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2014 DIGILAW 858 (HP)

Major Onkar Singh Guleria v. State of H. P.

2014-07-08

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2014
JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge The petitioner has approached this Court by way of present writ petition claiming therein the following substantive reliefs: “(i) That the order dated 04.06.2007 and 20.06.2007 passed by the respondent No.1 & 2 whereby the service of the petitioner has been terminated, be quashed and set aside as the same has been passed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 arbitrarily without hearing the petitioner and against the order of Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated 28.11.2005 in CWP No. 333 of 2003. (b) That the respondent No. 1 and 2 be directed to reinstate the petitioner alongwith all service benefits as the aforesaid order dated 4.6.2007 and 20.06.2007 are null and void as the same is wrong, illegal and arbitrary. (c) That the respondent No.1 and 2 be directed to release the back wages and medical reimbursement etc. to the petitioner with interest at the rate of 12% per annum and retirement benefits. (d) That the retirement date of petitioner from his service is 30th November, 2009 in case the petition is decided after 30th November, 2009 the petitioner prays that retirement benefits be given to him as per law.” 2. The petitioner was working as Zila Sainik Welfare Officer at Kangra and while this Court was ceased of the matter relating to shifting of Judicial Courts at Kangra in CWP No. 333 of 2003, the petitioner indulged in direct correspondence with the then Hon’ble the Chief Justice of this Court, the contents whereof reads as follows: “No. PWF-13/Kangra SPEED POST Deputy Director Sainik Welfare, Kangra at Dharamshala-176215. Dated, Dharamshala-176215 the 26th July, 2005. To Shri X, Chief Justice of High Court of H.P., Shimla – 171 001 (HP). Subject: Construction of new Courts Complex – Alternation accommodation-Handing over the possession of Sainik Rest House, Kangra. His Excellency, 1. Personal Attention of CHIEF JUSTICE is drawn to this office letter No.PWF-13/Kangra dated 20 July, 2005 addressed to Registrar High Court of Himachal Pradesh requesting Registrar to place the matter before Chief Justice. 2. Judges of District Court Kangra are illegally and in clandestine manner imposing their ‘WILL’ on Deputy Commissioner Kangra and SDM Kangra who want to confiscate the property of Sainik Welfare Department. The Sainik Rest House is the property of Rajya Sainik Board whose Chairman is Governor of Himachal Pradesh. 3. 2. Judges of District Court Kangra are illegally and in clandestine manner imposing their ‘WILL’ on Deputy Commissioner Kangra and SDM Kangra who want to confiscate the property of Sainik Welfare Department. The Sainik Rest House is the property of Rajya Sainik Board whose Chairman is Governor of Himachal Pradesh. 3. Deputy Commissioner, Kangra and SDM Kangra has no JURISDICTION to take over the said property which has movable property worth several lacs and what about SAINIK WELFARE for whom this Sainik Rest House is constructed by Government of India Funds. 4. KARGIL MARTYRS GIFT BY District Administration and Judges of Kangra Courts. To martyr they want to pay homage by confiscating Sainik Rest House, Kangra. What a homage letter No. SK/05-311/R-SDK dated 26 July, 2005 of SDM Kangra is enclosed as a proof of this gift on 26 July, 2005 on the Kargil day. 5. Kindly direct Registrar High Court, H.P. , D.C. Kangra, SDM Kangra and Judges of Kangra Courts not to interfere with the matters of SAINIK WELFARE. The least they can do is this to away from SAINIKS if they cannot look after them. 6. This office is not the owner of the said Sainik Rest House, Kangra but it is Rajya Sainik Board on behalf of Government of India whose Chairman is Governor of H.P.. Ask authorities listed in para 5 above not to pressurize undersigned. The copy is being enclosed by name to all those who are involved from District Administration and Judges of Kangra Courts. The Welfare of SAINIKS is to be seen first for whom Sainik Rest Houses were constructed. 7. Kindly confirm receipt of this letter. Yours faithfully, Sd/- Deputy Director, Sainik Welfare, Kangra at Dharamshala. No.PWF-13/Kangra Dated, Dharamshala-176215 the 26th July, 2005. Copies for similar necessary actions to: 1. Shri Bharat Khera, IAS, Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala. 2. Shri H.S.Pundeer, SDM, Kangra. 3. Smt. Y, Civil Judge-cum-JM-I, Kangra Courts, Kangra. 4. Shri Z, Civil Judge – I, Kangra Court, Kangra. 5. The Ld. District & Session Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. 6. Registrar - with reference to this offices even numbered letter dated Supreme Court of India, 20 July, 2005 (copy add sd. to you). Undersigned is New Delhi. unnecessarily being illegally pressurized to do wrong things. This is Sainik Welfare being done by Judges and District Administration on KARGIL MARTYRS, we are paying homage to MARTYRS. 6. Registrar - with reference to this offices even numbered letter dated Supreme Court of India, 20 July, 2005 (copy add sd. to you). Undersigned is New Delhi. unnecessarily being illegally pressurized to do wrong things. This is Sainik Welfare being done by Judges and District Administration on KARGIL MARTYRS, we are paying homage to MARTYRS. Sd/- Deputy Director, Sainik Welfare, Kangra at Dharamshala. No. Copies being endorsed to Governor & CM of HP, Chief of Army Staff, Director Sainik Welfare, B-OC 9 Corps, President (PC) Z&B, Kangra and others. Sd/- Deputy Director, Sainik Welfare, Kangra at Dharamshala. To Director Sainik Welfare, H.P. at Hamirpur – 177001 (HP) – Please refer to teleconv between OSD & undersigned. Sd/-” (names withheld). 