JUDGMENT Mr. Mahavir S. Chauhan, J.: - By way of this petition under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC, for short) read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India, applicant, M/s Krishan Chand Ganesh Dass Vinay Kumar and Company, craves that judgment dated 19.09.2013 dismissing Civil Writ Petition No.17038 of 1991, M/s Krishan Chand Ganesh Dass Vinay Kumar and Company versus The Union Territory, Chandigarh and others be recalled and Civil Writ Petition be set down the for fresh hearing. Background facts: 2. After the applicant was successful (highest bidder) in an open auction held on 16.12.1979, Cinema Site No.2, Sector-17, Chandigarh, was leased out for 99 years to it for a premium of Rs.56,04,000/- plus ground rent, vide letter of allotment dated 17.01.1980. Besides the terms and conditions set out in the letter of allotment, the lease was amenable to the Chandigarh Lease Hold of Sites and Building Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1973 Rules’). Applicant deposited an amount of Rs.14,01,000/- as 25% of the premium. Balance along with interest @ 7% per annum could be paid in three equated annual installments, as per schedule of payment given in the letter of allotment. Clause (8) of the letter of allotment stipulated that in the event of non-payment of any installment of premium or ground rent by the 10th of the month following the month in which it fell due or within such extended period as might be allowed by the Estate Officer, but not exceeding three months in all from the date on which the installment was originally due, the lease was liable to be cancelled and whole or part of the amount already paid was liable to forfeiture. A letter authorizing the applicant to take possession of the site in question was enclosed with the letter of allotment. 3. Applicant did not adhere to the schedule of payment, rather did not pay even a single installment towards the balance amount of the premium and even ignored notices dated 23.12.1981, 02.05.1985, 13.05.1985, 13.08.1985, 18.01.1986, 17.05.1986, 28.07.1986, 17.09.1986, 14.05.1987 and 25.06.1987 issued by the Estate Officer calling upon it to deposit the due installments. 3. Applicant did not adhere to the schedule of payment, rather did not pay even a single installment towards the balance amount of the premium and even ignored notices dated 23.12.1981, 02.05.1985, 13.05.1985, 13.08.1985, 18.01.1986, 17.05.1986, 28.07.1986, 17.09.1986, 14.05.1987 and 25.06.1987 issued by the Estate Officer calling upon it to deposit the due installments. Forced by the situation, Estate Officer, vide order dated 14.07.1987 (issued on 13.08.1987) cancelled the lease of the site in question and ordered forfeiture of 10% of the premium of the site plus interest and ground rent up to the date of cancellation of the lease, i.e., Rs.5,60,400/-, under Rule 12(3) of the 1973 Rules, that too after a notice dated 14.05.1987 served upon, and two opportunities of personal hearing granted to, the applicant proved ineffective. 4. To challenge order dated 14.07.1987, applicant preferred an appeal under Rule 22 of the 1973 Rules before the Chief Administrator, Union Territory of Chandigarh, which, after contest, was dismissed vide order dated 30.01.1990. Revision petition preferred by the applicant under Rule 22(4) of the 1973 Rules, against order dated 30.01.1990 was also dismissed by the Advisor to the Administration, Union Territory of Chandigarh, vide order dated 28.01.1991. 5. Revision petition preferred by the applicant under Rule 22(4) of the 1973 Rules, against order dated 30.01.1990 was also dismissed by the Advisor to the Administration, Union Territory of Chandigarh, vide order dated 28.01.1991. 5. To challenge cancellation of lease of the site in question vide order dated 14.07.1987, dismissal of appeal vide order dated 30.01.1990, dismissal of revision petition vide order dated 28.01.1991 and for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to hand over to it possession of the site in question on the terms and conditions on which it was auctioned to it in the year, 1979, the applicant invoked extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court by way of Civil Writ Petition No. 17038 of 1991, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, alleging that it could not commence construction over the site in question because its possession was never handed over to it, the writing showing delivery of possession under the signature of its partner Ashok Kumar was forged, the site was unfit for delivery of possession and commencement of construction as a number of huts were existing thereon, the site in question being adjoining the other cinema site, requisite gap of 40 feet between the two buildings was not available and for that reason the Fire Department would not clear the construction and the District Magistrate did not approve the building plan as it did not meet the requirements of Punjab Cinema Regulation Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cinema Act’) and rules framed there-under. 6. Respondents in the Writ Petition contested applicant’s claim by stating in the written reply that the applicant did not deposit the installments as per terms and conditions of allotment and did not submit building plan till the year 1987 even though possession of the site was handed over to it on 17.01.1980 after the site was cleared of the huts etc. on 15.01.1980 and neither the Fire Department, nor the District Magistrate nor the respondents ever stopped the applicant from raising construction of the cinema having 1375 seats. In fact, applicant deposited 15% of the premium (to make it 25% of the premium) only after the site had been cleared. 