage deed was registered on 4/2/1991. The defendants no.6 and 7 stated that the above mentioned Mortgage Deed was signed by the defendant no.1 for himself and as Constituted Attorney on behalf of the plaintiffs no.1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 and the defendant no.2. The defendants no.6 and 7 stated that as per the Clause 7 of the Power of Attorney dated 17/1/1991 executed by the plaintiff no.1, the defendant no.1 was authorized to partition, sell or transfer any of the immovable properties in which the plaintiff no.1 had right or interest and to execute the required deed of sale and other deeds and documents and to admit and acknowledge execution of the same before the registering authorities. The defendants no.6 and 7 claimed that in view of the four Powers of Attorney, the suit property was legally and validly mortgaged with the bank as security for the loan sanctioned in favour of defendant no.2 and it was binding on all the concerned parties. The defendants no.6 and 7 stated that the defendant no.2 failed to repay the outstanding amount of loan and recovery proceedings were filed before the Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies against defendants no.1 and 2 in which an ex parte award came to be passed on 26/12/1995, for an amount of Rs.6,81,998.74. The defendants no.6 and 7 stated that the defendant no.2 failed to repay the outstanding amount of loan and recovery proceedings were filed before the Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies against defendants no.1 and 2 in which an ex parte award came to be passed on 26/12/1995, for an amount of Rs.6,81,998.74. The defendants no.6 and 7 stated that execution proceedings were filed to recover the amount and proclamation and written notice of sale of immovable property which was mortgaged was published in the “Gomantak Times” dated 18/2/1998 and the suit property which was mortgaged was auctioned on 26/2/1998 and the sale was confirmed in favour of the bank and the Assistant Registrar issued the Sale Certificate dated 24/10/1998 confirming the sale of the mortgaged property in favour of the bank under the Multi- State Co operative Societies Act and pursuant to the public auction, the suit property came in possession of the bank. The defendants no.6 and 7 stated that the bank filed objections before the Land Acquisition Officer pointing out the fact of the purchase of the property in the auction sale dated 26/2/1998 and the amount of compensation was claimed by the bank as the owner of the suit property. The defendants no.6 and 7 stated that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to declare that the award dated 26/12/1995 passed by the Dy. Registrar of Cooperative Societies is null and void. These defendants submitted that the suit was filed beyond the period of limitation. They pointed out that the award was passed by the District Court in the reference proceedings on 26/4/2007 awarding the amount of compensation of Rs.5,66,027/- with interest in favour of the Goa Co-operative Bank. By an amendment to the written statement, the defendants no.6 and 7 stated that the Will dated 22/1/1999 was executed by the original plaintiff no.1 only with the intention of defeating the rights of the bank for recovery of the outstanding dues. 8. The learned Trial Judge proceeded with the matter and after completing the trial of the suit, partly decreed it as mentioned above. The defendants no.6 and 7 (appellants) being aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Judge have filed this appeal. 9. 8. The learned Trial Judge proceeded with the matter and after completing the trial of the suit, partly decreed it as mentioned above. The defendants no.6 and 7 (appellants) being aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Judge have filed this appeal. 9. Heard Shri S. R. Rivankar, the learned counsel for the appellants and Shri A. Monteiro, the learned counsel for the respondent no.4 and perused the record with the assistance of the learned counsel. None appeared for the other respondents. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the civil suit filed by the original plaintiffs was barred by limitation and therefore it could not have been entertained by the Trial Court. The learned counsel has submitted that the Deed of Mortgage is executed on 4/2/1991 and is registered on 1/10/1991 and the civil suit is filed on 1/7/2003. According to the appellants, the limitation for seeking the decree for declaration is prescribed by Article 56 of the Limitation Act and it is 3 years from the date when the issuance of the instrument or the registration of the instrument becomes known to the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the Deed of Mortgage being a registered document, the plaintiffs are supposed to have knowledge of it and in support of this submission, he relied on the provisions of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, which provides for the interpretation of “a person is said to have notice” and the Explanation- I below it – which reads as follows: “Where any transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated.” . He further relies on the judgment in the case of “The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad Vs. Haji Abdul Gaur Haji Hussenbhai” reported in AIR 1971 SC 1201 , in support of his submission that the plaintiffs are supposed to have knowledge of the execution of the Deed of Mortgage on its registration on 1/10/1991 and if they have not taken any steps to obtain the knowledge of the Mortgage Deed, then they have acted with wilful abstention and gross negligence and therefore, they are not entitled to contend that they were not having the knowledge about the execution of the Deed of Mortgage and the suit is filed by them after a period of about almost 12 years, is maintainable. 