Judgment : 1. Heard Mr. Usgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. Ramani, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. This Second Appeal has been directed against the Judgment and Decree dated 12/04/2013 passed by the learned District Judge-I Panaji (First Appellate Court) in Regular Civil Appeal No.485 of 2010. By the impugned Judgment, said appeal was allowed with the result that the Judgment, Order and Decree dated 01/11/2010 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ponda (Trial Court) in Regular Civil Suit No. 155/2000/B (New): Regular Civil Suit No.14/1989 (Old) came to be quashed and set aside and consequently the suit for partition filed by the plaintiffs stood dismissed. 3. The present appellants were the plaintiffs in the said Civil Suit whereas the respondents were the defendants therein. The parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status in the said suit. 4. The plaintiffs had filed the said suit for declaration that they are entitled for half share i.e. 5/10th share and that defendants no.2 to 12 and the heirs (children) of deceased defendant no. 3 or 13 i.e. Smt. Kumud Shirodkar and her late husband Shri Ranganath Shirodkar, namely defendants no. 13(a) and 13(b) are entitled for 1/10th share in the suit properties as shown in Annexure-II and consequent partition of the suit properties in metes and bounds. The plaintiffs further prayed to permanently restrain the defendants, their agents, servants etc. from interfering in any manner with the properties and premises to be allotted to the plaintiff no.1 or any part thereof and for direction to the defendant no.1 to give to the plaintiff no.1 her half share in the car bearing registration no.GGC-26 and scooter bearing registration no. GGF 879 or in the alternative to pay the market value of her share of the same. 5. The case of the plaintiffs in short was as follows: The plaintiff no.1 is the legally wedded wife of deceased defendant no.1 and the marriage between them was solemnized on 27th May 1947, in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Goa Velha, Goa against entry No. 290. The name of the plaintiff no.1 before her marriage was Bhanumati Naik Shirodkar. Along with the defendants, the plaintiffs are co-owners of the suit properties which bear new survey nos. 122/7, 138/0, 139/0, 140/0, 142/0, 147/3 and 147/4. The name of the plaintiff no.1 before her marriage was Bhanumati Naik Shirodkar. Along with the defendants, the plaintiffs are co-owners of the suit properties which bear new survey nos. 122/7, 138/0, 139/0, 140/0, 142/0, 147/3 and 147/4. The suit properties originally belonged to late Suryaji Shankar Mamlekar, who was the grandfather of the deceased defendant no.1. Shri Shankar Suryaji Mamlekar was the father of deceased defendant no.1 and that said Shankar Suryaji Mamlekar and Vaman Suryaji Mamlekar were brothers being the sons of late Suryaji Mamlekar. The deceased defendant no.1 and the plaintiffs are entitled to half i.e. 5/10th share in the suit properties whereas the other son of late grand father (Suryaji) by name Vaman Mamlekar, since deceased is entitled to the other half share i.e remaining 5/10th share in the suit properties. Late Vaman Suryaji Mamlekar was survived by following persons having 1/10th share each : I. Late Prabhakar Vaman Mamlekar survived by his wife Savitri P. Mamlekar who had six children Viz. (i)- Malu Prabhakar Mamlekar; (ii)- Kushendra Prabhakar Mamlekar; (iii)-Vishwas Prabhakar Mamlekar; (iv)- Vasanti @ Aruna Prabhakar Mamlekar; (v)-Suvarna Prabhakar Mamlekar; and (vi) Jyoti Prabhakar Mamlekar, who are all entitled to 1/10th share each in the suit Property. II. Late Dilip Vaman Mamlekar and his wife Late Jayawanti D. Mamlekar survived by their four children viz. (i)- Diwakar @ Shailesh Dilip Mamlekar; (ii)- Rudresh Dilip Mamlekar; (iii)-Rajesh Dilip Mamlekar; and (iv)- Rupa @ Reena Dilip Mamlekar, who are also entitled to 1/10th share in the suit Properties. III. Ramesh Vaman Mamlekar (defendant no.2) married to Smt. Kunda alias Laxmi Mamlekar (defendant no.3) who are entitled to 1/10 share in the suit properties. IV. Smt. Kumud V. Mamlekar married to late Ranganath Shirodkar and her children viz. (i)-Jotika Ranganath Shirodkar; (ii) Jitendra Ranganath Shirodkar, who are entitled to 1/10th share in the suit Properties. V. Vijaya Vaman Mamlekar (defendant no.11) and her husband Ramakant V. Naik (defendant no.12) entitled to 1/10th share in the suit Properties. The suit properties are undivided joint properties and enjoyed in common. The plaintiffs are also co-owners of the premises