JUDGMENT 1. The first defendant in the original suit O.S.No.7510 of 1997 on the file of the V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai is the appellant in the second appeal. The above said suit was filed by the first respondent herein against the appellant and the second respondent herein for a permanent injunction restraining the appellant herein first defendant from in any manner interfering with the first respondent’s right of passage through the driveway having a width of 40 feet. The second respondent, who figured as second defendant, is only an official and he does not have any personal interest in the outcome of the case. The appellant herein/first defendant alone contested the suit. 2. The learned trial Judge decreed the suit as prayed for. As against the decree passed by the trial Judge, the appellant herein preferred an appeal in A.S.No.230 of 2006 and the said appeal came to be disposed of by the VII Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai by judgment and decree dated 22.09.2006, whereby the learned appellate Judge chose to dismiss the appeal with costs confirming the decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved by and challenging the said decree of the lower appellate Court, the appellant herein/first defendant has chosen to prefer the present second appeal on various grounds set out in the grounds of second appeal. 3. Though a number of grounds have been raised in the grounds of second appeal, the scope of second appeal is limited by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to Section 100 CPC, an appeal from the appellate decree of a Court subordinate to the High Court will lie to the High Court only on a substantial question/substantial questions of law. At the time of admission, two questions were formulated as substantial questions of law. They are: “1. Whether the appellate Court has erred in law in deciding the very admissibility of Exhibits A2, A3, A4, A9 and A10 when they are certified truncated copies and not complete ones by simply perusing their respective originals when the same were produced by the plaintiff’s counsel at the time of hearing of the appeal and overruled the objections raised by the appellant’s counsel by simply saying that “much technicalities are not to be pressed upon the same”? Whether the lower appellate Court is justified in law when it confirmed the decree of the trial Court decreeing the suit as prayed for on the basis of Exhibit A7 rough sketch (plaint document No.7 wrongly referred to Plaint Document No.6 in the plaint relief column 13a) after accepting the submissions of the counsel for the appellant for the rejection of Exhibit A7 as inadmissible in evidence by applying the preposition of law laid down by the Honourable Court in the judgment reported in 2000 (1) Law Weekly, Page 476, nevertheless stated in Clause 2 of the decree, that Exihibit A10 sketch shall be referred instead of Document No.6 without there being any amendment sought for by the plaintiff to that effect? 4. The arguments advanced by S. Subbaiah, learned counsel for the appellant, by.M. Balasubramnian, learned counsel for the first respondent and by Devendran, learned counsel for the second respondent are heard. The materials available on record are also perused. 5. The first respondent in the original suit who suffered a decree for permanent injunction in the court of the first instance, which came to be confirmed by the first appellate Court, is the appellant in the second appeal. The second respondent, namely Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu, was vested with the power to manage the functions of the Nurses Club (Regd.), Madras amalgamated with Nurses Association (Regd.) Madras, purchased a larger extent of property comprised in S.No.650 and bearing Old Door No.6/New Door No.59, Eldams Road, Vepery, Madras – 7 consisting of building and vacant site under a sale deed dated 25.07.1934 bearing Document No.2044 of 1934 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, West Madras, after obtaining permission from the High Court in O.P.No.107 of 1934. Subsequently in 1979, the rear portion, measuring about 4 grounds, of the said property purchased under sale deed dated 25.07.1934 bearing Document No.2044/1934, was sought to be sold to one Premchand, Son of Saranyan, No.15, Sylvan Lodge Colony, Kilpauk, Chennai – 600 010 for a sum of Rs. 3,65,000/- and for the said purpose, permission was obtained from the High Court under Order dated 01.02.1979 made in Application No.282 of 1979 in O.P.No.107 of 1934. 