JUDGMENT : Amitava Roy, C.J. The instant appeal witnesses a challenge to the judgment/order dated 17.12.2013 rendered in W.P.(C) No.1754 of 2012 interfering with the order dated 21.01.2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Bhubaneswar, in CMA No.1/12 arising out of C.S. No.42/95 directing the respondent no.2 herein (plaintiff) to delete the name of respondent no.1 from the said application (CMA No.1/12) filed to restore CMA Nos.250 and 251 of 2009. 2. We have heard Mr A.R. Dash, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr R.C. Sarangi, learned for respondent no.2 and Mr K. Jena, learned counsel for respondent no.1. 3. The facts, in brief, would be necessary to outline the backdrop. The respondent no.2 instituted C.S. No.42/95 against the appellants. The suit was dismissed for default on 18.7.2003. The respondent no.2 (plaintiff) sold the suit property to respondent no.1 on 3.5.2010. Prior thereto, he had filed an application under Order 9 Rule 9 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, hereinafter referred to as “the CPC/Code”) for restoration of the suit along with an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). These applications were registered as CMA Nos. 250 and 251 of 2009. These petitions were also dismissed for default on 11.11.2010. Thereafter respondent nos. 1 and 2 i.e. the transferor and the transferee jointly filed CMA No.1/12 seeking restoration of CMA Nos.250 and 251 of 2009. 4. By order dated 21.1.2012 CMA No.1/12 was disposed of by the learned trial Court by requiring respondent no.2 (plaintiff) to delete the name of respondent no.1 from the cause title of the application. As the text of the order dated 21.1.2012 would reveal, the learned trial court was of the view that in terms of the Code it was the plaintiff alone who could file an application for restoration of the suit dismissed for default under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC and that such application under the provisions of the Code by any one else was not maintainable. It was held as well that no other person could also to be joined with the plaintiff in such an application. 5. It was held as well that no other person could also to be joined with the plaintiff in such an application. 5. Being aggrieved, respondent no.1 (transferee) invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court and by the judgment/order dated 17.12.2013 passed in W.P.(C) No.1754 of 2012 and impugned in the instant appeal, the learned Single Judge relying principally on Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code and the decision of the Apex Court in Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal and Ors, 2004 SAR (Civil) 181, permitted the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 herein to continue in CMA No.251/09 and the learned court below was directed to decide the suit on its own merits. 6. Mr A.R. Dash, learned counsel for the appellants, has emphatically argued that the transfer of the property involved not having been effected during the pendency of the suit, neither Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, hereinafter referred to as “the T.P. Act”) nor Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code is attracted to the facts of the case and thus the impugned judgment and order is not sustainable in law and on facts. The decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Raj Kumar (supra) also on the same logic is not applicable, he argued. Mr Dash has urged that even assuming that Section 52 of the T.P. Act and/or Order 22 of the Code had any application in the instant case, opp. party no.1 without being first impleaded in the suit cannot maintain an application with the original plaintiff to restore an application under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code, dismissed for default. According to him, as under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC, in case of assignment, creation or devolution during the pendency of the suit, it by leave of this Court can be continued by/or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved, it was incumbent on the part of opp. party no.1 to first obtain such leave before joining the original plaintiff to file restoration application under Order 9 Rule 9, CPC earlier dismissed for default. Mr Dash has insisted that the direction contained in the Judgment and order to the learned trial court to decide the suit on merits inheres a mandate by this Court to recall the dismissal of the suit, which is impermissible as the application for restoration of the Misc. Mr Dash has insisted that the direction contained in the Judgment and order to the learned trial court to decide the suit on merits inheres a mandate by this Court to recall the dismissal of the suit, which is impermissible as the application for restoration of the Misc. Case under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC is still pending to be considered by the learned trial court. 7. Mr Sarangi, per contra, has urged that as it is more than evident from Section 52 of the T.P. Act and Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code that a transferee pendente lite in a suit has the locus to apply for restoration of the suit dismissed for nonprosecution, the plea to the contrary is misconceived. According to the learned counsel for respondent no.1 as in view of Section 146 of the Code, the respondent no.1 is entitled in law to further a proceeding arising out of the suit, as a representative of the original plaintiff claiming under him, the contention that he ought to have obtained prior leave of the Court to do so is obviously fallacious. 