situated in the suit properties along with the houses wherein the defendants and plaintiffs reside separately and four buildings have been given on rental basis to following persons: i) Parashuram Ingle. ii) Purushottam G. Naik. iii) Shankar Kurtikar. iv) Shiva Parkar. v) Gurudas Sawant. vi) Rohidas Parkar. vii) Arun K. Naik. The plaintiffs are also co-owners of the premises situated in the suit properties along with the houses wherein the defendants and plaintiffs reside separately and four buildings have been given on rental basis to following persons: i) Parashuram Ingle. ii) Purushottam G. Naik. iii) Shankar Kurtikar. iv) Shiva Parkar. v) Gurudas Sawant. vi) Rohidas Parkar. vii) Arun K. Naik. viii) R. Menezes Teilerino. ix) Mechanic Anand. x) Gopal Krishna. xi) Lata Kurtikar. xii) Smt. Bharatamma. xiii) Gopi S. Contractor. xiv) Vishnu V. Haibatte. xv) Ciba Plastic Works. There is a Flour Mill in the suit property bearing Survey no.122/7 which is given to a person by name Laxman G. Naik for running the same whereas one room is kept for the business purpose in the said building in survey no. 122/7 by the defendant no. 2. The defendants no. 1, 2, 4 and 6 have collected a sum of about Rs.50,000/-as deposits towards the rented premises from the tenants and the defendants no. 1, 2, 4 and 6 collect about a sum of Rs.2,800/- as rent per month from the said tenants. Besides the same, the said defendants get about Rs.2,000/- as income per month from the above referred Flour Mill. The defendants no.1, 2, 4 and 6 also get an income of Rs.12,000/- per year from Cashew garden and Rs.15,000/-per year from coconut garden situated in the suit properties. The defendants no. 1, 2, 4 and 6 have cut timber worth Rs.10,000/-from the suit properties, in the year preceding the year in which the suit was filed. The defendant no.1 on 27/02/1984, by fraud and misrepresentation, took the Power of Attorney from the plaintiff no.1 and started selling some plots of the properties in collusion with the other defendants and without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs. This fact was known to the plaintiff no.1 somewhere in the year 1987 and then she revoked the said power of attorney. The defendant no.1 started misusing the income from the said sources. The defendant no.1, about a year back, purchased a new Fiat car bearing registration no. GGC-26 and said car is plying on road as taxi and thus the defendant no.1 gets about Rs.3,000/-per month as income from the said car. Besides the same, defendant no. 1 has recently purchased a new scooter bearing registration no. GGF-879. The defendant no.1, about a year back, purchased a new Fiat car bearing registration no. GGC-26 and said car is plying on road as taxi and thus the defendant no.1 gets about Rs.3,000/-per month as income from the said car. Besides the same, defendant no. 1 has recently purchased a new scooter bearing registration no. GGF-879. Both the vehicles have been purchased from the income derived from the suit properties and the premises situated therein. The plaintiff no. 1 on 04/06/1989 asked the defendants no. 1, 2, 4 and 6 for accounts but they refused to give the same. The defendant no.1 in collusion with the other defendants again intended to sell the suit properties. Since, there was dispute as to the share of each of the parties and as the plaintiffs did not wish to keep the same in common, it became necessary to partition the suit properties. Hence the suit. 6. Defendant no.1, since deceased, in his written statement, stated that the plaintiff no.1 and defendant no.1 are married to each other and marriage was not dissolved since they never asked for divorce or dissolution of the marriage. The said marriage was performed without any anti nuptial contract and consequently under the Regime of Communion of Assets, the husband is empowered exclusively with the administration of the property and wife cannot interfere with the same. The said power of administration include the right to receive and dispose of all the income of the movable and immovable properties and right to dispose of the movable properties belonging to them. Thus, the plaintiff no.1 has no right to ask for the partition of the common properties or for accounts. The defendant no.1 admitted that one room of the building under Survey no.122/7 is in possession of the defendant no.2 and that the defendant no.1 has been receiving rent for the same. Parties do not have right of ownership to the property under survey no.138/0. Income of the cashew grove under survey nos.139, 140 and 142 is exclusively reserved for the expenses of the