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2014 DIGILAW 879 (KER)

T. v. Narayanan Nambiar VS T. V. Kunkamma Amma

2014-10-31

V.CHITAMBARESH

body2014
JUDGMENT V. CHITAMBARESH, J. 1. The sharers are still languishing in Courts without obtaining possession of the property allotted to them under a decree for partition in a suit filed more than half a century ago. 2. O.S. No. 37 of 1957 on the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge of Vadakara is a suit for partition wherein a preliminary decree was passed on 30.11.1962 followed by a final decree on 20.11.1971. The revision petitioners are the legal heirs of defendants 2, 13, 24 and 34 in the suit who filed E.P. No. 28 of 1982 for obtaining delivery of the items of property allotted to them. Delivery of possession was sought in respect of plots A and D in Item No. 3, plots A, B and C in Item No. 14 and plots A and C in Item No. 94 of the decree scheduled property. Defendants 47, 73 and 74 resisted the same contending that they are deemed tenants under Section 7B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (the Act for short). The Execution Court initially held that such a plea cannot be considered in execution which was challenged in C.R.P. Nos. 1925, 1928, 1929, 1942 and 1968 of 1986. This Court by order dated 16.2.1989 therein held that the availability of the plea of deemed tenancy shall also be considered by the Execution Court. The Execution Court has now by order dated 20.3.1993 upheld the plea of deemed tenancy and dismissed the Execution Petition filed for obtaining delivery. This is challenged by the decree holders asserting that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree and the items of property deserve to be delivered over. 3. It appears that a portion of Item No. 14 of the decree schedule property was taken assignment of by two strangers who got themselves impleaded in this Civil Revision Petition as respondents 70 and 71. They along with defendants 47, 73 and 74 contend that they are holding the property on lease on the basis of a registered lease deed executed well before 11.4.1957. It is the case of the contesting respondents that the non obstante clause contained in Section 7B of the Act enables them to raise the plea of deemed tenancy and they are entitled to fixity of tenure. It is the case of the contesting respondents that the non obstante clause contained in Section 7B of the Act enables them to raise the plea of deemed tenancy and they are entitled to fixity of tenure. The contesting respondents maintain that the Execution Court was justified in dismissing the Execution Petition after upholding the plea of deemed tenancy. 4. I heard Mr. T. Sethumadhavan, Senior Advocate on behalf of the revision petitioners, Mr. M.C. Sen, Senior Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 39, Mr. R.D. Shenoy, Senior Advocate on behalf of respondents 70 and 71 and Mr. B. Krishnan, Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 62 in this Civil Revision Petition extensively. 5. The contesting respondents heavily rely on Section 7B (1) of the Act in support of their plea of deemed tenancy to topple the decree for partition which is extracted hereunder:- "7B. Certain persons occupying lands under leases granted by incompetent persons to be deemed tenants:- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of Court, any person in occupation of the land of another at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, on the basis of a registered deed purporting to be a lease deed, shall be deemed to be a tenant if he or his predecessor-in-interest was in occupation of such land on the 11th day of April, 1957, on the basis of that deed, notwithstanding the fact that the lease was granted by a person who had no right over the land or who was not competent to lease the land." Section 7B(1) of the Act came into effect with effect from 1.1.1970 even though it was declared unconstitutional in Chami Chettiar vs. Thirumandham Kunnu Bhagavathi Devaswom, 1970 KLT 897 (FB). But then the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (the Amendment Act for short) was included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India later. Such inclusion by the Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1972 was made on 9.6.1972 which has a retrospective effect by virtue of Article 31B of the Constitution of India which is extracted hereunder:- "31B. But then the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (the Amendment Act for short) was included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India later. Such inclusion by the Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1972 was made on 9.6.1972 which has a retrospective effect by virtue of Article 31B of the Constitution of India which is extracted hereunder:- "31B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations - Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in article 31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provision thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force." (Emphasis supplied). It may incidentally be stated that the validity of the Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1972 has already been upheld in His Holiness Kesaranda Bharati Sripadgalvaru and others vs. State of Kerala and others, AIR 1973 SC 1461 . 6. What is the impact of the inclusion of the Amendment Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India can be tested with reference to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in that regard. A Constitutional bench of the Supreme Court in Jagannath vs. