Order: The sole petitioner is the sole accused in C.C.No.19 of 2013. He seeks for quashment of C.C.No.19 of 2013 on the file of the Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Hyderabad against him for the offences under Section 409 IPC and under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (the P.C.Act, for short). 2. Before going into the question whether C.C.No.19 of 2013 deserves to be quashed or otherwise, I may answer the question whether the petitioner should be directed to approach the Trial Court and seek for the relief of discharge. In PADAL VENKATA RAMA REDDY v. KOVVURI SATYANARAYANA REDDY, the Supreme Court noticed: 13. It is well settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not in a situation where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. It cannot be used if it is inconsistent with specific provisions provided under the Code [vide Kavita v. State (2000 Cri LJ 315 (Del)) and B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana ( (2003) 4 SCC 675 )]. If an effective alternative remedy is available, the High Court will not exercise its powers under this section, specially when the applicant may not have availed of that remedy. Therefore, when the petitioner has the alternative remedy of approaching the Trial Court for discharge, is it necessary to entertain this application ? 3. In Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court referred to PADAL VENKATA RAMA REDDY (1 supra) and observed that filing of a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C before framing of the charges or before discharge application was filed or even during the pendency of the case before the Court concerned is not prohibited and that the High Court cannot reject a petition for quashment merely on the ground that the accused could argue legal and factual issues at the time of framing of the charges. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that when there is some substance in the allegations and material exists to substantiate complicity of the petitioner, the full conspectus of the case should be examined before the Trial Court. Therefore, whether there is any substance in the allegations deserves to be examined in this case. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that when there is some substance in the allegations and material exists to substantiate complicity of the petitioner, the full conspectus of the case should be examined before the Trial Court. Therefore, whether there is any substance in the allegations deserves to be examined in this case. That apart, legal pleas have been raised by Sri P.Gangaiah Naidu, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner regarding the very maintainability of the complaint. Consequently, this petition is disposed of on merits. 4. The petitioner was appointed as a Civil Supervisor in the Fisheries Corporation in 1978. He was promoted as Deputy Executive Engineer (DEE, for short) in 1989; and was promoted as Executive Engineer (EE, for short) in the year 1992. Between 1995 and 2012, the petitioner was deputed to work in a Public Sector Undertaking, Kakinada under the Fisheries Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. 5. ESI Corporation, New Delhi, entrusted its civil works to Andhra Pradesh Fisheries Department. An agreement was drawn between ESI Corporation and the Andhra Pradesh Fisheries Department. It is the case of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI, for short) that the petitioner, as the EE of the A.P. Fisheries Department opened accounts in the State Bank of India and Corporation Bank. The petitioner allegedly entrusted the construction work to a local Civil Contractor. Certain amounts were allegedly released by ESI Corporation. The petitioner deposited an amount of Rs.One Crore with the Corporation Bank, Jubilee Hills Branch, Hyderabad. Similarly, cheques for Rs.1.26 Crores issued in the name of the EE, Fisheries Department were encashed by the petitioner albeit the works entrusted at Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada were not carried out. Thus far, there is no dispute. 6. It is alleged by the prosecution that an amount of Rs.56,283/- and another amount of Rs.35,069/- were deposited by the petitioner in the Bank of Maharashtra, Khairatabad Branch, Hyderabad in his personal accounts when he received the cheques for the said amounts without any authority or permission to open or operate bank accounts in his official capacity. The accounts were maintained in the name of the Commissioner, Fisheries Department at Government Treasury and that the petitioner allegedly abused the official position as a public servant and fraudulently obtained orders for award of civil works. The accounts were maintained in the name of the Commissioner, Fisheries Department at Government Treasury and that the petitioner allegedly abused the official position as a public servant and fraudulently obtained orders for award of civil works. The gravamen of the charge, however, is that the petitioner misappropriated a sum of Rs.1,44,381/- through cheques for Rs.56,283/-, Rs.35,069/- and Rs.53,029/-. The petitioner thus allegedly committed offences under Section 409 IPC as well as under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C.Act. 7. The petitioner retired from service on 30-4-2012. An Inspector of Police of the CBI, by name Sri G.Sudhakar registered a case in Crime RC 04(A)/2011-CBI-HYD 2011, dated 28-01-2011 under Section 409 IPC and under Section 13(2) read with Sections 13(1)(c) and (d) of the P.C.Act. The case was registered on source information allegedly received by Sri Sudhakar. The charge-sheet was however laid on 27-6-2013, by Sri Sudhakar after the retirement of the petitioner. