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2014 DIGILAW 871 (SC)

Ram Chandra v. State of U. P.

2014-08-21

KURIAN JOSEPH, R.M.LODHA, ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN

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JUDGMENT : 1. Ms Sandhya Goswami, learned counsel for the appellant heavily relies upon the certificate issued by the Headmaster, Government College, Fatehpur, U.P. dated 26-10-2013. This certificate records that Ram Chandra, son of Raghuveer Prasad got initial admission on 8-10-1986 which is entered in the Admission Register at Serial No. 267 and the date of birth recorded therein is 2-1-1979. 2. The certificate relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant does not inspire confidence for more than one reason: 2.1. In the first place from school leaving certificate dated 26-4-1995 produced by the appellant, it is seen that the date of initial admission of Ram Chandra in the school is 8-7-1989 and not 8-10-1986 as stated in the certificate issued by the Headmaster. 2.2. Secondly, the serial number of Admission Register mentioned in the certificate issued by the Headmaster is 267 while in the school leaving certificate serial number of Admission Register is 3200 and no number is given against the column “Last serial number of school admission”. 3. In Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B., (2012) 10 SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83, the 3-Judge Bench of this Court summed up the legal position with regard to claim of juvenility as follows : (SCC pp. 509-10, para 39) “39.1. A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage even after the final disposal of the case. It may be raised for the first time before this Court as well after the final disposal of the case. The delay in raising the claim of juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of such claim. The claim of juvenility can be raised in appeal even if not pressed before the trial court and can be raised for the first time before this Court though not pressed before the trial court and in the appeal court. 39.2. For making a claim with regard to juvenility after conviction, the claimant must produce some material which may prima facie satisfy the court that an inquiry into the claim of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has to be discharged by the person who claims juvenility. 39.3. 39.2. For making a claim with regard to juvenility after conviction, the claimant must produce some material which may prima facie satisfy the court that an inquiry into the claim of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has to be discharged by the person who claims juvenility. 39.3. As to what materials would prima facie satisfy the court and/or are sufficient for discharging the initial burden cannot be catalogued nor can it be laid down as to what weight should be given to a specific piece of evidence which may be sufficient to raise presumption of juvenility but the documents referred to in Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall definitely be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the court about the age of the delinquent necessitating further enquiry under Rule 12. The statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code is too tentative and may not by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject the claim of juvenility. The credibility and/or acceptability of the documents like the school leaving certificate or the voters' list, etc. obtained after conviction would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard-and-fast rule can be prescribed that they must be prima facie accepted or rejected. In Akbar Sheikh v. State of W.B., (2009) 7 SCC 415 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 431, Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 15 SCC 259 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 522, these documents were not found prima facie credible while in Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 13 SCC 523 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 857, the documents viz. school leaving certificate, marksheet and the medical report were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry and verification of the appellant's age. If such documents prima facie inspire confidence of the court, the court may act upon such documents for the purposes of Section 7-A and order an enquiry for determination of the age of the delinquent. 39.4. school leaving certificate, marksheet and the medical report were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry and verification of the appellant's age. If such documents prima facie inspire confidence of the court, the court may act upon such documents for the purposes of Section 7-A and order an enquiry for determination of the age of the delinquent. 39.4. An affidavit of the claimant or any of the parents or a sibling or a relative in support of the claim of juvenility raised for the first time in appeal or revision or before this Court during the pendency of the matter or after disposal of the case shall not be sufficient justifying an enquiry to determine the age of such person unless the circumstances of the case are so glaring that satisfy the judicial conscience of the court to order an enquiry into determination of the age of the delinquent. 