3. This letter was put up on the judicial side in CWP No. 333 of 2003 and dealt with by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the following terms: “………A communication was received from Major (Retd.) Onkar Singh Guleria, Deputy Director, Sainik Welfare Kangra at Dharamshala. This communication is dated 23rd November, 2005 and has been addressed to the Chief Justice, H.P. High Court. Registry shall provide the copies of this communication alongwith the annexures thereto to the learned counsel for all the parties. This gentleman was asked to appear in the Court today in person so that this Court could ascertain from him his views personally on the aforesaid communication and its contents. Since this communication repeatedly claims that Major Guleria is a disabled person (soldier), this Court enquired from him about the nature and extent of his disability. He, on such inquiry, informed the Court that he is not suffering from any disability of any type (he also appeared to us to be physically fit in all respects) but that he was boarded out of the Army owing to some psychological disorder which he attributed was caused because of Military service. Mr. Sandeep Sharma, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India is directed to file a response of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, through an affidavit of a responsible Officer of the Ministry of Defence to the aforesaid communication and deal with the points raised therein. Similarly, Mr. Mr. Sandeep Sharma, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India is directed to file a response of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, through an affidavit of a responsible Officer of the Ministry of Defence to the aforesaid communication and deal with the points raised therein. Similarly, Mr. M.S. Chandel, learned Advocate General shall file the response of the State Government through the personal affidavit of Principal Secretary (GAD) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to the aforesaid communication which shall deal with all the points raised therein…….” 4. Pursuant to such directions, the affidavit was filed by one Sh. C.D.Shivgotra, Senior Accounts Officer, Kendriya Sainik Board, Ministry of Defence, Government of India wherein he pointed out that the petitioner for all intents and purposes was an employee of the State Government and therefore, it alone was competent to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. The relevant extract of the reply reads as follows: “5. That the replying respondent humbly submits that Major (Retd.) Onkar Singh Guleria, Deputy Director, Sainik Welfare Board, Kangra at Dharamshala is an employee of State Govt. of Himachal Pradesh for all intents and purposes and only the State Govt. of Himachal Pradesh is competent to take any disciplinary action against the above said official.” 5. The Secretary (GAD), filed his affidavit wherein it was alleged that petitioner has been boarded out from military service being a case of schizophrenia. It was further mentioned that for making direct correspondence with the Hon’ble Chief Justice, the State Government had served a memorandum to the petitioner on 16.12.2005. The relevant portion of the reply reads as follows: “Para-2. In reply to Para 2, it is submitted that the contention of Major (Retd.) Onkar Singh Guleria, Deputy Director, Sainik Welfare Kangra at Dharamshala that he is a disabled soldier is not correct as he has failed to elaborate the kind of disability. In fact, he has been boarded out from Military Service being a case of pschizophrenia. Para-3. In reply to this para and sub paras 3(a) to (d), it is submitted that the contention of Major (Retd.) Onkar Singh Guleria, Deputy Director, Zila Sainik Welfare, Kangra at Dharamshala given in para 3(a) to (d) is totally irrelevant and have no bearing in this case. Para-3. In reply to this para and sub paras 3(a) to (d), it is submitted that the contention of Major (Retd.) Onkar Singh Guleria, Deputy Director, Zila Sainik Welfare, Kangra at Dharamshala given in para 3(a) to (d) is totally irrelevant and have no bearing in this case. It is further submitted that Major (Retd.) Onkar Singh Guleria was appointed as Deputy Director in Sainik Welfare Department vide this departmental Notification No. GAD-E(B)3-2/90 dated 11th April, 1990 on the recommendation of H.P.Public Service Commission, Shimla. Copy of notification dated 11th April, 1990 is annexed as Annexure R-4 and HP Public Service Commission letter dated 31.1.1990 is annexed as Annexure R-5. It is also submitted that 50% share of expenditure on Sainik Welfare Department is borne by the Kendriya Sainik Board, Government of India, New Delhi. Major (Retd.) Onkar Singh Guleria is a State Government employee. That for making direct correspondence with the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Hon’ble High Court, the State Government has served memorandum to said officer on 16 December, 2005. He has been directed to explain his position with in seven days positively. Copy of memorandum is annexed as Annexure R-6. The said Officer has sent the reply of the said memorandum, and the same is being examined for taking action under the Rules.” 6. The memorandum dated 16.12.2005 which was served upon the petitioner reads as under: “IMMEDIATE TIME BOUND” “No. GAD-E(B)3-2/90 Government of Himachal Pradesh General Administration Department “E-Section” Dated Shimla-2 the 16 December, 2005. MEMO It has been brought to the notice of the Government by the Director, Sainik Welfare, H.P. and Deputy Commissioner, Kangra that he has made direct correspondence with the Chief Justice of Hon’ble High Court vide his letter No. PWF-13/Kangra dated 26th July, 2005 and also disobeyed the orders of the Govt. to hand over the accommodation of Sainik Rest House, Kangra which is contrary to the Government Policy. He has used discourteous language in making official correspondence with the superiors thus he has violated the provisions contained in Rule 3 of CCS Conduct Rules, 1964. He is directed to explain his position as to why disciplinary action may not be initiated against him, within seven days positively failing which it will be presumed that he has nothing to say in this behalf and ex-parte decision will be initiated against him. Sd/- Addl. Secretary(GAD) to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh. He is directed to explain his position as to why disciplinary action may not be initiated against him, within seven days positively failing which it will be presumed that he has nothing to say in this behalf and ex-parte decision will be initiated against him. Sd/- Addl. Secretary(GAD) to the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh. Major (Retd.) Onkar Singh Guleria, Deputy Director, Zila Sainik Welfare, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh.” 7. Undeterred by the issuance of the memo dated 16.12.2005, the petitioner again made direct correspondence (16 pages) with the then Hon’ble the Chief Justice and two senior Hon’ble Judges of this Court on 26.12.2005. 