11. Shri Rivankar, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the civil suit, in view of the bar created by Section 105 (3) of the Multi -State Co-operative Societies Act 1984. He further submits that the award passed by the Dy. Registrar of the Co- operative Societies on 26/12/1995 and the Certificate of Sale issued consequent thereto, are “orders”, as contemplated by the provision of Rule 22 of the Multi- State Co operatives Societies (Privileges, Properties and Funds, Accounts, Audit, Winding Up and Execution of Decrees, Orders and Decisions ) Rules, 1985 and these orders could not have been challenged before the Civil Court in view of the bar created by Rule 22 (14) (vi) of the Rules of 1985. 12. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to prosecute a time barred claim on the spacious plea that they were not having the knowledge of the execution of the deed of mortgage, when the deed of mortgage is registered on 1/10/1991 and the suit property is sold in public auction in respect of which the proclamation was published on 19/1/1998, in the “Gomantak Times”, which is having wide circulation in Goa. 13. 13. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted, in the alternative, that in any case, the trial Court could not have granted the decree declaring that the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991 is null and void ab-initio inasmuch as according to the learned counsel for the appellants the Deed of Mortgage was legal and valid at the behest of the defendants no.1 and 2 and the plaintiffs no.1, 2, 3, 6 and 7. Shri Rivankar has submitted that the learned Trial Judge has acted with material illegality in granting a decree for declaration in respect of the Deed of Mortgage in favour of all the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1 and 2, giving a go-bye to the factual aspects, as stated above. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the Deed of Mortgage was legally and validly registered after it was presented at the proper Registration Office and for this, he relied on the provisions of Section 32 (c) of the Registration Act 1908. He has further submitted that the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) are also legally and validly executed according to the provisions of Section 33 (1) (c) of the Registration Act, 1908. 15. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the Will dated 22/1/1999 on which the plaintiffs have relied does not have any effect on the entitlement of the appellants in respect of the suit property. According to the appellants, the Will is a fraudulent transfer as contemplated by Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as the Will is created with the intention of defeating the claim of the appellants. 16. The learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the learned Trial Judge has not considered the effect of the Award passed in the land acquisition case by the District Court in the reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act by which the appellants are held entitled for the amount of compensation for the acquisition of the suit property. 17. Shri A. Monteiro, learned counsel for the respondent no.4 has submitted that the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) on which the appellants are relying to substantiate their claim, does not give any authority to the original defendant no.1 to execute the Deed of Mortgage. 17. Shri A. Monteiro, learned counsel for the respondent no.4 has submitted that the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) on which the appellants are relying to substantiate their claim, does not give any authority to the original defendant no.1 to execute the Deed of Mortgage. According to the learned counsel for respondent no.4, the original defendant no.1 could have exercised the authority only in respect of the things mentioned in the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) and as there is nothing in the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) to show that the defendant no.1 was authorized to mortgage the property, the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991 is null and void ab-initio. He has further submitted that the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) does not authorize the original defendant no.1 to mortgage the suit property as security for the loan and therefore, the Deed of Mortgage executed by him in favour of the appellants is illegal, null