JUDGMENT By the Court.—These are two connected appeals filed by the claimant. First Appeal No. 814 of 2005 is directed against the judgment and order dated 17.12.1993 passed by the IXth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad. Whereas First Appeal No. (773) of 2000 is directed against the judgment and order dated 17.7.1993 passed by the IXth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad. 2. We have heard Sri S.K.Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Ramesh Jaiswal holding brief of Sri Shivam Yadav for the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority. 3. The land, subject-matter in First Appeal No. (773) of 2000, was acquired on 5.1.1982 for New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) and possession was taken on 22.4.1982. The Special Land Acquisition Officer made an award in respect of entire acquired land @ Rs. 25,578.95 paise per bigha, which works out to be Rs. 10 per sq. yard. On a reference, the Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad enhanced the same and determined the market value of the land to be Rs. 20/- per sq. yard. 4. In First Appeal No. 814 of 2005, the notification under Section 4 was published on 28.3.1986 and possession was taken on 12.8.1987. The Special Land Acquisition Officer made an award dated 11.5.1988 determining the market value @ Rs. 30,000/- per bigha. On a reference being made, the reference Court determined the market value of the land as Rs. 50/- per sq. yard. The land in both the First Appeals is situate in the same village i.e. Nagla Charandas though acquired by two different notifications. 5. However, since both the appeals are based on same set of facts raising common question of facts and law, hence, they have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 6. In reference out of which First Appeal No. 773 of 2000 arises, reference Court determined the market value @ Rs. 50/- per sq. yard. 7. The claimants filed another judgment of the reference Court determining the market value of the land acquired in respect of the same village i.e. Nagla Charandas @ Rs. 93.70 paise, as exemplar, which was wrongly and illegally not considered without assigning any reason. 8. In First Appeal No. 814 of 2005, another judgment of the reference Court in respect of village Bhangel Begumpur wherein the market value was determined to Rs. 50/- per sq. yard was cited as exemplar. 93.70 paise, as exemplar, which was wrongly and illegally not considered without assigning any reason. 8. In First Appeal No. 814 of 2005, another judgment of the reference Court in respect of village Bhangel Begumpur wherein the market value was determined to Rs. 50/- per sq. yard was cited as exemplar. Though both the villages are adjoining and the nature, quality and potentiality of the land are same but without assigning any reason, the said exemplar was not considered. 9. Learned counsel for the claimant-appellant has pointed that the decision in LAR No. 250 of 1990 in respect of village Bhangel Begampur was subject-matter of challenge by the claimants therein by way of various First Appeals before this Court which were connected together and decided by a detail judgment and order dated 19.5.2010 passed by a Division Bench in leading First Appeal No. 1056 of 1990 (Raghuraj Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others). From a perusal of the judgment, we find that the said Division bench has relied upon the judgment in L.A.R. No. 392 of 1993 (Ram Chandra and others v. State of U.P. and others) relating to village Bhangel Begampur filed as additional evidence wherein the rate of Rs. 58.93 paise per sq. yard awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was enhanced in reference proceedings to Rs. 500 per sq. yard, but after making 1/3rd deduction towards development charges owning to the largeness of the area was scaled down to Rs. 300/- per sq. yard. The property in the case of Raghuraj Singh was situate on Delhi Highway opposite to Industrial complex of NOIDA and was acquired vide notification dated 24.3.1988 and 16.6.1988 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act respectively. Possession was taken on 12.1.1989. It would be relevant to quote following observations from the judgment in the case of Raghuraj Singh (Supra) : “It seems that during the pendency of the instant appeals certain developments took place and subsequent to the same certain awards have been made by the reference Court with respect to certain other acquired lands which are similar to that of the appellants herein. To bring the same in the notice of this Court, the appellants have filed a supplementary paper-book alongwith an application for the same to be taken on record on 13.8.2003. To bring the same in the notice of this Court, the appellants have filed a supplementary paper-book alongwith an application for the same to be taken on record on 13.8.2003. It is important to mention here that this Court can take notice of such additional evidences under the provisions of Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Order XLI Rule 27, C.P.C. provides that: 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.