JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J. 1. It is one of those unfortunate cases, where sons have been litigating with their father over a property, which he got through his father, by way of a testamentary instrument (will). An endeavour was made by this Court to have the dispute amicably resolved. Regretfully, for reasons best known to the petitioners herein (sons), no ice could be broken. Hence, the present judgment. 2. In this petition, filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India, plaintiffs-petitioners (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) have assailed the order dated 24.11.2012, passed by learned District Judge, Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 25 of 2011, titled whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? As Arjun Singh vs. Swaran Singh & another. In an application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, trial Court vide order dated 26.5.2011, passed in CMA No. 93 of 2010, titled as Arjun Singh vs. Swaran Singh & another, directed the parties to maintain status quo qua the suit property during trial. It is this order, which was assailed by the defendants-respondents (hereinafter referred to as the defendants), before the lower appellate Court. Finding favour with the submission of the defendants, plaintiffs’ application, filed under the provisions of Section 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stands dismissed. Also, application filed by the defendants, restraining the plaintiffs from interfering with their possession, during trial, stands allowed. 3. Swaran Singh and Kamaldeep Singh, as plaintiffs, pleaded themselves to be coparceners alongwith defendants Arjun Singh (father), Nimo (mother) and sisters Pushpa Devi and Sambedna, in the joint Hindu family property, subject matter of the present lis. Without any legal necessity, defendant No.1 is alienating the suit property, thus adversely affecting their valuable right. Property originally belonging to Smt. Sanduri Devi was inherited by her son Dal Singh and thereafter by his son defendant Arjun Singh. Arjun Singh had two wives, namely Geeta and Nimo. Plaintiffs are born through Gita and defendants No. 3 & 4 are born through Nimo (respondent No. 2 herein). 4. Significantly, plaint does not disclose that parties are governed by the Mitakshra System of Law. Arjun Singh had two wives, namely Geeta and Nimo. Plaintiffs are born through Gita and defendants No. 3 & 4 are born through Nimo (respondent No. 2 herein). 4. Significantly, plaint does not disclose that parties are governed by the Mitakshra System of Law. Plaintiffs concealed that property belonging to Dal Singh did not devolve upon Arjun Singh by way of succession but by way of a testamentary instrument, i.e. registered Will dated 4.5.1964. As is borne out from the pleadings, suit land was originally allotted to Smt. Sanduri Devi by the State of Punjab. She willed it in favour of Dal Singh. After her death, Will was executed and mutation effected in the revenue record. Even Dal Singh during his life time, executed a registered Will dated 4.5.1964 in favour of his son Arjun, who also got the same executed and the property stood mutated in his name in the year 1971. All these facts have not been disputed by the plaintiffs. 5. Noticeably, ignoring such facts, trial Court, while allowing the application, solely relied upon copy of jamabandi, revealing the property to have been inherited by Arjun Singh though his father Dal Singh, passed an interim order of status quo. Trial Court failed to either refer to or deal with the factual matrix, with regard to devolution of the property by way of testamentary instrument on the legal heir of Sanduri or Dal Singh. 6. In this backdrop, reliance on provisions of Sections 6(3) and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as also Section 180 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, by learned counsel for the plaintiffs, is absolutely misconceived. 7. Significantly, in the instant case, plaintiffs have not been able to establish, ex facie, much less prima facie, that any Joint Hindu Family ever existed. Similarly, there is also nothing on record to show acquisition of the property and the ownership thereof by the Joint Hindu Family. Even otherwise, there cannot be any presumption of a property being joint family property, only on account of existence of Joint Hindu Family. Plaintiffs, in my considered view, have failed to place any material on record to prima facie establish such fact. Hence, applying the principles of law discussed hereinafter, existence of joint Hindu family or the plaintiffs being coparceners does not arise. 8. Plaintiffs, in my considered view, have failed to place any material on record to prima facie establish such fact. Hence, applying the principles of law discussed hereinafter, existence of joint Hindu family or the plaintiffs being coparceners does not arise. 