8. The petitioner was charge-sheeted on 1.2.2006 for this misconduct. The enquiry was initiated against the petitioner and during the course of enquiry, the Inquiry Officer gave due opportunity to the petitioner but when he failed to turn-up and associate himself with the enquiry, he was proceeded ex-parte. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report by concluding that all the charges against the petitioner were of serious nature and had been duly proved in the enquiry. Therefore, keeping in view the gravity of misconduct of the petitioner the penalty of removal from Government service was imposed by the respondents vide order dated 04.06.2007. 9. The petitioner has sought to challenge the order of removal which was lateron vide order dated 20.06.2007 converted to an order of dismissal from service, mainly on the ground that this Court on 28.11.2005 while adjudicating CWP No. 333 of 2003 had observed : “The State Government as well as the Union of India while filing their responses to the aforesaid communication shall also deal with the aspect as to why and how the aforesaid Deputy Director, a subordinate functionary of the State Government as well as the Central Government (as he claims himself to be ) has, by-passing all the normal administrative channels, addressed the aforesaid communication directly to the Chief Justice which also contains some objectionable remarks and some uncalled for comments which best should have been avoided. The aforesaid communication also tends to cast aspersions on various officials and Constitutional functionaries. The aforesaid communication also tends to cast aspersions on various officials and Constitutional functionaries. After receiving the responses of the Union of India and the State Government, this Court shall decide whether to proceed against the aforesaid Deputy Director or not, and if to proceed, in what manner.” The petitioner sought to take advantage of the aforesaid observation and claims that this Court in fact did not pass any further order as per the aforesaid observation while on the other hand, the respondents No. 1 and 2 without waiting for the decision of the aforesaid writ petition had not only charge sheeted the petitioner but also had imposed penalty of dismissal from service. According to the petitioner, the respondents ought to have waited for further orders of this Court and could not have initiated disciplinary proceedings much less passed any punitive orders thereupon. 10. The petitioner further claims that he had moved an application for being impleaded as party in CWP No. 333 of 2003 which application was registered as CMP No. 3253 of 2003 and was allowed by this Court on 10.11.2007 by impleading the petitioner as respondent No.7 therein and the following order came to be passed: “CMP No. 3253 of 2007 For the reasons stated, the application is allowed. The applicant is hereby impleaded as respondent No.7 in CWP No. 333 of 2003. This impleadment, however, is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in the writ petition. The impleadment also does not mean that this Court at this stage is adjudicating in any manner any dispute or claim raised by the applicant. Only in the light of the facts stated in the application, by way of abundant caution the Court has decided to implead the applicant as a respondent in the writ petition. The application is disposed of. It is upto the applicant to adopt any further course of action in the proceedings. The writ petitioner may file amended memo of parties in four weeks from today.” 11. Subsequently this Court on 26.3.2008 passed the following orders in CWP No. 333 of 2003: “…..Major Onkar Singh (retd.) Deputy Director, Zila Sainik Welfare, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh has made an application that he is aggrieved by certain actions of the State Government and prays that his rights are to be decided by this Court. Subsequently this Court on 26.3.2008 passed the following orders in CWP No. 333 of 2003: “…..Major Onkar Singh (retd.) Deputy Director, Zila Sainik Welfare, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh has made an application that he is aggrieved by certain actions of the State Government and prays that his rights are to be decided by this Court. The same cannot be decided in this P.I.L., however, for the said purpose, it is open for him to approach an appropriate Forum, if he so chooses.” 12. In this backdrop what appears to be the specific case of the petitioner is that the respondents could have proceeded against the petitioner only after this Court had passed further orders relating to the petitioner after 28.11.2005 in CWP No. 333 of 2003 and for this purpose he has repeatedly placed reliance on the order dated 28.11.2005 which has already been reproduced hereinabove. 13. Now, I deal with the contention of the petitioner as to whether the respondents could have proceeded against him departmentally or not and as to whether reliance placed by him upon the order passed by this Court on 28.11.2005 is factually correct. 14. It is settled law that in matter relating to initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the same lie within the exclusive purview and domain of the employer and thus in the given facts and circumstances the employer was well within its right to have initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner especially when the misconduct on the part of the employee had come to its notice. 