and void ab-initio. He has further submitted that the appellants have committed fraud in collusion with the defendants no.1 and 2. The learned counsel has submitted that the appellants have relied on Form I and XIV in respect of the suit property which according to him admittedly cannot be said to be a title document and in any case it does not show the names of the legal heirs of Shri Yeshwant Mainkar. Shri Monteiro, the learned counsel has submitted that the claim of the appellants is based on the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991 which itself is null and void ab-initio and therefore, the consequential actions/proceedings are also null and void. Therefore, the bar created by Section 105 of the Multi- State Co-operative Societies Act 1984 cannot be enforced in the present proceedings. According to him, the Deed of Mortgage itself being illegal and invalid, the proceedings which were taken up under Section 74 of the Multi- State Co-operative Societies Act were also not legal. He has submitted that if the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991 cannot sustain the scrutiny of law being null and void, the foundation of the claim of the appellants goes. He has submitted that if the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991 cannot sustain the scrutiny of law being null and void, the foundation of the claim of the appellants goes. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent no.4 that the fraud in the matter could not have been done only by the defendants no.1 and 2 and it is clear that the appellants are in collusion with the defendants no.1 and 2 in committing the fraud. It is submitted that the execution of the Will is not a fraudulent transfer as the Will becomes effective only after the death of the person executing the Will. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff no.1 who executed the Will died after the filing of the suit. The learned counsel for the respondent no.4 has submitted that the appellants have not cross-examined the witnesses of the plaintiffs on the point of knowledge. As far as the issue of limitation is concerned, according to him, the plaintiffs got knowledge of the fraud committed by the defendants no.1 and 2 in collusion with the defendants no.6 and 7 when they received the notice of the land acquisition proceedings on 10/6/2003 and the civil suit is filed on 1/7/2003 and therefore, the civil suit is filed within limitation. Shri Monteiro, learned counsel for respondent no.4 has submitted that the knowledge of registration of the Deed of Mortgage is only presumption in law and it is not possible for a person to search the registration of the document specially when the document is submitted for registration at the back of the person. According to the learned counsel for the respondent no.4, the presumption in law is rebuttable and the plaintiffs have discharged the burden of rebutting the presumption and have substantiated their contention that they got knowledge about registration of the Deed of Mortgage only pursuant to the notice in respect of the land acquisition proceedings. 18. After hearing the counsel for the respective parties, the following points arise for my determination: (i) Whether the civil suit is filed within limitation? (ii) Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the civil suit? 18. After hearing the counsel for the respective parties, the following points arise for my determination: (i) Whether the civil suit is filed within limitation? (ii) Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the civil suit? (iii) Whether the learned Trial Judge has committed an error in granting the decree for declaration in favour of the original defendants no.1, 2 and the original plaintiffs no.1,2,3, 6 and 7 that the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991 and the consequent orders are also null and void ab-initio? (iv) Whether the original plaintiffs have proved that fraud is committed by the original defendants no.1 and 2 in collusion with the defendants no. 6 and 7 while executing the Deed of Mortgage dated 4/2/1991? (v) Whether the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Judge is sustainable? 19. The issue of limitation and jurisdiction of the Trial Court to entertain and decide the civil suit goes to the root of the matter and therefore, it is advisable to deal with these two issues in the beginning. 