3,65,000/- and for the said purpose, permission was obtained from the High Court under Order dated 01.02.1979 made in Application No.282 of 1979 in O.P.No.107 of 1934. Since the said land was sought to be purchased for the purpose of putting up a temple, the proposed purchaser Premchand wanted conveyance of the front portion instead of the back portion as there would be hurdles for getting plan sanctioned for the rear portion, the High Court was again approached with another application, namely Application No.4373 of 1980 in O.P.No.107 of 1934, for permission to sell 4.54 grounds of land abutting the Rundalls Road for a sum of Rs. 9,78,400/- which would include a sum of Rs. 25,000/- for the right of passage to be given to the purchaser over the driveway lying on the north of the property proposed to be sold to him. The High Court by order dated 27.10.1980 granted permission, pursuant to which the second respondent herein executed a sale deed conveying 4.54 grounds and the right of passage in the 40 feet driveway to Premchand under a sale deed dated 17.12.1981 registered as Document No.1634 of 1987 on the file of Sub-Registrar, Periamet. Under the said sale deed, the entire property purchased by the second respondent under the parent deed, namely sale deed dated 25.07.1934 registered as Document No.2044 of 1934 in the office of the Sub-Registrar of West Madras was shown as ‘A’ schedule property and the property sold to Premchand was shown as ‘B’ schedule property. Out of the 4.54 grounds of land purchased by Premchand, he sold an extent of 2.515 grounds together with the right of passage on the 40 feet driveway to the first respondent herein/plaintiff under a sale deed dated 12.11.1982 registered as Document No.1489 of 1982 on the file of the Sub-Registrar, Periamet. In the said sale deed, the entire portion purchased by Premchand from the second respondent under the sale deed dated 17.12.1981 was described as ‘A’ schedule and the portion that was sold under the said sale deed to the plaintiff was shown in ‘B’ schedule to the said sale. In the said sale deed, the entire portion purchased by Premchand from the second respondent under the sale deed dated 17.12.1981 was described as ‘A’ schedule and the portion that was sold under the said sale deed to the plaintiff was shown in ‘B’ schedule to the said sale. Subsequently, on 13.07.1987, the remaining portion which had been retained by Premchand at the time of execution of the sale deed dated 12.11.1982 came to be sold by him to the plaintiff, here again together with the right of passage over the 40 feet driveway and the said sale deed was registered as Document No.747 of 1987 on the file of Sub-Registrar, Periamet. Thus, having been purchased it in parts under the above said two sale deeds dated 12.11.1982 and 13.07.1987, the entire property purchased by Premchand from the second respondent under the sale deed dated 17.12.1981 became the property of the plaintiff. After such purchase, the first respondent has put up a temple on the front portion and the rear portion occupies a dining hall-cum-meeting hall. As the plaintiff wanted to have no disturbance to the worshipers of the temple, they provided no direct access from the temple portion to the rear portion occupied by the dining hall-cum-meeting hall. On the other hand, the 40 feet driveway lying on the north of the said property was used as an ingress and egress to the back portion, namely the portion having the dining hall-cum-meeting hall. While so, the appellant herein/first defendant claiming that the driveway absolutely belong to the appellant without any restriction, except a right of passage to the first respondent which could be restricted to a narrow passage, made an attempt to put up construction on the space claimed by the first respondent to be the driveway and the same prompted the first respondent/plaintiff to lodge a complaint with the police and then to approach the civil Court for injunction when the police said that it was a civil matter which could be decided only by the civil Court. 6. 6. The appellant/first respondent resisted the suit contending that since only a right of way had been given to Premchand under sale deed dated 12.11.1982 in the driveway, he had acquired no title or exclusive right over the said passage and that the plaintiff who purchased the property from Premchand could not maintain the suit for a prohibitory injunction against the owner of the land providing a driveway. It was also indicated in the written statement that in the plaint Document No.6 had been wrongly referred to as the sketch showing the driveway instead of plaint Document No.7. It contended further that the passage had been referred to as green marked portion in the plan attached to the sale deed dated 17.12.1981 and without producing the original sale deed with plan, the first respondent /plaintiff could not sustain their claim that the passage was occupying the entire stretch with the breadth of 40 feet. The appellant/first defendant could have stated that they had not chosen to provide any obstruction for the use of the driveway. But it has been stated in the written statement that the appellant, being the owner of the land, was having every right to put up construction in their property without causing obstruction to the passage by leaving sufficient space. The crux of the entire written statement running to 6½ pages is that though the property described in ‘B’ schedule to the sale deed dated 17.12.1981 belongs to the first respondent/plaintiff together with a right of use of the driveway that runs on the north of the said property purchased by the first respondent/plaintiff, the right conferred on the plaintiff could not restrict the appellant/first defendant of their right to put up any construction over the property claimed to be the driveway without causing hindrance to the right of passage conferred on the first respondent/plaintiff and that the same can be done by leaving a minimum space necessary. According to the appellant, if such constructions are made by the appellant/first defendant, they could not be prevented. 