JUDGMENT : C.R. Dash, J. The award dated 25.06.2007 passed by the learned Labour Court, Bhubaneswar in I.D. Case No.15 of 1997 vide Annexure-1 is impugned in this writ petition. 2. The petitioner was working as a daily labourer under the Management of Notified Area Council, Jatni (‘N.A.C.’ for short) w.e.f. 21.01.1994 on daily wage of Rs.25/-(rupees twenty-five). All of a sudden the Management of N.A.C., Jatni terminated the service of the petitioner workman w.e.f. 18.05.1995 without any notice. The petitioner workman approached the Executive Officer of the N.A.C., Jatni for engagement, but in vain. On the other hand some other persons, who were quite junior to the petitioner workman, were allowed to work under the Management of the N.A.C., Jatni. With such background the petitioner workman raised an Industrial Dispute and the appropriate Government referred the matter under Section 10(1) read with Section 12 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reference reads as follows :- “Whether the action of the Management of Notified Area Council, Jatni in terminating the services of Sri Bira Kishor Pradhan, Casual Labourer w.e.f. 18.05.1995 is legal and/or justified ? If not, what relief Sri Pradhan is entitled to ?” 3. The Management of the N.A.C., Jatni, on being noticed, entered appearance and filed written statement. It was specifically averred in the written statement that the petitioner workman was working as daily labourer in the residence of the Executive Officer, Jatni N.A.C. from 01.06.1994 till 17.05.1995 @ Rs.25/-per day with intermittent break. The assertion of the petitioner workman to the effect that he was working w.e.f. 21.01.1994 to 17.05.1995 was denied. It was further averred in the written statement that the petitioner workman was not allowed to work by the N.A.C., Jatni w.e.f. 18.05.1995 without issuance of any notice for termination, as written appointment order was not issued by the Management at the time of engaging the petitioner workman. It was further averred in the written statement that Sri Manmaohan Rout, Manorama Katayat and Sri Shyam Sundar Sahoo were engaged as daily labourer at a date later to the engagement of the petitioner workman. 4. The Management however did not contest the proceeding and it was set ex parte vide order dated 17.11.2000. 5. It was further averred in the written statement that Sri Manmaohan Rout, Manorama Katayat and Sri Shyam Sundar Sahoo were engaged as daily labourer at a date later to the engagement of the petitioner workman. 4. The Management however did not contest the proceeding and it was set ex parte vide order dated 17.11.2000. 5. The petitioner workman examined himself as W.W.1, and in his evidence he supported the averments made in his petition to the effect that he was engaged as daily labourer by the Management from 21.01.1994 to 17.05.1995. It was further deposed by him that his services were terminated w.e.f. 18.05.1995 by way of refusal of employment. The Management without following the procedure laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act, terminated his service though he had worked continuously for more than 240 days during twelve calendar months preceding the date of his termination from service. 6. Learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar dismissed the claim of the petitioner workman on the ground that the petitioner has failed to prove that he was in continuous service within the meaning of Section 25 (B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’). In reaching such conclusion, the P.O., Labour Court, Bhubaneswar relied on the decision of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Range Forest Officer vs. S.T. Hadimani, 2002-1 L.L.J. Supreme Court 1053. It was specifically held by the learned P.O., Labour Court, Bhubaneswar that only from the bald statement of the workman it cannot be said that the workman was in continuous service, and when the workman has failed to prove that he was in continuous service, he is not entitled to any benefit under Section 25-F of the Act, and consequently it cannot be held that termination of service of the petitioner workman by the Management w.e.f. 18.05.1995 was illegal in any way. 7. In spite of sufficiency of notice, the N.A.C., Jatni (opp. party no.2) has chosen not to appear in this case. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner workman submits that refusal to allow a workman to work comes under the definition of ‘retrenchment’, as defined in Section 2 (oo) of the Act. 7. In spite of sufficiency of notice, the N.A.C., Jatni (opp. party no.2) has chosen not to appear in this case. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner workman submits that refusal to allow a workman to work comes under the definition of ‘retrenchment’, as defined in Section 2 (oo) of the Act. It is further submitted that the petitioner being a poor workman and he having come to the witness box to say that he had worked continuously for 240 days, the burden of proof shifts to the Management to show that the workman had in fact not worked for a continuous period of 240 days. It is further submitted that, in this case the principle of “last come first go” having not been followed and some of the junior employees of the petitioner having been allowed to work after retrenchment of the petitioner from service, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of reinstatement. 