Judgment : 1. By this petition, the judgment and order dated 4/03/2011, passed by President, Administrative Tribunal, Panaji, Goa in Eviction Appeal no.28/1995, has been challenged. 2. The petitioner is a tenant of the respondent and, since, he had fallen in arrears of rent for a period of more than three months and, since, he did not pay the arrears of rent within 30 days of the receipt of the registered notice served upon him by the respondent, respondent filed an application dated 2/08/1990 before the Additional Rent Controller, Ponda, Goa under Section 22 (2)(a) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rent Control Act') for eviction of the premises. 3. The application was resisted by the petitioner stating that the rent fell in arrears because of refusal of the respondent to accept the rent whenever it was attempted to be paid to her. The petitioner contended that reason for refusal to accept the rent by the respondent was that respondent illegally demanded increase of rent to which the petitioner was not aggreable. 4. During the pendency of the eviction proceedings before the Rent Controller, an application filed by the respondent under Section 32(4) of the Rent Control Act came to be allowed by the order passed by Rent Controller on 1/11/1990. This order was challenged by the petitioner by filing an appeal before the Administrative Tribunal. The Administrative Tribunal allowed the appeal and setting aside the order dated 1/11/1990, directed the Rent Controller to proceed further in eviction proceedings, in accordance with law. 5. After the remand of the matter, the Rent Controller proceeded with the eviction proceedings and by his judgment and order dated 10/10/1995, allowed the application of the respondent. In an appeal filed against the said judgment and order before the Administrative Tribunal, the learned President found that there was no error or illegality in the judgment and order of the Rent Controller and, therefore, by his judgment and order dated 4/03/2011, dismissed the appeal. It is the same judgment and order which are subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 6. I have heard Shri Shivan Dessai, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel with Shri J. Simoes, learned Counsel for the respondent. 7. It is the same judgment and order which are subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 6. I have heard Shri Shivan Dessai, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel with Shri J. Simoes, learned Counsel for the respondent. 7. It is submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned judgment and order have been delivered by the learned President of the Administrative Tribunal after an inordinate delay, the delay being of about twenty months and, therefore, justice has been denied to the petitioner. He submits that directions given by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in various cases regarding delivery of judgments within a reasonable period of time and in any case within three months from the date on which the judgment is reserved, have not been followed by the Tribunal and considering the extent of delay, prejudice to the petitioner is obvious and nothing further is required to be demonstrated by the petitioner to prove his contention that justice has been denied to him. 8. He has further submitted that the Tribunal has not considered petitioner's evidence in its proper perspective and even though the petitioner has a statutory right under Section 22(4) of the Rent Control Act, to prove his case and even though the petitioner had tendered sufficient evidence in this regard, the Tribunal did not record a finding as to whether or not any reasonable cause was shown by the petitioner for alleged non-payment of arrears of rent. 9. The learned Counsel further submits that merely because the petitioner had taken a different reason for falling in arrears of rent than the one in reply to an application filed under Section 32 (4) of the Rent Control Act for non-payment of rent, it could not be said that petitioner failed to show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent as Section 22 and Section 32 are two different sections and operate in different situations. 10. 10. Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submits that basically this is not a case wherein there is an inordinate delay in delivery of the judgment by the Administrative Tribunal as the roznama of the case would indicate that even though the judgment was reserved on 26/02/2009, on 31/01/2011, the Tribunal had invited parties to make further arguments, if any, and the reason being that considerable time had passed after reserving the matter for pronouncement of judgment. He submits that if the petitioner desired to make any submission, there was an opportunity for him to make the same but, he did not avail of it and, therefore, now it does not lie in his mouth that there is an inordinate delay in delivery of the judgment, which has resulted in denial of justice to him. He submits that the date on which the matter was finally reserved for judgment, as per roznama, was 31/01/2011 and in about one month's time thereafter, the judgment was delivered by the Administrative Tribunal. Therefore, he further submits that the impugned judgment and order cannot be faulted on this count. 11. He further submits that if the respondent had really refused to accept the rent as alleged by the petitioner, what had prevented the petitioner from depositing the rent with the controller by taking recourse to the procedure laid down under Section 18 of the Rent Control Act and the fact that the petitioner did not resort to that procedure itself, would establish that the default in payment of arrears of rent was willful. 12. He further submits that the findings recorded by the Administrative Tribunal are correct and legal and cannot be interfered with in the writ jurisdiction. He further submits that while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it would not be open for this Court to reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the judgment and order of the Administrative Tribunal, unless, the order is shown to be perverse or has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice or is passed upon non-consideration of material evidence. He further submits that such is not the case here. On this grounds, he urges that there is no merit in this petition and it deserves to be dismissed with costs. 