15. In so far as the observations made by this Court on 28.11.2005 are concerned, the reliance placed by the petitioner on the aforesaid observation is totally misplaced. In fact when the entire order dated 28.11.2005 (supra) is read, it clearly reflects that this Court was of the prima-facie opinion that the petitioner in fact had committed contempt of this Court by not only entering into direct correspondence with this Court but also having used intemperate language. It was in this background that this Court had called for the responses of the Union of India and the State Government so that it could decide whether to proceed against the aforesaid Deputy Director i.e. petitioner or not and if to proceed then in what manner. 16. I have carefully and meticulously gone through the report of the Inquiry Officer. 16. I have carefully and meticulously gone through the report of the Inquiry Officer. In normal circumstance, it would have been sufficient to have thrown out the writ petition not only on the ground of existence of alternate and efficacious rather proper remedy under CCS Rules, but that at this stage would be harsh and oppressive upon the petitioner. After going in detail through the enquiry report, I find no infirmity or illegality with the same. The petitioner for some strange reasons did not fully cooperate with the enquiry and was in fact proceeded against ex parte. He did not even try to join the proceedings and contest the same seriously. As per the enquiry report, the charged officer (petitioner) always remained unwilling to associate with the enquiry proceedings and he was not even prepared to associate with the proceedings at Dharamshala which was quite near to his native place and duty place. Therefore, under such circumstances, there was no other option left but to proceed ex parte against the petitioner. 17. The Court while exercising its power of judicial review is not to act as a Court of appeal, the same is exercised so as to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of law. This Court is required to see whether the inquiry conducted on charges of misconduct was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice were complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, it is the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry that has the jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion, though such findings must be based on some evidence. It is settled law that neither technical rules of Evidence Act nor proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceedings. 18. Further while exercising its power of judicial review the Court cannot act as appellate Authority to re-appreciate the evidence and then arrive at its own findings based on such evidence. It is settled law that neither technical rules of Evidence Act nor proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceedings. 18. Further while exercising its power of judicial review the Court cannot act as appellate Authority to re-appreciate the evidence and then arrive at its own findings based on such evidence. This Court would normally interfere only when the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry of where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence or if the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, it is then alone that this Court would interfere with the conclusion or the finding and thereafter mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. The Hon’ble Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.C.Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and others (1995) 6 SCC 749 , has held: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of a misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice be complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent office is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal on its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at the own independent findings on the evidence. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent office is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal on its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at the own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry of where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H. C. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 718 : ( AIR 1964 SC 364 ), this Court held at page 728 (of SCR): (at p 369 of AIR), that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. 14. In Union of India v. S. L. Abbas (1993) 4 SCC 357 : (1993 AIR SCW 1753), when the order of transfer was interfered by the Tribunal, this Court held that the Tribunal was not an appellate authority which could substitute its own judgment to that bona fide order of transfer. The Tribunal could not in such circumstances, interfere with order of transfer of a Government servant. In Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. H. P. Vora (1993) Supp. The Tribunal could not in such circumstances, interfere with order of transfer of a Government servant. In Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. H. P. Vora (1993) Supp. I SCC 551 : (1992 AIR SCW 2830), it was held that the Administrative Tribunal was not an appellate authority and it could not substitute the role of authorities to clear the efficiency bar of a public servant, recently, in State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow (1994) 1 JT (SC) 217 : (1994 AIR SCW 1465), a Bench of this Court to which two of us (B. P. Jeevan Reddy & B. L. Hansaria, JJ) were members, considered the order of the Tribunal, which quashed the charges as based on no evidence, went in detail into the question as to whether the Tribunal had power to appreciate the evidence while exercising power of judicial review and held that a Tribunal could not appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion to that of the disciplinary authority. It would, therefore, be clear that the Tribunal cannot embark upon appreciation of evidence to substitute its own findings of fact to that of a disciplinary / appellate authority.” 