Ranju Devi v. State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar
2014-08-05
JYOTI SARAN
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : Heard Mr. Shashi Bhushan Kumar Manglam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Madhuresh Prasad, learned Government Pleader No. 12 for the State. 2. The petitioner an elected Mukhiya of Gram Panchayat Raj, Patasang under Rahui Block of District of Nalanda has moved this Court through the present writ petition being aggrieved by the order bearing memo no. 8079 dated 21.11.2013 passed by the Principal Secretary, Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Bihar, Patna whereby the respondent no. 2 Principal Secretary in exercise of power vested in him under the provisions of Section 18(5) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the „Act?) has been pleased to order for removal of the petitioner from the post of Mukhiya. Annexure-6 to the writ petition contains the allegations set out against the petitioner which are the foundation for passing the impugned order and inter alia contains the following charges:- (a). 11 ration coupons found in the Steel Almirah present in the house of the petitioner; (b) 22 job cards issued under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme of the current year and 23 job cards of the previous year was also found; (c) Marriage registration card was found from the Almirah; and (d) Pension application forms were found. 3. The said Annexure-6 is a letter of the District Magistrate, Nalanda addressed to the Director, Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Bihar, Patna and refers to an enquiry said to have been made by the Block Development Officer as contained in letter no. 1003 dated 25.6.2012 but it is the case of the petitioner that this enquiry report was never served upon her. 4. It would be pertinent to mention here that it is under the notification dated 26.8.2008 issued by the Panchayati Raj Department that all the District Magistrates have been empowered to hold enquiry against Mukhia on the allegations warranting proceeding under Section 18(5) of the Act. The District Magistrate(s) have been further empowered to get the matter enquired into by an appropriate officer and it is by virtue of such authorization that perhaps the enquiry was conducted by the Block Development Officer. 5. The petitioner was asked to show cause and who replied to the same and whereafter the matter traveled before the Principal Secretary respondent no. 2 for appropriate orders with recommendation of removal under Section 18(5) of the Act.
5. The petitioner was asked to show cause and who replied to the same and whereafter the matter traveled before the Principal Secretary respondent no. 2 for appropriate orders with recommendation of removal under Section 18(5) of the Act. The petitioner was again noticed by the Principal Secretary and she responded to the same vide a detailed reply filed on 9.10.2012, copy whereof is placed at Annexure-8. The petitioner did not make any excuse for the documents including the job cards and the ration coupons found present within her residential premises rather admitted the same. Insofar as the marriage registration card and the pension application form is concerned, it was specifically stated that since she happens to be the Registrar under the Bihar Marriage Registration Rules, 2006 framed under the Act there was no illegality in those documents being present at her residence and insofar as the pension application form is concerned, it was stated that since the condition of the Panchayat Bhawan was not proper hence these papers were kept at her residence. She, however, specifically denied any misuse of the papers referred to in the complaint. The Principal Secretary considering the response filed by the petitioner in the backdrop of the allegations, has by the impugned order passed on 21.11.2013 upheld the allegations and ordered for her removal under Section 18(5) of the Act. 6. I have heard Mr. S.B.K. Manglam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. Madhuresh Prasad, learned G.P. 12 for the State. 7. It is the contention of Mr. Manglam that even in absence of any abuse of power by the petitioner or misuse of the documents found at her residence, on a presumptuous conclusion, that the impugned order has been passed. He submits that even if these documents were found at the residence of the petitioner though in normal course they should have been kept at the Panchayat office but such minor irregularity did not warrant the extreme punishment of removal under Section 18(5) of the Act considering that the petitioner is an elected representative and there is no evidence to prove that there was any misuse of such document for unjust gains. 8. The argument of Mr. Manglam has been contested by Mr.