7. The Civil Writ Petition, after hearing the parties, was dismissed vide order dated 19.09.2013. 8. In fact, applicant deposited 15% of the premium (to make it 25% of the premium) only after the site had been cleared. 7. The Civil Writ Petition, after hearing the parties, was dismissed vide order dated 19.09.2013. 8. With reference to clauses (4) and (5) of the letter of allotment dated 17.01.1980 and schedule of payment of installments this Court held as under: “A perusal of the above-cited clause of the letter of allotment leaves nothing to doubt that lease of the site and liability of the applicant to pay installments of the balance 75% of the premium and ground rent commenced with effect from the date of issue of the letter of allotment. Admittedly, nothing has been paid by the applicant towards the balance 75% of the premium and ground rent beyond 25% of the amount of premium, i.e., Rs.14,01,000/- out of the total premium of Rs.56,04,000/-. The situation attracts Clause (8) of the letter of allotment. It reads as under:- “8. In the event of non- payment of any installment of premium or rent by the 10th of the month following the month in which it falls due or such extended period as may be allowed by the Estate Officer but not exceeding three months in all from the date on which the installment was originally due, the Estate Officer may issue a notice to the lessee calling upon him to show cause why the lease may not be cancelled and the site resumed and the amount already paid forfeited to the Government. After considering the cause, if any, shown by the lessee, in pursuance of the aforesaid notice the Estate Officer may either allow payment of installment/rent with penalty which may extend to 100% of the amount due or order cancellation of lease and forfeit the whole/part of the amount already paid.” It has remained undisputed that the Estate Officer issued to the applicant notices dated 23.12.1981, 02.05.1985, 13.05.1985, 13.08.1985, 18.01.1986, 17.05.1986, 28.07.1986, 17.09.1986, 14.05.1987 and 25.06.1987 besides grant of opportunities of being heard in person. In such a situation the Estate Officer was left with no option but to resort to Rule 12(3) of the 1973 Rules to cancel the lease and order forfeiture of 10% of the total premium plus interest and ground rent.” 9. In such a situation the Estate Officer was left with no option but to resort to Rule 12(3) of the 1973 Rules to cancel the lease and order forfeiture of 10% of the total premium plus interest and ground rent.” 9. With regard to delivery of possession this Court found as a matter of fact, as under: “Though delivery of possession of the site in question was not, at all, relevant as regards payment of instalments of premium and ground rent yet a perusal of letter of allotment, Annexure P20, reveals that it was accompanied by a letter authorizing the applicant to take possession of the allotted site. Possession of the site in question, in fact, was taken over on 17.01.1980 by the applicant through its partner, Ashok Kumar. Copy of possession letter has been appended by the applicant with the petition as Annexure P- 1 but a portion of it has been missed. It is specifically stated by the respondents in the counter that aforesaid Ashok Kumar had appended on the letter of possession a certificate to the following effect:- “Certified that I, Ashok Kumar, Partner, son of Shri Ganesh, have this day taken possession of the Site No.II of Cinema Site No.2, Sector 17-A at Chandigarh, measuring 2145.13 sq. yards allotted to me on lease-hold basis vide allotment letter No.695 CPL 3581(CIAI) dated 17-1-80 from the Executive Engineer, C.P. Division No.3, Chandigarh. Sd/- Ashok Kumar for M/s Ganesh Theatre, Sector 17,Chandigarh. Sd/- Executive Engineer, Capital Project, Chandigarh.” Not only this, on the reverse of the letter of possession said Ashok Kumar made a signed endorsement to the following effect:- “The site has been seen by me. Sd/- Ashok Kumar 17.180" It is now contended that this writing has been forged by the respondents. However, while making this assertion, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, has overlooked the fact in the grounds of revision, copy of which is available on record as Annexure P-17, the above-stated writing and signature have been admitted by the applicant and the allegation that the aforesaid writing and signature were forged by the respondents is not shown to have been urged before either the appellate or the revisional authority, and, therefore, this contention cannot be taken cognizance of. Even otherwise, case of the applicant throughout has been that owners of Anand Cinema (Cinema Site No.1) had erected some hutments over the site in question and for that reason its possession could not be delivered to the applicant. However, a perusal of record reveals that on behalf of Anand Cinema an undertaking was given before learned District Judge, Chandigarh, in the case titled as M/s Vedsons Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Versus The Estate Officer, on 16.12.1979 for removal of the hutments and after removing the same M/s Vedsons, vide their letter dated 15.01.1980 (Annexure R-1) had intimated the Estate Officer that the site had been cleared by them of the huts etc. It was only after this intimation that the present applicant deposited 15% of the premium to make it 25% of the premium together with the 10% of it deposited at the fall of the hammer, and took over possession of the allotted site on 17.01.1980. 