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2014 DIGILAW 869 (PNJ)

Gauri v. Union Territory of Chandigarh

2014-05-16

SURINDER GUPTA

body2014
JUDGMENT : Surinder Gupta, J. Three petitions captioned above have been taken up together as a common relief has been claimed in these three petitions seeking quashing of FIR No. 52 dated 11.3.2011 registered at Police Station Industrial Area, Chandigarh for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') on the complaint of respondent no.2 Rajiv Chanana. 2. Respondent No.2 preferred a complaint before the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Chandigarh which was sent to Police Station Industrial Area, Chandigarh to register the FIR under order of the Court against petitioners Surinder Kumar Nagpal, Sanjeev Nagpal, Gauri daughter of Surinder Kumar Nagpal (divorced wife of complainant), Sushma Wahi and P.Kumar. 3. For the sake of convenience, the facts have been taken from petition No. CRM-M-15126-2012 and the reference of the documents shall be made as appended with this petition. There are five petitioners in these three petitions reference to them shall be made as follows:- 1. Surinder Kumar Nagpal as petitioner No. 1, 2. Sanjeev Nagpal as petitioner No. 2, 3. Gauri as petitioner No. 3, 4. Sushma Wahi as petitioner No. 4 and 5. P. Kumar as petitioner No. 5. The reference to the complainant shall be made as respondent No.2. 4. The allegations levelled in the complaint, in brief, are that Surinder Kumar Nagpal, Sanjeev Nagpal and Vishav Kant Nagpal were the joint owners of industrial-shed No.99, Industrial Area, Phase-I, Chandigarh. The mental condition of Vishav Kant Nagpal was not sound. As such, he was financially dependent on his elder brother Surinder Nagpal. petitioner No.2 Sanjeev Nagpal was in possession of main gate entry area adjoining to industrial-shed No.98 measuring 37 feet 9 inches X 178 feet (37'9" X 178') which comprises of two big rooms and a small kitchen on the first floor and an open verandah. He was running a factory in the name and style of M/s Washwell Metals and M/s Varun Enterprises. The rest of the industrial-shed was in possession of petitioner No.1 towards industrial-shed No.100. Respondent No.2 was already in possession of rooms on the ground floor in the portion occupied by petitioner No.1 adjoining industrial-shed No.100. He was running a factory in the name and style of M/s Washwell Metals and M/s Varun Enterprises. The rest of the industrial-shed was in possession of petitioner No.1 towards industrial-shed No.100. Respondent No.2 was already in possession of rooms on the ground floor in the portion occupied by petitioner No.1 adjoining industrial-shed No.100. Due to financial crisis petitioner No.2 wanted to sell his share in the industrial-shed and on persuasion by his father-in-law (petitioner No.1), respondent No.2 agreed to purchase area measuring 37'9" X 178', which was in occupation of petitioner No.2, vide agreement dated 11.06.2003 (Annexure-A). Petitioner No.2 was owner of ?rd share in the total area of the industrial-shed, which is approximately 74' X 178'. But keeping in view the fact that their brother was not in physical possession of the property, the area of the plot agreed to be sold was mentioned as 37'9" X 178' in the agreement. The total sale consideration was of Rs. 20 lacs out of which an amount of Rs. 5 lacs was paid in cash at the time of agreement to sell and the remaining amount was paid by an account payee cheque No. 720211 dated 20.06.2003 drawn at HDFC Bank. It was mentioned in the agreement that property was free from all sorts of incumbrances. 5. A Will dated 11.06.2003 was executed by petitioner No.2 in favour of respondent No.2 and a general power of attorney with power to appoint sub attorney was also got executed on 10.07.2003 (Annexures B and C). This fact was not disclosed to respondent No.2 and his wife i.e. petitioner No.3 that the share of petitioner Noo.2, agreed to be sold, had been attached in arbitration matter. 6. The cheque of Rs. 15 lacs given at the time of agreement was not got encashed. However, the matter was later on settled with the intervention of common friends. Petitioner No.2 was paid Rs. 5 lacs vide pay order No. 158947 dated 18.11.2004 and he issued a receipt. The cheque of Rs. 15 lacs bearing No.720211 dated 20.06.2003 drawn at HDFC Bank was returned. It was agreed that sale deed shall be executed only in the name of Rajiv Chanana respondent No.2, though the agreement was in favour of respondent No.2 and his wife petitioner No.3. Regarding the remaining sale consideration of Rs. The cheque of Rs. 15 lacs bearing No.720211 dated 20.06.2003 drawn at HDFC Bank was returned. It was agreed that sale deed shall be executed only in the name of Rajiv Chanana respondent No.2, though the agreement was in favour of respondent No.2 and his wife petitioner No.3. Regarding the remaining sale consideration of Rs. 10 lacs, it was settled that respondent No.2 will make the payment in the execution petition pending against petitioner No.2 and the amount paid shall be adjusted towards remaining 10 lacs amount of sale consideration. In the event of payment exceeding Rs. 10 lacs, the amount over and above Rs. 10 lacs shall be paid by petitioner No.2. It was agreed that petitioner No.2 shall execute a fresh general power of attorney in favour of brother of respondent No.2 Sandeep Chanana, so that he could execute the sale deed in favour of complainant. 