13. He further submits that such is not the case here. On this grounds, he urges that there is no merit in this petition and it deserves to be dismissed with costs. 13. In view of the rival submissions, following points arise for my determination: (i) Whether, there is any failure of justice caused by the delay in pronouncing the impugned judgment and order? (ii) Whether the impugned judgment and order are so perverse and so illegal as to warrant interference by this Court? 14. In support of the argument canvassed on behalf of the petitioner with regard to failure of justice resulting from the delay in pronouncement of impugned judgment and order, the learned Counsel has referred to me the judgments rendered in the cases of MangueshKasturi Pai (since deceased) and Ors. V/s. The Administrative Tribunal of Goa and Others in Writ Petition No.427/2012 dated 8/03/2012 and ShriJitendra Raghuraj Deshprabhu and Others V/s. Shri Vasudeo Rajendra Deshprabhu & Others in Writ Petition No.191/2012 dated 13/06/2012. 15. In the case of MangueshKasturi Pai (since deceased) and Ors. (supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court considered various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and held that unreasonable delay between the hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment, unless explained by exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable, even when written arguments are submitted. The learned Single Judge further held that what is important is the faith of the litigants in the judicial system of this country and the principle that justice must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done, should be followed by all the Courts. The relevant observations of the learned Single Judge appear in paragraph 19 which reads thus: “19. What emerges from the above judgments is that the Courts and the Tribunals functioning within the State of Goa are bound to follow the mandate given by the Apex Court in various judgments as well as the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court. In the case of R.C. Sharma (supra), the Apex Court has observed that unreasonable delay between the hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment, unless explained by exceptional and extraordinary circumstance, is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It has been held that in such an eventuality, some points which the litigants considered important, might have escaped the notice. It has been held that in such an eventuality, some points which the litigants considered important, might have escaped the notice. But what is more important is that the litigants must have complete confidence in the result of the litigation and the same tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment; Justice must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done.” 16. In the case of ShriJitendra Raghuraj Deshprabhu and Others (supra), Division Bench of this Court found that since there was a delay of about fifteen months in the delivery of the judgment and order impugned therein by the Administrative Tribunal, the Tribunal violated the directions given by this Court in the case of PradeepSangodkar V/s. State of Goa Anr. reportedin and, therefore, quashed and set aside the judgment and order and remanded the matter back to the Administrative Tribunal for a decision afresh. 17. These judgments lay down a rule that there should not be any unreasonable delay between the hearing of arguments and delivery of judgment and if it is there, it must be explained by exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. In fact, learned Single Judge of this Court, in the case of PradeepSangodkar (supra), had issued specific directions to be followed by all Courts and Tribunals including the Administrative Tribunal of Goa functioning within the jurisdiction of Goa. These directions are as follows: “(i) All Courts should arrange their roaster in such a manner that they should be able to deliver judgment/ order in any matter at the soonest possible. (ii) Where final arguments are heard in a matter, judgment should be pronounced within a period of three months from the date of conclusion of the arguments. (iii) In Misc. Application and/or all other matters, order shall not be delayed beyond a period of two months from the date of conclusion of arguments. (iv) Whenever judgment/order is reserved, the judgment/ order when delivered should bear the date on which the judgment/order was reserved and date on which it is delivered. (iii) In Misc. Application and/or all other matters, order shall not be delayed beyond a period of two months from the date of conclusion of arguments. (iv) Whenever judgment/order is reserved, the judgment/ order when delivered should bear the date on which the judgment/order was reserved and date on which it is delivered. (v) Directions contained in clauses 4 and 5 (inadvertently mentioned as 4 and 5 instead of 3 and 4) above shall be subject to any statutory provisions, if any, providing for a different period such as Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005; wherein Consumer Forum is required to pass the order invariably within fifteen dates of the conclusion of the arguments as per clause-7 thereof. (vi) Any judicial officer, failing to comply with directions at Sr.Nos.4 and/or 5 (inadvertently mentioned as 4 and 5 instead of 3 and 4) above shall report to the Registrar, High Court of Bombay at Goa every such matter where there is a failure with reasons for non-delivery of such order/ judgment. The same will form part of their personal file. (vii) In case of Government officers discharging judicial/ quasi judicial functions, such report shall 20 be made to the Chief Secretary of Goa and the same will form part of their personal records. (viii) The judicial officers concerned shall also be liable for disciplinary action by the High Court and the State Government, as the case may be, for their persistent failure to comply with these directions. (ix) It is common knowledge that most of the quasi judicial authorities communicate the decision to the parties after reserving the order. This practice should be discontinued forthwith. Every judgment/ order should be pronounced in open Court after notifying the parties the date of the order. (x) Once the judgment/ order is pronounced, the certified copy should be made available to the parties, if applied for, not later than 7 days and not later than 2 days if the copy is applied for on urgent basis.” 