10. Applicant’s contention that as per terms and conditions of the auction, circulated and announced at the time of the auction, the cinema site was auctioned for a seating capacity of 1375 seats but as per plans of construction of the cinema issued by the respondents there was a provision for 935 seats only and the respondents had failed to revalidate the plans to bring the seating capacity to 1375 seats.; and that the site in question being adjoining to the site of Anand Cinema the requisite space of 40 feet between the two buildings being not available, the Fire Department of Union Territory of Chandigarh, had raised an objection to raising of the building over the site in question was also found to be incorrect and it was held as under: “However, the learned senior counsel representing the applicant has not been able to show to us even a single letter received by it either from the Fire Department of U.T., Chandigarh, or from the District Magistrate or from any other authority or any of the respondents prohibiting erection of building on either of the grounds mentioned above. In fact, the applicant did not submit the building plans till the year 1985 and even those building plans, as per plea of the respondents in the counter, were incomplete and were returned to the applicant for removal of the objections and have not been resubmitted after removal of the objections. In fact, the applicant did not submit the building plans till the year 1985 and even those building plans, as per plea of the respondents in the counter, were incomplete and were returned to the applicant for removal of the objections and have not been resubmitted after removal of the objections. It may be apposite to refer here to letter dated 05.05.1985/17.05.1985 (Annexure P-30). Vide this letter, written with reference to letter dated 06.03.1985 asking deposit of one copy of the building plan, the applicant was reminded that no such plan had been submitted by him and was requested to submit the same. It was in response to this letter that the applicant, vide its letter dated 14.10.1985 (Annexure P-31) submitted the building plan. It may also be relevant to point out here that it was vide letter dated 31.12.1979 (Annexure R-II) that Chief Architect-cum- Secretary, Department of Architecture, Chandigarh Administration, conveyed to the applicant that Clause 24 of the Architectural control sheet relating to the site in question (Drawing No.15, Job No.885) was to the following effect:- “Seating capacity of a maximum of 1375 seat is allowed subject tot the provision of adequate space for gangways and other services as per Cinema to graph Act.” From the above, it is manifestly clear that the applicant has never been interested in commencing the construction of the building and its effort throughout has been to buy time and to avoid deposit of due installments. It may be added here that auction is a price discovery mechanism which falls in the contractual realm. The auction basically is an exercise in raising revenue for the Government and nonpayment of the agreed price within the time stipulated, not only results in loss of revenue to the Government but also breaches the terms of the contract because in the matters concerning auctions the time is the essence of the contract. It is a matter of common knowledge that prices of the real estate are rising day in and day out and non-payment of price of the property in such a situation puts the public exchequer to a great loss.” 11. It is a matter of common knowledge that prices of the real estate are rising day in and day out and non-payment of price of the property in such a situation puts the public exchequer to a great loss.” 11. This Court, while going through the record came across a communication whereby the applicant had requested the respondents for refund of the money deposited by it and had prayed in the Civil Writ Petition, though in the alternative, that the money deposited by it be refunded to it. 12. Ultimately, while relying upon a judgment dated 20.09.2007 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh and others Versus Vipin Kumar Jain, Civil Appeal Nos.4450 and 4451 of 2007, arising out of S.L.P (C) Nos.12968 of 2006 and 13141 of 2006, decided on 20.09.1987 the Civil Writ Petition was dismissed vide judgment dated 19.09.2013 but with a direction to the respondents to refund to the applicant the amount deposited by it by way of 25% of the premium after deducting 2% of the total premium and interest and ground rent and to invite fresh bids and put the site in question to auction afresh at the earliest possible. The applicant was allowed liberty to participate in the auction. Petition for Special Leave to Appeal dismissed: 13. To assail the correctness of judgment dated 19.09.2013 applicant approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by way of a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal which has been dismissed vide order dated 25.04.2014. Review Application: 14. As afore-stated, by way of this application applicant now seeks review of the judgment dated 19.09.2013 dismissing Civil Writ Petition No. 17038 of 1991. Review Application: 14. As afore-stated, by way of this application applicant now seeks review of the judgment dated 19.09.2013 dismissing Civil Writ Petition No. 17038 of 1991. It is alleged in the Review Application that the applicant, in response to its applications dated 