7. Based on the pleadings, the learned trial Judge conducted trial, in which PW1 was examined and Exs.A1 to A11 were marked on the side of the first respondent herein/plaintiff, whereas DW1 was examined and Exs.B1 to B10 were marked on the side of the appellant herein/first defendant. 7. Based on the pleadings, the learned trial Judge conducted trial, in which PW1 was examined and Exs.A1 to A11 were marked on the side of the first respondent herein/plaintiff, whereas DW1 was examined and Exs.B1 to B10 were marked on the side of the appellant herein/first defendant. An Advocate Commissioner appointed by the trial Court submitted a report and plan and they were marked as Exs.C1 and C2. 8. The learned trial Judge, upon considering the evidence, came to the conclusion that the driveway lying on the north of the property purchased by the plaintiff was of 40 feet wide and that the appellant/first defendant should be injuncted by a decree of permanent injunction not to put up any construction so as to restrict the free use of the driveway by the plaintiff to reach the rear portion of the plaintiff’s property where there is a dining-cum-meeting hall. While doing so, the learned trial Judge has chosen to point out the fact that there was a mistake in the prayer, whereby the first respondent herein/plaintiff had referred to plaint Document No.6 as the sketch showing the disputed property. After noting the said mistake, the learned trial Judge chose to grant the relief sought for by the first respondent/plaintiff and at the same time grant the relief by making a reference to Ex.A10, the certified copy of the sale deed dated 17.12.1981 for the identification of the disputed property. 9. When the matter was taken on appeal to the lower appellate Court, the lower appellate Court concurred with the factual findings recorded by the trial Court. However, pointing out the fact that there was no clarity in Ex.A10 in demarcating the driveway which is in dispute, it chose to modify the decree by making a reference to plaint Document No.7, a sketch prepared by the Assistant Engineer attached to the Office of the Administrator General and Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu, which was marked as Ex.A7 for the proper identification of the driveway regarding which injunction was granted. 10. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant in the second appeal, at the first instance argued that since the property sold to Premchand under the original of Ex.A2 which has been in turn purchased by the first respondent/plaintiff under two sale deeds certified copies of which have been marked as Exs.A3 and A4 is facing Rundalls (now EVK Sampath Road), there was no necessity for the first respondent/plaintiff to use the driveway running on the north of the property purchased by the plaintiff and that they could very well have a point of access through the front portion to their rear portion. 11. Learned counsel for the first respondent, on the other hand submitted that the right of passage itself was purchased only to have an access to the rear portion having the dinning-cum-meeting hall, which shall be separated from the front portion where the temple had been put up and that therefore, the above said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant should be discountenanced. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff that the claim of the first respondent /plaintiff being one of grant under the sale deeds, cannot be defeated by the appellant/first defendant pointing any alternative access as a ground for denying such right of passage. When such a contention was taken by the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff, the second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant came to be made to the effect that the driveway is not of 40 feet wide even though a right of passage in the driveway had been granted under the sale deeds and that the appellant/defendant whose tittle had been confirmed by the parties in the sale deeds was entitled to leave only a reasonable space without causing hindrance to right of passage granted to the first respondent /plaintiff in the driveway and put up construction in the rest of the portion on the north of it. 12. 12. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant has made an attempt to contend that the driveway is not of 40 feet wide and on the other hand it is only a narrow one less than 40 feet and that hence, the remaining space on the north after leaving sufficient space abutting the property of the first respondent/plaintiff shall be free to be used by the appellant/first defendant as their own land without any restriction. Learned counsel for the appellant wants to submit that the driveway on which the right of passage has been granted is of a smaller width and the 40 feet referred to in the document is only the length of the driveway and that therefore the claim of the first respondent/plaintiff to have access through the entire stretch having a width of 40 feet should not be sustained. The said attempt made by the learned counsel is countered by the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff referring to the sale deeds dated 17.12.1981, 12.11.1982 and 13.07.1987 wherein the driveway has been clearly referred to as a 40 feet driveway, indicating that the driveway extended upto the western boundary and its width is 40-feet. 13. Both the courts below, on a proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, came to a correct conclusion that the property purchased by the plaintiff was 4.54 grounds defined with reference to the measurements of the said plot on all four sides; that on the north of it immediately abutting the said land, there is a driveway to a width of 40 feet and that in the said driveway right of passage had been purchased by the plaintiff. The first respondent/plaintiff chose to produce only the certified copies of the sale deeds dated 17.12.1981, 12.11.1982 and 13.07.1987 marked as Exs.A2, A3 and A4 respectively, to substantiate their case that a right of passage had been purchased in the driveway having a width of 40 feet. In addition to the production of the said certified copies, the first respondent/plaintiff also produced the sketch prepared by the Assistant Engineer attached to the office of the Administrator General and Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu showing the property proposed to be sold to Premchand, the vendor of the first respondent/plaintiff. The said sketch has been marked as Ex.A7. In addition to the production of the said certified copies, the first respondent/plaintiff also produced the sketch prepared by the Assistant Engineer attached to the office of the Administrator General and Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu showing the property proposed to be sold to Premchand, the vendor of the first respondent/plaintiff. The said sketch has been marked as Ex.A7. However, in the prayer portion of the plaint, the first respondent/plaintiff by mistake chose to refer to the sketch as Document No.6 annexed to the plaint while referring to the sketch. The acknowledgement given to the plaintiff by the Station House Officer of the Vepery Police Station to the first respondent herein/plaintiff for the receipt of the complaint made by the first respondent/plaintiff on 04.10.1997 alone has been produced as Document No.6 in the annexure to the plaint. Copy of the police complaint has been produced as Document No.5 and they have been marked as Exs.A5 and A6 respectively. The sketch has been marked as Ex.A7. By mistake, the first respondent/plaintiff referred to the sketch as “Plaint Document No.6” instead of “Plaint document No.7”. The learned trial Judge, obvious of the said mistake that crept in the prayer portion in referring to the sketch, chose to hold that such a mistake would not prevent the first respondent herein/plaintiff from getting the relief and that the relief could be granted making a reference to Ex.A10, namely another certified copy of the sale deed dated 17.12.1981 executed by the second respondent in favour of Premchand. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant/first respondent has contended that the certified copies of sale deeds dated 17.12.1981, 12.11.1982 and 13.07.1987 marked as Exs.A2 to A4 respectively are the copies obtained by xeroxing the documents available with the Sub-Registrar concerned and certifying the same to be the true copies, without the plan referred in the documents being annexed to them. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant/first respondent has contended that the certified copies of sale deeds dated 17.12.1981, 12.11.1982 and 13.07.1987 marked as Exs.A2 to A4 respectively are the copies obtained by xeroxing the documents available with the Sub-Registrar concerned and certifying the same to be the true copies, without the plan referred in the documents being annexed to them. Learned counsel for the appellant/first defendant, pointing out the fact that the certified copies of the document dated 17.12.1981 and the certified copy of the document dated 12.11.1982 marked as Exs.A2 and A3 do not contain the plan annexed to those sale deeds, has contended that the said documents could not have been relied upon by the Courts below to arrive at the conclusion that the driveway referred to in those documents, over which a right of passage had been granted, was of 40 feet wide to the entire length of the property sold to Premchand by the second respondent herein/2nd defendant which was in turn sold by Premchand in favour of the first respondent/plaintiff. However, along with the certified copy of the last of the sale deeds, namely sale deed dated 13.07.1987 bearing Document No.747 of 1987, a copy of the plan is available and the portions sold under the sale deed and the driveway have been referred as portions indicated in different colours in the sale deed. But the xerox copy annexed to the certified copy of