JUDGMENT : Dr. B.R.Sarangi, J. The petitioner, who is a retired Deputy Divisional Manager of the Orissa Forest Development Corporation, has filed this application challenging the order dated 21.05.2004 passed by the Disciplinary Authority following disciplinary proceeding imposing penalty of recovering an amount of Rs.3,01,179/- from the retiral dues of the petitioner and arrears, if any, and balance amount, if any, shall be realized by instituting legal action vide Annexure-6 and confirmation thereof vide order 15.02.2005 passed by the Appellate Authority under Annexure-7 and consequential direction for realization of dues vide office order dated 19.10.2004 under Annexure-8. 2. The factual matrix of the case in hand is that the petitioner joined service under Orissa Forest Development Corporation as Sub-Divisional Manager in the year 1966. While continuing as Divisional Manager in Rairakhol Commercial Division during the year 1984-85 and 1985-86, there was shortage of timbers in Ramed-II Depot of Rairakhol Division. The shortage was detected on the basis of a special audit conducted between 7.5.1988 and 14.10.1988. On the basis of such audit report, vide letter dated 20.08.1993, the petitioner was called upon to deposit the cost of timber amounting to Rs.16,99,206.70/- and submit his explanation within 30 days. Thereafter the petitioner was transferred and consequently he had not been communicated anything regarding the shortfall by granting reasonable time for clarification to the audit objection. Without doing so, the proceeding had been initiated against him by framing charges on 09.06.1994 vide Annexure-3. The petitioner submitted explanation on 25.07.1994 and another on 19.06.2001. Consequently, an inquiry officer was appointed, who conducted the inquiry to the charges leveled against him and ultimately the inquiry officer submitted his inquiry report exonerating the petitioner of all the charges on 27.07.2001 vide Annexure-4 with following conclusion and suggestions: “The audit para has been raised due to the following reasons: (1) Improper verification of record by audit. (2) Non-compliance of the objections raised by audit by the concerned officer, in absence of delinquent officer as he was transferred. As analyzed above, I am to say that: 1. All the charges may be dropped, in view of the analysis made above. 2. It is open to the appropriate authority to take suitable action against the concerned staff for improperly raising the audit para, as well as non-compliance of the audit objections, in time, as analyzed above. 3.The audit para may be settled/dropped accordingly.” 3. All the charges may be dropped, in view of the analysis made above. 2. It is open to the appropriate authority to take suitable action against the concerned staff for improperly raising the audit para, as well as non-compliance of the audit objections, in time, as analyzed above. 3.The audit para may be settled/dropped accordingly.” 3. The Disciplinary Authority agreed with the finding of the inquiry officer with regard to charge Nos. II, III, IV and V levelled against the petitioner and held that the said charges should be dropped. But he disagreed with the enquiring officer with regard to charges I and VI and on considering the materials available before him came to the conclusion that the enquiry officer relying on Ext.-P.W.6 came to hold that the concerned depot incharge was responsible for the shortage but the said P.W.6 relates forest working and not in case of depot and therefore the petitioner cannot be exonerated of gross negligence of his duty because his duty is to ensure proper functioning of his subordinates and to check their works/performance. He further concluded that though the charge is for more than Rs.30,00,000/- at least Rs.3,00,000/- be recovered from the petitioner. Therefore, he proposed to recover a sum of Rs.3,00,984/- from the petitioner and called upon him to show cause in writing within 15 days as to why the above penalties shall not be imposed and finally the disciplinary authority vide order dated 21.5.1994 under Annexure-6 imposed following penalty:- “ORDER : The amount of Rs.3,01,179/- (Rs.3,00,000.00 + Rs.1,179.00) shall be recovered from the payable retrial dues and arrears, if any, to this extent and balance amount, if any, shallbe realized by instituting legal action if considered worth the cost.” 4. Against such order of imposition of punishment, the petitioner preferred appeal before the appellate authority, which has been rejected vide order dated 15.02.2005 under Annexure-7. Consequence thereof, vide office order dated 19.10.2004 under Annexure-8 the direction was issued that retrial and arrear dues amounting to Rs.3,82,682/- be adjusted against the corporation outstanding dues of Rs.6,01,950.46 and the balance sum of Rs.2,19,268.46/- be recovered by instituting legal action. Hence this application. 5. Mr. Consequence thereof, vide office order dated 19.10.2004 under Annexure-8 the direction was issued that retrial and arrear dues amounting to Rs.3,82,682/- be adjusted against the corporation outstanding dues of Rs.6,01,950.46 and the balance sum of Rs.2,19,268.46/- be recovered by instituting legal action. Hence this application. 5. Mr. K.C. Kar, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously urged that the direction given under Annexure-8 for adjusting the retrial dues of Rs.3,82,082/- towards recovery adjustment of outstanding dues of Rs.6,01,950.40 and directing for recovery if not recovered outstanding amount of Rs.2,12,268/- by instituting legal action is not permissible. Therefore, he seeks to quash the said order. In addition to that, it is stated that the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings given by the inquiry officer with regard to charge Nos.