8. Similar question with regard to inheritance and devolution of property under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act came up for consideration before the apex Court in Yudhishter vs. Ashok Kumar, (1987) 1 SCC 204, in which the Court held as under: “10. This question has been considered by this Court in CWT vs. Chander Sen, (1986) 3 SCC 567 , where one of us (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J) observed that under the Hindu Law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in father’s property and become part of the coparcenary. His fight accrues to him not on the’ death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Normally, therefore whenever the father gets a property from whatever source, from the grandfather or from any other source, be it separated property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family with him. This Court observed that this position has been affected by section8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and, therefore, after the Act, when the son inherited the property in the situation contemplated by section 8, he does not take it as Karta of his own undivided family but takes it in his individual capacity. At pages 577 to 578 of the report, this Court dealt with the effect of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and. the commentary made by Mulla, 15th Edition pages 924-926 as well as Mayne’s on Hindu Law 12th Edition pages 918-919. Shri Banerji relied on the said observations of Mayne on Hindu Law, 12th Edition at pages 918-919. This Court observed in the aforesaid decision that the views expressed by the Allahabad High Court, the Madras High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court appeared to be correct and was unable to accept the views of the Gujarat High Court. To the similar effect is the observation of learned author of Mayne’s Hindu Law, 12th Edition page 919. To the similar effect is the observation of learned author of Mayne’s Hindu Law, 12th Edition page 919. In that view of the matter, it would be difficult to hold that property which developed on a Hindu under section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be HUF in his hand vis-a-vis his own sons. If that be the position then the property which developed upon the father of the respondent in the instant case on the demise of his grandfather could not be said to be HUF property. If that is so, then the appellate authority was fight in holding that the respondent was a licensee of his father in respect of the ancestral house.” 9. The apex Court in Sheela Devi and others vs. Lal Chand and another, (2006) 8 SCC 581 , had an occasion to deal with the question as to when the joint family property can be treated as separate or coparcenary. The Court, taking into account the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act (unamended and amended in 2005) observed as under: “14. In Law of Joint Family System, Debts, Gifts, Maintenance, Damdupat, Benami Transaction and Pre-emption, 1st Edition 1993, by Dr. Paras Diwan, at p. 51, it is stated: "They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Such share, however, is ancestral property only as regards his male issues. As regards other relations, it is a separate property, and if the coparcener dies without leaving male issues, it passes to his heirs by succession. A person who for the time being is the sole surviving coparcener is entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as if it were his separate property. He may sell or mortgage the property without legal necessity or he may make a gift of it. If a son is subsequently born to him or adopted by him, the alienation, whether it is by way of sale, mortgage or gift, will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alienations made by his father before he was born or begotten." 15. If a son is subsequently born to him or adopted by him, the alienation, whether it is by way of sale, mortgage or gift, will nevertheless stand, for a son cannot object to alienations made by his father before he was born or begotten." 15. In M.T. Pankajammal vs. M.T. Parthasarathy Aiyangar, AIR 1946 Mad 99 it was held: (AIR p. 101) "If it were necessary I would on the circumstances above adverted be prepared to hold that there was no intention on the part of the executant that the son to be adopted had to share the property with any son that may be born to him subsequently. But as I have already held on a construction of the settlement deed, the plaintiff became entitled to the property only on the death of his father and as an adopted son, according to Hindu law he had to share it along with the after-born brother and his stepmother." 16. Although in 1927, Babu Ram had no son and the property at his hands became a separate property. But, in view of the well-settled principles of Hindu law, as soon as a son was born to him the concept of the property being a coparcenary property in terms of the Mitakshara school of Hindu law revived. The law in this behalf has succinctly been stated in Mayne's Hindu Law & Usage, 14th Edition, at pp. 627-28 and 641, in the following terms: "Where ancestral property has been divided between several joint owners, there can be no doubt that if any of them have male issue living at the time of the partition, the share which falls to him will continue to be ancestral property in his hands, as regards his male issue, for their rights had already attached upon it, and the partition only cuts off the claims of the dividing members. The father and his male issue still remain joint. The same rule would apply even where the partition had been made before the birth of male issue or before a son is adopted, for the share which is taken at a partition, by one of the coparceners is taken by him as representing his branch. The father and his male issue still remain joint. The same rule would apply even where the partition had been made before the birth of male issue or before a son is adopted, for the share which is taken at a partition, by one of the coparceners is taken by him as representing his branch. It was held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that where a father divided the family property between him and his sons, the share obtained by him was his self-acquired property which he could bequeath to his wife. Coparceners may hold property separately – An examination into the property of the joint family would not be complete without pointing out what property may be held by the individual members as their separate property. All property which is not held in coparcenary is separate property and Hindu law recognises separate property of individual members of a coparcenary as well as of separated members. (1) Property which comes to a man as obstructed heritage (sapratibandhadayd) is his separate property. It is not self-acquired property within the meaning of Hindu law, though in their incidents, there may be no difference between the two species." (See also Muttayan Chettiar vs. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinnatambiar, (1881-82) 9 IA 128: ILR (1883) 6 Mad 1 (PC). 17. The question again came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Pratap Narain vs. CIT, (1967) 63 ITR 505 (All) wherein Pathak, J. (as His Lordship then was) opined: (ITR p. 510) "It seems to us that it is now well settled, that when Hindu undivided family property is partitioned between the members of a Hindu undivided family, and a share is obtained on such partition by a coparcener, it is ancestral property as regards his male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently. We are of opinion that it is not correct to say that the share of the property, upon partition, constitutes the separate property of the coparcener and that it is only subsequently when a son is born that the property becomes ancestral property or Hindu undivided family property. The birth of the son does not alter the nature of the property. The property all along continues to be coparcenary property. ... The birth of the son does not alter the nature of the property. The property all along continues to be coparcenary property. ... But upon the birth of a son all the rights which belong to a coparcener belong to that son, and the enlarged rights hitherto enjoyed by the sole coparcener are now abridged within their normal compass." 18. We may, however, notice that the same learned Judge in CWT vs. Chander Sen, (1986) 3 SCC 567 , in a case where the father and his son constituted a HUF and had been carrying on business in a partnership firm, stated the law in the following terms: (SCC p. 577, paras 20-22) "20. We have noted the divergent views expressed on this aspect by the Allahabad High Court, Full Bench of the Madras High Court, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh High Courts on one side and the Gujarat High Court on the other. 21. It is necessary to bear in mind the Preamble to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Preamble states that it was an Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus. 22. In view of the Preamble to the Act i.e. that to modify where necessary and to codify the law, in our opinion it is not possible when Schedule indicates heirs in Class I and only includes son and does not include son's son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8 he takes it as Karta of his own undivided family. The Gujarat High Court's view noted above, if accepted, would mean that though the son of a predeceased son and not the son of a son who is intended to be excluded under Section 8 to inherit, the latter would by applying the old Hindu law get a right by birth of the said property contrary to the scheme outlined in Section 8. Furthermore as noted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the Act makes it clear by Section 4 that one should look to the Act in case of doubt and not to the pre-existing Hindu law. Furthermore as noted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the Act makes it clear by Section 4 that one should look to the Act in case of doubt and not to the pre-existing Hindu law. It would be difficult to hold today the property which devolved on a Hindu under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act would be HUF in his hand vis-a-vis his own son; that would amount to creating two classes among the heirs mentioned in Class I, the male heirs in whose hands it will be joint Hindu family property and vis-a-vis son and female heirs with respect to whom no such concept could be applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned that heirs in Class I of Schedule under Section 8 of the Act included widow, mother, daughter of predeceased son, etc." 19. In para 15, however, the law was stated as under: (SCC pp. 573-74) "15. It is clear that under the Hindu law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in the father's property and becomes part of the coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Normally, therefore whenever the father gets a property from whatever source from the grandfather or from any other source, be it separated property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family with him. But the question is: Is the position affected by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and if so, how? The basic argument is that Section 8 indicates the heirs in respect of certain property and Class I of the heirs includes the son but not the grandson. It includes, however, the son of the predeceased son. It is this position which has mainly induced the Allahabad High Court in the two judgments, we have noticed, to take the view that the income from the assets inherited by son from his father from whom he has separated by partition can be assessed as income of the son individually. It includes, however, the son of the predeceased son. It is this position which has mainly induced the Allahabad High Court in the two judgments, we have noticed, to take the view that the income from the assets inherited by son from his father from whom he has separated by partition can be assessed as income of the son individually. Under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the property of the father who dies intestate devolves on his son in his individual capacity and not as Karta of his own family. On the other hand, the Gujarat High Court has taken the contrary view." The said decision has been followed by this Court in CIT vs. P.L. Karuppan Chettiar, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 580 and CIT vs. M. Karthikeyan, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 112. 