39.5. The court where the plea of juvenility is raised for the first time should always be guided by the objectives of the 2000 Act and be alive to the position that the beneficent and salutary provisions contained in the 2000 Act are not defeated by the hypertechnical approach and the persons who are entitled to get benefits of the 2000 Act get such benefits. The courts should not be unnecessarily influenced by any general impression that in schools the parents/guardians understate the age of their wards by one or two years for future benefits or that age determination by medical examination is not very precise. The matter should be considered prima facie on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. 39.6. Claim of juvenility lacking in credibility or frivolous claim of juvenility or patently absurd or inherently improbable claim of juvenility must be rejected by the court at the threshold whenever raised.” 4. In the light of the above legal position, any claim of juvenility lacking in credibility must be rejected by the court at the threshold whenever raised. Moreover, making a claim of juvenility after conviction, the claimant must produce an evidence which prima facie satisfies the court that inquiry into the claim of juvenility is necessary. 5. In what we have indicated above, the documents produced by the appellant are self-contradictory and do not inspire any confidence. We are satisfied that the appellant's claim of juvenility does not require further inquiry. 6. Crl. 5. In what we have indicated above, the documents produced by the appellant are self-contradictory and do not inspire any confidence. We are satisfied that the appellant's claim of juvenility does not require further inquiry. 6. Crl. MP No. 14937 of 2012 is dismissed accordingly. Criminal Appeal No. 1372 of 2008 7. We have heard Ms Sandhya Goswami, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr Ratnakar Dash, learned Senior Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh. 8. The High Court in the impugned judgment has noted the twelve circumstances, which in its opinion form a complete chain which in all probability establish the complicity of the appellant in the offence. The circumstances noted by the High Court are: 8.1. The familiarity of the abducted child Chandan with the appellant Ram Chandra and the evidence that he used to visit Ram Chandra's house freely who was his neighbour. 8.2. The disappearance of Chandan on 19-2-1995 at about 4 p.m. and the simultaneous disappearance of the appellant Ram Chandra from his house and school. 8.3. The discovery of the dead body of the child Chandan on 6-3-1995 in an old well in a village neighbouring the village of the appellant, Dhansenpur. 8.4. The apprehension of the appellant on 8-3-1995 by the informant and other persons and his extra-judicial confession before them of having committed Chandan's murder and then throwing the corpse in the well. 8.5. The absence of any suggestion by the appellant that any third degree methods were used against him for compelling him to make the extra-judicial confession against his will. 8.6. The admission by the appellant that he had got the ransom note, which was received by the informant on 23-2-1995 written by Arvind and three lines of the note were written by his class fellow Dhanraj. 8.7. The subsequent apprehension of Arvind immediately thereafter and his admission about this allegation before the informant and other witnesses, and Arvind's subsequent deposition in court as an approver. 8.8. The subsequent admission about this fact by the witness PW 2 Dhanraj, who explained the circumstances how the appellant Ram Chandra, and one Vishambhar had compelled him to write the three lines on the ransom note. 8.9. 8.8. The subsequent admission about this fact by the witness PW 2 Dhanraj, who explained the circumstances how the appellant Ram Chandra, and one Vishambhar had compelled him to write the three lines on the ransom note. 8.9. The corroboration by the handwriting expert of the Forensic Science Laboratory that the portion of the handwritten note attributed to Arvind was indeed in the handwriting of Arvind, whose specimen writings had been taken by the CJM. 8.10. The falsity of the suggestion that the police had compelled Arvind and Dhanraj, PWs 1 and 2 to write the note after the apprehension of the appellant Ram Chandra on 8-3-1995, because the envelope (Ext. Ka-7) containing the ransom note bore a stamp mark of February 1995. 8.11. The corroboration of the appellant's extra-judicial confession by the medical evidence viz. the presence of a fracture of the hyoid bone in the neck of the deceased, which corroborated the averment in the extra-judicial confession that the child had been strangulated with a nylon rope. 8.12. Absence of any reason whatsoever for the informant to falsely implicate the appellant. 9. The High Court opined that the above circumstances provide for sufficient evidence for establishing the complicity of the appellant, Ram Chandra, in commission of crime under Section 302 and Section 364-A of the Penal Code, 1860. 10. We have carefully perused the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW 4, PW 5 and PW 7 and we find no justification to take a view different from that of the High Court. 11. As a matter of fact, the trial court as well as the High Court in the light of the above circumstances have concurrently held that cumulatively the circumstances established by the prosecution form a complete chain from any escape that the crime was committed by the accused Ram Chandra and none else. The chain of evidence furnished by the above circumstances is complete and does not leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, and establishes that within all human probability, the crime must have been committed by the appellant. 12. We, therefore, find no justification to interfere with the impugned judgment. Criminal appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.