9. The petitioner workman, in the present case, has pleaded in his statement of claim as well as in the rejoinder that he had worked as a daily labourer from 21.01.1994 to 17.05.1995 continuously and was drawing his salary by signing vouchers. He substantiated such pleadings on leading oral evidence by examining himself as W.W.1. The evidence of the petitioner workman as W.W.1 goes uncontroverted, as the Management, N.A.C. was set ex parte on 17.11.2000. The Management, N.A.C. in its written statement has specifically admitted that the petitioner was working as a daily labourer @ daily wage of Rs.25/-from 01.06.1994 to 17.05.1995 with intermittent break. It is further averred by the Management, N.A.C. that at the time of appointment of the petitioner, no written appointment order was issued and for that reason it was not felt necessary to issue a written termination order. From the materials in the pleadings of the parties it is clear that the petitioner workman has worked for more than 240 days, even if it is accepted that he has worked from 01.06.1994 to 17.05.1995. No document was there, which would have been indicative of appointment or termination of the petitioner. The petitioner therefore could not have proved any documentary evidence showing his appointment and termination. The petitioner workman in his rejoinder has specifically asserted that he was drawing his salary by signing vouchers. No document was there, which would have been indicative of appointment or termination of the petitioner. The petitioner therefore could not have proved any documentary evidence showing his appointment and termination. The petitioner workman in his rejoinder has specifically asserted that he was drawing his salary by signing vouchers. If the Management, N.A.C. would have contested the proceeding, the petitioner workman could have asked the Management, N.A.C. to produce the vouchers or any other documents to substantiate his claim. The Management having been set ex parte, the workman was left with no choice but to leave the matter after examining him as a witness. The evidence of the workman however goes uncontroverted. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Director, Fisheries Terminal Division vs. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda, A.I.R. 2010 (SC) 1236, analyzing Sections 25-B and 25-F of the Act, in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the judgment has ruled thus :- “15. The respondent claims he was employed in the year 1985 as a watchman and his services were retrenched in the year 1991 and during the period between 1985 to 1991, he had worked for a period of more than 240 days. The burden of proof is on the respondent to show that he had worked for 240 days in preceding twelve months prior to his alleged retrenchment. The law on this issue appears to be now well settled. 16. This court in the case of R.M.Yellatty vs. Assistant Executive Engineer [ (2006) 1 SCC 106 ], has observed: “However, applying general principles and on reading the aforesaid judgments, we find that this Court, has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping up in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily-wage earners, there will be no letter of appointment of termination. There will also be no receipt of proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment of termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register, etc. There will also be no receipt of proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (the claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment of termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register, etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on the facts of each case.” 17. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by this court, the evidence produced by the appellants has not been consistent. The appellants claim that the respondent did not work for 240 days. The respondent was a workman hired on a daily wage basis. So it is obvious, as this court pointed out in the above case that he would have difficulty in having access to all the official documents, muster rolls etc. in connection with his service. He has come forward and deposed, so in our opinion the burden of proof shifts to the employer/appellants to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in the requisite period to constitute continuous service.” 10. From the principle enunciated supra it is therefore clear that if the workman has come forward and deposed that he worked for 240 days, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove that the workman did not complete 240 days of service in the requisite period to constitute continuous service. Learned P.O., Labour Court has not been alive to the fact that whatever evidence had been lead by the petitioner workman had gone uncontroverted and the petitioner workman had no scope further to call the Management to produce any record to show that he had not, in fact, worked for 240 days in the requisite period to constitute continuous service. In view of such fact, it is to be held that the petitioner workman, in view of his oral evidence, had worked for 240 days in the requisite period to constitute continuous service and it was incumbent on the Management, N.A.C. to comply with the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act while terminating his service. 