the sale deed is only in black and white. Certified copies of the sketch annexed to those sale deeds dated 17.12.1981 and 12.11.1982 have been marked as Exs.A10 and A9 respectively. Those documents not only contain the measurements of the property purchased by the first respondent/plaintiff, but also the measurements of the driveway over which the right of passage was granted to the first respondent/plaintiff. However in those two documents also, the respective portions indicated in different colours in the originals have not been indicated with such colours as they are the black and white xerox copies of the plans. However in those two documents also, the respective portions indicated in different colours in the originals have not been indicated with such colours as they are the black and white xerox copies of the plans. Despite the fact that the properties purchased under the sale deeds and the driveway in which the right of passage has been granted, have not been shown in the plans in the colours referred to in the body of the sale deeds, the portions of the properties sold and the portion of the property referred to as driveway have been clearly indicated in those plans with reference to their measurements on four sides and boundaries. The measurements found in the plans also correspond to the measurements found in the description of property provided in the sale deeds. The same was the reason why the learned trial Judge chose to refer to Ex.A10 to indicate the driveway. The simple mistake committed by the first respondent/plaintiff by referring to plaint document No.6 instead of plaint Document No.7, as the sketch is sought to be relied on by the appellant/first defendant to deny the right of the first respondent/plaintiff for free and unhindered use of the driveway. The oral and documentary evidence adduced on both sides clearly indicate that the driveway lying on the north of the property purchased by the plaintiff is 40 feet wide. There is also a clear admission made by DW1 in this regard. Despite such an admission, the mistake found in the prayer portion of the plaint is sought to be taken advantage of to deny the right of the first respondent/plaintiff. 15. The learned trial Judge in order to render a complete justice chose to grant the relief of permanent injunction sought by the first respondent/plaintiff by making reference to Ex.A10 as the document showing physical features and measurements of the driveway, holding that the first respondent herein/plaintiff was entitled to the relief of permanent injunction in respect of the driveway, which could be easily ascertained from Ex.A10. On appeal also, the learned lower appellate Judge has concurred with the finding of the trial Court that the clerical mistake found in the prayer portion will not deter the Court from granting the relief which can otherwise be granted. On appeal also, the learned lower appellate Judge has concurred with the finding of the trial Court that the clerical mistake found in the prayer portion will not deter the Court from granting the relief which can otherwise be granted. However, in an attempt to provide more clarity, the learned appellate Judge has chosen to refer to Ex.A7 sketch instead of Ex.A10 to denote the disputed property, namely the driveway over which the first respondent/plaintiff claim right of unhindered passage. 16. We have seen from the aforesaid discussions that a certified copy of the sale deed under which the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff purchased the property from the second respondent has been produced as Ex.A2, whereas the certified copies of the sale deeds under which the said property was purchased by the plaintiff in two spells have been produced as Exs.A3 and A4. It is true that Exs.A2 and A3 do not contain the annexures, namely the sketches annexed to those sale deeds. However, Ex.A4 contains a copy of the sketch annexed to the sale deed. Therefore, Ex.A4 cannot be projected as a truncated certified copy of the sale deed dated 13.07.1987 registered as document No.7747/1987 on the file of the Sub-Registrar, Periamet. Though Exs.A2 and A3 do not contain the copies of the respective annexures, namely the sketches, the same have been supplemented by the production of Exs.A10 and A9 respectively. Hence, Exs.A2 and A10 form a complete set of the certified copies of the sale deed dated 07.02.1981 along with the sketch annexed to it, whereas Exs.A3 and A9 have formed the complete set of the certified copies of the sale deed dated 12.11.1982 along with the sketch annexed to it. Normally, when certified copies of documents are applied for, unless specifically applied for the annexure also, certified copies will be provided without the sketches annexed to such documents and when specifically applied for the certified copies of the annexures also, the same will be provided. Exs.A2 and A3 are the certified copies obtained without the annexure, namely the sketch. Subsequently, certified copies of the annexures, namely sketches were obtained and produced as Exs.A10 and A9 respectively. Exs.A2 and A3 are the certified copies obtained without the annexure, namely the