(I) & (VI) has not assigned any reasons and subsequently the appellate authority while rejecting the order of the disciplinary authority has not considered the case of the petitioner on merits and a cryptic order rejected the appeal without application of mind by non-complying the principles of natural justice. Therefore, he seeks for quashing of the order of imposition of penalty by the disciplinary authority and confirmation made thereof by the appellate authority and consequential order vide Annexures-6, 7 and 8 respectively as the same are contrary to the Orissa Forest Development Corporation Rules, 1986 and settled principles of law laid down by the apex Court. To substantiate his contention, Mr. Kar relies upon the judgments in Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and others, AIR 1999 SC 1841 , Dev Prakash Tewari v. U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board, 2014 (8) SCALE 216, Sukadev Behera v. M.D. OFDC, Ltd., 2008 (II) OLR 612 , Sarat Chandra Das v. Orissa State Warehousing Corporation, 2013 (II) ILR CUT 109, Dhruba Charan Panda and others v. State of Orissa and others, 1999 (II) OLR 433. 6. Mr. C.A. Rao, learned Sr. Counsel for the Corporation strenuously urged that the petitioner cannot be exonerated of the liability of making good the loss caused to the corporation due to the illegality and irregularity committed during his tenure in the Corporation and there is no such provision available under the rules not to recover the amount after the retirement of an employee. Counsel for the Corporation strenuously urged that the petitioner cannot be exonerated of the liability of making good the loss caused to the corporation due to the illegality and irregularity committed during his tenure in the Corporation and there is no such provision available under the rules not to recover the amount after the retirement of an employee. In view of the amendment to the provision under Rule-123 A, power has been vested with the authority to initiate and continue proceedings after superannuation/retirement/termination of service. Therefore, the direction given by the authority for recovery of the amount is wholly and fully justified. Accordingly, this Court may not interfere with the same. 7. After considering the contention raised by learned counsel for the parties and on going through the records, it appears that the Orissa Forest Development Corporation has framed rules to regulate the service of its employees called “The Orissa Forest Corporation Service Rules, 1986, (hereinafter called as “the 1986 Rules”). Chapter-VIII deals with disciplinary rules. Rule 121 deals with penalties wherein it is stated that for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided be imposed on an employee/workman, namely, minor penalties and major penalties. Minor penalties have been specified in clauses-(i) to (vi) whereas major penalties have been enumerated in clauses-(vii) to clause-(x). Clause-(iv) of Rule-121 deals with recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by the employee/workman to the Corporation by negligence or breach of orders or misappropriation or any other reasons. Rules-125 dealt with procedure for imposing minor penalty. Rules 122 deals with disciplinary authorities whereas Rule 123 prescribes the authority to institute proceedings. When the matter stood thus, amendment of 1986 Rules was made by incorporating the Rule-123-A, which reads as follows:- “123-A. Authority to initiate and continue proceedings after superannuation/retirement/termination of service. 1.(a) Competent disciplinary authority as enumerated in Rule 123 may institute disciplinary proceedings against any employee after superannuation for his misconduct and for whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation if he is found prima facie responsible for such misconduct or negligence in duty during the period of his service including the service rendered on reemployment after retirement. Such departmental proceeding shall be deemed to be proceeding under this Rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authorities by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the corporation employee had continued in service. Such departmental proceedings referred to above if instituted while the employee was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment. iii) Shall not be instituted save with sanction of Board of Directors, if the CMD is the disciplinary authority and of the CMD if the disciplinary authority is subordinate to CMD. iv) Shall be conducted by such authority and at such place as the disciplinary authority may direct ad in accordance with the procedure applicable to disciplinary proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relation to the corporation employee during his service. b) Disciplinary proceedings instituted while the employee/workman was in service, whether before his retirement or during his reemployment, shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the employee/workman had continued in service. 1. (c) In the case of Corporation employee/workman, who has retired on attaining the age of superannuation or otherwise and against whom any disciplinary or judicial proceedings are instituted or were disciplinary proceedings continued under clause (a) and (b) the whole or part of the retrial and other payable dues to the extent of loss alleged shall be withhold till final disposal of disciplinary proceeding and /or judicial proceedings.” The above mentioned rules clearly indicate the authority to initiate and continue proceedings after superannuation/ retirement/ termination of service and such amendment has been made pursuant to the notification dated 24.02.2004. 8. Mr. K.C. Kar, learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner retired from service on 30.04.1998, i.e. prior to 24.02.2004 when there was no such provision to initiate or continue proceeding after superannuation/retirement/termination from service. In the present case, the proceeding was initiated against the petitioner by framing charge on 9.6.1994 vide Annexure-3 and punishment was imposed by the disciplinary authority under Annexure-6 on 21.05.2004 and the same was confirmed by the appellate authority on 15.02.2005 vide Annexure-7 and consequential direction for realization of dues was passed vide office order dated 19.10.2004 under Annexure-8, but Rule-123-A was incorporated by way of amendment with effect from 24.02.2004. The provision of rule-123-A may apply prospectively and not retrospectively. The provision of rule-123-A may apply prospectively and not retrospectively. In that view of the matter, the proceeding initiated for recovery of the amount cannot be sustained. 