JUDGMENT S.G. Shah, J. 1. Rule. Mr. Shukla waives service of Rule for the respondents. The State has challenged the judgment and order dated 29-4-2014 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, City Civil & Sessions Court, Court No. 12, whereby the application Exh. 139 in Sessions Case No. 144 of 2011 preferred by the respondents-accused under Sec. 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) is allowed and thereby Investigating Officer (I.O.) of Satellite Police Station of C.R. No. I-683 of 2010 is directed to produce the documents as prayed for by the accused in Para 5 of the application. It is not disputed that Sessions case is initiated with reference to the same F.I.R, under Secs. 307,506(2), 143, 147, 148, etc., of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) and Sec. 135(1) of the B.P. Act. It is also further directed by the impugned order that if the documents in question are not in the custody of the I.O., then he should avail the same from the concerned Police Stations and Hospitals before the next date of hearing and to provide the copies of such documents to the accused. It is further directed in the impugned order that pursuant to such production, the prosecution will be at liberty to recall and re-examine any witness in view of the documents as they may appear just and necessary to them irrespective of further examination-in-chief i.e. re-examination by the prosecution. It is further stated that in such a scenario, prosecution will be at liberty to conduct re-examination of such witness. 2. If we peruse Para 5 of the application Exh. 139, by which the accused have prayed for production of several documents, it becomes clear that practically some of the documents are already produced on record, but they are not legible inasmuch as the accused have specifically contended in such application that xerox copy of the letter addressed to Charge Officer is illegible, copy of Wardhi (disclosure) dated 10-10-2010 received from Sanjivani Hospital by the Vastrapur Police Station and communication pursuant to such disclosure regarding report by the Medical Officer are also illegible. Even statement of Jalubhai Ramjibhai Desai by A.S.I. Shri B.S. Valand, Vastrapur Police Station dated 13-10-2010 is also illegible. 3. Even statement of Jalubhai Ramjibhai Desai by A.S.I. Shri B.S. Valand, Vastrapur Police Station dated 13-10-2010 is also illegible. 3. In view of such illegible documents and in view of hiding of certain documents and statements by the I.O. while filing the charge-sheet, the accused have called for the copies of certain statements recorded by the I.O. viz., statement of Tejabhai dated 10-11-2011, Kaliben dated 10-11-2010, Bhavnaben Tejabhai and Shilpaben dated 25-10-2010, letter dated 14-10-2010 by the complainant to Satellite Police Station and letter by P.S.I. to the office of the Police Commissioner. A copy of remand application dated 19-10-2010 was also called for with copy of Entry No. 20 by Vastrapur Police Station, wherein it is stated that offence has been committed within the jurisdiction of Kalol Police Station, and therefore, papers are to be forwarded to Kalol Police Station, thereby what steps have been taken by Kalol Police Station. When Dr. Jagat Pandya at Exh. 53 being witness No. 8 has deposed about some X-ray of victim Manojbhai and when it was disclosed that the victim was treated at Sanjivani Hospital as well as Shalby Hospital, relevant X-ray plate and report were also called for. With reference to witness No. 13 at Exh. 77, again there is a reference of Citi-scan of victim Manojbhai, but when witness has failed to produce relevant treatment papers, Citi-scan report and other relevant papers are also called for. Considering details stated in the application of relevant medical papers of the victim are also called for with allegation that the accused are complaining right from the filing of the complaint against them that I.O. and certain witnesses are hiding certain facts with intention and some papers are not provided to the accused with charge-sheet which are otherwise very much necessary and material evidence to prove the truth on record. 4. The trial Court has considered the rival submissions, both on facts and on law point and by detailed order running into 12 pages, allowed the application as aforesaid. The prosecution has also filed a reply against the application under reference and trial Court has taken care of their defence also. 5. To avoid prejudice to the pending trial, though I have gone through the material on record, it would be appropriate to avoid discussion on factual details. The prosecution has also filed a reply against the application under reference and trial Court has taken care of their defence also. 5. To avoid prejudice to the pending trial, though I have gone through the material on record, it would be appropriate to avoid discussion on factual details. However, if we peruse the impugned order, it becomes clear that the trial Court has in Para 26 onwards, given cogent reasons for allowing the application wherein it is categorically stated that the prosecution is duty bound to see that the accused shall not prejudice in any manner during the trial and fairness in all aspect is necessary. 6. As against that, the defence by A.P.P. was only to the effect that the documents called for are irrelevant. However, trial Court has considered that when the accused are facing charge of murder, where capital punishment is possible, and when prima facie it appears that there is some inquiry by other Police Station also, and the deceased was admitted in different hospitals, details of such inquiry and treatment are very much necessary to disclose on record. 7. Though the judgment reported in State of Orissa v. Debendranath Padhi, reported in 2005 (1) GLH 312 (SC) is touching the production of the documents at the time of framing of charge or deciding discharge application, the accused have relied upon such judgment before the trial Court because in such judgment it is also observed that Sec. 91 presupposes that when the document is not produced, process may be initiated to compel production thereof. The trial Court has also categorically observed that by production of such document, if trial is not to be prejudiced in any manner, then there is no harm in allowing such application rather than giving an excuse to the accused that the trial was unfair, unjust and prejudicial against them since they were not allowed to prove their case by refusing to produce such documents on record. Considering the discretionary powers of summoning and calling documents by the trial Court, the trial Court has opined that the production of documents, as prayed for, by the accused appears to be desirable and necessary so as to separate the grain from the chaff. 