8. The argument of Mr. Manglam has been contested by Mr. Prasad appearing for the State who even while canvassing that it was not proper for these documents to be present at the residence of the petitioner, could not satisfy this Court as to whether in absence of any evidence as to the misuse of these documents by this petitioner for her personal gains, the removal can be passed. The order impugned passed by the Principal Secretary simply mentions that keeping these documents at the residence was illegal, and nothing more. In fact there is complete absence of allegation that the petitioner was utilizing the documents including the job cards or the ration cards for extraneous purposes and to secure personal gains and thus abusing her position as the Mukhiya. There is also no allegation that the job cards were in respect of such persons who were non-existent. Even when these important foundational facts are missing in the present case, on a mere recovery of some documents which in ordinary course should have been available within the Panchayat office, that the extreme penalty of removal has been passed by the Principal Secretary. 9. Considering the nature of allegation as well as the consequences of the impugned order, this Court before arriving at any conclusion, would like to reproduce a paragraph of a judgment passed by the Supreme Court reported in (2001) 6 SCC 260 (Tarlochan Dev Sharma vs. State of Punjab & ors.): “11. The expression “abuse of powers” in the contest and setting in which it has been used cannot mean use of power which may appear to be simply unreasonable or inappropriate. It implies a wilful abuse or an intentional wrong. An honest though erroneous exercise of power or an indecision is not an abuse of power. A decision, action or instruction may be inconvenient or unpalatable to the person affected but it would not be an abuse of power. It must be such an abuse of power which would render a Councillor unworthy of holding the office of President. Inasmuch as an abuse of power would entail adverse civil consequences, the expression has to be narrowly construed. Yet again, the expression employed in Section 22 is “abuse of his powers or of habitual failure to perform his duties”.
It must be such an abuse of power which would render a Councillor unworthy of holding the office of President. Inasmuch as an abuse of power would entail adverse civil consequences, the expression has to be narrowly construed. Yet again, the expression employed in Section 22 is “abuse of his powers or of habitual failure to perform his duties”. The use of plural- powers, and the setting of the expression in the framing of Section 22 is not without significance. It is suggestive of legislative intent. The phrase “abuse of powers” must take colour from the next following expression-“or habitual failure to perform duties”. A singular or casual aberration or failure in exercise of power is not enough; a course of conduct or plurality of aberration or failure in exercise of power and that too involving dishonesty of intention is “abuse of powers” within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act. The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action or error of decision.” 10. Section 18(5) of the Act sets out the conditions in which an order of removal can be passed and which are as follows: (a) The Mukhiya or the Up-Mukhiya absents himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings; or (b) Willfully omits or refuses to perform his duties and functions under this Act; or (c) Abuses the power vested in him; or (d) Is found to be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties; or (e) Is physically or mentally incapacitated for performing his duties; or (f) Is absconding. 11. It is more than apparent that amongst the conditions precedent warranting such action, the respondents have endeavoured to bring the allegations against the petitioner within the confines of Clause (c) and (d) i.e. abuse of power or guilty of misconduct. 12. Insofar as the allegation of abuse of power is concerned, the judgment rendered in the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma (supra) by the Supreme Court is a complete answer on the issue.
12. Insofar as the allegation of abuse of power is concerned, the judgment rendered in the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma (supra) by the Supreme Court is a complete answer on the issue. A mere unreasonable or inappropriate exercise of power by a holder of public office unless is accompanied with ulterior motives and for extraneous consideration would not fall within the confines of abuse of powers and although it may be an irregular exercise but such irregular exercise would not be sufficient to render a Mukhia unworthy of holding the public office. An abuse of power is a natural consequence of misconduct and the same principles would equally apply to a charge of misconduct for until such time that the holder of a public post misuses or abuses his position in such a manner so as to render himself unfit to hold the post, he cannot be held guilty of misconduct on a mere irregularity or an innocent aberration. 13. Adverting to the case in hand it is more than eloquent that there is complete absence of accusations against the petitioner as to the illegal use of the job cards or the ration coupons or of securing unjust gains. As I have already observed hereinabove a mere availability of these documents within the residential premises of the petitioner with no evidence connecting them with alleged misuse, it was not sufficient enough to order for her removal. 14. In result the order bearing Memo No. 8079 dated 21.11.2013 passed by the Principal Secretary as contained in Annexure-12, is held unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The petitioner stands restored to her post of Mukhiya. 15. The writ petition is allowed. 16. Before parting this Court would place on record that the observations made hereinabove in no manner would affect the investigation in the criminal prosecution instituted against the petitioner which would be taken to its logical conclusion on its own merits.