JUDGMENT : Subrata Talukdar, J. By filing CO 627 of 2011 the petitioner challenges the order impugned dated 20th January, 2011 passed in Title Suit no. 243 of 1982 by the Learned 5th Civil Court (Junior Division) at Alipore. The case of the petitioner in brief is as follows. (a) That the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite parties, one late Dhruva Roy instituted Title Suit no.243 of 1982 against the petitioner before the Learned 5th Civil Court (Junior Division) at Alipore praying, inter alia, for a decree for specific performance of contract and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property. (b) That the present petitioner in CO 627 of 2011 is the defendant and resisted the suit by filing written statement. The present petitioner defendant contended before the Learned Trial Court that the property agreement for sale (Bayna Patra) is not a genuine one but manufactured for the purpose of the suit. According to the present petitioner-defendant the said Dhruva Roy obtained his signature on a blank piece of paper by way of security against a loan amount of Rs. 1,000 given to the petitioner-defendant. However, the petitioner never executed any agreement for sale in respect of the suit property in favour of the late Dhruva Roy. (c) That at the time of giving deposition PW1, one Sri Ujjwal Bhowmick deposed as the authorised representative of the substituted plaintiffs and filed an affidavit-in-chief under Order 18 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the CPC) on 20th September, 2010 and thereafter tendered the said affidavit-in-chief on the 22nd of November, 2010. During his deposition the said Ujjwal Bhowmick tendered a piece of writing on a plain paper showing it to be the alleged agreement for sale and praying before the Learned Trial Court to mark the same as an exhibited document. (d) The petitioner-defendant thereafter filed an application under Section 151 of the CPC for expunging the said document marked as exbt.-1 contending, inter alia that the alleged agreement for sale is not stamped and requires to be properly stamped prior to be admissible in evidence. The additional point was taken by the petitioner-defendant that the document was not proved in accordance with law. (e) The present opposite parties-plaintiffs did not file any written objection to the said petition under Section 151 of the CPC but contested the same at the time of hearing. The additional point was taken by the petitioner-defendant that the document was not proved in accordance with law. (e) The present opposite parties-plaintiffs did not file any written objection to the said petition under Section 151 of the CPC but contested the same at the time of hearing. On contested hearing the Learned Trial Court vide order dated 28th January, 2011 passed in Title Suit no.243 of 1982 was pleased to reject the petition under Section 151 of the CPC filed by the present petitioner-defendant. (f) The Learned Trial Court by the order impugned held that even an unregistered sale deed could be received in evidence to prove the agreement between the parties though it may not itself constitute a contract to transfer the property. In this connection the Learned Trial Court relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Civil Appeal no.3192 of 2010 (arising out of SLP (C) no. 1451 of 2009 vide its order dated 12th April, 2010. 2. In this connection, the Learned Trial Court was pleased to take notice of the objection raised on behalf of the present OP-plaintiff to the effect that the Court is not prevented from considering the value of a document so exhibited at the appropriate time and such consideration on the document being exhibited does not mean that the document is accepted beyond proof. 3. Sri Dilip Mondal, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the order impugned of the Learned Trial Court dated 28th January, 2011 is cryptic and a non-speaking order. Sri Mondal has further argued that there is no application of Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act. He has also relied upon Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. The aforementioned Sections 35 and 36 of the Indian Stamp Act read as follows:- "35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc. Sri Mondal has further argued that there is no application of Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act. He has also relied upon Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. The aforementioned Sections 35 and 36 of the Indian Stamp Act read as follows:- "35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc. - No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped: Provided that (a) any such instrument [shall], be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, or, in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion; (b) where any person from whom a stamped receipt could have been demanded, has given an unstamped receipt and such receipt, if stamped, would be admissible in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him on payment of a penalty of one rupee by the person tendering it; (c) where a contract or agreement of any kind is effected by correspondence consisting of two or more letters and any one of the letters bears the proper stamp, the contract or agreement shall be deemed to be duly stamped; (d) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in evidence in any proceeding in a Criminal Court, other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898); (e) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in any Court when such instrument has been executed by or on behalf of [the [Government]] or where it bears the certificate of the Collector as provided by section 32 or any other provision of this Act 36. Admission of instrument where not to be questioned. Admission of instrument where not to be questioned. - Where an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided in section 61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not duly stamped." 