20. In Eramma vs. Verrupanna, (1966) 2 SCR 626 , this Court observed: (SCR p. 629 E-F) "It is clear from the express language of the section that it applies only to coparcenary property of the male Hindu holder who dies after the commencement of the Act. It is manifest that the language of Section 8 must be construed in the context of Section 6 of the Act. We accordingly hold that the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act are not retrospective in operation and where a male Hindu died before the Act came into force i.e. where succession opened before the Act, Section 8 of the Act will have no application." (See also Daya Singh vs. Dhan Kaur.)” 10. The aforesaid principle stands reiterated in M. Yogendra and others vs. Leelamma N. and others, (2009) 15 SCC 184 and Bhanwar Singh vs. Puran and others, (2008) 3 SCC 87 . 11. In the case in hand, there is nothing on record to even prima facie show that the property ever belonged to the Joint Hindu Family. Hence, the question of plaintiffs being coparceners does not arise at all. 12. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has referred to and relied upon the law laid down by the apex Court in Valliammai Achi vs. Nagappa Chettiar and another, AIR 1967 SC 1153 (paras 9, 10, 11) and Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and others vs. Chander Sen and others, (1986) 3 SCC 567 , which in my considered view, is squarely inapplicable to the given fact situation. 13. 13. In Villiammai Achi (supra), the Court was dealing with a case, as is evident from para-2 of the report, where property belonged to the Joint Hindu Family. It is in this backdrop, the Court held that a father in Mitakshra family has a limited right to make a Will as under the Mitakshra Law, each son upon his birth takes an interest equal to that of his father in ancestral property, moveable or immoveable and the right of a son in such ancestral property is wholly independent of and not through his father. To the same effect is the opinion rendered by apex Court in Chander Sen (supra). 14. Opposing the petition, Mr. R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, ably assisted by Mr. Gaurav Thakur, Advocate, has referred to and relied upon the decision rendered by the apex Court in Sunil Kumar and another v. Ram Parkash and others, (1988) 2 SCC 77 , wherein it is held that a coparcener by birth takes interest in the ancestral property, but is not entitled to separate possession of the coparcenary estate. His rights are not independent and the control of the Karta, upon whom would rests the responsibility of handling the property, is the best judge to beneficially put the property so as to sub-serve the interest of the family. A coparcener cannot interfere in the act of management. Power of Karta to manage the property includes power to sell. If the sale is not for benefit, the purchaser takes the risk and the right and interest of the coparcener would remain unimpaired in the alienated property, which can be independently asserted by challenging the sale and not obstruction thereof. The Court specifically held that the right to obstruct alienation could be considered incidental to the right to challenge alienation by the coparcener. But however, coparcener cannot claim the right to interfere with the process of alienation and any move on the part of the coparcener, seeking injunction, restraining the Karta from alienating the coparcenary property, is misconceived and untenable in law. 15. To the same effect is also decision rendered by the apex Court in Subhodkumar and others vs. Bhagwant Namdeorao Mehetre and others, (2007) 10 SCC 571 . 16. In the instant case, plaintiffs are not seeking partition of the property. 15. To the same effect is also decision rendered by the apex Court in Subhodkumar and others vs. Bhagwant Namdeorao Mehetre and others, (2007) 10 SCC 571 . 16. In the instant case, plaintiffs are not seeking partition of the property. There is also no challenge either to the authority of the person making the Will or its genuineness, through which defendant Arjun Singh got the property. 17. Principles for grant of temporary injunction, either under the provisions of Specific Reliefs Act, 1963 or the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are now well settled. Plaintiffs have to satisfy the Court, existence of essential ingredients, being (a) prima facie strong case; (b) irreparable loss and injury, which cannot be compensated in terms of money; and (c) balance of convenience in their favour, which in the instant case none exists. 18. It cannot be said that findings returned by the lower Appellate Court are perverse, erroneous, in violation of principles of natural justice, arbitrary or capricious, resulting into manifest injustice. It also cannot be said that the Court below exceeded or failed to correctly exercise the jurisdiction so vested in it. It also cannot be said that the findings are contrary to the settled principles of law. 19. Hence, impugned order cannot be said to be unreasonable, illegal and perverse, warranting interference by this Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Waryam Singh and another vs. Amarnath and another, AIR 1954 SC 215 (Constitution Bench). 20. Any observation made hereinabove shall have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the main case. Parties, through their learned counsel, are directed to appear before the Court below on 6.8.2014. Record be immediately sent back. 21. For all the aforesaid reasons, present petition, devoid of merit, is dismissed. Petition stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.