19. The learned Deputy Advocate General has contended that normally it is not the function of the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment particularly once the Court comes to the conclusion that the charges were proved and the charges were of serious nature. For this purpose, she has rightly relied upon the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Narain Singh (2002) 5 SCC 11 wherein it has been held as under: “9. As seen above, the Division Bench notes that the charges against the respondent are proved and that the charges are of serious nature. Once the Court came to the conclusion that the charges were proved and that the charges were of a serious nature, it was not the function of the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. The Division Bench was wrong in holding that factors viz. (a) the person is coming from which place (b) his family background, and (c) his service record etc. were to be kept in mind. In our view, the Division Bench was also wrong in holding that if a poor person pleads guilty to the misconduct, then extreme penalty of dismissal is uncalled for. (a) the person is coming from which place (b) his family background, and (c) his service record etc. were to be kept in mind. In our view, the Division Bench was also wrong in holding that if a poor person pleads guilty to the misconduct, then extreme penalty of dismissal is uncalled for. In our view a court must not lightly interfere with sentences passed after a properly conducted enquiry where the guilt is proved. Reduction of sentence, particularly in military, paramilitary or police services can have a demoralizing effect and would be a retrograde step so far as discipline of these services is concerned. In this case the charges being of a serious nature the penalty was commensurate with the charges. Further the Division Bench has itself noted that this was the third time the respondent was punished. 10. Mr. Mehta tried to support the impugned order on the ground that the Division Bench had taken a just and kind view considering the fact that the respondent had served for a long time and came from a poor family. He submitted that the impugned order was a just order and should not be interfered with. We are unable to accept this submission. As stated above, the law is clear. It is not for the court to determine the quantum of punishment once charges are proved. In this case it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal is not commensurate with the charges. It is not for the court to interfere on misplaced grounds of sympathy and/or mercy.” 20. The learned Deputy Advocate General further contends that once the charge against a delinquent is established, the quantum of punishment is for the employer to decide and the court ordinarily would not interfere with the order on the quantum of punishment once the court comes to a conclusion that there has been no infirmity with the procedure. In support of such contention, she has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. P. Chandra Mouli and others (2003) 10 SCC 196 wherein it has been held as follows: “3. Mr. P.P.Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contends that the findings of the learned Single Judge that proviso to Rule 19 was not complied with, is an error of record. Mr. P.P.Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contends that the findings of the learned Single Judge that proviso to Rule 19 was not complied with, is an error of record. It is apparent from the facts that notice was duly served in terms of proviso to Rule 19 by a letter dated 21.7.1987 and the judgment of the Gauhati High Court itself indicate that the respondents had submitted a representation to the same on 13.8.1987. The conclusion of the learned Single Judge therefore is fully vitiated on account of the aforesaid erroneous facts. The question that arises for consideration therefore is that whether the employer would be justified in taking recourse to the proviso to Rule 19, even when against some others who were also involved in the agitation no such action has been taken. The power to inflict punishment has been conferred on the employer and there is no embargo on that power which has been exercised under Rule 19. The procedure indicated therein has been complied with. In the case in hand we have said earlier that an appropriate notice was issued in terms of proviso to Rule 19. The fact that the respondents were convicted and sentenced on a criminal charge being not disputed the power being exercised under Rule 19 (i) cannot be faulted with. In this view of the matter, the High Court was wholly unjustified in interfering with the order of compulsory retirement and directing that it would be open for the Union Government to give a lesser punishment. “It is well settled that once the charge against a delinquent is established, the quantum of punishment is for the employer to decide and the court ordinarily would not interfere with the order on the quantum of punishment once the court comes to a conclusion that there has been no infirmity with the procedure.” In this view of the matter, the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench cannot be sustained. We therefore, set aside both the judgment and the writ petitions stand dismissed. The appeals are allowed accordingly.” 21. We therefore, set aside both the judgment and the writ petitions stand dismissed. The appeals are allowed accordingly.” 21. Lastly, the learned Deputy Advocate General has contended that while exercising the power of judicial review, this Court should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority with regard to the imposition of punishment unless such discretion suffers from illegality or material procedural irregularity or that would shock the conscience of the Court because exercise of discretion in imposition of punishment by the disciplinary authority is dependent on host of factors such as gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of the position that the delinquent holds, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department or establishment he works. She further contended that in normal circumstance the Court would not substitute its opinion on reappraisal of facts. In support of such contention, she relied upon the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli vs. Gulabhia M. Lad (2010) 5 SCC 775 , wherein it has been held as under: “14. The legal position is fairly well settled that while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court or a Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority, and/or on appeal the appellate authority with regard to the imposition of punishment unless such discretion suffers from illegality or material procedural irregularity or that would shock the conscience of the court/tribunal. The exercise of discretion in imposition of punishment by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority is dependent on host of factors such as gravity of misconduct, past conduct, the nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of the position that the delinquent holds, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department or establishment he works. Ordinarily, the court or a tribunal would not substitute its opinion on reappraisal of facts.” 