sketch. Subsequently, certified copies of the annexures, namely sketches were obtained and produced as Exs.A10 and A9 respectively. In the light of the production of Exs.A10 and A9 to supplement Exs.A2 and A3 respectively, the attempt made on behalf of the appellant in the second appeal to project those documents to be incomplete and truncated documents, inadmissible in evidence, cannot be sustained. For the said reasons, this Court comes to the conclusion that the first substantial question of law deserves to be answered in the negative and the answer shall be against the appellant/first respondent and on the other hand it shall be in favour of the first respondent plaintiff. The consequence shall be reliance made on Exs.A2 to A4, A9 and A10 for deciding the question of right of passage over the driveway does not suffer from any infirmity and the Courts below have not committed any error in this regard. 17. The second substantial question has been pressed into service because of the clerical mistake committed by the first respondent/plaintiff in the prayer portion of the plaint. Instead of referring to Document No.7 annexed to the plaint as the sketch, it has been wrongly referred to as Document No.6. The Courts below were obvious of the said mistake and were of the view that because of the simple clerical mistake, the plaintiffs could not be non-suited for the relief, as the case of the plaintiff had been substantiated with reference to the plea found in the body of the plaint and the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff. The learned trial Judge has chosen to draft the decree referring to Ex.A10 as the sketch showing the driveway. The learned lower appellate Judge, on appeal, was also aware of the mistake in the prayer that was sought to be rectified in the decree of the trial Court, by making a reference to Ex.A10. In order to provide more clarity to the decree, the lower appellate Court has chosen to refer to Ex.A7, namely the sketch prepared by the Assistant Engineer attached to the Office of the Administrator General and Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu, produced as Document No.7 with the plaint, as the basis of identification of the driveway, the disputed portion. In order to provide more clarity to the decree, the lower appellate Court has chosen to refer to Ex.A7, namely the sketch prepared by the Assistant Engineer attached to the Office of the Administrator General and Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu, produced as Document No.7 with the plaint, as the basis of identification of the driveway, the disputed portion. The appellant has chosen to take advantage of the mistake in the plaint and tried to defeat the claim of the plaintiff pointing out the said mistake alone. However, the learned lower appellate Judge did not take into consideration the fact that the said document (Ex.A7) had been marked subject to objection and that hence the same could not be a substitute for the sketches annexed to the sale deeds certified copies of which have been marked as Exs.A2 to A4. 18. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Ex.A7, being the sketch prepared by the Assistant Engineer attached to the office of the Administrator General and Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu, Madras-1, showing the property proposed to be sold, ought not to have been admitted as a piece of evidence, as it was superseded by the sale deed dated 17.12.1981. It is his further contention that even if it is assumed that the same could have been looked into to ascertain the property sold under the sale deed dated 17.12.1981, a certified copy of which has been marked as Ex.A2, as a corroborating piece of evidence, it would have been done only in the case of an ambiguity in the description of the property found in Ex.A2. Of course there is substance in the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. But the appellant chose to raise a contention that the description of 40 feet driveway would not refer to the driveway with a width of 40 feet and the said measurement might be the measurement of the length of the driveway. Under such circumstances alone, it became necessary and prudent to rely on Ex.A7 to ascertain the correct features and measurements of the driveway, which is the subject matter of the dispute in this case. 19. Under such circumstances alone, it became necessary and prudent to rely on Ex.A7 to ascertain the correct features and measurements of the driveway, which is the subject matter of the dispute in this case. 19. The said sketch prepared and signed by the Assistant Engineer attached to the Office of the Administrator General and Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu had been produced by the first respondent herein/plaintiff with a view to enable the Court and the parties to identify the disputed property, which is also in consonance with the description found in Ex.A2 sale deed and also in consonance with the certified copy of the sketch annexed to the said sale deed, which has been marked as Ex.A10. In addition to Ex.A10, there are Exs.A4, A3 and A9 together forming a certified copy of the sale deed dated 17.12.1981 and its annexure. From the above said documents, it is abundantly clear that a property abutting Rundalls Road (Now EVK Sampath Road) comprised in suit S.No.650 measuring East-West 173 feet on the South, East West 143 feet on the north, North-South 69 feet on the west and 69 feet distance between the North-South boundaries at all points, except the road facing portion, which is in a rectangular triangle shape the hypotenuse of measuring 74 feet that aligns with the border of the road. Beyond this property on the north and abutting it, there is an East-West driveway, which does have a uniform breadth of 40 feet between its southern and eastern edges. The said driveway is the property in dispute. 