20. It is not disputed that Article 56 of the Limitation Act 1963 provides the limitation for filing a civil suit to declare the forgery of an instrument issued or registered and the period of limitation prescribed is 3 years from the date when the issue or registration of the instrument becomes known to the plaintiff. It is not disputed that the Deed of Mortgage in respect of which the declaration is sought is executed on 4/2/1991 and it is registered on 1/10/1991 and the civil suit is filed on 1/7/2003. The question which falls for consideration is that when the plaintiffs got the knowledge about the execution of the Deed of Mortgage? The case of the plaintiffs is that they got knowledge of the execution and registration of the Deed of Mortgage on 10/6/2003, when they received notice of the land acquisition reference case. 21. Per contra, the case of the appellants is that the plaintiffs and defendants no.1 and 2 are closely related and not only this, the plaintiffs had executed the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) in favour of the defendant no.1 authorizing him to deal with the suit property. The execution of the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) is undisputed. Per contra, the case of the appellants is that the plaintiffs and defendants no.1 and 2 are closely related and not only this, the plaintiffs had executed the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) in favour of the defendant no.1 authorizing him to deal with the suit property. The execution of the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) is undisputed. This substantiates the submission made on behalf of the appellants that the relations between the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1 and 2 were good. It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the chronology of events show that the plaintiff no.1-mother of defendant no.1 and the sisters of the defendant no.1 (plaintiffs no.2, 4, 6 and defendant no.3) were making attempts to help out the defendant no.1, who was not engaged in any work. 22. Though the plaintiffs have given the details as to when the cause of action has arisen and have referred to the notice received by them under Section 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, about the receipt of the copies of the documents demanded by them and about issuance of the legal notices, the plaintiffs are silent and have not made any averment in respect of the proclamation notice issued in the “Gomantak Times” dated 19/11/1998 (Exhibit 51), in respect of the suit property regarding public auction. The failure on the part of the plaintiffs to refute knowledge in respect of the above mentioned proclamation notice adversely affects their contention that they got knowledge about the execution and registration of the Deed of Mortgage on 10/6/2003. Furthermore, the pleadings of the plaintiffs in para 32 of their claim about the knowledge of the execution and registration of the Deed of Mortgage are contradictory. The plaintiffs, in paragraph 32 of the plaint have stated as follows: “32. The cause of action for filing the present suit arose for the first time when in or about the month of April 2000, some of the plaintiffs received the Notice under Section 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 from which it was merely learnt that the Defendant no.6 was also a claimant to the compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on account of a part of the land of the suit property being acquired for 400 K.V. Sub station at Colvale Village of Bardez Taluka. The cause of action further rose in or about the month of October 2001 when the defendants nos. 6 and 7, supplied to the plaintiffs, copies of the documents on the basis of which they had filed their claim and subsequently on 21st January 2002 when the defendant no.6 filed the Written Statement of the defendants nos. 6 & 7, elucidating the nature of their claim. The cause of action also arose when the defendants nos. 6 & 7 acting through their advocate Shri S. R. Rivankar, replied to the Legal Notice dated 10th February 2003, that was issued to the defendants nos.5,6 & 7, whereby they denied the claims of the plaintiffs and refused to comply with the said Legal Notice that was addressed to them. The cause of action lastly arose when the defendants nos. 1 & 2, having received the Legal Notice dated 10th June 2003 addressed to them also failed to comply with the same Legal Notice.” 23. The plaintiffs have categorically stated that the cause of action for filing the suit has arisen in April 2000 when they received the notice issued under section 12 (2) of the Act of 1894. This is inconsistent with the submission made on behalf of the plaintiffs that the cause of action has arisen when the defendants no.1 and 2 received the legal notice dated 10/6/2003 addressed to them failed to comply with it. The inconsistent pleadings of the plaintiffs speak volumes about their claim regarding knowledge in the matter. 24. In my view, the conduct of the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1 and 2 throughout, is the relevant factor for adjudicating the point. The plaintiffs no.2 and 3 executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff no.1 on 3/9/1985. The plaintiff no.1 executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant no.1 on 7/9/1985. The plaintiff no.1 executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant no.1 on 17/1/1990. The defendant no.2 executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant no.1 on 15/1/1991. The loan is sanctioned in favour of defendant no.2 on 31/1/1991. The power of attorney (four in number) are registered, as required by the provisions of Section 33 (1) (c) of the Registration Act. The defendant no.2 executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant no.1 on 15/1/1991. The loan is sanctioned in favour of defendant no.2 on 31/1/1991. The power of attorney (four in number) are registered, as required by the provisions of Section 33 (1) (c) of the Registration Act. The plaintiffs no.