religious ceremonies, being performed by the family of Mamlekars (defendants) for the last more than 30 years. The defendant no.1 denied that trees had been cut from the common properties expect three trees, the product of which was utilized to repair the common house. The defendant no.1 denied that trees had been cut from the common properties expect three trees, the product of which was utilized to repair the common house. The properties or plots referred to by the plaintiff no.1 had been sold with the complete knowledge and consent of the plaintiff no.1 and prior to the plaintiff giving power of attorney to the defendant no.1, she had intervened directly in the sale of more than 14 plots from the common property. 7. The defendants no.2 to 9, in their written statement, alleged that the suit was not maintainable against them because the same was premature and incompetent under the Family Laws (Portuguese) in force in Goa and further because the defendant no.10 was minor and not represented by guardian ad-litem. The plaintiff no.1 is moiety holder of the rights of the defendant no.1 and the moiety rights of the plaintiff and defendant no.1 together are joint with the right of the present defendants in the suit property. Within the property bearing survey no.142, originally there were two houses meant for handloom industry of Mamlekar family and somewhere about six years back one of the said house was reconstructed in such a way as to form two separate residential houses joining each other and divided by a common wall. Such reconstruction was done by defendant no.2 and the elder son of defendant no.1 out of their own money. However, such houses were similarly divided into two separate houses by two married sisters of defendant no.1 and defendants no.2, 4 and 6. The said two sisters are now occupying the said two houses separately. In the same property there is also another residential house constructed about one or two years back by the brother of defendant no.1 out of his own money. All the said structures are occupied by respective parties, as owners thereof to the exclusion of others. There are different houses constructed by the defendants out of their own money and in the properties surveyed under No.147/3, 147/4 and 122/7. The parties have mutually divided two such houses each in two equal halves; one half allotted to defendant no.1 and the other half of each house allotted to defendants no.2, 4 and 6. The said house have been leased out to third party. The rents thereof are accordingly accepted by respective parties. The parties have mutually divided two such houses each in two equal halves; one half allotted to defendant no.1 and the other half of each house allotted to defendants no.2, 4 and 6. The said house have been leased out to third party. The rents thereof are accordingly accepted by respective parties. Hence, the third house could not be divided into two equal houses as the same was given on lease and the rent proceeds are shared equally by defendant no.1 and defendants no.2, 4, and 6. All the rents are so received by all the defendants since last more than 30 years, without objection from anyone including the plaintiff no.1. In fact the rent proceedings form the main source of income of the said defendants. There was a shed/godown constructed by defendant no.6 with his own money in the property bearing survey no. 122/7 for over 30 years. The flour mill at Upper Bazar in survey no. 122/7 was run by Shri Laxman Naik, the brother-in-law of defendant no.1 and the present defendants do not get anything from the same, not even the rent. They denied that they collected monthly rent or had received deposit towards the rented premises from the tenants. They denied that they get income from coconut garden. According to them, the coconuts are divided in such a manner that half of them were taken by defendant no.1 and remaining half are shared equally by defendants no. 2, 4 and 6. Three trees were cut from common properties as timber was required for repairs of the ancestral house. Fourteen plots in the common property had been sold with due consent and knowledge of the plaintiffs and the plaintiff no.1 had affixed her signature on all these fourteen sale deeds along with other defendants prior to giving power of attorney to the defendant no.1. Subsequently, power of attorneys were taken from respective wives of the defendants including that of the plaintiff. The properties were purchased by defendant no.1 and the father of defendants no.2, 4 and 6, who is the father-in-law of defendants no. 3 and 5 and grandfather of defendants no. 7 to 10. 