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that (a) there was no sanction under Section 19 of the P.C.Act to prosecute the petitioner, (b) the investigation was not conducted by an officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or above, (c) Sri Sudhakar was the complainant, Investigating Officer and the person who laid the charge-sheet and (d) the allegations do not constitute either the offence under Section 409 IPC or the offences under Section 13(2) read with Sections 13(1)(c) and (d) of the P.C.Act. He consequently submitted that the case is liable to be quashed against the petitioner. 8. Sri P.Kesava Rao, learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI, on the other hand, contended that under Section 17(a) of the P.C.Act, Sri Sudhakar was competent to investigate the case, consent of the State Government was obtained through G.O.Ms.No.109, Home (SC.A) Department, dated 07-5-2010, that the sanction under Section 19 of the P.C.Act was not necessary as the petitioner retired from service, that the complainant was not Investigating Officer and the charge-sheet was not filed by the Investigating Officer and that the case consequently is maintainable. He further asserted that prima facie case is made out against the petitioner, so much so, it is a fit case to proceed with the trial of the case. 9. He further asserted that prima facie case is made out against the petitioner, so much so, it is a fit case to proceed with the trial of the case. 9. In Maddu Lakshmana Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, placing reliance upon Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1975 SCC (Crl.) 737], it was noted that the complainant being the Investigating Officer has far reaching significance effecting the credibility of the prosecution case. The Supreme Court pointed out that the question of complainant being the Investigating Officer was raised at the earliest possible stage when the investigation was still in progress and that there was no point in allowing the investigation to continue with such an infirmity. The Supreme Court consequently quashed investigation subsequent to the recording of the FIR. The learned Senior Counsel contended that where Sri Sudhakar is the complainant as well as the Investigating Officer, the investigation is liable to be quashed. In Maddu Lakshmana Rao (3 supra), the Supreme Court quashed the case from the stage after filing of the FIR but not the entire case. 10. The learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI, on the other hand, submitted that the Investigating Officer and the complainant are not one and the same. He submitted that the case was registered on source information which is evident from column No.6 of the FIR. He submitted that the Investigating Officer was not the complainant and that the claim of the petitioner that the complainant and the Investigating Officer are one and the same and that the investigation consequently is liable to be quashed cannot be accepted. 11. As rightly submitted by the learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI, the source information led to the filing of the FIR. Indeed, the FIR is a suo motu action on the part of Sri Sudhakar who investigated the case. However, where Sri Sudhakar acted on source information, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the complainant and the Investigating Officer are one and the same and that the very FIR therefore is liable to be quashed cannot be accepted. This defence consequently is not accepted. 12. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the allegations do not constitute the offence under Section 409 IPC as well as under Sections 3(2) read with Section 3(1)(d) of the P.C.Act. This defence consequently is not accepted. 12. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the allegations do not constitute the offence under Section 409 IPC as well as under Sections 3(2) read with Section 3(1)(d) of the P.C.Act. Section 409 IPC imposes penalty for criminal breach of trust by a public servant or by a banker, merchant or agent. There is no dispute that the petitioner is a public servant. However, did he commit the offence of criminal breach of trust ? 13. The case of the prosecution is that monies were entrusted to the petitioner by the ESI Corporation. If there was any criminal breach of trust on the part of the petitioner, ESI Corporation would be the sufferer which would have raised a claim that the petitioner committed criminal breach of trust. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that ESI Corporation did not raise any contention that the petitioner committed criminal breach of trust. It is the source information which disclosed that the petitioner committed criminal breach of trust. It is not as though the case is at the investigation stage. Even after the completion of the investigation and even after laying of the charge-sheet, there was no complaint whatsoever from the ESI Corporation that the petitioner committed criminal breach of trust. 