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and the defendants no.1, 2, 3 and 4 jointly prosecuted the Land Acquisition Case no.46/1999, that is, the reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the suit property and made claim for compensation. 25. The above mentioned facts clearly show that throughout the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1, 2, 3 & 4 were having good relations. It is important to note that the plaintiffs have not made any monetary claim in the civil suit against the defendants no.1 and 2, though the plaintiffs have made a claim against the defendants no.6 and 7 on the ground that a fraud is played by the defendants no.6 and 7 in collusion with the defendants no.1 and 2. All these factors necessarily point out that the claim as made by the plaintiffs is not bonafide. In view of the facts which have come on record there cannot be any conclusion except that the claim is made by the plaintiffs only to frustrate the legitimate title of the suit property acquired by the appellants. 26. In this background, the submission made on behalf of the appellants relying on the provisions of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act assumes significance, Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act provides the interpretation of “a person is said to have notice” and it reads as follows: “a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for willful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.” 27. Considering the cordial relations of the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1 and 2 throughout as is evident from the record and in view of the interpretation of the Clause “a person is said to have notice” and the Explanation I below, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs were not having knowledge about the execution of the Deed of Mortgage on 4/2/1991 and its registration on 1/10/1991. Considering the matter from this perspective, I hold that the suit having being filed after 3 years from 1/10/1991, it is barred by limitation in view of the provisions of Article 56 of the Limitation Act 1963. In view of my conclusions, it is not necessary to consider the submissions made by Shri Rivankar relying on the Judgment in the case of “The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad Vs. Haji Abdul Gafur Haji Hussenbhai” reported in AIR 1971 SC page 1201. The learned Trial Judge has failed to consider the relevant aspects which have resulted in the erroneous conclusions and it makes the impugned Judgment unsustainable in law. 28. The provisions of Section 105 (3) of the Mufti-State Co operative Societies Act 1984 reads as follows: “105. Bar of jurisdiction of courts- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of - (a) The registration of Multi-State Co-operative Society or its bye-laws or of an amendment of the bye-laws; (b) the removal of board of directors; (c) any dispute required under section 74 to be referred to the Central Registrar; and (d) any matter concerning the winding up and the dissolution of a Multi-State co-operative society. (2) While a Multi-State Co-operative Society is being wound up, no suit or other legal proceedings relating to the business of such society shall be proceeded with or instituted against the liquidator or against the society or any member thereof, except by leave of the Central Registrar and subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose. (3) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no decision or order made under this Act shall be questioned in any court.” 29. In view of the express bar created by Section 105 (3) of the Act 1984, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the civil suit challenging the order passed by the authorities under the provisions of the Act of 1984. The Award dated 26/12/1995 which is challenged in the civil suit is the award passed by the competent authority in the proceedings under Section 79 of the Act of 1984. The Award dated 26/12/1995 which is challenged in the civil suit is the award passed by the competent authority in the proceedings under Section 79 of the Act of 1984. The plaintiffs have endeavoured to make out a case that the above mentioned award is unsustainable in law, as the cause of action for the proceedings under Section 79 of the Act of 1984 had arisen because of the execution and registration of the Deed of Mortgage, which according to the plaintiffs is done fraudulently. Though, fraud vitiates everything and the party is entitled to raise challenge to the fraudulent action, and the judgment or order obtained by fraud even in collateral proceedings, in my view, this principle will not be applicable in the present case. Thought the plaintiffs have based their claim on the ground that the Deed of Mortgage is executed and registered in fraudulent manner, the plaintiffs have not pleaded and led evidence to substantiate their claim. It is settled law that when the challenge is based on the ground