22. The learned Deputy Advocate General has then contended that the petitioner’s past record has also not been very exemplary rather he had been suspended twice on 22.4.1995 and 30.9.1999 for various misconducts. For these charges, he was imposed penalty of withholding of three increments without cumulative effect on 27.10.1999 and again a penalty of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect was imposed on 30.6.2004. 23. For these charges, he was imposed penalty of withholding of three increments without cumulative effect on 27.10.1999 and again a penalty of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect was imposed on 30.6.2004. 23. The record establishes that the petitioner prior to filing of this petition has entered into direct correspondence and used intemperate language and had levelled unwarranted aspersions on various judicial and other officers of the State. The petitioner has made deliberate attempt to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings and such action could be construed to be obstructive or attending to obstruct the administration of justice. This court could have proceeded against the petitioner for contempt as was observed in the order dated 28.11.2005 because the petitioner had not only subjected the Judges of the subordinate judiciary but even the Hon’ble Judges of this Court to scurrilous and indecent attack. It will be apt to reproduce the following passage from judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, (1998) 7 SCC 248 : “17. The subordinate judiciary forms the very backbone of the administration of justice. This Court would come down with a heavy hand for preventing the judges of the subordinate judiciary or the High Court from being subjected to scurrilous and indecent attacks, which scandalize or have the tendency to scandalize, or lower or have the tendency to lower the authority of any court as also all such actions which interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. The protection is necessary for the courts to enable them to discharge their judicial functions without fear.” It is well settled that litigant cannot be permitted to browbeat the court or terrorize or intimidate the Judges as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chetak Construction Ltd. v. Om Prakash (1998) 4 SCC 577 : “16. Indeed, no lawyer or litigant can be permitted to browbeat the court or malign the presiding officer with a view to get a favourable order. Indeed, no lawyer or litigant can be permitted to browbeat the court or malign the presiding officer with a view to get a favourable order. Judges shall not be able to perform their duties freely and fairly if such activities were permitted and in the result administration of justice would become a casualty and the rule of law would receive a setback. The Judges are obliged to decide cases impartially and without any fear or favour. Lawyers and litigants cannot be permitted to ‘terrorise’ or ‘intimidate’ Judges with a view to ‘secure’ orders which they want. This is basic and fundamental and no civilized system of administration of justice can permit it.” These observations were subsequently, reiterated in Radha Mohan Lal v. Rajasthan High Court (2003) 3 SCC 427 . 24. The petitioner is a retired Major from the Indian Army and has served the disciplined force and cannot feign ignorance in matters relating to conduct, propriety and procedure to be followed while entering into ‘official correspondence’ etc. However, unfortunately the petitioner has exhibited gross indiscipline, insubordination, misconduct and not only used intemperate language in his representations but he has even gone to the extent of entering into direct correspondence not only with the functionaries of the State but even with the then Hon’ble Chief Justice and other senior Judges of this Court. This is unfortunate because the conduct of the petitioner is highly objectionable and unbecoming of anyone who was then serving the State, more particularly when the petitioner himself had retired from the Armed forces and was therefore expected to maintain far higher degree of discipline than the ordinary citizen but he failed to maintain discipline which is absolutely paramount. Any leniency shown to the petitioner would infact encourage others to commit similar or more serious acts of indiscipline and misconduct which will not be in public interest as it is bound to undermine the discipline as well as erode efficacy of the system and above all shake the confidence of the people in the efficacy of the entire system. 25. Thus, from what has been discussed hereinabove, I find no infirmity or illegality with the action of the respondents and accordingly, the writ petition is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. 26. 25. Thus, from what has been discussed hereinabove, I find no infirmity or illegality with the action of the respondents and accordingly, the writ petition is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. 26. This takes me to another very serious issue which has occasioned while going through the contents of the writ petition as also the written arguments filed by the petitioner. 27. After having filed this petition, the petitioner should have exercised restraint and felt duty bound not to proceed further in the matter. Instead, he filed written arguments running into 10 volumes comprising 2427 pages where he attributed motives vituperative terrorism and scurrilous and indecent attack not only on the Judges of the subordinate Court but did not even spare the Hon’ble Judges, the successive Hon’ble Chief Justice’s of this Court. The aspersions tend to scandalize the Court and further tend to interfere in the course of justice. 