7. The payment of Rs. 10 lacs was made to sub-attorney of petitioner No.2 as full and final payment in respect of agreement to sell dated 11.06.2003. A complaint was filed by petitioner No.2 on 6.04.2005 against the complainant which after inquiry was dismissed by the police. The sub attorney executed the sale deed in favour of complainant on 09.06.2005 (Annexure-E). 8. After the execution of the sale deed, petitioner No.2 filed a complaint No.468 dated 26.09.2005 in E.O.W. Cell with the plea that the general power of attorney in favour of complainant was cancelled on 05.04.2005 and intimation was sent through UPC but this fact nowhere finds mentioned in the complaint made to the E.O.W. Cell by petitioner No.2. The UPC was got fabricated in connivance with the officials of the postal authorities. Allegations against petitioners No. 1, 3, 4 and 5 9. The allegations levelled against the aforesaid petitioners are as follows:- (i) Petitioner No.1 had accompanied his brother petitioner No.2 to the police station and helped him in drafting the complaint against the complainant. (ii) Petitioner No.2 and petitioner No.3 filed separate suits for declaration against the complainant challenging the sale deed executed in his favour dated 09.06.2005 by the sub attorney appointed by the complainant himself. (iii) Petitioner No.3 had denied that the area of the property purchased was 37'9" X 178' which reflects her mala fide intention. (ii) Petitioner No.2 and petitioner No.3 filed separate suits for declaration against the complainant challenging the sale deed executed in his favour dated 09.06.2005 by the sub attorney appointed by the complainant himself. (iii) Petitioner No.3 had denied that the area of the property purchased was 37'9" X 178' which reflects her mala fide intention. (iv) A rough site plan was forged by petitioner No.2 in connivance with petitioner No.1 on 11.06.2003 which was witnessed by petitioners No.4 and 5. (v) Petitioner No.3 had relied upon the false rough site plan in the suit for declaration filed by her against respondent No.2. Petitioners No.4 and 5 were the witnesses to the Will dated 18.09.2005 executed by late Shri Charan Dass and the family arrangement amongst the petitioners. Respondent No.2 came to know about family arrangement in the year 2010 when it was produced in the Court of Shri Sunil Kumar, Rent Controller, in a case titled as "Rajiv Chanana v. Krishan Kumar". This family arrangement was also a fabricated document created by petitioners No.1 to 3 in connivance with petitioners No.4 and 5. At the time of family arrangement dated 20.11.1992. Shanti Devi, mother of petitioners No.1, 2 and Vishav Kant Nagpal was alive and was having the share in the property but in the family arrangement, her share was not reflected and she was also not a signatory to the same. Shanti Devi had expired in the year 2002." 10. While summing up the allegations in para No.34 of the FIR, the complainant has stated as follows:- "34. That the accused No.1, 2 & 3 created to forged family arrangement and accused No.4 & 5 witnessed. They have also created a forged rough site plan which is said to be part of the family arrangement. Accused No.1, 2 & 3 created a forged family arrangement in the year 2006 with the motive to reduce and encroach upon the area, which has been sold to the complainant vide agreement to sell dated 11.06.2003 and further sale deed dated 09.06.2005. Accused No.1, 2 & 3 forged and created family arrangement and rough site plan. Complainant criminally and to further deprive him from the area for which he was already paid to accused No.2 completely. Accused No.1, 2 & 3 forged and created family arrangement and rough site plan. Complainant criminally and to further deprive him from the area for which he was already paid to accused No.2 completely. The following points are important to prove the forgery against accused No.1 to 5:- (i) forged family arrangement created in 2006 and depicted to be as dated 20.11.1992. In this family arrangement, it is mentioned that three brothers were the owners to the extent of ? share on 20.11.1992 although as per the Will dated 18.09.1985 of late Shri Charan Dass, three brothers and their mother were the owners to the extent of th share each on 20.11.1992, the alleged date of family arrangement and the mother died in 2002. (ii) forged rough site plan which is the part of the family arrangement which is created by accused No.1, 2 & 3 and witness by accused No.4 and 5. (iii) creating of UPC anti date i.e. 20.04.2006 in connivance with postal authority. (iv) using of stamp paper to create forged family arrangement which was actually issued for the purpose of the affidavit. (v) cancellation of irrevocable GPA on 05.04.2005 which is not permitted according to Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act. (vi) denial by accused No.2 of receiving the payment in respect of the said industrial shed. (vii) contradictory statement given by accused No.1, 2 & 3 in respect of area mentioned in agreement to sell. (viii) accused No.4 and 5 being witness to the forged and fabricated family arrangement which in entirety in contradiction to the Will dated 18.09.1985 of which also they were witness. (ix) concealing of facts by accused No.2 before agreement to sell dated 11.06.2003 that the machinery kept in the property is attached in an arbitration matter which ultimately led to the attachment of the share of the complainant of which he was not made aware and this fact was concealed from him." 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the file with the active assistance rendered by them. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that present case is a glaring example of the misuse of the process of Court by the complainant-respondent No.2. He was a person who was very dear to the petitioners and was married with petitioner No.3. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that present case is a glaring example of the misuse of the process of Court by the complainant-respondent No.2. He was a person who was very dear to the petitioners and was married with petitioner No.3. The marriage, however, could not survive and ultimately resulted in divorce by mutual consent. Petitioner No.2 had agreed to sell his share in the industrial-shed to respondent No.2 vide agreement to sell dated 11.06.2003 (Annexure P-6). As per this agreement, petitioner No.2 had agreed to sell his ?rd share in the industrial-shed No.99, Industrial Area Phase-1, Chandigarh to respondent No.2 for a sum of Rs. 20 lacs. This is admitted fact that this plot was earlier owned by Shri Charan Dass Nagpal, father of petitioners No.1 and 2 and after his death, devolved on petitioners No.1, 2 and their brother Vishav Kant Nagpal. The dispute has arisen because of the contradiction in the averment in agreement (Annexure P-6). The area of the industrial-shed No.98 Industrial Area, Phase-1, Chandigarh admittedly is around 74' X 178'. Petitioner No.2 never backed out of the agreement. Even if, this fact is mentioned in the agreement that possession of 37'9" X 178 adjoining shed No.99 Industrial Area Phase-1, Chandigarh had been given under the agreement neither petitioner No.2 could execute the sale deed of more than his ?rd share in that industrial-shed nor respondent No.2 could get the sale deed executed beyond the scope of agreement to sell. Respondent No.2 played smart and after the cancellation of the power of attorney given in his favour by petitioner No.2, he executed sub general power of attorney in favour of his brother and got the sale deed dated 09.06.2005 (Annexure P-20) executed in his favour regarding ?rd share of the plot in question. On the complaint filed by petitioner No.1, an FIR No.262 dated 05.12.2006 was registered against respondent No.2. This fact was concealed by him in the complaint made to the Court which was sent to the police under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code') for registration of FIR. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further argued that even if the allegations as levelled by respondent No.2 in his complaint, on the basis of which FIR No. 52 dated 11.3.2011 was registered, are taken on the face value, no offence is disclosed against either of the petitioners. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further argued that even if the allegations as levelled by respondent No.2 in his complaint, on the basis of which FIR No. 52 dated 11.3.2011 was registered, are taken on the face value, no offence is disclosed against either of the petitioners. Petitioners No.1, 3 to 5 have absolutely no role in the agreement executed in between petitioner No.2 and respondent No.2. No document in pursuance of that agreement was either prepared by them or they are party to the execution of that document. This FIR is an extension of matrimonial discord in between respondent No.2 and petitioner No.3 in which divorce was granted by mutual consent. Petitioner No.3 has been mischievously arrayed as an accused in the FIR. 14. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has argued that petitioner No.2 vide agreement dated 11.06.2003 had not only agreed to sell his share but has also defined the area to be sold of which possession was given. The allegations have been levelled against the petitioners for forging the family arrangement and a rough site plan which was produced in the rent petition titled as "Rajiv Chanana v. Krishan Kumar". Petitioner No.2 had wrongly mentioned in the agreement that the property, which he had agreed to sell, was free from all incumbrances while it was attached in arbitration proceedings. Petitioner No.3 was aware that agreement was with regard to 37'9" X 178" area of industrialshed No.99 Industrial Area Phase-1, Chandigarh but she also resiled from this fact in collusion with petitioners No.1 and 2. Petitioners No.4 and 5 were signatory to the forged will and family arrangement. He has further argued that the police has presented the challan after investigation. In the petition under Section 482 of the Code, this Court has not to appraise the evidence produced before the Court. If the petitioners have any plea to put forth, they can place the same before the trial Court at the relevant stage of the trial. In support of his arguments, he has relied upon State of Bihar and another v. Shri P.P. Sharma and another, 1991 Cri.L.J. 1438(1); Upkar Singh v. Ved Parkash 2004(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 294; and judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Crl. Appeal No. 1297 of 2004 decided on 11.02.2014, titled as Vijayander Kumar and others v. State of Rajasthan and another. 15. Appeal No. 1297 of 2004 decided on 11.02.2014, titled as Vijayander Kumar and others v. State of Rajasthan and another. 15. Learned State counsel representing Union Territory, Chandigarh has argued that complaint filed by respondent No.2 is result of mala fide is no ground for quashing of the proceedings. In proceedings under Section 482 of the Code, the evidence collected and produced by the prosecution is not to be appraised as a Court of appeal or revision. When the allegations levelled by the complainant are assumed to be true, no relief can be allowed to the petitioners by quashing the FIR. He has relied upon observations in Monica Kumar (Dr.) and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases 781. 