8. The defendants no.11 and 12, in their written statement, alleged that the suit for partition was not maintainable without joining all the heirs. The properties were purchased by defendant no.1 and the father of defendants no.2, 4 and 6, who is the father-in-law of defendants no. 3 and 5 and grandfather of defendants no. 7 to 10. 8. The defendants no.11 and 12, in their written statement, alleged that the suit for partition was not maintainable without joining all the heirs. The suit was also not maintainable without first determining or specifically pleading about the specific shares of the co-owners. These defendants alleged that they are also the co-owners of the suit properties. They stated that late Suryaji Mamlekar, the grandfather of defendant no.1 had two sons: Shankar and Vaman who were entitled to the suit properties during their life time, in equal shares. Said Vaman Suryaji Mamlekar married to Parvati Vaman Mamlekar and they had five children namely:-(i) late Prabhakar Vaman Mamlekar (defendant no. 4) survived by Smt. Savitri Prabhaker Mamlekar (defendant no. 5); (ii) late Dilip Vaman Mamlekar (defendant no. 6) survived by Diwakar alias Shailesh Mamlekar (defendant no.7), Rudresh Mamlekar(defendant no. 8) Rajesh Mamlekar (defendant no. 9), Miss Rupa alias Reena Mamlekar (defendant no. 10); (iii) Ramesh Vaman Mamlekar (defendant no.2) married to Smt Kunda alias Laxmi Mamlekar (defendant no.3); (iv) Kumud Mamlekar; and (v) Vijaya Mamlekar (defendant no. 11) married to Ramakant V. Naik. Likewise, said Shankar Vaman Mamlekar was survived by Saraswati Mamlekar who was the original plaintiff and four children namely:- Shri Vithoba Mamlekar (plaintiff no.2) married to Smt Sushila Mamlekar (plaintiff no.3), Pushpa S. Mamlekar (plaintiff no. 4 married to Shri Rajendra Laxman Naik (plaintiff no.5), Shri Lawoo Mamlekar (plaintiff no.6) married to Smt. Shanti Mamlekar (plaintiff no. 7), Govind Mamlekar (plaintiff no.8) who died issueless and Shrihari Mamlekar (plaintiff no.9) married to Smt. Deepa Mamlekar (plaintiff no. 10). The rights of the above heirs of Vaman and Shankar have not been determined by competent Inventory Proceedings and unless there is a Judicial pronouncement of declaring the rights of the heirs, the properties cannot be partitioned. It is true that late Suryaji Mamlekar (defendant no.1) and defendants no. 2, 4 and 6 were getting an income of Rs.12,000/- fro cashew garden and Rs.15,000/- from coconut garden. The defendants no.11 and 12 are also entitled to the crops of cashew and coconut gardens. Out of the income from these properties, expenses are also incurred for joint and common celebration of festivals and religious ceremonies. 9. 2, 4 and 6 were getting an income of Rs.12,000/- fro cashew garden and Rs.15,000/- from coconut garden. The defendants no.11 and 12 are also entitled to the crops of cashew and coconut gardens. Out of the income from these properties, expenses are also incurred for joint and common celebration of festivals and religious ceremonies. 9. By way of additional written statement, filed after amendment to the plaint carried out by the plaintiffs, the defendants no.2 to 10 further alleged that the defendant no.1 had acquired undetermined and unascertained rights by way of succession in the unspecified properties of his late father Shri Shankar Suryaji Mamlekar and these specific rights had not been determined either by competent public deed of partition or by judicial decree in the competent Inventory Proceedings. They stated that the plaintiffs have sought partition of the undivided estate of a common ancestor of the plaintiffs and the defendants namely late Suryaji Mamlekar, which is not maintainable without filing Inventory Proceedings or without a competent public deed of partition. 10. By order dated 05/09/2008, the Trial Court, relying upon the decision in the case of “Cruz Fernandes Vs. Gregorina Fernandes” [1991(2) Goa L.T. 42] held that the suit was not maintainable in the 17 SA 129/13 absence of public deed of partition or Inventory Proceedings instituted upon the death of the common ancestor of the plaintiffs and the defendants. The plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Appeal No.112/2008 against the said order dated 05/09/2008. The learned District Judge-I, F.T.C., Mapusa, observed that in the year 2008, the plaintiffs had filed an amendment application in the suit stating the shares of each of the parties to the suit and the defendants did not file any written statement after the said amendment was allowed. He held that the shares of the parties have been pre-determined and admitted by the parties and hence the principle laid down in the case of “Cruz Fernandes”(supra) did not apply but he ruling in the case of “Marcus Nunes Vs. Filomena Sebastiana Fernandes” [2000(2) Goa L.T. 539] was applicable. The appeal was allowed. The suit was restored. 