ORDER This application has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding of Ranchi Sadar (Vigilance) Case No. 30 of 2012 (Special Case No. 33A of 2012) including the order dated 11.2.2013, whereby and whereunder, cognizance of the offences punishable under Section 7/13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been taken against the petitioner. 2. The case of the prosecution is that when the complainant approached to the petitioner, a CDPO, for getting the vouchers relating to purchase of certain materials certified, the petitioner asked her to pay Rs. 2000/- as bribe. Thereupon a complaint was made to the Vigilance who constituted a team and when the bribe was paid to the petitioner, it was recovered not from the possession of the petitioner but from the possession of one Manikant Prasad Yadav, who was found sitting beside the petitioner. 3. On such allegation, a case was registered as Ranchi Sadar (Vigilance) Case No. 30 of 2012 for the offences under Section 7/13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On completion of investigation, when charge sheet was submitted after procuring sanction for prosecution, cognizance of the offences as aforesaid was taken vide its order dated 11.2.2013 which is under challenge. 4. Mr. Rajendra Krishna, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the controlling department of the petitioner happens to be the Social and Welfare Department and, thereby, the Secretary of that Department happens to be the appointing authority and in terms of the provision, as contained in Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it could be the appointing authority who can accord sanction for prosecution but in the instant case, sanction for prosecution has been accorded by the Secretary, Department of Law (Judicial), Government of Jharkhand, in view of the note appended to Rule 53(1)(c) of the Rules of Executive Business, stipulating therein that the sanction order regarding prosecution shall be issued by the Law (Judicial) Department, but the Secretary, Department of Law (Judicial) failed to take notice of the fact that the said note has been substituted by the following clause: “All kinds of order regarding prosecution shall be issued by the Law (Judicial) Department after the orders have been obtained in accordance with Rule 32(a)(xix).” 5. But nothing is there on the record to establish that the Secretary, Department of Law (Judicial) after obtaining order from the appointing authority in terms of Rule 32(a)(xix) has issued order sanctioning prosecution, rather the impugned order does indicate that it was the Secretary, Department of Law (Judicial), who by assuming himself to be the controlling authority has passed the order impugned and thereby the order sanctioning prosecution never seems to be in consonance with the Rules of Executive Business and hence the impugned order becomes quite illegal and is fit to be quashed, as any order, passed by the authority, who does not have jurisdiction, goes to the very root of the case and thereby the order, according sanction for prosecution by the Secretary, Department of Law (Judicial), cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 6. In this regard, learned counsel has referred to the decisions rendered in the cases of State of Goa Vs. Babu Thomas { (2005) 8 SCC 130 ) and Mansukhlal Vithal Das Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat { (1997) 7 SCC 622 }. 7. As against this, Mr. Jai Prakash, learned A.A.G., appearing on behalf of the State, by referring to Section 19 (3)(4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, submits that no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge warrants to be reversed or altered on the ground that the sanction order issued under sub-section (1) of Section 19 suffers from any irregularity, error or omission unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby, which proposition has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in number of cases and recently in a case of State of Bihar and others Vs. Rajmangal Ram (AIR 2014SC 1674). 8. Further, it was submitted that so far point relating to failure of justice is concerned, it needs to be addressed during trial and not at this stage, as only by adducing evidence that would be established or could be rebutted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases, referred to above, has been quite categorical in holding that this point is to be appreciated during trial when the parties lead their evidences. 9. Learned A.A.G. did point it out that in the case of State of Bihar and others Vs. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases, referred to above, has been quite categorical in holding that this point is to be appreciated during trial when the parties lead their evidences. 9. Learned A.A.G. did point it out that in the case of State of Bihar and others Vs. Rajmangal Ram (supra), submission had been advanced on behalf of the accused that the sanction has never been granted by the parent department but by the Law (Judicial) Department. That plea was dispelled with by the Court keeping in view the provision contained in Section 19(3)(4) of Prevention of Corruption Act by holding that merely because there is any omission, error or irregularity in the matter of according sanction, that does not affect the validity of the proceeding unless the court records the satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in failure of justice. Same is the situation here and, therefore, the order granting sanction never warrants to be interfered with by this Court. 10. The ground on which the impugned order has been sought to be quashed is that the petitioner being CDPO was under the control of the Secretary, Social and Welfare Department and as such the Secretary, Department of Law (Judicial) being not an appointing authority is not competent to accord sanction for prosecution in terms of Section 19(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The said submission appears to be quite fallacious in view of the said provision which never speaks that the head of controlling department would be the competent person to accord sanction for prosecution rather it does stipulate that if the person is employed in connection with the affairs of the State, it is only the State Government who can accord sanction for prosecution in terms of Section 19(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The said provision seems to have been adhered to in the present case, as the petitioner being Class-II Officer has been appointed in connection with the affairs of the State Government and thereby his services would be removable by the State Government and as such, it would be the State Government who is competent to grant sanction. The said provision seems to have been adhered to in the present case, as the petitioner being Class-II Officer has been appointed in connection with the affairs of the State Government and thereby his services would be removable by the State Government and as such, it would be the State Government who is competent to grant sanction. Here in the instant case, the Secretary, Department of Law (Judicial) has issued the order granting sanction in the name of the Governor which seems to have been issued in consonance with note appended to Rule 53 (1)(c) of the Rules of the Executive Business. 11. However, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, that note, reference of which has been given hereinabove, seems to have been substituted through a resolution dated 3rd July, 1993 by the following clause: “All kinds of order regarding prosecution shall be issued by the Law (Judicial) Department after the orders have been obtained in accordance with Rule 32(a)(xix).” Said amended clause, according to the petitioner, has not been taken into account by the Secretary, Department of Law (Judicial). Even if it has not been taken into account, that would be, at best, an error or irregularity which does not affect the validity of the proceeding in terms of the provision, as contained in Section 19(3)(4) of Prevention of Corruption Act, unless it results into a failure of justice. Even if it has not been taken into account, that would be, at best, an error or irregularity which does not affect the validity of the proceeding in terms of the provision, as contained in Section 19(3)(4) of Prevention of Corruption Act, unless it results into a failure of justice. At this stage, the provision of Section 19(3)(4) of Prevention of Corruption Act needs to be taken notice of which reads as follows: 19(3) – Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) – (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation – For the purposes of this section, - (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” 14. Explanation – For the purposes of this section, - (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” 14. A combined reading of sub-sections (3) and (4) makes the position clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no finding, sentence and order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. 15. It be noted that explanation (a) to sub-section (4) does stipulate that error includes incompetency by the authority to grant sanction. Meaning thereby that even if the order granting sanction is assailable on the ground that the authority is incompetent to grant sanction, it cannot be interfered with by the court unless it is shown that the said defect/irregularity has resulted into failure of justice. The aforesaid proposition has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case of State of Police Inspector Vs. T. Venkatesh Murthy { (2004) 7 SCC 763 } which view has been reiterated subsequently in a case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Virendra Kumar Tripathy { (2009) 15 SCC 533 } and recently in a case of State of Bihar and others Vs. Rajmangal Ram (AIR 2014SC 1674). 16. Further Their Lordships in a case of State of Bihar and others Vs. Rajmangal Ram (supra) has been pleased to observe that to determine the plea of prejudice, appropriate stage would be a trial when the parties would be leading evidences. Under the circumstances, I do not find any merit in this application and hence, this application stands dismissed.