JUDGMENT : M.M. Das, J. - This second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law: (i) As under Section 61 of the O.L.R. Act, the decision of the Revenue Officer, if final, cannot be called in question in any other Court of law whether the appellate Court has committed an error apparent on the face of the record by the interfering with the final order passed by the Revenue Officer? (ii) Whether the land having been vested in the State and having been recorded as Abada Jogya Anabadi, the plaintiffs were necessary parties in the said O.L.R. proceeding initiated by the defendants? 2. The respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4 and the predecessors in interest of the respondent Nos. 2(a) to 2(f) filed O.S. No. 72 of 1977 before the Munsif, Puri, at present, the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Puri against the State of Orissa and the present appellants as defendants, for declaration of the plaintiffs title over the suit property and confirmation of their possession over the same along with a prayer for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs either by themselves or through their agents. The plaintiffs case is that the disputed property was recorded in the joint names of one Bancha Jena (father of plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3) and the husband of plaintiff No. 4 and one Artra Jena in stitiban status. The kissam of the land was recorded as "Puratan Patita". Subsequently, at the instance of the recorded tenants, it was converted to homestead and a house was constructed thereon. In an amicable partition, Ac.0.09 decimals of land fell to the share of the plaintiffs from the southern side and Ac. 0.04 decimals of land fell to the share of Arta Jena from northern side. While constructing the house, the plaintiffs amalgamated Ac.0.04 decimals of land from the eastern side of adjoining Plot No. 311 and made the entire Ac.0.13 decimals of land into a compact block which was assigned in Plot No. 337 in the settlement of the year, 1977. Bancha Jena possessed the land during his life time and thereafter the plaintiffs are in possession over the same openly and peacefully without interruption from any quarter. The original defendant No. 2, who is the predecessor of defendant Nos. 2 to 6, never possessed any part of the said land. Bancha Jena possessed the land during his life time and thereafter the plaintiffs are in possession over the same openly and peacefully without interruption from any quarter. The original defendant No. 2, who is the predecessor of defendant Nos. 2 to 6, never possessed any part of the said land. The plaintiffs while in possession received a notice in a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. prohibiting their entry into the suit land. On enquiry, they learnt that the original defendant No. 2 obtained an illegal order from the Addl. Tahasildar, Puri on 12.2.1975 in OLR Case No. 2153 of 1974 in an application, under Section 4(2) of the O.L.R. Act without impleading the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs challenged the said order to be without jurisdiction since the matter did not fall within the purview of Clause (h) of Section 4 of the O.L.R. Act. However, despite such order, the original defendant No. 2 could not possess the land but the local police locked the house over the suit land acting under the order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. The original defendant No. 2 threatened to dispossesses the plaintiffs on the strength of the said illegal order passed in the O.L.R. case for which the plaintiffs filed the suit. 3. The defendant No. 1 i.e. the State of Odisha in its pleading while admitting the correctness of the entry in 1927 Settlement asserted that the original defendant No. 2 being in possession of the suit land since long, it was settled in his favour. The other defendants i.e. the present appellants contested the suit on the ground that the land belonged to Emar Math of Puri and Bancha and Arta were recorded as tenants under the Math. As the land did not yield any income, they surrendered the suit land in favour of the Math. The Emar Math while in Khass possession inducted the original defendant No. 2 as tenant into the said land in or about the year, 1939, and the original defendant No. 2 possessing and reclaiming the same raised vegetables and grew coconut threes thereon and paid bhag produce to the Math. On vesting of the trust, an application under Section 4(2) of the O.L.R. Act was filed by him and the revenue Court after due enquiry declared him as raiyat in respect of the suit property. On vesting of the trust, an application under Section 4(2) of the O.L.R. Act was filed by him and the revenue Court after due enquiry declared him as raiyat in respect of the suit property. The plaintiffs applied for lease of the said land being aware of the possession of the original defendant No. 2. In the alternative, they pleaded that even if defendant No. 2 had no title, he perfected his title by way of adverse possession over the said property in view of long continuous possession for more than the statutory period. It was also claimed that the original defendant No. 2 constructed a house which exists on the suit land. The learned Munsif after trial of the suit on consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on record held that the defendants have no right, title and interest over the suit land and that the plaintiffs being out of possession for more than 12 years preceding the date of filing of the suit, the suit is not maintainable being barred by limitation. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred Title Appeal No. 20/11755 of 1985/1994/1982. The lower appellate Court by its judgment dated 7.5.1985 came to the findings that the plaintiffs are the occupancy raiyats in respect of the suit land as per the entries in R.O.R. of 1927. During 1977 Settlement, the draft khataian/parcha also shows that the plaintiffs to be in possession over the suit land. In the 1977 Settlement final R.O.R., the plaintiffs have been shown to be in forcible possession over the suit land, which was recorded as cultivable waste land. There is no clear evidence, when the Math took the suit land to its Khass possession. In the eye of law, there is no valid surrender of the suit land as claimed by the defendants, to the Math. Coming tot he alternative plea of adverse possession of the defendants, the lower appellate Court firstly came to the conclusion that there is no evidence to show that the original defendant No. 2 was inducted as tenant in respect of the suit land. The records of Math also do not support this fact. Coming tot he alternative plea of adverse possession of the defendants, the lower appellate Court firstly came to the conclusion that there is no evidence to show that the original defendant No. 2 was inducted as tenant in respect of the suit land. The records of Math also do not support this fact. Referring to Section 4 of the O.L.R. Act, the lower appellate Court came to the finding that the original defendant No. 2 was never a temporary lessee in respect of the suit property as required under Section 4(h) of the O.L.R. Act, which is a precondition to be satisfied to declare him as raiyat under the said section. According to the lower appellate Court, the further requirement that a person to be declared as raiyat under Section 4 of the O.L.R. Act must have been in cultivating possession of the lands, is also not satisfied. The lower appellate Court also came to the conclusion that the defendants have failed to show that they were holding the land for agriculture purpose, which is the further requirement of the Act. Finding that the defendants if came into the possession of the suit land it was only in the year 1974, the lower appellate Court dismissed the plea of adverse possession taken by the defendants as the period of 12 years did not expire by the time the suit was filed. Thus holding, the lower appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court by which the suit was dismissed and allowed the appeal by decreeing the suit on granting the reliefs sought for by the plaintiffs. 4. With regard to the substantial questions of law on which the second appeal has been admitted, this Court finds that the lower appellate Court having found that Section 4 of the O.L.R. Act could not have been made applicable to the facts of the present case, Section 61 of the O.L.R. Act cannot be considered to be a bar for the civil Court to exercise its jurisdiction in such situation. Hence, finding of the lower appellate Court cannot be construed to be illegal on the ground that the order passed by the revenue authority having attained the finality cannot be questioned in a civil suit. Hence, finding of the lower appellate Court cannot be construed to be illegal on the ground that the order passed by the revenue authority having attained the finality cannot be questioned in a civil suit. In addition to the above, it is well settled in law that even if a statute bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court, any order passed under the provisions of such statute is always open to be questioned in a civil suit on the ground of none following the procedure laid down in the Act or passing of orders which are not contemplated under the Act. Answering the aforesaid question of law in the manner indicated above, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court. 5. With regard to the second substantial question of law, as the lower appellate Court arrived at a finding of fact that the plaintiffs had title and possession over the suit property and as concluded above, the order of revenue officer being found to be without jurisdiction, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs had got no semblance of right, title and interest over the suit land at the time of inception of the proceeding under the O.L.R. Act. The proceeding initiated by the defendants is, therefore, found to be not maintainable before the revenue officer. Hence, the second substantial question of law does not arise for consideration in the present second appeal. In the result, therefore, the second appeal holds no merit and is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, parties shall bear their respective cost of this appeal. Final Result : Dismissed