28. One such glaring example is found at page 301-A of the paper book, which is an application preferred by the petitioner wherein para 1 (c) reads as under: “My CMPs dated 24th June, 2013 and 07th July, 2013 have not been placed on record but filed in part A file. These CMPs reveal illegal acts of respondent No.3 and others.” While para -2 reads as under: “I am disabled from Right Foot, Ex-soldier, suffering from Chronic breathlessness and acute financial distress:- All caused by respondent No.3 i.e. High Court Administration through CWP No. 333/2003 in which there was no “Rule of Law” and various Articles of Constitution of India, violated just to victimize this Ex-Soldier who was not arrayed as NECESSARY PARTY in CWP 333/2003.” 29. Similarly at page 315 of the paper book (Vol.-II) the petitioner has submitted as under: “……Similarly administrative Head (Chief Justice) of respondent No.3 has not cared to reply to my numerous petitions till date, inspite of the fact that this Court on 26th March, 2008 on CWP 333/2003 passed orders that I can approach any appropriate forum (Annexure PA 61). On the contrary respondent No.3, illegally and arbitrarily on 06 January 2012 returned by CMP dated 26th December, 2011 in original against law of land, rules of law, natural justice, fair play, not being reasonable and making all efforts to first delay then deny me justice. Registrar General respondent No.3, although, this CWP 2279/2008 was filed in Nov. On the contrary respondent No.3, illegally and arbitrarily on 06 January 2012 returned by CMP dated 26th December, 2011 in original against law of land, rules of law, natural justice, fair play, not being reasonable and making all efforts to first delay then deny me justice. Registrar General respondent No.3, although, this CWP 2279/2008 was filed in Nov. 2008, but Registrar General, respondent No.3, did not accept notice till this Hon’ble Court after four years on 02nd March, 2012 ordered respondent No.3 to accept notice. On 12th March, 2012 coming from Kullu (250 Kms away) at exhorbitant costs, I processed the notice but again on 23rd March, 2012 the respondent No.3 remained ABSENT. Such is the arbitrariness, arrogance of respondent No. 3 on account of whom since 2005, I and my family all are living in destitute and leading a demeaning life and each trip to Shimla cost Rs.10,000/-(Rupees ten thousand) approx and in March 2012 itself this Court made me do three trips to Shimla. Such are DELIVERY OF JUSTICE to this ex-Soldier and Senior Citizen who from 1990-2008 (Annexure PA 29 to PA 51), gave his yesterday and had tryst with Destiny for fellow Solders fraternity, inspite of being placed in adversity by respondents yet I took up issues at national level for self less soldiers at my costs.” Now it would be seen that though this Court had nothing to do with the disciplinary proceedings or the ultimate outcome of the same but yet the petitioner arrayed this Court as respondent No.3 and launched a tirade attack on this Court. 30. At page 951 of the paper book (Vol.—III) the petitioner submitted as under: “3. That in furtherance of these BARBERIC ACTS as given in Para 2 as above, the Judges of H.P. High Court gave UNSTINTEDSUPPORT to above said OFFENDERS, when Mr. X, then C.J. and Mr. X-1, J., in their orders dated 28th Nov., 2005 in CWP 333/2003 made “UNCALLED FOR REMARKS” on the Petitioner’s alleged DISABILITY and INVALIDMENT from Army, when it had no DIRECT /INDIRECT links with CWP 333/2003, or illegal annexation of Sainik Rest House, Kangra by JUDICIARY on 21st Nov., 2005 with UNCOOTH ORDERS. X, then C.J. and Mr. X-1, J., in their orders dated 28th Nov., 2005 in CWP 333/2003 made “UNCALLED FOR REMARKS” on the Petitioner’s alleged DISABILITY and INVALIDMENT from Army, when it had no DIRECT /INDIRECT links with CWP 333/2003, or illegal annexation of Sainik Rest House, Kangra by JUDICIARY on 21st Nov., 2005 with UNCOOTH ORDERS. And with all these orders, the Judges of H.P. High Court, ridiculed the H.P. High Court, lowered the dignity of H.P.High Court, to look like street fighters and carried out “CONTEMPT OF OWN COURTS” which with acts on 26th March 2008 in CWP 333/2003 were repeated by Mr. X-2 next C.J. and Mr. X-3, J when failing in COURTS-self bounded duty to decide my “FATE”, the writ petition was allowed to be withdrawn by these two JUDGES and leaving the Petitioner to approach any FORUM (IS IT ANY REHRIWALA?). The other Judges still working in H.P.High Court, who were involved, in passing various illegal orders in CWP 333/2003 against the …. 4. In the interest of justice, this CWP 2279/2008, should not be listed before Mr. X-4, J., Mr. X-1, J., Mr. X-5, J. , Mr.X-3, J and Mr. X-6, J., all of CWP 333/2003 fame, in which the H.P. High Court and State Govt. of H.P. have VICTIMISED this petitioner and have violated Human Rights and Fundamental rights of not only the petitioner, but that of entire family and have denied the FORMATIVE YEARS to his two children and taken away all sources of income, thereby, Right to live and right to personal liberty was also taken away, especially when petitioner, in discharge of his bonafide duties was within the frame work of constitution and in given Statutory powers and acting as per laid down charter of Duties. Whereas Judges of H.P.High Court (aforesaid) transgressed their constitutional limits and statutory powers and for this petitioner and his family are paying heaving price since 2005 onwards for last SEVEN long years.” (X-1 to X-6 the then Hon’ble the Chief Justice and other Judges of this Court). 31. Not only this, similar scurrilous and indecent attacks have been made throughout in the written arguments filed by the petitioner and I do not want to unnecessarily burden this judgment by reproducing such allegations which are not only indescent and distasteful but on the face of it are contemptuous. 32. 31. Not only this, similar scurrilous and indecent attacks have been made throughout in the written arguments filed by the petitioner and I do not want to unnecessarily burden this judgment by reproducing such allegations which are not only indescent and distasteful but on the face of it are contemptuous. 