16. Before proceeding further, it will be relevant to have a look on the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case Monica Kumar (Dr.) and Another (supra) regarding the scope of Section 482 of the Code and the cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognisable offences to prevent the abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It was observed in the aforesaid case as follows:- "It may be mentioned that in exercise of the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code, this Court has to prima facie ascertain about the existence of the sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For limited purpose the court can evaluate the material and documents on record but it cannot be appreciate the evidence so as to access the credibility of the statements of the witnesses recorded in the course of investigation. Further it is not required to appreciate the evidence to find out whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. In case of Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 1956, it was observed by the Apex Court that when the material relied upon by a party are required to be proved, no inference can be drawn on the basis of materials to conclude the FIR/complaint version to be unacceptable. In case of Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 1956, it was observed by the Apex Court that when the material relied upon by a party are required to be proved, no inference can be drawn on the basis of materials to conclude the FIR/complaint version to be unacceptable. The scope of exercise of the power under Section 482 of the Code and categories of the cases where High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognisable offences to prevent the abuse of the process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set in detail by the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335. The Hon'ble Apex Court has enumerated as under:- "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognisable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognisable offence but constitute only a non-cognisable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 17. In case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 Hon'ble Supreme Court summarized some of the categories of cases in which inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings as follows:- (i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) Where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. (iii) Where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 18. Testing the allegations levelled in the present case by respondent No.2 on the parameters as laid above by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, I find that it is a fit case which call for invoking the inherent power of this Court to quash the FIR in question and the subsequent proceedings for the reasons:- (i) The allegations in the FIR even if taken on face value and accepted in entirety disclosed no prima facie case to constitute or make out a case against the petitioners. (ii) The criminal proceedings instituted by respondent No.2 are actuated with mala fide, malice, with an ulterior motive to wreak vengeance on the petitioners out of his personal grudge and for the reasons apparent. 19. Now, I proceed to discuss the reasons for my reaching the above conclusion. 20. Firstly, respondent No.2 had a deal with petitioner No.2 in which petitioners No.1,3,4 and 5 had absolutely no role to play. This deal was for purchase of ?rd share of the industrial-shed of petitioner No.2. 19. Now, I proceed to discuss the reasons for my reaching the above conclusion. 20. Firstly, respondent No.2 had a deal with petitioner No.2 in which petitioners No.1,3,4 and 5 had absolutely no role to play. This deal was for purchase of ?rd share of the industrial-shed of petitioner No.2. The fact that petitioners No.4 and 5 had signed the Will of late Shri Charan Dass dated 18.09.1995 is no reason to array them as accused with regard to a dispute of respondent No.2 with petitioner No.2 which has started much afterwards. The Will of late Shri Charan Dass Nagpal was a matter in between his legal heirs. The respondent No.2 being a person alien to this matter has no locus standi to raise any plea regarding the genuineness or validity of that Will. So far as the subject matter of the agreement to sell (Annexure P-6) is concerned, it is nowhere in dispute that petitioner No.2 was owner of ?rd share in the industrial-shed. Moreover, petitioner No.2 or any of the legal heirs of late Shri Charan Dass Nagpal had ever challenged this agreement or the share of petitioner No.2 mentioned in the agreement dated 11.06.2003. 21. Secondly, much stress has been given on the point that petitioner No.2 had mentioned the area of the plot of which possession was delivered to respondent No.2 as 37' 9" X 178' adjoining plot No.98, Industrial Area, Phase-I, Chandigarh which admittedly is one half share of the plot/shed. The question which arise for consideration in this regard is qua the effect of this recital in the agreement. There is clear recital in para 1 of the agreement that petitioner No.2 is absolute owner of ?rd share in industrial-shed No.99, Industrial Area, Phase-I, Chandigarh and he agreed to sell his share to respondent No.2 on the terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement. It was specifically inquired from counsel for respondent No.2 as to whether under this agreement, a sale deed more than the share of vendor could be got executed. Though learned counsel for respondent No.2 has not come up with any specific reply to this query but the answer to this is clear and unambiguous. It was specifically inquired from counsel for respondent No.2 as to whether under this agreement, a sale deed more than the share of vendor could be got executed. Though learned counsel for respondent No.2 has not come up with any specific reply to this query but the answer to this is clear and unambiguous. The sale deed was to be executed for the share of petitioner No.2 and nothing beyond that even if the possession of more portion of the plot/shed than the title of petitioner No.2 had been given under the agreement. 