8. We have examined the foundational facts which are not in dispute. The rival arguments have been analyzed as well. 9. The joint application filed by respondent nos.1 and 2 registered as CMA No.1/12 discloses that the same came to be lodged on the receipt of summons in C.S. No.1865/2001 instituted by the appellant no.1 impleading both of them as defendants therein. It was stated in the said application that respondent no.2 herein had sold the suit land to respondent no.1 on 3.5.2010 and thus though the latter was not plaintiff in C.S. No.42/95 nor a petitioner in CMA No.251 of 2009, he had stepped into the shoes of the former by dint of such purchase and as respondent no.2 was bound to safeguard the interest of respondent no.1, the vendee, both of them had filed application for restoration of CMA No.251 of 2009. It was averred as well in the application that the respondent no.2 (plaintiff) was ignorant about the dismissal of the suit and that he was dependant fully on his conducting counsel. It was averred as well in the application that the respondent no.2 (plaintiff) was ignorant about the dismissal of the suit and that he was dependant fully on his conducting counsel. It was stated too that because of wrong entry in the diary of his learned counsel, CMA No.251 of 2009 was dismissed for default and that it was in this backdrop that in the interest of justice the restoration application i.e. CMA No.1/12 had been filed. 10. Section 52 of the Transfer of the Property Act, 1882, Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code and Sections 141 and 146 of the CPC are quoted herein below being of formidable relevance. “52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.—During the 1[pendency] in any Court having authority 2[3[within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir] or established beyond such limits] by 4[the Central Government] 5[* * *] of 6[any] suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation -For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force." “Order 22 Rule 10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit.-(1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.” “141. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit.-(1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.” “141. Miscellaneous proceedings -The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction.” “146. Proceedings by or against representatives Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him.” 11. It would be explicit from Section 52 of the T.P. Act that if during the pendency of any ‘suit’ or ‘proceeding’ which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly or specifically in question, such property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order, which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as may be imposed. 12. The explanation to section 52 clarifies that the pendency of a suit or proceedings shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction and would continue until the suit or proceeding is disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction of discharge of such decree or order has been obtained or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for execution thereof by any law for the time being in force. 13. 13. It is thus patent that mere dismissal of a suit or proceeding for default would not oust the application of Section 52 of the T.P. Act and in terms of the explanation provided, the pendency thereof would continue till complete satisfaction or discharge of decree or order that may be obtained or would become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period prescribed for execution therefor. 14. Section 141 of the Code predicates that the procedure provided in CPC with regard to suit would be followed as far as can be made applicable in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction. The explanation thereto clarifies that the expression “proceedings” would include one under Order 9 and Section 141 of the Code. A proceeding under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code would thus come within the ambit of Section 52 of the T.P.Act and Order 22 Rule 10 CPC. 15. Section 146 conceives of furtherance of proceedings by or against representatives of any person claiming under his title and would have application unless excluded by any provision of the Code or by any law for the time being in force. This salutary provision thus recognizes a substantive right in favour of a representative of any person involved in any proceeding as contemplated to pursue the same on his/her behalf. A conjoint reading of Section 146 and Order 22 Rule 10 thus recognizes the right of a representative of a person claiming under him, amongst others by virtue of assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit or proceeding in any court of civil jurisdiction to continue with it on his behalf. Such a right is therefore fundamental and intrinsic for such a representative claiming under the person concerned. 16. In Raj Kumar (supra), their Lordships of the Apex Court did encounter a fact situation where the suit property had been purchased by respondent no.4 therein from the defendants being unaware of the pendency of a suit filed against his vendors. The suit was decreed ex parte on 27.11.1995 whereafter respondent no.4 filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC to set aside the decree and also made a prayer under Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC for being brought on record. The suit was decreed ex parte on 27.11.1995 whereafter respondent no.4 filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC to set aside the decree and also made a prayer under Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC for being brought on record. This application was allowed by the learned trial court after condoning the delay in filing the same and the ex parte decree was set aside. Before the Apex Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff that the application under Order 9 Rule 13, CPC should have been filed by the defendants and none else and that as respondent no.4, a transferee pendente lite had failed to take prompt steps under Order 22 Rule 10, CPC to be brought on record, he remained bound by the decree. 