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms and Others, 1971 (2) SCC 893 , has held as follows:- "23. Apart from the question as to whether fundamental rights originally enshrined in the Constitution were subject to the amendatory process of Article 368 it must now be held that Article 31-B and the Ninth Schedule have cured the defect, if any, in the various Acts mentioned in the said Schedule as regards any unconstitutionality alleged on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights, and by the express words of Article 31-B such curing of the defect took place with retrospective operation from the dates on which the Acts were put on the statute book. These Acts even if void or inoperative at the time when they were enacted by reason of infringement of Article 13(2) of the Constitution, assumed full force and vigour from the respective dates of their enactment after their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule, read with Article 31-B of the Constitution." (Emphasis supplied) The same view is taken in Sasanka Sekhar Maity vs. Union of India, 1980 (4) SCC 716 , by the Constitutional bench of the Supreme Court and in Glanrock Estate Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2010 (10) 96. 7. It is therefore obvious that the effect of inclusion of the Amendment Act in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India is that it assumed full force and vigour right from the inception. Section 7B of the Act should therefore be deemed to be in the statute book from 1.1.1970 notwithstanding the fact that it was declared unconstitutional in Chami Chettiar's case. The plea of deemed tenancy under Section 7B of the Act was therefore very much available to the contesting respondents to be urged in the final decree proceedings from 1.1.1970 itself. I.A. No. 35 of 1966 filed for passing the final decree in terms of the preliminary decree was pending disposal for almost about 5 years. No plea based on Section 7B of the Act was raised either by the contesting respondents or their predecessors at any time before the final decree was passed on 20.11.1971. The contesting respondents could have either amended their pleadings or filed supplementary pleadings in the final decree proceedings after Section 7B of the Act was introduced. The Amendment Act was declared unconstitutional by the dictum in Chami Chettiar's case on 21.10.1970 only even though revalidated on 9.6.1972 as aforesaid. It is not as if the plea raised in the final decree proceedings based on Section 7B of the Act could not be urged due to its invalidation in Chami Chettiar's case. The final decree was passed on 17.11.1970 followed by a modified final decree on 20.11.1971 without any whisper of any plea under Section 7B of the Act. 8. Wisdom dawned on the contesting respondents to urge the plea of deemed tenancy under Section 7B of the Act only when E.P. No. 28 of 1982 was filed for obtaining delivery of the allotted items. 8. Wisdom dawned on the contesting respondents to urge the plea of deemed tenancy under Section 7B of the Act only when E.P. No. 28 of 1982 was filed for obtaining delivery of the allotted items. The contesting respondents has had an opportunity to urge the plea of deemed tenancy under Section 7B of the Act even when the final decree proceedings were pending. The transitory provision contained in Section 108(3) of the Amendment Act enabled the contesting respondents to have the final decree proceedings disposed of in accordance therewith. It is as follows:- "108. Transitory provisions:- (1) xxxxxxxxxxxx (2) xxxxxxxxxxxx (3) If in any suit, application, appeal, revision, review, proceedings in execution of a decree or other proceedings pending at the commencement of this Section before any Court, Tribunal, officer or other authority, any person claims any benefit, right or remedy conferred by any of the provisions of the principal Act or the principal Act as amended by this Act, such suit, application, appeal, revision, review, proceedings in execution or other proceedings shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act." The contesting respondents having failed to avail of the benefit of Section 108(3) of the Amendment Act in respect of the pending proceedings cannot be permitted to rake up the issue in execution. The non obstante clause in Section 7B of the Act would come to the rescue of the contesting respondents only if the plea was not available when the final decree was passed. The plea of deemed tenancy in short might and ought to have been raised by the contesting respondents even before the final decree was passed and the failure operates as constructive resjudicata. The contesting respondents having failed to urge this plea at any time before are estopped from raising their objection in the proceedings in execution. It is trite law that the executing court cannot go behind the decree and can only execute the decree as it stands which warrants a warrant of delivery to be issued. 9. I may incidentally state that defendant No. 43 had applied for delivery of plots B and E in Item No. 3 of the decree scheduled property by filing E.P. No. 216 of 1983. 