11. In view of such fact, it is to be held that the petitioner workman, in view of his oral evidence, had worked for 240 days in the requisite period to constitute continuous service and it was incumbent on the Management, N.A.C. to comply with the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act while terminating his service. 11. Coming to the second contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner workman, it is found from the written statement of the Management, N.A.C. that Sri Manmaohan Rout, Manorama Katayat and Sri Shyam Sundar Sahoo were engaged as daily labourer at a date later to the engagement of the petitioner workman. In view of the provisions contained in Section 25-G of the I.D. Act, if necessity of retrenchment of any workman was felt by the Management, N.A.C., then it should have resorted to the principle of “last come first go”. Allowing juniors of the petitioner to remain in service while retrenching the petitioner from service is violative of Section 25-G of the Act, according to learned counsel for the petitioner. 12. Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, A.I.R. 2010 SC 1116, has held that the workman is not required to prove that he had worked for a period of 240 days within twelve calendar months preceding the termination of service, to attract application of Section 25-G of the Act. It is sufficient for him to plead and prove that while effecting retrenchment the employer has violated the principle of “last come first go” without tangible reasons. 13. It is admitted fact that three persons junior to the petitioner have been allowed to work while the petitioner’s service has been terminated. From the materials on record and admission of the Management, N.A.C. it is found that there has been violation of the principle of “last come first go” and consequently there has been contravention of the provision of Section 25-G of the I.D. Act. 14. The Management, N.A.C. neither contested the proceeding before the P.O., Labour Court nor had appeared before this Court in spite of sufficiency of notice. For the callousness on the part of the Management, N.A.C. the poor and hapless workman cannot be allowed to suffer the technicalities and niceties of law. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed for reinstatement of the petitioner with full back-wages. 16. For the callousness on the part of the Management, N.A.C. the poor and hapless workman cannot be allowed to suffer the technicalities and niceties of law. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed for reinstatement of the petitioner with full back-wages. 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Asst. Engineer, Rajastan Development Corporation vs. Geetam Singh, 2013 I.L.R. 225, was seized with the question as to whether the direction to the employer for reinstatement with continuity of service and 25% back wages was legally sustainable, where a workman had worked only for eight months as a daily wager and his termination had been held to be in contravention of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. Partly allowing the Appeal filed by the Management, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, in case of wrongful retrenchment of a daily wager, who worked for a short period, the award of reinstatement cannot be said to be proper and rather the award of compensation in such cases would be in consonance with the demand of justice. Before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising the industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. 17. Taking into consideration the aforesaid principle, it is found that the workman, in the present case, has worked barely for eleven months as a casual labourer. Neither he was issued with any written appointment order nor he was issued with any written termination order. In the meantime restriction has been imposed by the Housing and Urban Development Department of the Govt. of Odisha so far as appointments by Municipalities and N.A.Cs. are concerned. True it is that some of the juniors of the petitioner are still working in the Department, but that alone cannot be a ground to award reinstatement when much development has taken place in the meantime so far as public employment is concerned. 18. of Odisha so far as appointments by Municipalities and N.A.Cs. are concerned. True it is that some of the juniors of the petitioner are still working in the Department, but that alone cannot be a ground to award reinstatement when much development has taken place in the meantime so far as public employment is concerned. 18. Taking into consideration all the aforesaid facts, present price index, the amount the petitioner would have got had he been allowed to work, and ability of the petitioner to start an honourable living, this writ petition is allowed with a direction to the N.A.C., Jatni (opposite party no.2) to pay compensation of Rs.75,000/-(rupees seventy-five thousand) to the petitioner in lieu of reinstatement. The compensation amount be paid within two months, failing which the Management shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The Writ Petition is accordingly disposed of.