JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge: The petitioner had preferred a writ petition wherein it had claimed that the petitioner was supplying sprinklers from outside the State for which sale, the invoices were being raised from Gurgoan and the supply was being made to the farmers in Himachal, the same was inter-State sale and fell under the category “agricultural implement, manually operated or animal driven” and was therefore, specifically exempted from tax under Schedule “B” notified by the State of Himachal Pradesh under section 9 of H.P. VAT Act., 2005. This contention of the petitioner has been negated by the judgement under review. 2. The main thrust of the petitioner in this review petition is that there is inherent contradiction of findings of fact recorded in paragraphs- 14 and 15 of the judgement under challenge, which has affected the ultimate decision of this court. He contends that paragraph-14 of the judgement, it has been recorded that there was no record placed by the petitioner to reveal the supply of sprinklers or Micro irrigation system had occasioned from Haryana to Himachal, while in paragraph-15 this court had made the following observations:- “15. The analysis of documents no doubt reveal that the petitioner-Company has brought the goods from Gurgaon (Haryana) to Mandi Branch, in the name of Sub Divisional Soil Conservation Officers Agriculture Department and then supplied / installed the irrigation systems in the fields of different farmers/beneficiaries under the ‘Yojna’ and the petitioner-Company received 80% cost of material as subsidy from the department of Agriculture and 20% cost from farmers/beneficiaries. The petitioner-Company has found to have been charged local taxes from the farmers, as evident from the invoices, which has been issued inclusive of all taxes from the branch office, Mandi. Thus, the petitioner for all purposes is said to have made intra-State sales which is liable to payment of VAT. Therefore, we hold that the transaction in question is intra- State and not inter-State sale. The first point is dealt with accordingly.” 3. Thus, the petitioner for all purposes is said to have made intra-State sales which is liable to payment of VAT. Therefore, we hold that the transaction in question is intra- State and not inter-State sale. The first point is dealt with accordingly.” 3. The respondents on the other hand has contended that there is no error apparent on the face of the record, inasmuch as there is no conflict between the observations made in paragraphs-14 and 15 of the judgement, because it is on the basis of the documents annexed by the petitioner itself that this court has come to a definite conclusion that transaction in question was only intra-State and not inter-State sale. 4. Before we proceed to determine the question on merit, this court is required to bear in mind the scope of review because in case of a review petition the exercise of discretion is circumscribed by the provisions of order 47 and section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, CPC). 5. The learned Senior Advocate representing the petitioner has contended that an application for review would be maintainable not only when there is an error apparent on the record, but even when there is a discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or the review is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. According to him, the petitioner did not place the complete documents to show that it was intra State sale, as according to him, this fact was not even disputed by the respondents and for this submission placed reliance on the order of the Assessing Authority. 6. He further placed reliance upon the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India and another vs. Netaji Cricket Club and others (2005) 4 SCC 741 :- “88. We are, furthermore, of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a review application cannot be said to be ex facie bad in law. Section 114 of the Code empowers a court to review its order if the conditions precedents laid down therein are satisfied. The substantive provision of law does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court except those which are expressly provided in Section 114 of the Code in terms whereof it is empowered to make such order as it thinks fit. The substantive provision of law does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court except those which are expressly provided in Section 114 of the Code in terms whereof it is empowered to make such order as it thinks fit. 89 Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. 90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words 'sufficient reason' in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an Advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit". 91. It is true that in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Another Vs. The Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Others [ (1955) 1 SCR 520 ], this Court made observations as regard limitations in the application of review of its order stating : SCR p.529) "Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XLVII, rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XLVII, rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words "any other sufficient reason" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule.", but the said rule is not universal. 92. Yet again in Lily Thomas (supra), this Court has laid down the law in the following terms: "52. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement". It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error.” 7. To buttress his submission the learned counsel has contended that the error in the present case was self evident and therefore, the impugned judgement should be reviewed. Reliance was placed on S.Bagirathi Ammal vs. Palani Roman Catholic Mission (2009) 10 SCC 464 , wherein it has been held as under: “12. To buttress his submission the learned counsel has contended that the error in the present case was self evident and therefore, the impugned judgement should be reviewed. Reliance was placed on S.Bagirathi Ammal vs. Palani Roman Catholic Mission (2009) 10 SCC 464 , wherein it has been held as under: “12. An error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. In other words, it must be an error of inadvertence. It should be something more than a mere error and it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. When does an error cease to be mere error and becomes an error apparent on the face of the record depends upon the materials placed before the Court. If the error is so apparent that without further investigation or enquiry, only one conclusion can be drawn in favour of the appellant, in such circumstances, the review will lie. Under the guise of review, the parties are not entitled re-hearing of the same issue but the issue can be decided just by a perusal of the records and if it is manifest can be set at right by reviewing the order. With this background, let us analyze the impugned judgment of the High Court and find out whether it satisfy any of the tests formulated above. “25. From the materials, we are satisfied that the conclusion reached by the High Court holding that the review petitioner/respondent herein is a "religious Mission"/ "institution" within the meaning of amended provision and entitled to the