9. I may incidentally state that defendant No. 43 had applied for delivery of plots B and E in Item No. 3 of the decree scheduled property by filing E.P. No. 216 of 1983. The Execution Court had disposed of the present Execution Petition (E.P. No. 28 of 1982) along with E.P. No. 216 of 1983 aforesaid jointly by the impugned order dated 20.3.1993. The order in E.P. No. 216 of 1983 was the subject matter of C.R.P. No. 147 of 1994 on the file of this Court at the instance of the legal heirs of defendant No.43 to whom it was allotted. This Court by order dated 3.4.2000 set at naught the benefit of deemed tenancy granted to defendant No. 47 by observing as follows:- "6. The final decree in the case was passed on 17.11.1970 after the Kerala Land Reforms Amendment Act, Act 35 of 1969 came into force with effect from 1.1.1970. Section 7B of the Act was introduced by that amendment. The claim under Section 7B of the Act was available to be raised during the course of the final decree proceeding. Under Section 108(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, Act 35 of 1969, there was an obligation on the predecessor of the present objectors to claim the protection of Section 7B of the Act if they thought that they were entitled to the protection of that provision. Even if in the final decree the question had not been agitated it was for the predecessor of the contesting respondents to have pursued the matter by way of an appeal. Since the final decree was passed after the coming into force of the Act by amended Act 35 of 1969 the contesting respondents cannot raise the claim during execution. In my view the final decree passed precludes the objectors and their predecessor from raising the claim in execution of the final decree." I agree with the reasoning in C.R.P. No. 147 of 1994 to hold that the contesting respondents are disentitled to protection of Section 7B of the Act in the fact situation. The retrospective effect of the Amendment Act by virtue of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India is an added reason though not noticed in the order in C.R.P. No. 147 of 1994. The retrospective effect of the Amendment Act by virtue of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India is an added reason though not noticed in the order in C.R.P. No. 147 of 1994. I have no reason to take a different view even though the present Civil Revision petition has been directed to be disposed of independently. The direction was in R.P. Nos. 166 of 2002 and 333 of 2006 later to consider the present Civil Revision Petition untrammelled by the order in C.R.P. No. 147 of 1994. 10. Much was argued on the basis of the order of remand dated 16.2.1989 in C.R.P. Nos. 1925, 1928, 1929, 1942 and 1968 of 1986 wherein the availability of the plea was directed to be considered. Firstly, the order proceeds on a totally wrong premise that Section 7B of the Act came into force only after the passing of the final decree. Secondly, the order does not give any indication that the plea of deemed tenancy claimed by the contesting respondents under Section 7B of the Act is liable to be upheld. Thirdly, the order can at best be understood as one directing the Execution Court to consider the plea of deemed tenancy under Section 7B of the Act along with the other issues. Fourthly, there is no fetter either for the Execution Court or this Court to adjudicate as to whether the contesting respondents are entitled to the benefit of Section 7B of the Act. 11. I should note that the plea of tenancy (not deemed tenancy) was very much raised by the contesting respondents even at the stage of the passing of the preliminary decree for partition. Defendants 73 and 74 claimed to be sub-tenants under defendant No.59 who himself claimed tenancy under his own mother Chirutheyi Amma. The court below has in the preliminary decree found that she was only a maintenance allottee and that the oral lease and the sub-lease cannot be upheld. Similar is the case with regard to the tenancy raised by defendant No. 47 under the first defendant in the suit which has been found to be an improvident one. The court below has noticed that the first defendant who purchased the property for Rs. 100/- had allegedly leased the property to defendant No. 47 for a paltry sum of Rs. 20/-. The court below has noticed that the first defendant who purchased the property for Rs. 100/- had allegedly leased the property to defendant No. 47 for a paltry sum of Rs. 20/-. It is extremely doubtful therefore as to whether the claim of defendant Nos. 47, 73, and 74 are bonafide in the context of Section 7B of the Act. A Full Bench of this Court in Mohammed vs. Devaky Amma, 1995 (2) KLT 155 , has held that the element of bonafides has to be satisfied even in a claim under Section 7B of the Act. Equity, justice and good conscience demands that allottees under a partition decree are enabled to obtain delivery and enjoy the fruits of the decree. Such delivery has to be effected unless there are any supervening factors disabling the same which are wholly absent in the case on hand. The contesting respondents finally point out that even the preliminary decree for partition has provided payment of value of improvements in the event of they being dispossessed. It is true that defendant Nos. 73 to 75 have been directed to be paid the value of improvements in the preliminary decree (the propriety of which cannot be questioned now). It is reported that the value of improvements has already been assessed in the final decree proceedings even though it has to be revisited before ordering eviction. 12. The impugned order dismissing the execution petition is set aside and it is declared that the revision petitioners are entitled to obtain delivery of the allotted items of property. This is of course subject to the condition that defendants 73 to 75 or their legal heirs are paid the value of improvements in tune with the preliminary decree. The Execution Court shall make every endeavour to take the proceedings to a logical end at least within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed. No costs.