11. It appears that the plaintiffs then filed an application before the Trial Court praying for a preliminary decree in terms of Order XX Rule 18(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.). Filomena Sebastiana Fernandes” [2000(2) Goa L.T. 539] was applicable. The appeal was allowed. The suit was restored. 11. It appears that the plaintiffs then filed an application before the Trial Court praying for a preliminary decree in terms of Order XX Rule 18(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.). The defendants no.2 to 10 resisted the application on the following grounds:- The application was not maintainable as the plaintiffs had failed to unequivocally specify the shares of the parties more particularly of respective heirs of the defendants no.2, 4 and 6, who had been brought on record, after the demise of said defendants no.2, 4 and 6. The burden of proving shares of the parties was upon the plaintiffs. The trial had not yet commenced. The admission of shares by defendants no.11 and 12 did not dilute the case of these defendants. 12. The Trial Court, by order dated 01/11/2010, held that the defendants no.11 to 13 had not disputed the shares of the plaintiffs and the defendants as pleaded by the plaintiffs and insofar as the defendants no.2 to 10 were concerned, there was no specific denial of the shares of the parties as pleaded by the plaintiffs, as required by Order VIII Rules 3, 4 and 5 of C.P.C.. The Trial Court held that the defendants had not stated as to what were their shares in the suit properties and hence their denials were evasive. The Trial Court, therefore, held that the shares of the parties were admitted. The application under Order XX, Rule 18(2) of C.P.C. was granted. It was declared that the plaintiffs were entitled to 5/10th (half) share; defendants no.2(a) to 3 were entitled to 1/10th share; defendants no. 4(a) to 5 were entitled to 1/10th share; defendants no.7 to 10 were entitled to 1/10th share; defendants no.11 and 12 were entitled to 1/10the share; and defendants no.13, 13)a) and 13(b) were entitled to 1/10th share, in the suit properties. Preliminary decree was ordered to be drawn. 13. Not being satisfied with the order of the Trial court, the plaintiffs filed the Regular Civil Appeal No.485/2010, before the District Court, North Goa. The learned First Appellate Court framed the point for determination as to whether the suit for partition was maintainable in the absence of an Inventory Proceedings. Preliminary decree was ordered to be drawn. 13. Not being satisfied with the order of the Trial court, the plaintiffs filed the Regular Civil Appeal No.485/2010, before the District Court, North Goa. The learned First Appellate Court framed the point for determination as to whether the suit for partition was maintainable in the absence of an Inventory Proceedings. The First Appellate Court found that the Adhoc District Judge-I, F.T.C., Mapusa, wrongly held that no written statement was filed after amendment when actually additional written statement was filed by defendants no.2 to 10. The First Appellate Court held that the finding of the Trial Court that the defendants no.2 to 10 had not specified their shares in the suit properties, was unsustainable as the said defendants could not have specified their shares in each property since the shares had not been determined judicially or by competent deed either by way of Inventory Proceedings or by an agreement to this effect. The First Appellate Court held that it may be that an heir would be entitled to a particular share in the entire estate of the deceased, but without an Inventory Proceedings by which the shares are allotted or an agreement arrived at, a party cannot claim a specific share to a specific property comprised in the entire estate. The Court therefore, held that it cannot be said that the denials put forth by the defendants were evasive and not specific. The First Appellate Court further observed that the plaintiffs themselves have stated in the plaint at paragraph 11(A) that there is a dispute as to the shares of each and as the plaintiffs do not wish to keep the same in common, it is necessary to partition the suit properties. The learned Court therefore held that there was no agreement between the parties in respect of their shares to each property. The First Appellate