9. Mr. C.A. Rao, learned Sr. Counsel for the Corporation strenuously urged that the authority can initiate or continue proceeding after superannuation/retirement/termination from service. In the present case, while the proceeding was in continuance, the amendment came. Therefore, it is applicable to the petitioner and consequently he is liable to pay the demand raised in Annexure-8 forthwith. It is stated that since the disciplinary authority was in seisin of the matter that amounted to continue a proceeding, therefore, no illegality has been committed by such continuance of proceeding by the authorities. 10. As it appears, there was no provision contained in 1986 Rules prior to 24.02.2004 for continuance of disciplinary proceeding after retirement of a delinquent officer. No material has also been produced before this Court to indicate that the authority competence to proceed against the petitioner even after his superannuation. Rather, referring to the amended provision of 1986 Rules, which has been incorporated on 24.02.2004, it is stated that it is applicable to continue proceeding. 11. The further question raised is that the disciplinary authority while differing with the findings of the inquiry officer having not assigned any reasons, the order of punishment passed in the proceeding cannot be sustained. It appears from in Annexure-5 that the disciplinary authority perused the report of the inquiry officer and stated that the inquiry officer has acquitted the petitioner of the charges levelled against him and recommended to drop the charges and while concurring in the finding of the inquiry officer with regard to charge nos. (ii) to (v), the disciplinary authority did not agree with the findings of the inquiry officer on charge nos. (i) and (vi) and held the two charges to have been proved. But such disagreement which has been referred to in Annexure-5 has not been based on cogent reasons. Therefore, the punishment inflicted on the petitioner in the departmental proceeding is vitiated. 12. It appears that the appellate authority while rejecting the appeal in Annexure-7 vide order dated 15.02.2005 has not assigned any reasons, rather by a cryptic order mechanically rejected the same. Therefore, neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority has acted in consonance with the provisions of law. 12. It appears that the appellate authority while rejecting the appeal in Annexure-7 vide order dated 15.02.2005 has not assigned any reasons, rather by a cryptic order mechanically rejected the same. Therefore, neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority has acted in consonance with the provisions of law. Thereby, the impugned order of punishment and the order passed by the appellate authority confirming the same cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 13. In Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and others, AIR 1999 SC 1841 , the apex Court held that in absence of any provision, the disciplinary proceeding so initiated stands closed after retirement of the delinquent officer. In paragraph-5 of the said judgment the apex Court held as follows: “It will be noticed from the abovesaid regulations that no specific provision was made for deducting any amount from the provident fund consequent to any misconduct determined in the departmental enquiry nor was any provision made for continuance of departmental enquiry after superannuation.” Similar view has also been reiterated in Dev Prakash Tewari v. U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board, 2014 (8) SCALE 216. 14. So far as the contention raised by Mr. C.A. Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Corporation with regard to the applicability of Rule-123-A, which has been given effect from 24.02.2004 that it is applicable to a continue proceeding, the same fact has also been considered by this Court in Sukadev Behera case (supra) wherein referring to Bhagirathi Jena case (supra), this Court held that since the petitioner retired from service on 31.03.1999 and disciplinary proceeding initiated on 12.07.2003, amendment of the rules being prospective and no provision in the pre-amended rules to initiate such a proceeding, proceeding initiated against the petitioner cannot be said to be legal and accordingly quashed the same. Similar view has also been taken by this Court in Sarat Chandra Das (supra). 15. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present context, the petitioner having been retired from service on 30.04.1998 though the proceeding was initiated against him by framing charge on 9.6.1994 in absence of any provision under pre-amended rules, continuance of the said proceeding after retirement of the petitioner was not justified and cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Therefore, the reliance placed on the amended provisions of Rule-123-A can only be applied prospectively not retrospectively. 16. Therefore, the reliance placed on the amended provisions of Rule-123-A can only be applied prospectively not retrospectively. 16. Taking into consideration the ratio decided by the apex Court in Bhagirathi Jena and Dev Prakash Tewari cases (supra) and as well as by this Court in Sarat Chandra Das (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that continuance of proceeding against the petitioner after his retirement in absence of specific rules under 1986 Rules was unwarranted. Accordingly, the order dated 21.05.2004 passed by the Disciplinary Authority vide Annexure-6 and confirmation thereof by the appellate authority on 15.02.2005 vide Annexure-7 and consequential direction for recovery of the amount vide office order dated 19.10.2004 under Annexure-8 cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the same are quashed. The authorities are directed to pay the retrial dues of the petitioner along with interest @12% per annum within a period of four months from the date of passing of the judgment. 17. With the above observation and direction, the writ petition is allowed. However, there is no order to cost.