04.02.2014 and 24.02.2014 made under Right to Information Act, 2005, has received information vide memorandum dated 26.02.2014 (Annexure RA/3), in the form of copies of letter dated 18.02.1980 (Annexure RA/4), noting dated 01.09.1980/03.09.1980 (Annexure RA/5), letter dated 29.02.1980 (Annexure RA/6), order dated 24.12.1981 (Annexure RA/7), noting dated 30.09.1985/01.10.1985 (Annexure RA/8), letter dated 28.01.1986 (Annexure RA/9), letter dated 26.02.1986 (Annexure RA/10), and letter dated 03.06.1994 (Annexure RA/11) a perusal whereof would show that zoning plan of Ganesh Cinema (proposed to be raised by the applicant on the site in question) was not finalized and encroachments were not removed by the respondents even though the applicant had submitted the requisite “Building Plan” prior to 26.02.1980 but these very material facts were concealed by the respondents during the pendency of the above-cited Civil Writ Petition, and thereby a fraud was played upon the applicant and the Court. 15. We have anxiously heard learned senior counsel representing the applicant. 16. Learned senior counsel has, in the first instance, relied upon Kunhayammed versus State of Kerala, 2000(3) RCR(Civil) 671, to contend that dismissal of applicant’s Petition for Special Leave to Appeal cannot stand in the way of applicant’s right to seek review of the judgment dated 19.09.2013. 17. Learned senior counsel has also argued that the documents referred to here-in-above are very material and are likely to change fate of the case of the applicant but these documents, though in the custody of the respondents, were not brought to the notice of this Court during the hearing of Civil Writ Petition No. 17038 of 1991 and by doing so they (the respondents) have impeded the due process of justice and, as such, the judgment dated 19.09.2013 deserves to be reviewed and the Civil Writ Petition to be set down for fresh hearing. 18. Nothing more has been urged. Review jurisdiction of the Court: 19. Section 114, CPC, provides for a substantive power of review by a Court. 18. Nothing more has been urged. Review jurisdiction of the Court: 19. Section 114, CPC, provides for a substantive power of review by a Court. Section 114, CPC, although does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the Court but such limitations have been provided for in Order XVII, Rule 1, CPC, which reads as under: “Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved,— (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.” 20. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114, CPC, has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the Court since it merely states that it “may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.” The parameters are prescribed in Order XLVII, CPC, which permit a party to the lis to press for a rehearing “on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason”. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulates a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoy a favourable verdict. Neither of them postulates a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoy a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the explanation in Rule 1 of the Order XLVII, CPC, which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the Court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court, on numerous occasions, have deliberated upon the issue of scope of review proceedings, arriving at the conclusion that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. 21. Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (in all the Appeals) v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Anantapur, AIR 1964 1372, held as follows: “There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by “error apparent”. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which states one in the face and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.” 22. In Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudary, 1995(1) RRR 499: AIR 1995 Supreme Court 455 it was held that : “It is well settled law that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudary, 1995(1) RRR 499: AIR 1995 Supreme Court 455 it was held that : “It is well settled law that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the Court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the following pertinent observations : It is true there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to be exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found, it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merit. That would be in the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate Court to correct all manner of error committed by the Subordinate Court.” 23. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merit. That would be in the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate Court to correct all manner of error committed by the Subordinate Court.” 23. A perusal of the Order XLVII, Rule 1 show that review of a judgment or an order could be sought : (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or any other sufficient reason. 24. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1047, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there are definite limits to the exercise of power of review. In that case, an application under Order XLVII, Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code was filed which was allowed and the order passed by the judicial Commissioner was set aside and the writ petition was dismissed. On an appeal to this Court it was held as under : “It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1909) there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inherest in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court.” 