18. The rationale behind all these directions is that Courts of law being the last resort for the persons feeling aggrieved to seek justice, any unusual step by the Court, or some departure from established procedure or unreasonable delay in giving a decision by the Court is most likely to result in shaking of the litigant's faith in ability of Court to deliver justice. That is the reason why it is said that Courts of law are driven by the cardinal principle of justice, justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done. 19. In the instant case, there is no dispute about the fact that final arguments were heard on 29/06/2009 and the judgment was pronounced on 4/03/2011, almost after a period of twenty months from the date on which final arguments were heard. The delay was thus inordinate. Therefore, it has to be seen if there were any extraordinary and exceptional circumstances justifying delayed pronouncement of the judgment. On 31/01/2011, as per the roznama, it appears that the Administrative Tribunal had asked advocates of both sides if they would like to make any further arguments in the matter, although, the roznama does not say this fact in these words. But, it can be read and understood from the notings in the roznama which read as under: 31/01/2011 Case called out. Adv. Ms. Rane present for Appellant Adv. Ms. Bandekar holding for Adv. Shri N.G. Kamatpresent for Respondent. Both advocates states that writ. Submission of both parties is already filed on record covering all the points and matter may be decided on same fact for judgment on… 4/03/20144 at 10.30 a.m. It is clear from the above noting that the advocates did not wish to make any further submissions in the matter and only stated that their written submissions were already filed on record covering all the points and therefore the case may be decided accordingly. This noting, as rightly submitted by learned Counsel for the respondent, gave an opportunity to advocates of both sides to make their arguments again. It appears that it was not indicated to them as to why the Administrative Tribunal was giving them such an opportunity. Such an opportunity could have been given to them if there was any change of incumbency to the post of President of the Administrative Tribunal or the learned President of the Tribunal had some exceptional and extraordinary reasons to not deliver the judgment within reasonable period of time and which circumstances necessitated rehearing or further hearing in the mater. These circumstances ought to have been reflected on record of the appeal before the Administrative Tribunal or at least in the roznama of the appeal. These circumstances ought to have been reflected on record of the appeal before the Administrative Tribunal or at least in the roznama of the appeal. They are not to be found recorded anywhere and therefore, I am of the view that this is not a case in which the inordinate delay occurred in delivery of the judgment has been explained by exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, it has to be said that the unreasonable delay occurred in delivery of the judgment has itself caused prejudice to the appellant and this prejudice is in relation to his confidence in the judicial system. 20. The impugned judgment and order also show that they do not bear the date on which the arguments were heard although, there is a specific direction given in this regard by this Court in the case of PradeepSangodkar (supra). Therefore, one must say there is a further violation of the directions of this Court made by the Administrative Tribunal. 21. For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that by inordinate delay caused in delivery of the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal, there has been a violation of the cardinal principle of justice by which all Courts of law are governed and it has resulted into erosion of faith of the appellant in the objectivity of the judgment and order impugned herein. Such an order, therefore, cannot be sustained in law and it deserves to be quashed and set aside and matter remanded back to the Administrative Tribunal for a decision afresh on merits of the case. Since the impugned judgment and order are being quashed and set aside, on this ground, I do not think it appropriate to consider the remaining arguments canvassed on behalf of the rival parties, lest any observation with regard to them may affect decision to be rendered by the Administrative Tribunal on the merits of the case. Accordingly, first point is answered as in the affirmative and second point in terms that for the purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary to deal with it. 22. In the result, the Writ Petition succeeds and it stands allowed. The impugned judgment and order are quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Administrative Tribunal for a decision afresh on merits. 22. In the result, the Writ Petition succeeds and it stands allowed. The impugned judgment and order are quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Administrative Tribunal for a decision afresh on merits. The Tribunal shall decide the case finally within the period of three months from the appearance of the parties before it. Parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 21/04/2014 at 10.00 a.m. Rule is made absolute in the above terms with no order as to costs.