4. Furthermore, relying upon 2005 (4) CHN 287 Sri Mondal has argued that when an objection is taken at the threshold regarding the value of a document on the ground that the document being not a stamped document the same cannot be admitted under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. The Learned Trial Court ought to have taken notice of the same and denied marking the document as exhibit. 5. Per contra Sri Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, Learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party has submitted that Section 33 (5) and Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act operate in the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Section 33 (5) of the Indian Stamp Act reads as follows:- "33. Examination and impounding of instruments. - (1) Every person having by law or consent of parties, authority to receive evidence, and every person in charge of a public office, except an officer of police, before whom any instrument, chargeable, in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same . (2) For that purpose every such person shall examine every instrument so chargeable and so produced or coming before him, in order to ascertain whether it is stamped with a stamp of the value and description required by the law in force in [India] when such instrument was executed or first executed: Provided that (a) nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require any Magistrate or Judge of a Criminal Court to examine or impound, if he does not think fit so to do, any instrument coming before him in the course of any proceeding other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898); (b) in the case of a Judge of High Court, the duty of examining and impounding any instrument under this section may be delegated to such officer as the Court appoints in this behalf. (3) For the purposes of this section, in cases of doubt,- (a) [the [State Government]] may determine what offices shall be deemed to be public offices; and (b) [the [State Government]] may determine who shall be deemed to be persons in charge of public offices." 6. Sri Bhowmick strongly argues that once the document is marked as exhibit, it cannot be de-exhibited. Relying on the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 Sri Bhowmick argues that the Learned Trial Court committed no illegality in marking the said document as exhibit in the suit which is admittedly a suit for specific performance. 7. Relying on the affidavit-in-opposition of Ujjwal Bhowmick, Learned Counsel for the opposite parties submits that the facts of the case are that on 11th February, 1979 the present petitioner-defendant, in view of a tight money market, being the owner of a Bagan' land at Mouza - Ramnagar Taluk, R.S. Dag No. 335, Khatian No.205 being the northern portion of the said Dag (and adjacent to the residential house of the plaintiff) comprising 4 cottahs 8 chittaks of low land agreed to sell the same at the rate of Rs. 900 per cottah totaling Rs. 4050. The plaintiff defendant accepted the earnest money of Rs. 1,001 and in part performance of the contract the petitioner-defendant, Sheikh Samsuddin has delivered the vacant possession of the said land to the original plaintiff, Dhruva Roy who died on 11th February, 1979. 8. Sri Bhowmick also submits that the original registered title deeds of the suit property were handed over on 20th December, 1982 to the said Dhruva Roy who, as purchaser accepted possession of the entire land and developed the said land, which was a low land, to a normal level at his cost. The original plaintiff/the said Dhruva Roy (since deceased) was under the expectation that the sale deed or Kobala' will be registered in his favour by the petitioner-defendant free from all encumbrances and on 12.01.1982 and 30.01.1982 paid the balance consideration money of Rs. 3049 only. 9. However, the petitioner-defendant refused to accept the same. Upon the petitioner-defendant refusing to perform the contract, the original plaintiff served notice on the petitioner-defendant and, still on failure to execute the registered deed filed Title Suit no.243 of 1982 on 25th of February, 1982 for Specific Performance. 10. 3049 only. 9. However, the petitioner-defendant refused to accept the same. Upon the petitioner-defendant refusing to perform the contract, the original plaintiff served notice on the petitioner-defendant and, still on failure to execute the registered deed filed Title Suit no.243 of 1982 on 25th of February, 1982 for Specific Performance. 