25. The judgment in Aribam’s case (supra) has been followed in the case of Smt. Meera Bhanja (supra). In that case, it has been reiterated that an error apparent on the face of the record for acquiring jurisdiction to review must be such an error which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning. The following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tiruymale, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 137 were also noted : “An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ.” 26. It is also pertinent to mention the observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Parsion Devi v. Sumiri Devi, 1997(4) RCR (Civil) 458 : (1997) 8 SCC 715 . Relying upon the judgments in the cases of Aribam’s (supra) and Smt. Meera Bhanja (supra) it was observed as under: “Under Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code a judgment may be open to review inter alia, if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.” 27. Hon’ble Supreme Court in N. Anantha Reddy v. Anshu Kathuria, 2013(14) Scale 585, ruled as under: “9. A careful look at the impugned order would show that the High Court had a fresh look at the question whether the Appellant could be impleaded in the suit filed by the Respondent No. 1 and, in the light of the view which it took, it recalled its earlier order dated 08.06.2011. The course followed by the High Court is clearly flawed. The High Court exceeded its review jurisdiction by reconsidering the merits of the order dated 08.06.2011. The review jurisdiction is extremely limited and unless there is mistake apparent on the face of the record, the order/judgment does not call for review. The mistake apparent on record means that the mistake is self evident, needs no search and stares at its face. Surely, review jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not permit rehearing of the matter on merits.” 28. In Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., [2013(4) Law Herald (SC) 2669] : 2013(8) SCC 337 : 2013(6) Scale 257, Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled as under: “22. It has been time and again held that the power of review jurisdiction can be exercised for the correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. In Parsion Devi & Ors. v. Sumitri Devi & Ors., 1997(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 458 : (1997) 8 SCC 715 , this Court held as under :- “9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. In Parsion Devi & Ors. v. Sumitri Devi & Ors., 1997(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 458 : (1997) 8 SCC 715 , this Court held as under :- “9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule I CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” Conclusion: 29. Review application, when tested on the touchstone of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the cited judgments, is found to be unacceptable. 30. When Civil Writ Petition No. 17038 of 1991 was filed the letter dated 18.02.1980 (Annexure RA/4), noting dated 01.09.1980/03.09.1980 (Annexure RA/5), letter dated 29.02.1980 (Annexure RA/6), order dated 24.12.1981 (Annexure RA/7), noting dated 30.09.1985/01.10.1985 (Annexure RA/8), letter dated 28.01.1986 (Annexure RA/9), letter dated 26.02.1986 (Annexure RA/10), and letter dated 03.06.1994 (Annexure RA/11) were in existence. Right to Information Act, 2005 came into being much before the afore-stated Civil Writ Petition was set down for hearing. Entire record was available for being placed reliance upon any part of iot by either of the parties. It is not case of the applicant that after the exercise of due diligence the cited documents were not within its knowledge; or these documents could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the judgment sought to be reviewed was passed or that in the judgment there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of record. In any case, learned senior counsel representing the applicant has not been able to point out any mistake or error in the judgment dated 19.09.2013 nor has he been able to show that the documents referred to above could not be brought forth during the pendency of the Civil Writ Petition. In any case, learned senior counsel representing the applicant has not been able to point out any mistake or error in the judgment dated 19.09.2013 nor has he been able to show that the documents referred to above could not be brought forth during the pendency of the Civil Writ Petition. No effort is shown to have been put in by the applicant to lay its hands on the above-stated documents. In fact, the applicant wants rehearing of the Civil Writ Petition after setting aside of the judgment dated 19.09.2013, only because the documents referred to here-in-before were not referred to and relied upon by the applicant’s counsel while arguing the Civil Writ Petition. This, in a way, amounts to exercise of powers of an appellate forum which is beyond the scope of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. 31. In view of the above, reference to Kunhayammed versus State of Kerala (supra) is wholly unnecessary. 32. As a natural consequence of what has been said and discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, the application fails and is hereby dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------ —————————