32. This all has been done calculatedly to undermine the authority of the Courts and public confidence in the administration of justice. Contempt of Court is to keep a blaze the glory around the judiciary and to deter the people from attempting to render justice contemptible in the eyes of public. A libel upon the Court is a reflection upon the sovereign people themselves. The petitioner has tried to convey to the people that the administration of justice is weak or incorrupt hands and that the fountain of justice is tainted. Therefore, it is necessary to regulate the judicial process free from fouling the fountain of justice to ward off the people from undermining the confidence of the public in the purity of fountain of justice and due administration. Justice thereby remains pure, untainted and unimpeded. If the people’s allegiance to the law is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most vital and most dangerous obstruction of justice calling for urgent action. The petitioner has indulged in scandalizing the Court, which means hostile criticism of Judges as Judges or judiciary. The gravamen of the offence is lowering the dignity or authority or an affront to majesty of justice. The petitioner has challenged the authority of the Court and has, therefore, interfered with the performance of duties of Judge’s office or judicial process or administration of justice or production of tendency bringing the Judges or judiciary into contempt. If the attempts of the petitioner are encouraged the judicial independence would vanish eroding the very edifice on which the institution of justice stands. Any action on the part of a litigant which has the tendency to interfere with or obstruct the due course of justice has to be dealt with sternly and firmly to uphold the majesty of law. None can be permitted to intimidate or terrorize Judges by making scandalous unwarranted and baseless imputations against them in the discharge of their judicial functions so as to secure orders which the litigant “wants”. 33. None can be permitted to intimidate or terrorize Judges by making scandalous unwarranted and baseless imputations against them in the discharge of their judicial functions so as to secure orders which the litigant “wants”. 33. The petitioner has further not even spared members of the subordinate judiciary which forms the very backbone of administration of justice. This Court is duty bound to come down with the heavy hand for preventing the Judges of the subordinate judiciary from being subjected to scurrilous and indecent attacks, which scandalize or have the tendency to scandalize, or lower or have the tendency to lower the authority of any Court as also all such actions which interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The function of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. The protection is necessary for the courts to enable them to discharge their judicial functions without fear. 34. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society and the judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the Courts has to be respected and protected at all costs. It is for this reason that the Courts are entrusted with the extraordinary power of punishing those for contempt of court who indulge in acts whether inside or outside the Courts, which tend to undermine the authority of the Courts and bring them in disrepute and disrespect thereby obstructing them to discharge their official duties without fear or favour. This power is exercised by the Courts not to vindicate the dignity and honour of any individual Judge who is personally attacked or scandalized but with a view to uphold the majesty of law and the administration of justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such no action can be permitted to shake the very foundation itself. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice and as such no action can be permitted to shake the very foundation itself. Thus, it is now settled that abuses, attribution of motives, vituperative terrorism and scurrilous and indecent attacks on the impartiality of the Judges in the pleadings, applications or other documents filed in the Court or otherwise published which have the tendency to scandalize and undermine the dignity of the Court and the majesty of law amounts to criminal contempt of court. 35. No doubt, the litigant has the freedom of expression and liberty to project his case forcefully, but it has to be remembered that while exercising this liberty he is required to maintain dignity, decorum and order in the Court proceedings. Liberty of free expression cannot be permitted to be treated as a licence to make reckless imputations against the impartiality of the Judges deciding the cases. Even criticism of the judgment has to be in a dignified and temperate language and without any malice. (See: D.C.Saxena vs. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India (1996) 5 SCC 216 , In Re: Ajay Kumar Pandey (1996) 6 SCC 510 , Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, in RE: (1998) 7 SCC 248 , S.K.Sundaram: IN RE (2001) 2 SCC 171 and Arundhati Roy, IN RE (2002) 3 SCC 343 ). 36. The matter cannot therefore be permitted to rest here or else, this would amount to compromising with the majesty of the Court and undermining the authority of the Court and the public confidence in the administration of justice. The petitioner has indulged in scandalizing the Court and his act amount to interference with the administration of justice. This action tends to lower the authority of the Court and at the same time prejudice and interfere with due course of judicial proceedings apart from scandalizing and lowering the dignity of the Court. Therefore, taking suo motu notice for initiation of criminal contempt proceedings against the acts of the petitioner, let criminal contempt proceedings be separately registered against the petitioner and the matter be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for obtaining orders regarding listing of the same before the Hon’ble Division Bench in accordance with rules.