22. Thirdly, even the sale deed which was got executed by respondent No.2 through his brother, who was appointed as sub attorney by him, the sale of ?rd share of industrial plot No.99, Industrial Area, Phase-I, Chandigarh has been effected and there is no mention in the sale seed regarding selling of 37'9"X178' area to respondent No.2. It is clear that respondent No.2 has only created a hype regarding the area agreed to be sold to him by petitioner No.2 when the terms of the agreement (Annexure P-6) are very clear and unambiguous. 23. Fourthly, so far as the family arrangement is concerned, it was executed on 20.11.1992 i.e. much before the date of agreement to sell dated 11.11.2003. Respondent No.2 is neither a party to this family arrangement nor any of the persons inheriting the property of late Shri Charan Dass Nagpal has challenged this family arrangement. Respondent No.2 could have no basis to allege that it was a family arrangement fabricated at any subsequent stage or it was anti-dated. As per respondent No.2, this family arrangement was produced only in the rent petition titled, "Rajiv Chanana v. Krishan Kumar". There is nothing that the Court has given any finding regarding the fabrication of this family arrangement. The plea taken by respondent No.2 with regard to this family arrangement is misplaced and without any substance. This family arrangement has not affected the right of respondent No.2 under the agreement dated 11.06.2003. 24. It has been argued that some rough site plan was fabricated by the petitioners to reduce the area of respondent No.2 mentioned in the agreement. As already discussed, the vendor was owner of ?rd share in the industrial shed. This family arrangement has not affected the right of respondent No.2 under the agreement dated 11.06.2003. 24. It has been argued that some rough site plan was fabricated by the petitioners to reduce the area of respondent No.2 mentioned in the agreement. As already discussed, the vendor was owner of ?rd share in the industrial shed. As per recital in the agreement, the total area of the plot was 74'X178' and in no manner he (the vendor) could sell more than his share in the shed so this allegation levelled by respondent No.2 is also without any substance. 25. Fifthly, even otherwise, the entire dispute in between respondent No.2 and petitioner No.2 was of civil nature having not an iota of criminal tinge therein. The agreement was executed on 11.06.2003. The sale deed was got executed by respondent No.2, by appointing his brother as sub attorney, in his favour on 09.06.2005. The complaint was made on 15.02.2011 and there is absolutely no explanation for the delay in filing the complaint and this fact in itself reflects the vengeance on the part of respondent No.2 who was facing trial in the case bearing FIR No.262 dated 05.12.2006 got registered against him by petitioner No.1 and sufficient to depict the misuse of process of Court. The vengeance of the respondent No.2 is further reflected from the fact that the strain in his matrimonial relation with petitioner No.3, who was daughter of petitioner No.1, led to the end of his matrimonial alliance with her through decree of divorce by mutual consent. This appears to have given a reason to respondent No.2 to unnecessarily implicate petitioners No. 1, 3, 4 and 5 in the case. He had gone to the extent of not disclosing the earlier complaint made before the Court on the basis of which FIR was registered. 26. One more point stressed by learned counsel for respondent No.2 is that in the agreement (Annexure P-6) this fact was mentioned that the property is not subject to any attachment, lien, mortgage or Court dispute and is free from all sort of incumbrances. This property was in fact lying attached and this amount to a wrong statement on the part of petitioner No.2. The above arguments has also no substance. This property was in fact lying attached and this amount to a wrong statement on the part of petitioner No.2. The above arguments has also no substance. This fact was clearly discussed in between the parties and was narrated in the receipt relied upon by respondent No.2, which has been placed on file as Annexure P-7. In this receipt, it is mentioned that respondent No.2 will get the matter settled in the execution petition in which share of petitioner No.2 had been attached. It was further agreed that in case the amount to be paid to settle, exceeds Rs. 10 lacs which were kept at the disposal of respondent No.2, the same shall be paid by petitioner No.2. 27. In view of the above facts, respondent No.2 cannot allege that he was not aware of the incumbrances on the property of petitioner No.2. 