17. Their Lordships held that the doctrine of ‘lis pendens’ expressed in the maxim “ut lite pendente nihil innovetur” has been statutorily incorporated in Section 52 of the T.P. Act and that as the defendant could not by alienating the property, during the pendency of the litigation, venture into depriving the successful plaintiff of the fruits of the decree. It was propounded that a transferee pendente lite is treated in the eye of law as representative of the judgment debtor and is bound by the decree passed against the judgment debtor even if the defendant had chosen not to bring the transferee on record by apprising his opponent and the court of the transfer nor the transferee had come on record by taking recourse to order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC. While referring to Section 146 of the Code in this regard as well, their Lordships ruled that the decree was executable against respondent no.4 being a lis pendente transferee though not joined in the suit. It was held as well that such a person could prefer an appeal being a person aggrieved and was also liable to be proceeded against in the execution of the decree. Their Lordships thus proclaimed that such a person does have locus standi to move an application for setting aside an ex parte decree passed against the person in whose shoes he had stepped in. Their Lordships thus proclaimed that such a person does have locus standi to move an application for setting aside an ex parte decree passed against the person in whose shoes he had stepped in. It was thus enunciated that the word ‘he’ used in Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code could not be construed with such rigidity and constriction to exclude the person who had stepped into the shoes of the defendants from moving an application for setting aside the ex parte decree more particularly in view of Section146 of the Code. The plea of locus standi against opp. party no.4 to maintain the application under Order 13 of the Code was thus rejected. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court clearly as a corollary upheld the locus standi of respondent no.4 acting on the principle of representation envisioned in Section 146 of the Code by departing from the literal construction of Order 9 Rule 13 CPC as if restricting an application thereunder only to the defendant in the suit. 19. In Krishnaji Pandharinath v. Anusayabai and another, AIR 1959 (Bom) 475 , their Lordships of the Bombay High Court with particular reference to the explanation to Section 52 of the T.P.Act held that after the disposal of the suit, the lis continues so as to prevent the defendants from transferring the property to the prejudice of the plaintiff. 20. This decision only fortifies the plea that even after the dismissal of the suit for default as in the instant case, for the purpose of Section 52 of the T.P.Act, the lis did continue and thus with the transfer of the suit property in favour of respondent no.1 herein he indeed had acquired a right as a representative of his vendor (rrespondent no.2) to pursue any proceeding contemplated by the court relatable thereto (suit) claiming under him. 21. Our attention has not been drawn to any provision of the Code barring the application of Section 146 of the Code to the facts of the case. There is no manner of doubt that on the date on which CMA No.1/12 had been filed, respondent no.1 had by dint of purchase of the suit property acquired interest therein. As contemplated in Section 146 and Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code he was thus entitled in law to pursue the same as the representative of respondent no. 2 by claiming under him. As contemplated in Section 146 and Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code he was thus entitled in law to pursue the same as the representative of respondent no. 2 by claiming under him. In that view of the matter, as respondent no.1 had joined respondent no.2, the original plaintiff in the application for restoration of CMA Nos.250 and 251 of 2009, we are of the unhesitant opinion that he could not have been excluded from the said pursuit on the ground that Order 9 Rule 9, CPC did not permit him to do so. As it is, law of procedure is handmaid of justice and has to be essentially interpreted to subserve this paramount objective. Any exposition of the procedural law defeating this salubrious imperative, has to be eschewed. The insistence for an application by respondent no.1 seeking leave of the Court to enable him to join defendant no.2 to get the earlier application under Order 9 Rule 9, CPC and that for condonation of delay restored, on a overall consideration of all relevant aspects as involved does not commend for acceptance. We find ourselves with respectful agreement with the conclusion reached in the impugned judgment and order vis-à-vis the maintainability of CMA 1/2012. However, as the said application awaits adjudication on merits, we hereby clarify that the suit if eventually revived will be disposed of as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. The appeal thus fails with the marginal variation in the impugned judgment/order indicated herein above.