—[1] The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in Appellate Court. But if [a] the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or [aa] the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or [b] the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgement, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. [2] Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission. In accordance with the aforesaid provision, the appellant has produced a large number of document, which are on record, for consideration by this Court in the form of supplementary paper book. These are the awards made by the reference Court in subsequent proceedings with respect to the similar land acquired by the defendant/State. According to the argument advanced by the appellant, the aforesaid awards given in these documents as well as the order of the reference Court should be taken into account while considering the claim of the appellants. The appellants contend that they have been deprived of their valuable land by the State largesse without being comepnsated justifiably for the same. The above mentioned documents were permitted to be included as part of the pleadings advanced by the appellants, as we think that the aforementioned documents are important to be taken into consideration by this Court so as to reach on correct factual position to decide the present case. The above mentioned documents were permitted to be included as part of the pleadings advanced by the appellants, as we think that the aforementioned documents are important to be taken into consideration by this Court so as to reach on correct factual position to decide the present case. “ It has been further brought to the notice of this Court that during the pendency of the present appeals, few of the original appellants have died and in place of them substitution applications have been moved by the legal representatives, the same have been allowed. So far as the details of the abovementioned exemplare decisions of the reference Court are concerned, which have been filed as additional evidences/supplementary paper-book, they can be summed up as hereunder : Firstly, the L.A.R. No. 392/93, Ram Chander and others v. State of U.P. and others, the same related to the village Bhangel Begumpur, wherein the rate awarded by the S.L.A.O. was Rs. 58.93/- while the rate awarded by the reference Court in the reference was Rs. 500/- per sq. yard. The award compensation at the rate of Rs. 500/-, has, however, been scaled down to Rs. 300/- after making a deduction of 1/3rd of the amount in the name of development charges owing to largeness of the area acquired. The date of Notification in this matter was 30.11.1989 & 16.6.1990 under Section 4 and 6 of the Act, respectively.” 10. In the case in hand, while enhancing the compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the reference Court placed reliance on the judgment passed in reference proceedings in respect of village Bhangel Begumpur and the same having been enhanced to Rs. 297/- per sq. yard in various appeals filed by the claimants of the said village, the compensation in the case of village in question Nagla Charandas, which is admittedly situate adjacent to village Bhangel Begumpur and there being nothing on record to demonstrate any dissimilarity in nature or potentiality of the land of two villages, the claimants herein are entitled to be paid compensation at the same rate. 11. Learned counsel for the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority does not dispute the aforesaid facts nor has been able to point out any contrary judgment. 12. We find that enhancement of compensation to Rs. 297 per sq. 11. Learned counsel for the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority does not dispute the aforesaid facts nor has been able to point out any contrary judgment. 12. We find that enhancement of compensation to Rs. 297 per sq. yard in respect of village Nagla Charandas also stands affirmed by another Division Bench judgment dated 11.10.2012 passed on First Appeal No. 564 of 1997. The Division Bench judgment in First Appeal No. 564 of 1997 was based on judgment dated 19.5.2010 passed by this Court in First Appeal No. 1056 of 1999 and other connected appeals affirming the rate of compensation of Rs. 297/- per sq. yard awarded therein in respect of village Nagla Charandas and other adjoining villages. It may be relevant to quote the following relevant paragraphs from the judgment of First Appeal No. 564 of 1997. “The cases before us relates to village Bhangel Begumpur. Notifications were issued in the year 1983, 1986 and 1988 and possession was also taken in the year 1983, 1987 and 1989. So far as the other three villages namely, Nagla Charandas, Geha Tilapatabagh and Chhalera Banger, notifications were issued in the year 1986, 1988, 1991, 1992 and possession was also taken in the year 1987, 1990, 1992 and 1995 and the compensation was determined and ultimately under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the reference Court in the year 1993, 1995, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008 and 2010. All the four villages are adjacent to each other. The reference Court ultimately granted similar relief in respect of the matter of Raghuraj Singh (Supera). Hence, we quantify the rate of compensation as above, the same will be paid following the directions as we have given in the case of of Raghuraj Singh (Supra).” 13. Thus the Division Bench affirmed the rate of Rs. 297 per sq. yard to be awarded as market value of the land acquired in respect of village Nagla Charandas. The market value of the land for the purpose of computing the compensation to be paid to the claimants in respect of village Nagla Charandas having been determined as Rs. 297/- per sq. 297 per sq. yard to be awarded as market value of the land acquired in respect of village Nagla Charandas. The market value of the land for the purpose of computing the compensation to be paid to the claimants in respect of village Nagla Charandas having been determined as Rs. 297/- per sq. yard, the same is also liable to be paid in the case of appellant-claimant in these appeals alongwith other statutory dues and we see no reason to take a different view in this matter, particularly when the notifications in the present cases are very proximate to that in the case of Raghuraj Singh (Supra). 14. Accordingly, both the appeals stand allowed and the appellants are held entitled for payment of compensation @ Rs. 297/- per sq. yard alongwith 30% solatium, interest and other Statutory benefits as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 15. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.