benefits of amended Act. Further if the same is not applied to the Mission, it would result in miscarriage of justice and it had been rightly rectified by the High Court by the impugned judgment. The benefit that has been bestowed upon the religious institution by the Legislature cannot be ignored lightly merely because the issue was decided by way of review applications. Further if the same is not applied to the Mission, it would result in miscarriage of justice and it had been rightly rectified by the High Court by the impugned judgment. The benefit that has been bestowed upon the religious institution by the Legislature cannot be ignored lightly merely because the issue was decided by way of review applications. Inasmuch as at the relevant point of time, the Amended Act 2 of 1996 was not enacted and not available for consideration before the Court and also of the fact that the proceeding instituted by the tenant/appellant herein was pending and not reached finality on the date of coming into force of the amended Act, we are satisfied that the High Court is justified in granting the relief as provided under the amended Act (Act No.2 of 1996) by allowing the review applications. 26. As held earlier, if the judgment/order is vitiated by an apparent error or it is a palpable wrong and if the error is self evident, review is permissible and in this case the High Court has rightly applied the said principles as provided under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. In view of the same, we are unable to accept the arguments of learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, on the other hand, we are in entire agreement with the view expressed by the High Court.” 8. On the other hand, Sh. Shrawan Dogra, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. Romesh Verma, Additional Advocate General has claimed that this is not a case where the power of review ought to be exercised, as none of the pre- requisites of section 114 or Order 47 CPC are attracted. He placed reliance upon the judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inderchand Jain (dead) through LRS vs. Motilal (dead) through LRs (2009) 14 SCC 663 , wherein it has been held as follows:- “7. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "the Code") provides for a substantive power of review by a Civil Court and consequently by the appellate courts. The words "subject as aforesaid" occurring in Section 114 of the Code means subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed as appearing in Section 113 thereof and for the said purpose, the procedural conditions contained in Order 47 of the Code must be taken into consideration. The words "subject as aforesaid" occurring in Section 114 of the Code means subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed as appearing in Section 113 thereof and for the said purpose, the procedural conditions contained in Order 47 of the Code must be taken into consideration. Section 114 of the Code although does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the court but such limitations have been provided for in Order 47 of the Code; Rule 1 whereof reads as under: "17. The power of a civil court to review its judgment/decision is traceable in Section 114 CPC. The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, which reads as under: "1. Application for review of judgment.-(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order." 8. An application for review would lie inter alia when the order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice. In Rajendra Kumar v. Rambai [ AIR 2003 SC 2095 ], this Court held: (SCC p. 514, para 6) "6. The limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed." 9. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed." 9. The power of review can also be exercised by the court in the event discovery of new and important matter or evidence takes place which despite exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. An application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake. Furthermore, an application for review shall also lie for any other sufficient reason. 10. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A re-hearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. It is also trite that exercise of inherent jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order. 11. Review is not appeal in disguise. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India [ AIR 2000 SC 1650 ], this Court held: (SCC p. 251, para 56) "56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated an appeal in disguise." “31. Contention of Mr. Venugopal that the defendant having accepted novation of contract but only the quantum of the amount being different, the court could have asked the plaintiff - respondent to deposit a further sum of Rs. 24,000/- cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Apart from the fact that such a contention had never been raised before the appellate court, keeping in view the finding of fact arrived at that there had in fact been no novation of contract, such a course of action was not open. 24,000/- cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Apart from the fact that such a contention had never been raised before the appellate court, keeping in view the finding of fact arrived at that there had in fact been no novation of contract, such a course of action was not open. In any view of the matter, the same would amount to re- appreciation of evidence which was beyond the review jurisdiction of the High Court.” 9. The Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in Muzamil Afzal Reshi vs. State of J&K & ors. Review (LPA) No. 16/2009 decided on 29.3.201 3, to which one of us (Hon’ble the Chief Justice) was a party, has laid down that power of review is to be exercised in limited circumstances and that too as per the mandate of order 47 CPC. The remedy available in the shape of review cannot be allowed to be a masquerade appeal. It was observed:- “11) Let us take a look at Rule 1 of Order XLVII of CPC thus: 1. Application for review of judgement (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved – a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any order made against him may apply for a review of judgement to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. 12) It is beaten law of the land that power of review is to be exercised in limited circumstances and that too as per the mandate of Order XLVII CPC. The remedy available in the shape of review cannot be allowed to be a masquerade appeal. 13) Apex Court in case titled Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Mawasi & Ors. The remedy available in the shape of review cannot be allowed to be a masquerade appeal. 13) Apex Court in case titled Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Mawasi & Ors. Reported as AIR SCW 2012, 4222, has made elaborate discussion and has referred to all the judgements on the subject right from 1950 till judgement is rendered. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 16 and 17 herein: 16. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224 , R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarized the scope of the power of review in the following words (Para 15): “Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practiced.” 17. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4 SCC 78 , the Court observed: “The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing “on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reasons”. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict.” 14) Reliance can also be placed on a case law titled M/s Jain Studios Ltd. V. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. Reported as AIR SCW 2006, 3592. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 11 herein: “11. Ltd. Reported as AIR SCW 2006, 3592. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 11 herein: “11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior Court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate Court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.” 15) The identical issue was raised before the Apex Court in case titled Smt. Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary, reported as AIR 1995, SC 455. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 8 of the same herein:- 8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1, while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharmal, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations: (para 3) it is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hedge v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record: An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.” 10. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.” 10. Thus what appears to be more than settled law is that an error contemplated under the rule must be such, which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must essentially be an error of inadvertence and definitely something more than a mere error and must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. If the error is so apparent that without further investigation or inquiry only one conclusion can be drawn in favour of the applicant, in such circumstances, the review will lie. However, under the guise of review, the parties are not entitled to re-hearing of the same issue but the issue can be decided just by a perusal of the record and if it is manifest can be set right by reviewing the order. It must be remembered that in exercise of the powers of review this court cannot sit in appeal over its own order. Re-hearing of the matter is impermissible in law, since the power of review is an exception to the general rule that once the judgement is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. It has to be remembered that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. 11. The error contemplated under the rule is that the same should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning. The wrong decision can be subject to appeal to a higher form but a review is not permissible on the ground that court proceeded on wrong proposition of law. It is not permissible for erroneous decision to be “re-heard and corrected.” There is clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the former can be corrected only by a higher form, the latter can be corrected by exercise of review jurisdiction. It is not permissible for erroneous decision to be “re-heard and corrected.” There is clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the former can be corrected only by a higher form, the latter can be corrected by exercise of review jurisdiction. A review of judgement is not maintainable if the only ground for review is that point is not dealt in correct perspective so long the point has been dealt with and answered. A review of a judgement is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition of old and overruled arguments cannot create a ground for review. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order, which has the normal feature of finality. 12. Having observed so, it would be seen that the petitioner is seeking the present review on the ground that points raised in the petition have not been dealt in correct perspective, though the same have admittedly been dealt with. We are afraid that such questions cannot be gone into and determined by this court in exercise of its review jurisdiction, particularly when a detailed judgement running into 35 pages has been delivered by this court, wherein not only the factual but even the legal aspects of the case have been dealt with in detail. 13. Whether the sales of the petitioner are inter-State or intra-State, are findings of fact, which have already been determined by this court and cannot be interfered with, because power of review cannot be exercised on the ground that decision is incorrect or erroneous on merit as the same lies within the ambit of a higher court having appellate power which alone is in a position to correct the error committed by the subordinate courts by virtue of power of appeal conferred on the said court by some statute. 14. Moreover, the judgement sought to be reviewed has to be read as a whole and the petitioner cannot be permitted to pick up or single out a paragraph and juxtapose the same with another paragraph to contend that there is an error apparent on the face of record. 15. 14. Moreover, the judgement sought to be reviewed has to be read as a whole and the petitioner cannot be permitted to pick up or single out a paragraph and juxtapose the same with another paragraph to contend that there is an error apparent on the face of record. 15. Based upon the documents on record, it had been found by the Assessing Officer that company had created false documents by generating invoices in the names of the farmers from the State of Haryana. While in fact, the goods were transported to the State of Himachal Pradesh and the name of consigner was declared the department of agriculture. Whereas it was proved on record that company was not supplying the agriculture implements i.e. manually operated and animal driven agriculture, rather installing a complete irrigation system which required material like pipes, joints, sockets, sprinklers etc. and these were not exempted from tax (VAT). This court while adjudicating the writ petition had formulated the following points for determination:- (i) Whether in the facts and circumstances, the transaction of supplying sprinkler etc. from Haryana in question i.e. installation of irrigation system including sprinkler to the farmers of Himachal Pradesh is interstate or intra-state sale? (ii) Whether irrigation sprinkler system supplied by the petitioner- Company is “agricultural implement, manually operated or animal driven” and falls under Schedule “B” of VAT Act, therefore, exempted from tax? After taking into consideration the factual and legal aspects of the matter this court came to a categorical finding that the petitioner for all purposes had made intra-State sales, which were liable to payment of VAT. Thereafter by detailed analysis of the factual and legal aspects, this court further came to a categorical conclusion that sprinkler in question was not an agriculture implement nor it was driven manually or by animal and therefore, was not exempted from tax in Schedule-B of H.P. VAT Act and consequently the petitioner was not entitled to exemption of tax. 16. In view of the above discussion, the petitioner has failed to make out a case within the four corners of Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule1 and section 151 CPC Accordingly, we find no merit in this review petition and the same is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.