Court further held that since the plaintiffs have prayed for declaration that they are entitled to 5/10th share; defendants no.2 to 12 and the heirs of Kumud Shirodkar and the children of late Raghunath Shirodkar are entitled to 1/10th share in the suit properties, it goes to show that there was no agreement between the parties regarding the shares. The First Appellate Court held that since there were no Inventory Proceedings filed to establish the shares of the parties, the suit was not maintainable. The First Appellate Court held that since there were no Inventory Proceedings filed to establish the shares of the parties, the suit was not maintainable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed. The suit for partition was dismissed. 14. Mr. Usgaonkar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs submitted that admittedly, the deceased defendant no.1, namely Suryaji and Vaman had equal shares in the suit properties. He submitted that the plaintiffs after amendment of the plaint specifically mentioned the shares of the parties and the defendants no.11 and 12 admitted the said shares but the defendants no.2 to 10, who did not admit the said shares, failed to state as to what was the share of each party. Counsel urged that denials could not be evasive. According to him evasive denials are not denials at all. He relied upon the case of “Sheikh Abdul Sattar Vs. Union of India”, [ 1970 (3) SCC 845 ]. Learned Counsel alleged that when shares are admitted, there is no need of Inventory. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of “Marcus Nunes” (supra). Counsel submitted that the Adhoc District Judge-I, F.T.C., Mapusa, had held that the shares were pre-determined and admitted and hence the Trial Court had rightly ordered preliminary decree to be drawn. According to him, the said order dated 31/10/2009 had attained finality and the First Appellate Court could not have bypassed the same. 15. On the other hand, Mr Ramani, learned Counsel for defendants no. 2(a) to 2(d), 3, 7, 7(a), 8 to 10, submitted that all parties, admittedly having right, were not before the Court and hence suit for partition was not maintainable. He further urged that the suit properties are ancestral properties and hence without Inventory Proceedings being conducted, the suit was not maintainable. My attention was drawn to the cause title of the suit, wherein the defendants no.13 (a) and 13(b) are shown as resident of C/o Dhananjay Shankar Mamlekar. He submitted that said Dhananjay, son of Shankar Mamlekar was not a party to the suit. Learned Counsel submitted that said Dhananjay and six others had filed an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of C.P.C. to add them as parties, but by order dated 20/09/2010, the said application was rejected by the Trial Court, on the ground of delay of 21 years. Counsel submitted that these are interested parties. Learned Counsel submitted that said Dhananjay and six others had filed an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of C.P.C. to add them as parties, but by order dated 20/09/2010, the said application was rejected by the Trial Court, on the ground of delay of 21 years. Counsel submitted that these are interested parties. He pointed out that admittedly there were about 15 tenants paying rents, occupying the four buildings. He questioned as to who would collect these rents after partition. According to him all these questions will have to be determined in Inventory proceedings. Learned Counsel drew my attention to paragraph 11(A) of the plaint wherein the plaintiffs themselves have pleaded that there is dispute as to the shares of each party. Learned Counsel contended that the Judgment and Order dated 31/10/2009 passed by the Adhoc District Judge-I, F.T.C., Mapusa was ab initio void since it was passed under wrong assumption that the defendants had not filed any additional written statement to the amended plaint. 16. I have gone through the entire material on record. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties. 17. The first substantial question of law which is sought to be raised by the plaintiffs is that the defendants no. 2 to 10 had not challenged the Judgment and Order dated 31/10/2009 passed by the Adhoc District Judge-I and hence they were precluded from dispelling its correctness, in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 105 of C.P.C. It was contended that the said order dated 31/10/2009 had attained finality and could not have been bypassed by the First Appellate Court. With regard to the Judgment and Order dated 31/01/2009, passed by the Adhoc District Judge-I, F.T.C., Mapusa in Regular Civil Appeal No. 112/2008, a bare reading of the same reveals that the same is fully based on a wrong assumption that the defendants no. 2 to 10 did not file additional written statement to the amended plaint when in fact they had filed the same. The plaintiffs had mentioned the shares of the parties by way of amendment to the plaint. Since the Adhoc District Judge-I was under impression that no additional written statement was filed to the amended plaint, he held that the shares of the parties were admitted. The finding of the Adhoc District Judge-I that no additional written statement was filed by the defendants no. Since the Adhoc District Judge-I was under impression that no additional written statement was filed to the amended plaint, he held that the shares of the parties were admitted. The finding of the Adhoc District Judge-I that no additional written statement was filed by the defendants no. 2 to 10 was contrary to the records and an error apparent on the face of the record. Since the said Judgment and order, indisputably, was not correct, the question of application of the provision of Subsection (2) of Section 105 of C.P.C. did not arise. The said Judgment and order dated 31/10/2009, therefore, was liable to be simply discarded and could not have been acted upon. The learned Trial Court acted upon the same and entertained the application under Order XX Rule 18(2) of C.P.C.. Though the Adhoc District Judge-I, F.T.C., Mapusa observed that there was no additional written statement to the amended plaint, the Trial Court, however, took into account the additional written statement of the defendants no. 2 to 10, but held that there were evasive denials of shares in the same. If the Judgment and order of the Adhoc District Judge-I dated 31/10/2009 in Regular Civil Appeal No.112/2008 had attained finality, it would have meant that the defendants no. 2 to 10 had not filed additional written statement to the amended plaint. In such circumstances, as has been rightly observed by the learned First appellate Court, the Trial Court could not have gone into the said additional written statement and held that there were evasive denials. The plaintiffs did not object for the Trial Court taking into account the said additional written statement. The said Judgment and order dated 31/10/2009, in Regular Civil Appeal No.112/2008 was ab initio void and hence could not have attained finality. No substantial question of law, with regard to the said remand order dated 31/10/2009, arises in the present appeal. 18. The next substantial question of law sought to be raised by the plaintiffs is that the admissions of the defendants in their written statement about the separate shares of the parties in the suit properties, have been ignored by the First Appellate Court. 18. The next substantial question of law sought to be raised by the plaintiffs is that the admissions of the defendants in their written statement about the separate shares of the parties in the suit properties, have been ignored by the First Appellate Court. The defendants no.2 to 10, in this additional written statement, had specifically averred that the defendant no.1 (husband of plaintiff no.1 and father of plaintiffs no.2 to 10) had acquired undetermined and unascertained rights by way of succession, in the unspecified properties of his late father Shri Shankar Suryaji Mamlekar and that the specific rights of the defendant no. 1 have not been established and determined either by a competent public deed of partition or by judicial decree in competent Inventory Proceedings and hence the suit was not maintainable. As has been rightly, held by the First Appellate Court, the question of the defendants stating their specific shares in the suit properties did not therefore arise. The above were specific averments in the additional written statement and it cannot be said that there were evasive denials. In the case of “Sheikh Abdul Sattar” (supra), in paragraph 13 of the written statement it was pleaded as under: “That Para 13 of the plaint as it stands is not admitted”. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the truth of Paragraph 13 of the plaint was not admitted, then it should also have been stated in this paragraph as to who, according the defendant, was the officer sanctioning the contract. The facts of the above case are totally different and hence the Judgment supra is not applicable to the present case. In the present case, the defendants no.2 to 10 have specifically pleaded that the specific rights of the defendant no. 1 have not been established and determined either by a competent public deed of partition or by judicial decree in competent Inventory Proceedings. Thus, the question of stating the shares of the parties did not arise. The shares of the parties as pleaded by the plaintiffs were, thus, not admitted by the defendants no.2 to 10. No substantial question of law arises, in this regard. 