10. It is the further case of Sri Bhowmick that the petitioner-defendant is trying to delay the suit on one ground or another. Upon the death of the mother of the original plaintiff from 9th of March, 1983 to 7th of March, 1990 the suit could not be proceeded. The suit was dismissed for default on 6th March, 1991 in view of the illness of the Learned Advocate for the plaintiff and thereafter the petitioner-defendant contested the Misc. Case no.12 of 1991 filed on behalf of the present plaintiffs-opposite parties for 14 years from 18th March, 1991 to 20th June, 2005 only for the purpose of delaying the hearing of the suit. 11. The present petitioner-defendant also moved this Hon'ble Court earlier by way of revision being CO 2977 of 2006 challenging the order dated 28th June, 2005 in Misc. Appeal no.364 of 2005. The said CO 2977 of 2006 was dismissed by this Court on 17th September, 2007. 12. Sri Bhowmick submits that the Agreement for Sale tendered as Exhibit P1 can be considered by the Learned Trial Court to arrive at the finding whether the said document was executed by the petitioner defendant himself. According to Sri Bhowmick a look at the reply of the Learned Advocate for the petitioner-defendant dated 20th February, 1982 will reveal that reference to the Agreement for Sale was deliberately suppressed. Supporting the order impugned dated 20th of January, 2011 he submits that in view of the provisions of Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, once the document is exhibited in evidence it cannot be de-exhibited. 13. Heard the parties. Considered the materials on record. 14. This Court notices a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2003 (4) SCC 161 in the matter of Bondar Singh & Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. While considering Section 17 of the Registration Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court at para - 5 was pleased to hold as follows:- "5. The main question, as we have already noted, is the question of continuous possession of the plaintiffs over the suit lands. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. While considering Section 17 of the Registration Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court at para - 5 was pleased to hold as follows:- "5. The main question, as we have already noted, is the question of continuous possession of the plaintiffs over the suit lands. The sale deed dated 9.05.1931 by Fakir Chand, father of the defendants in favour of Tola Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, is an admitted document in the sense its execution is not in dispute. The only defence set up against the said document is that it is unstamped and unregistered and therefore it cannot convey title to the land in favour of the plaintiffs. Under the law a sale deed is required to be properly stamped and registered before it can convey title to the vendee. However, legal position is clear law that a document like the sale deed in the present case, even though not admissible in evidence, can be looked into for collateral purposes. In the present case the collateral purpose to be seen is the nature of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land. The sale deed in question at least shows that initial possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land was not illegal or unauthorized. It is significant to note that the sale deed is dated 9.05.1931 and Fakir Chand died somewhere in the year 1949-50. During his lifetime Fakir Chand never disputed the plaintiffs' title or possession of the suit land. There is other reliable evidence on record which establishes that the plaintiffs have been in continuous possession of the land in question. There is a notice dated 16-04-1956 Exhibit P-6. The notice was issued on behalf of the defendants and is addressed to the predecessor-ininterest of the plaintiffs. By the notice the defendants called upon the plaintiffs to hand over possession of the suit land to them. According to the notice, the plaintiffs were trespassers on the suit land and were liable to hand over its possession to the defendants. This notice is an admission on the part of the defendants that the plaintiffs were in possession was followed by an application dated 8-5-1956 (Exhibit P-3), filed by the defendants under Section 58 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 before the Revenue Authorities. This notice is an admission on the part of the defendants that the plaintiffs were in possession was followed by an application dated 8-5-1956 (Exhibit P-3), filed by the defendants under Section 58 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 before the Revenue Authorities. In the said application the defendants admit that the land in question was in possession of the plaintiffs since the lifetime of their father. It is further admitted that the land was being cultivated by the plaintiffs. It was prayed in the said application that the plaintiffs be declared trespassers over the suit land and possession of the land be given to the defendants. In their reply to the application, the present they refer to the sale deed of 9-5-1931 by Fakir Chand in favour of their predecessor. Thus the plaintiffs were all along asserting that they were in possession of the land in their own right. The Tahsildar vide his order dated 3-10-1959 dismissed the said application of