8. Before determining the revision on merits, it cannot be ignored that same order was challenged by the original complainant in Revision Application No. 309 of 2014. 8. Before determining the revision on merits, it cannot be ignored that same order was challenged by the original complainant in Revision Application No. 309 of 2014. However, after hearing the matter, the complainant has selected to withdraw the same without calling for reasoned order. Therefore, though no fault can be found with the complainant, the fact remains that the complainant has opted to avoid observation on merits of the case by this Hon'ble Court. 9. However, at present the State being prosecuting agency, challenged the same order contending that documents called for by the accused in an earlier application were given to the accused, and therefore, there is no need for the accused to file same application again for production of more documents, contending that the accused want to delay the trial. So far as provision of Sec. 91 is concerned, it is contended that the accused should demand the documents in its exact form and state clearly that which documents and what kind of documents they want to be produced. Thereby, it is submitted that vague application is nothing but misuse of the process of the Court. It is further stated that the I.O. is yet to be examined and thereby accused have a chance to cross-examine him and they have a chance to take their defence when their statements are to be recorded under Sec. 313 of the Cr.P.C. Thereby, it is contended that this is not the stage so as to allow the application as prayed for, which is mainly filed with a view to delay the trial. 10. Even if we do not enter into the factual details and merits of the case, it cannot be ignored that as per F.I.R. and charge-sheet, probably there is no eye-witness and entire case is based upon the circumstantial evidence only. If it is so, there is a reason for the accused to call for certain documents to prove their innocence when there is a material contradiction in the charge-sheet itself that though F.I.R. is filed with Vastrapur Police Station, the allegation in column No. 5 of the charge-sheet specifically disclosed that the victim was taken to Vayna village of Kalol Taluka and accused have beaten him. If it is so, there is certainly a question regarding jurisdiction of the concerned I.O. 11. If it is so, there is certainly a question regarding jurisdiction of the concerned I.O. 11. Therefore, there is reason for the accused to call for certain documents from the concerned public authority. Prima facie, it is the duty of the I.O. to gather and collect the evidence and information to prove the guilt of the accused. However, if there is evidence in favour of the accused, even if it is not included in the charge-sheet by the investigating agency, considering its own view that even after such evidence in favour of the accused, there is reason to file charge-sheet against the accused, there is no reason to deny the accused to ask for production of such evidence on record to prove his innocence. On the contrary, it is in the interest of justice because neither the prosecuting agency nor the Court has to simply convict a person against whom charge-sheet is filed, but the basic and primary duty of investigating agency and the Court is to find out the truth that who is the real culprit before awarding any punishment to such culprit. Therefore, there is no reason in the Revision Application when accused are seeking production of certain documents to prove their innocence or to disprove the version of the prosecution and its witnesses or even to prove the veracity of the witnesses considering the fact that in some cases like present one, though there is commission of some crime against some person, it cannot be ruled out that the complainant and witnesses may rightly or wrongly and intentionally or unintentionally try to implicate their rival group in such crime; whereas in fact crime might have been committed by some other person/s. Therefore, in such circumstances, in fact, it is the duty of the prosecution and the Court to see that the accused shall get reasonable opportunity to prove their innocence and for the purpose except for specific reasons, to deny the production of documents or particular evidence on record, only because the complainant or prosecution objected to production of such evidence, the same could not be refused. No doubt, that there are some instances wherein such a request cannot be granted. But at the same time, there are several reasons for granting such request. 12. No doubt, that there are some instances wherein such a request cannot be granted. But at the same time, there are several reasons for granting such request. 12. In view of above, I do not see any illegality or irregularity in the impugned order so as to interfere with it in revisional jurisdiction because the trial Court is always well concerned with the facts and circumstances at particular point of time during investigation to realise and understand that whether such documents should be allowed to be produced or not. Therefore, the trial Court has allowed production and when the complainant has withdrawn his revision and the State has no specific reason to put forward that why such application should not be allowed, only on the ground that such application is filed simply to delay the proceedings, cannot be ground for rejection of the application and thereby interfering with the impugned order by allowing the revision. 