20. The documents, especially Ex.A2, contains a clear recital that only a right of passage through the driveway was given to the purchaser and the title to the land would west to the vendor. However, it was provided without ambiguity that the title holder, namely the vendor under the Ex.A2 sale deed should use it only as a driveway and should not put up any obstruction or construction so as to hinder the use of the driveway. However, it was provided without ambiguity that the title holder, namely the vendor under the Ex.A2 sale deed should use it only as a driveway and should not put up any obstruction or construction so as to hinder the use of the driveway. When vendor has chosen to impose a restriction corresponding to a right of passage granted to the purchaser on the use of his property, then the vendor cannot contend that the right of passage cannot be exercised over the entire breadth of 40 feet and that he can leave a space with a reasonable breadth so as to allow passage of vehicles and use the rest of the portion as he likes. Suppose the document is silent as to the width of the portion over which the right of passage has been granted and it simply recites a right of passage, such a contention of the appellant/first respondent may be tenable. The sale deed itself recites that the driveway of 40 feet over which the right of passage is granted. It has been proved not only by the documentary evidence but also by the oral evidence and in addition by the admission of DW1. Hence, there cannot be any abridgment or restriction of the right of passage by narrowing down the passage from 40 feet to a lesser width without the consent and concurrence of the respondent herein/plaintiff, who has got the grant not gratuitously, but for a price. Even in the absence of the production of Ex.A7, the first respondent/plaintiff shall be entitled to the relief of permanent injunction in respect of the driveway that has been referred to in Ex.A2. The appellant/first defendant has not disputed that there was no cause of action for the first respondent/plaintiff to file the suit for injunction. Admittedly, an attempt was made to cause obstruction by putting up construction leaving only a lesser space as an access to the rear portion of the plaintiff’s property and they had started laying a foundation. Therefore, the cause of action for the suit has also been proved. 21. Hence, this Court does not find any substance in the contention of the appellant that the rejection of the contention of the appellant regarding the admissibility of Ex.A7 was bad in law. Ex.A7 is a supporting document, which is also an original document signed by the Assistant Engineer. 21. Hence, this Court does not find any substance in the contention of the appellant that the rejection of the contention of the appellant regarding the admissibility of Ex.A7 was bad in law. Ex.A7 is a supporting document, which is also an original document signed by the Assistant Engineer. What evidentiary value can be attached in the light of its incorporation in the sale deed is a matter for appreciation. That will not affect the admissibility of Ex.A7. Therefore, the second substantial question of law relied on by the appellant/first defendant also deserves to be answered against the appellant and in favour of the first respondent/plaintiff. 22. However, in order to avoid confusion, this Court makes the following clarification to the decree passed by the trial Court, which was also confirmed by the appellate Court: Permanent injunction granted by the trial Court and confirmed by the lower appellate Court shall be in respect of the driveway with a width of 40 feet along the northern boundary of the plaintiff’s property having a length of 143 feet, which portion has been referred to as green marked portion in the plan annexed to the sale deed registered as Document No.1634 of 1987 on the file of Sub-Registrar, Periamet and the copy of the sale deed and the annexure have been marked as Ex.A2 and A10 respectively and the same was based on the sketch prepared by the Assistant Engineer attached to the Office of the Administrator General and Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu, marked as Ex.A7. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed confirming the decree passed by the trial Court, which was confirmed by the lower appellate Court. However, considering the nature of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.