the defendants. He relied on an admission on the part of Punam Chand, eldest son of Fakir Chand that the present plaintiffs were in possession for the last 26-27 years. Relying on the said statement the Revenue Authorities held that since possession of the present plaintiffs was continuing for the last 26-27 years they could not be dispossessed from the suit land. The application of the defendants was dismissed. The defendant filed an appeal against the said order which was also dismissed on 6-8-1962. A copy of the order of the Tahsildar is Exhibit P-8 while a copy of the order of the Appellate Authority i.e. SDO is Exhibit P-9. These judgments of the Revenue Authorities establish that at least till 1962 the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land. They also totally nullify the assertion of the defendants in their written statement in the present suit that they had taken possession of the suit land in 1957-58. If they had taken possession of the suit land in 1957-58, why were they pursuing the matter before the Revenue Authority till 1962 when the appeal was contested before the SDO and the decision of the SDO was given on 6-8-1962?" 15. If they had taken possession of the suit land in 1957-58, why were they pursuing the matter before the Revenue Authority till 1962 when the appeal was contested before the SDO and the decision of the SDO was given on 6-8-1962?" 15. The judgment in Bondar Singh's case (supra) came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in a subsequent decision in the matter of Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra, reported in 2009 (2) SCC 532 . Considering the provisions of Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to hold in the facts of that case that Section 35 uses the words "for any purpose whatsoever". Accordingly, the purpose for which a document is sought to be admitted in evidence or the extent thereof would be a relevant factor for invoking Section 35. The Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to however hold that if for all purposes for which the document sought to be brought into evidence is excluded, there is no reason as to why the document would be admissible for collateral purposes. 16. Distinguishing the ratio of Bondar Singh's case (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court in Avinash Kumar Chouhan's case (supra) was pleased to hold at paras - 23, 24 & 25 as follows:- "23. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the document was admissible for collateral purpose, in our opinion, is not correct. In Bondar Singh this Court was not concerned with the provisions of the Act. Only interpretation of the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 was in question. It was opined : (SCC p.163, para 5) "5. The main question, as we have already noted, is the question of continuous possession of the plaintiffs over the suit lands. The sale deed dated 9-5-1931 by Fakir Chand, father of the defendants in favour of Tola Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, is an admitted document in the sense its execution is not in dispute. The only defence set up against the said document is that it is unstamped and unregistered and therefore it cannot convey title to the land in favour of the plaintiffs. Under the law a sale deed is required to be properly stamped and registered before it can convey title to the vendee. The only defence set up against the said document is that it is unstamped and unregistered and therefore it cannot convey title to the land in favour of the plaintiffs. Under the law a sale deed is required to be properly stamped and registered before it can convey title to the vendee. However, legal position is clear law that a document like the sale deed in the present case, even though not admissible in evidence, can be looked into for collateral purposes. In the present case the collateral purpose to be seen is the nature of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land. The sale deed in question at least shows that initial possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land was not illegal or unauthorized." 24. In the present case, by reason of the statutory interdict, no transfer at all is permissible. Even transfer of possession is also not permissible. (See Pandey Oraon v. Ram Chander Sahu and Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati.) The Registration Act, 1908 provides for such a contingency in terms of the proviso appended to Section 49 thereof, which reads as under: "49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered. - No document required by Section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered shall- (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered: Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (1 of 1877) or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument." 25. Section 35 of the Act, however, rules out applicability of such provision as it is categorically provided therein that a document of this nature shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded, we fail to see any reason as to how the document would be admissible for collateral purposes." 17. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded, we fail to see any reason as to how the document would be admissible for collateral purposes." 