14. Indeed, the petitioner has taken a two-fold stand regarding Rs.1,44,381/-. His first stand is that he has dispersed as much as Rs.7.26 Crores. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that if there was any intention on the part of the petitioner to commit criminal breach of trust, the amount would have been huge money and not a mere Rs.1,44,381/-. Such a contention however cannot be sustained as the criminal breach of trust of Re.1/- or Rs.One Crore is equally punishable. It can be argued that the petitioner had opportunity to commit breach of trust to the extent of this much of money only. At any rate, whether the petitioner had intention and the requisite mens rea to commit criminal breach of trust is a question of fact which cannot be decided in this petition. 15. The 2nd contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner regarding the amounts is that the petitioner received those cheques towards his TA (Travelling Allowance) claim. Admittedly, the cheques were issued in the name of the petitioner. 15. The 2nd contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner regarding the amounts is that the petitioner received those cheques towards his TA (Travelling Allowance) claim. Admittedly, the cheques were issued in the name of the petitioner. If they were not issued in the name of the petitioner, the question of Bank of Maharashtra accepting the cheque would not have arisen. ESI Corporation would not have issued cheques in the name of the petitioner if the amounts sent were in connection with the construction and payable to the Andhra Pradesh Fisheries Department and not to the petitioner. However, this defence again is a matter of evidence which cannot be gone into in this petition. I therefore do not hold that on merits, no case is made out against the petitioner. 16. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also raised objections under Sections 19 and 17 of the P.C.Act. Under Section 17 of the P.C.Act, no Police Officer below the rank of an Inspector of Police in the case of Delhi Special Police Establishment shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act. The investigation was conducted by Sri Sudhakar who is an Inspector of Police. However, the investigation was conducted by the Delhi Special Police. As rightly submitted by the learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI, the investigation of the case by an Inspector of the Delhi Special Police Establishment is permissible in view of Section 17(a) of the P.C.Act. 17. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon Section 17(c) of the P.C.Act which contemplates that a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a Police Officer of equivalent rank alone is entitled to investigate any offence punishable under the P.C.Act in residuary circumstances not covered by Sections 17(a) and 17(b). Where the case is covered by Section 17(a), the question of Section 17(c) being applicable does not arise. Indeed, Section 17 of the P.C.Act is mandatory. However, where Sri G.Sudhakar is an Inspector of Police of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, Section 17(a) of the P.C.Act empowers him to conduct the investigation. I therefore reject the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the investigation is bad being in violation of Section 17 of the P.C.Act. 18. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that as the petitioner is a public servant, sanction under Section 17(1)(a) of the P.C.Act is necessary. I therefore reject the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the investigation is bad being in violation of Section 17 of the P.C.Act. 18. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that as the petitioner is a public servant, sanction under Section 17(1)(a) of the P.C.Act is necessary. The petitioner is the employee of Fisheries Corporation. He was on deputation with the Fisheries Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. In either event, the petitioner is a Government Servant under Section 19 of the P.C.Act. Previous sanction of the Government or the competent authority is necessary to prosecute any public servant for various offences including the offence under Section 13 of the P.C.Act. Where the petitioner is a Government Servant, prosecution of the petitioner without prior sanction is impermissible. 19. The learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI contended that the petitioner was dismissed from service and was not in employment by the time the charge-sheet was laid. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner retired from service on 30-4-2012 and that he was not dismissed from service. The charge-sheet was laid on 27-6-2013. By then, the petitioner was no more in service. It is contended by the learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI that as the petitioner was no more in service, sanction of the Government or the competent authority to prosecute the petitioner was not necessary. 