13. As usual, both the sides have referred several citations in support of their submissions. I have gone through all such citations, which are referred hereinafter. However, overall scrutiny of all such citations makes it clear that there is no Rule of thumb to hold that the accused has no right whatsoever to call for the production of certain documents and information either to disprove the prosecution case or to prove his innocence. Some of the citations referred by the petitioner is practically relating to the production of documents at pre-trial stage i.e., before framing charges; whereas in case on hand, when the trial has not only started, but several witnesses are examined, it cannot be said that to challenge the veracity of the witnesses or to prove certain facts which are otherwise connected with such witnesses, but not disclosed or produced with the charge-sheet by the investigating agency, such documents cannot be allowed to be called for and produced on record at the behest of the accused. 14. 14. The list of citations be as under and its outcome is summarised as under: "I. In the case of P. Chhaganlal Daga v. M. Sanjay Shaw, reported in 2003 (11) SCC 486, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that grant of such permission by trial Court even at the fag end of the trial, is within the powers of the Court and the High Court erred in interfering therewith on the assumption that production of the said document at that belated stage was only to fill up a lacuna. II. In the case of Manjeet Singh Khera v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2013 (9) SCC 276 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that non-supply of copy of the document to accused by prosecution would result into prejudice to accused and thereby principle of fair trial would violate. III. In the case of State of Kerala v. Babu, reported in, 1999 (4) SCC 621 , additional documents was called for the purpose of establishing the contradiction in the evidence of the witness and in order to impeach the said witness. The defence made an application for summoning the case diary of that case invoking Sec. 172of the Code with a consequential prayer for recalling of the witness. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that in view of Sec. 145 of the Evidence Act, it is the right of a party in a trial to use the previous statements of a witness either for the purpose of establishing a contradiction in his evidence or for the purpose of impeaching the credit of the witness. This right given to a party in a trial under Sec. 145 of the Evidence Act is somewhat controlled in criminal trials by the provisions made in the Criminal Procedure Code. IV. In the case of Lakshmi v. Chinnammal, reported in 2009 (13) SCC 25 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that if bringing on record a document is essential for proving the case by a party, ordinarily the same should not be refused, the Court's duty being to find out the truth. The procedural mechanics necessary to arrive at a just decision must be encouraged though the Court in the said process would not encourage any fishing enquiry. The procedural mechanics necessary to arrive at a just decision must be encouraged though the Court in the said process would not encourage any fishing enquiry. V. In the case of Om Prakash Sharma v. C.B.I., reported in 2000 (5) SCC 679 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that ultimately, this would always depend upon the facts of each case and it would be difficult to lay down a rule of universal application and for all times. The Court concerned must be allowed a large latitude in the matter of exercise of discretion and unless in a given case the Court was found to have conducted itself in so demonstrably an unreasonable manner unbecoming of a judicial authority, the Court superior to that Court cannot intervene very lightly or in a routine fashion to interpose or impose itself even at that stage. VI. In the case of Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of W.B., reported in 2007 (12) SCC 230 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the trial Judge should not have closed the case. He should have invoked his jurisdiction under Sec. 311 in the interest of justice and instead of blaming the defence for non-examination of the Superintendent of Presidency Jail, the Court itself should have called upon authorities to produce the document. VII. In the case of State (Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri, reported in 2006 (7) SCC 172 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the document in possession of a public functionary, who is under a statutory obligation to produce the same before the Court of law and for his failure to produce it before the Court, adverse inference may be drawn against him. VIII. In the case of Sk. Meheboob v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2005 (10) SCC 387 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that though the sequence of events narrated by deceased's father indicated that the written report would be the first contemporaneous document putting on record the true facts of the incident, but that document was not produced by prosecution despite trial Court's order for production thereof. Evidence of deceased's father as an eye-witness also not credible in view of inconsistencies between his statement to the police under Sec. 161 of Cr.P.C. and his statement before Court. Evidence of deceased's father as an eye-witness also not credible in view of inconsistencies between his statement to the police under Sec. 161 of Cr.P.C. and his statement before Court. It is further held that evidence of deceased's father and the dying declaration not credible so as to bring home charge of murder against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt arose on evidence led by prosecution and its conduct in suppressing the vital document (viz. The written report given by deceased's father to police) and witnesses. Therefore, appellants entitled to benefit of doubt. IX. In the case of Ashok Chawla v. Ram Chander Garvan, Inspector, C.B.I., reported in 2011 Cri.LJ 2353, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, relying on the decision rendered in the case of Navin Ramji Kamani v. Shri K.C. Shekhran, Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, reported in 1981 RCC 218 dealt with Sec. 91 of the Cr.P.C, which provides that whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a Police Station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purpose of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons or such officer a written order, requiring the person in whose possession or power such documents are believed to be to attend and produce the same. The powers conferred under Sec. 91 are enabling in nature aimed at arming the Court or any officer in charge of a Police Station concerned to enforce and to ensure the production of any document or other things "necessary or desirable" for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code, by issuing a summons or a written order to those in possession of such material. The language of Sec. 91 would, no doubt, indicate the width of the powers to be unlimited but the in-built limitation inherent therein takes its colour and shape from the stage or point of time of its exercise, commensurately with the nature of proceedings as also the compulsions of necessity and desirability, to fulfil the task or achieve the object. The language of Sec. 91 would, no doubt, indicate the width of the powers to be unlimited but the in-built limitation inherent therein takes its colour and shape from the stage or point of time of its exercise, commensurately with the nature of proceedings as also the compulsions of necessity and desirability, to fulfil the task or achieve the object. X. In Navin Ramji Kumani (supra), the Court held that the power given under Sec. 91 of the Code is a general and wide power which empowers the Court, the production of any document or any other thing at any stage of any investigation, inquiry or other proceedings under the Cr.P.C. It is no doubt true that the Legislature has circumscribed this power to be exercised only where the Court considers that the summoning of such document or things was necessary or desirable in its view, then the Court could pass an order both in favour of the accused as well as the prosecution. It is no doubt true that such power would not be exercised where the documents or thing may not be found relevant or it may be for the mere purpose of delaying the proceedings or the order is sought with an oblique motive. Similar view has also been expressed in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 (Supp.) Cri.LR 265. XI. In Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi), reported in 2010 (6) SCC 1 , it was held that the right of the accused with regard to disclosure of documents is a limited right but is codified and is the very foundation of a fair investigation and trial. On such matters, the accused cannot claim an indefeasible legal right to claim every document of the police file or even the portions which are permitted to be excluded from the documents annexed to the report under Sec. 173(2) as per orders of the Court. But certain rights of the accused flow both from the codified law as well as from equitable concepts of constitutional jurisdiction, as substantial variation to such procedure would frustrate the very basis of a fair trial. To claim documents within the purview of scope of Secs. But certain rights of the accused flow both from the codified law as well as from equitable concepts of constitutional jurisdiction, as substantial variation to such procedure would frustrate the very basis of a fair trial. To claim documents within the purview of scope of Secs. 207, 243 read with the provisions of Sec. 173 in its entirety and power of the Court under Sec. 91 of the Code to summon documents signifies and provides precepts which will govern the right of the accused to claim copies of the statement and documents which the prosecution has collected during investigation and upon which they rely. XII. In the case of V.K. Sasikala v. State, reported in AIR 2013 SC 613 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that though the power of the investigating agency is large and expansive and the Courts have a minimum role in this regard, there are in-built provisions in the Code to ensure that investigation of a criminal offence is conducted keeping in mind the rights of an accused to a fair process of investigation. XIII. In the case of Maheshchandra K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2000 (1) GLR 701 , this Court held that merely because the trial is on, the weapon which is with the accused under that very See. 91 does not remain suspended. It can be used even strategically if the accused feels that he wants to avoid the formality of leading evidence in defence. He can request the Court for production of the document from the prosecution side. The accused can legitimately refer such document, even while cross-examination of any witness by referring such documents. He can recall the witnesses if examined, provided, permitted by the Court and put such question as to certain documents and can carve out the line or alternative line of defence if such documents are brought on record very well in time. The accepted principle of criminal jurisprudence of this country says that the prosecution should be fair enough and has no privilege to put a curtain on any oral or documentary evidence. The privilege given under Sec. 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if is not used at proper time or stage, then the defence of the accused might be prejudiced." 15. The privilege given under Sec. 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if is not used at proper time or stage, then the defence of the accused might be prejudiced." 15. However, it cannot be ignored that in such cases the accused are also taking a risk because if at all some evidence produced by way of such order is proving his guilt, then he would have no option. Therefore, also when the accused seeks to produce particular documents, there is no reason to refuse production of such documents or information so as to avoid a position wherein ultimately trial Court or appellate Court may have to give benefit of doubt to the accused that if such evidence was allowed to be produced, it may prove innocence. In view of above facts, circumstances and settled legal position, there is no substance in the revision application and hence it is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Application dismissed