28. In view of the facts discussed above, it is clear that the allegations levelled in the FIR disclose no criminal offence committed by the petitioners. The observations made in the case of Monica Kumar (Dr.) (supra) by learned State counsel representing Union Territory, Chandigarh are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 29. In the case of State of Bihar and another v. P.P. Sharma (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that after the presentation of challan in Court, the High Court should refrain from entertaining quashing proceedings. In case of Vijayander Kumar and others v. State of Rajasthan and another (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the order of Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Bench, declining to interfere in the order of Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence with the observation that the informant and witnesses have supported the allegations made in the FIR, as such, it would not be appropriate to evaluate the evidence on the basis of documents annexed with the memo of appeal. In the case of Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had allowed the application of complainant under Section 156 (3) of the Code filed before the Magistrate and set aside the order of the High Court affirming the order of Court of Sessions which has set aside the orders of the Magistrate passed under Section 156(3) of the Code. The facts of the above case and the observations made therein are not relevant in the present case. 30. Now the question which require answer in view of the observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and another v. P.P. Sharma (supra), is as to whether this Court should proceed with the proceedings in this petition even after the presentation of challan by the police in the Court. It has been argued that the case is still at preliminary stage and the charge has not been framed. To find the answer to the above query, reference can be made to the observations in case Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, 2013(3) SCC 330 , wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the discretion vested under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised by this Court to prevent the abuse of process of Court and to secure the ends of justice. The observation made in para 20 of the judgment in Rajiv Thapar's case (supra) is reproduced as follows:- "20. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx The discretion vested in a High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised suo-moto to prevent the abuse of process of a court, and/or to secure the ends of justice. This Court had an occasion to examine the matter in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (supra) (incidentally the said judgment was heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-complainant), wherein it was held thus:- "29. This Court had an occasion to examine the matter in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (supra) (incidentally the said judgment was heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-complainant), wherein it was held thus:- "29. Regarding the argument of accused having to face the trial despite being in a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and Article 226 of Constitution of India is unlimited where under in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal's case." (emphasis is ours) Recently, this Court again had an occasion to examine the ambit and scope of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar & Ors., (2008) 14 SCC 1 , wherein in the main order it was observed, that the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was unlimited. In the instant judgment, this Court held that the High Court could make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In a concurring separate order passed in the same case, it was additionally observed, that under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court was free to consider even material, that may be produced on behalf of the accused, to arrive at a decision whether the charge as framed could be maintained. The aforesaid parameters shall be kept in mind while we examine whether the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the facts and circumstances of this case." 31. In the case Joseph Salvaraja v. State of Gujarat and others, (2011) 7 SCC 59 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that even after the filing of charge-sheet, this fact can be examined as to whether a prima facie case is made out on the basis of documents produced or not. The relevant observations are contained in para No.16, which is reproduced as follows:- "16. The relevant observations are contained in para No.16, which is reproduced as follows:- "16. Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the Appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the Complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the Appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents etc. or not." 32. In the case of M/s Pepsi Foods Limited and Another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and another 1997(4) RCR (Crl.)761 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:- "It is settled that High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this court examined the extraordinary power under article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised invoking these powers." 33. As a sequel of what is discussed herein-above and following the ratio of above referred judgments, I am of the considered view that the impugned FIR and subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including the submission of charge-sheet by the police are sheer abuse on the process of the Court and are liable to be quashed to secure the ends of justice. 34. Ordered accordingly.