that the impugned action is fraudulently done, then there has to be pleadings and evidence in that regard and the details of the alleged fraud should be precisely placed on record. In the present case, the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants no.6 and 7 (the Chief Executive Officer, Goa State Co- operative Bank Ltd. Panaji and the Branch Manager of Goa State Cooperative Bank Ltd., Mapusa) are in collusion with the defendants no.1 and 2. The plaintiffs were under the obligation to implead the alleged Officials of the bank by their names so that the concerned officials had the notice and an opportunity to rebut the claim as made by the plaintiffs. In view of the failure on the part of the plaintiffs to plead and lead evidence and to implead the necessary parties, to substantiate their case of fraud, the claim as made by them on the foundation of fraud cannot be considered. Consequently, the plaintiffs cannot wriggle out of the bar created by Section 105 (3) of the Act of 1984. The Central Government has made the Multi-State Co-operative Societies (Privileges, Properties and Funds, Accounts, Audit, Winding Up and Executions of Decrees, Orders and Decisions) Rules, 1985 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 109 of the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 1984. Rule 22 (14) (vi) reads as follows: 22 (14) …................................ The Central Government has made the Multi-State Co-operative Societies (Privileges, Properties and Funds, Accounts, Audit, Winding Up and Executions of Decrees, Orders and Decisions) Rules, 1985 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 109 of the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 1984. Rule 22 (14) (vi) reads as follows: 22 (14) …................................ (vi) An order made under this sub-rule shall be final, and shall not be liable to be questioned in any suit or other legal proceedings” In view of my findings that the original plaintiffs have failed to prove the fraud as alleged by them, the submission that the civil suit is maintainable challenging the fraudulent action cannot be accepted. Therefore, I hold that the civil suit filed by the plaintiffs was not maintainable and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the civil suit. The award dated 26/12/1995 is passed by the competent authority in the proceedings under Section 79 of the Act of 1984 and the Sale Certificate issued pursuant to it cannot be challenged in civil suit in view of the bar created by Rule 22 (14) (vi) of the above mentioned Rules. 30. The facts discussed above regarding the execution of the Powers of Attorney (4 in number) and the prosecution of the land acquisition reference case jointly by the plaintiffs no.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and the defendants no.1, 2, 3 and 4 and the conduct of the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1, 2, 3 and 4 clearly show that the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1 and 2 are having good relations. In this background, the alternate submissions made on behalf of the appellants that the learned Trial Judge has committed an error in granting relief to the defendants no.1, 2 and the plaintiffs no.1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 by granting the decree for declaration that the Deed of Mortgage executed on 4/2/1991 and the consequent documents/deeds are null and void ab-initio is worth consideration. The submission on behalf of the appellants that the mortgage of the suit property to the extent of the shares of the defendants no.1 and 2 and the plaintiff no.1 was legal and valid and the learned Trial Judge could not have declared the mortgage to that extent as null and void require consideration. The submission on behalf of the appellants that the mortgage of the suit property to the extent of the shares of the defendants no.1 and 2 and the plaintiff no.1 was legal and valid and the learned Trial Judge could not have declared the mortgage to that extent as null and void require consideration. However, in view of the findings on the points of limitation and jurisdiction, I am of the view that the merits of the submission made in this regard need not be dealt with. The Award in the Land Acquisition Reference Case is passed by the District Court on 22/4/2007, that is, much before the impugned Judgment and Decree and the learned Trial Judge has failed to consider its effect on the present proceedings. Similarly, the learned Trial Judge has not taken into consideration the fact that the appeal challenging the above mentioned award was pending before this Court when the impugned Judgment and Decree is passed but in view of my findings on the points of limitation and jurisdiction, I am not considering this point also. 31. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The Judgment and Decree passed by Ad-hoc District Judge-I, Fast Track Court, Panaji in Civil Suit No.304/2004 is set aside. The Civil Suit No.304/2004 filed by the plaintiffs is dismissed. The appellants are entitled for the costs throughout from the plaintiffs. The other defendants to bear their own costs.