19. As rightly urged by the learned Counsel for the defendants no. Thus, the question of stating the shares of the parties did not arise. The shares of the parties as pleaded by the plaintiffs were, thus, not admitted by the defendants no.2 to 10. No substantial question of law arises, in this regard. 19. As rightly urged by the learned Counsel for the defendants no. 2(a) to 2(d), 3, 7, 7(a), 8 to 10, the name of one Shri Dhananjay Shankar Mamlekar has been mentioned by the plaintiffs themselves in the cause title of the suit. Said Shri Dhananjay, his wife Smt. Kalpana and five others had filed an application for joining them as parties, claiming that they also had right to the suit properties. The said application was rejected by the Trial Court on the ground of delay. The application for addition of parties, filed by defendants no. 2 to 10 was also rejected by the Trial court. The defendants no. 2 to 10, then sought to further their written statement to incorporate averments that late Shankar Suryaji Mamlekar had a second wife by name Radha and out of this second marriage, they had four children. It can certainly be said that there are other interested parties in respect of the suit properties. Without, at least, addition of Dhananjay, son of Shankar Mamlekar and his wife as parties to the suit, no preliminary decree for partition could have been passed. 20. The deceased defendant no.1 had specifically pleaded in his written statement that the parties did not have any ownership rights to the suit property no. (ii), bearing survey no.138/0. Admittedly, there were about 15 tenants, and may be even more, residing in four buildings situated in the suit properties and a Flour Mill given to one Laxman Naik, in survey no. 122/7. There was nothing in the preliminary decree as to who would get the rents of the said premises after partition. In paragraph 11-A of the plaint, the plaintiffs themselves had pleaded that there was dispute as to the share of each party. In the circumstances above, it could not be held that the shares were admitted by the defendants no.2 to 10. 21. In the case of “Marcus Nunes” (supra), the plaintiffs, in paragraph 5 of the plaint. had specified the shares of the parties in respect of the suit property. In the circumstances above, it could not be held that the shares were admitted by the defendants no.2 to 10. 21. In the case of “Marcus Nunes” (supra), the plaintiffs, in paragraph 5 of the plaint. had specified the shares of the parties in respect of the suit property. The defendants in paragraph 5 of their written statement submitted that the contents of paragraph 5 of the plaint were admitted by them. Thus, there was absolute undisputed admission about the shares of the parties. In these circumstances, it was held that the exercise of initiating inventory proceedings will be redundant. In the case of “Cruz Fernandes” (supra), it has been held that no suit for physical partition of a common and undivided property lies unless previously the rights of the parties have been established and determined by a competent public deed of partition or by judicial decree in the competent inventory proceedings. In fact, in the case of “Cruz Fernandes” (supra), the property was not inherited from any ancestor of the parties in the suit but instead had been purchased by the ancestors of the petitioners and respondents in equal shares. However, subsequently, the widow of one of the purchasers, the plaintiff's mother, had willed on 22/12/1988 her disposable share in favour of the petitioners. Thus there could not be any partition in terms of the shares purchased by the ancestors of the petitioners and respondents until the will has not been declared null and void. In the present case before this Court, the suit properties are ancestral properties. The shares of the parties cannot be said to have been admitted by the defendants no. 2 to 10. There is question of burden of tenants. In the circumstances above, since there were no inventory proceedings filed to establish the shares of the parties, the suit was not maintainable. 22. In view of the above no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal and the appeal deserves to be rejected. 23. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.