20. The learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI placed reliance upon State through CBI v. Raj Kumar Jain . In that case, CBI intended to approach the Court under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C seeking for the discharge of the accused. The offence involved was under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. CBI wanted to seek for discharge on the ground that prima facie case to substantiate the charges has not been found against the accused. The Supreme Court held that prior sanction for prosecution need not be obtained by CBI before it seeks for discharge of the accused. In the present case, CBI insists upon proceeding against the petitioner. This decision therefore is not an authority to show that prior sanction to prosecute a public servant is not necessary. 21. The Supreme Court held that prior sanction for prosecution need not be obtained by CBI before it seeks for discharge of the accused. In the present case, CBI insists upon proceeding against the petitioner. This decision therefore is not an authority to show that prior sanction to prosecute a public servant is not necessary. 21. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the prosecution is in respect of the alleged misconduct on the part of the petitioner while the petitioner was discharging duties as a public servant and that the sanction is sine qua non before the Court can take cognizance of the offence. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon G.SAGAR SURI v. STATE OF U.P. as well as in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab [Appeal (civil) 5636 of 2006] in support of his contention. In these cases, the Supreme Court observed that whether a public servant retired from service or is in service, to prosecute such a public servant under the provisions of the P.C.Act, there shall be sanction under Section 19 of the P.C.Act if the alleged offence was committed by an employee during the course of his employment. 22. The learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI placed reliance upon State of Kerala v. V.Padmanabhan Nair and Raj Kumar Jain (4 supra), where it was observed that when a public servant retired from service, sanction under Section 19 of the P.C.Act is not necessary. 23. In V.Padmanabhan Nair (6 supra), case was instituted against the Government Servant under Section 406 read with Section 120-B, IPC. The Supreme Court held that the sanction for prosecution was not necessary. In the present case, the offence that is sought to be prosecuted is under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C.Act. On the face of Section 19 of the P.C.Act which bars prosecution without sanction, this decision regarding prosecution under Section 406 read with Section 120-B, IPC has no relevance. 24. Further, in view of the latter view of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Jain (4 supra), I agree with the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the sanction under Section 19 of the P.C.Act is necessary before the petitioner is prosecuted. 25. The learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI placed reliance upon G.O.Ms.No.109 submitting that the sanction was accorded by Government to prosecute the petitioner. 25. The learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI placed reliance upon G.O.Ms.No.109 submitting that the sanction was accorded by Government to prosecute the petitioner. The Notification was to the effect that the Government of Andhra Pradesh accorded consent to the members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the investigation of offence confining to the case PE.01/2010-H, being enquired into by the CBI against the petitioner. It is contended by the learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI that the State Government thus accorded sanction. 26. The present case is in respect of FIR in Crime RC.04(A)/2011-CBI-HYD 2011, dated 28-01-2011. The learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI, however, contended that sanction was with reference to Preliminary Enquiry 01/2010-H. There is no correlation between the sanction and the present case. Where it is evident that there was no sanction to prosecute the petitioner under Section 19 of the P.C.Act and where the sanction through G.O.Ms.No.109 is not correlated to the present case, I agree with the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the prosecution has failed to show that the sanction was accorded by the competent authority or by the State Government to prosecute the petitioner for the offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C.Act. 27. Thus, although the petitioner failed in establishing that the Investigating Officer had no power to investigate the case under Section 17 of the P.C.Act, although the petitioner failed to show that the offences under Section 409 IPC and under Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C.Act are not applicable to the case of the petitioner and although the petitioner failed to show that the Investigating Officer was the complainant himself, the petitioner succeeded in showing that the prosecution failed to obtain approval and permission from the concerned Government to prosecute him. Consequently, the case against the petitioner is not maintainable and is accordingly quashed. Consequently, the criminal petition is allowed. The miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this petition shall stand closed. 1. (2011) 12 SCC 437 2. 2014 (1) ALD (Crl.) 304 (SC) 3. 2000 (4) ALD 663 4. AIR 1998 SC 2985 5. 2000 (1) SCR 417 6. AIR 1999 SC 2405