17. Thereafter in a judgment reported in 2014 (1) SCC 618 in the matter of Omprakash v. Laxminarayan & Ors. the Hon'ble Apex Court held that at the time of considering the question of admissibility of a document, it is the recitals therein which shall govern the issue. At paras - 11 & 18 it was, inter alia, held as follows:- "11. As stated earlier, the plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of contract and their case is founded on the agreement to sell executed on 27-12-2000. The agreement to sell acknowledges payment of the part of consideration money and further giving actual physical possession to the purchaser by the seller. Though the defendants dispute that, but in our opinion, for determination of the question of admissibility of a document, it is the recital there in which shall be decisive. Whether the possession in fact was given or not in terms of the agreement to sell is a question of fact which requires adjudication. But, at the time of considering the question of admissibility of document, it is the recital therein which shall govern the issue. It does not mean that the recital in the document shall be conclusive but for the purpose of admissibility it is the terms and conditions incorporated therein which shall hold the field. Having said that, we proceed to consider as to whether the document in question is "conveyance" within the meaning of Section 2(10) of the Act." "18. To put the record straight, the correctness of the impugned judgment, Laxminarayan v. Omprakash came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court itself in Writ Petition No.6464 of 2008 (Mansingh v. Rameshwar) and the same has been overruled by the judgment dated 22-1-2010. The High Court observed as follows: (MPLJ p.142, paras 8-9) "8. A document would be admissible on basis of the recitals made in the document and not on basis of the pleadings raised by the parties. The High Court observed as follows: (MPLJ p.142, paras 8-9) "8. A document would be admissible on basis of the recitals made in the document and not on basis of the pleadings raised by the parties. In the matter of Laxminarayan, the learned Single Judge with due respect to his authority we do not think that he did look into the legal position but it appears that he was simply swayed away by the argument that as the defendant was denying the delivery of possession, the endorsement/recital in the document lost all its effect and efficacy. 9. It would be trite to say that if in a document certain recitals are made then the court would decide the admissibility of the document on the strength of such recitals and not otherwise. In a given case, if there is an absolute unregistered sale deed and the parties say that the same is not required to be registered then we do not think that the court would be entitled to admit the document because simply the parties say so. The jurisdiction of the court flows from Sections 33,35 and 38 of the Stamp Act and the court has to decide the question of admissibility. With all humility at our command we overrule the judgment in Laxminarayan." 18. This Court notices that in Avinash Singh Chauhan's case (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to consider the statutory interdict which prevented the consideration of a document under which no transfer was at all permissible. Having noted such statutory interdict the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to come to the view that if the said document could not be admitted for any purpose, the question of its admission for a collateral purpose cannot arise. 19. In the decision reported in Omprakash's case (supra) the recitals in a document attain supremacy and such recitals are to be judged in the light of Sections 33, 35 and 38 of the Indian Stamp Act for considering whether such a document can be received in evidence. 20. However, in the facts of the present case it is noticed by this Court that by order dated 22nd November, 2010 the document in question was admitted in evidence and marked Exbt.1. 21. The said order dated November, 2010 was not challenged by the present petitioners. 20. However, in the facts of the present case it is noticed by this Court that by order dated 22nd November, 2010 the document in question was admitted in evidence and marked Exbt.1. 21. The said order dated November, 2010 was not challenged by the present petitioners. Subsequently, the present petitioner filed the application under Section 151 CPC questioning the acceptance by the Learned Trial Court of the said document which was marked Exbt.1. Having regard to the provisions of Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, the said document could be used only for two purposes, viz. a) in a suit for specific performance and; b) in a suit for considering it as evidence in a collateral transaction. 22. This Court finds that the said document having already been marked as Exbt. 1 and in the light of the provisions of Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 there is no reason to interfere with the order impugned dated 20th January, 2011 passed in Title Suit no.243 of 1982 by the Learned 5th Civil Court (Junior Division) at Alipore. CO 627 of 2011 is therefore dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties upon compliance of all formalities.