ORDER 1. The present appeal has been filed against the order dated 13.10.2011 passed by the Commissioner Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 by which the application of the State Government for setting aside the ex-parte order dated 4.6.2011 has been turned down. 2. The facts of the case reveal that one Raghunath who was serving the State of Madhya Pradesh as a Gangman expired on 11.1.2006 and his widow along with three minor children preferred an application before the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 for grant of compensation. The application was allowed by the learned Commissioner vide award dated 3.8.2009 and a sum of Rs.2,26,619/- along with interest was granted in favour of the claimants. The State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred an appeal against the award dated 3.8.2009 and this Court vide order dated 18.3.2010 passed in MA No. 352/2010 has dismissed the appeal preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh, meaning thereby the award has become final. The interest was not paid to the claimants and therefore, the claimants have filed again an application before the Commissioner for grant of interest and the same has been allowed on 5.5.2011. The order passed by the learned Commissioner was ex-parte order and therefore, the miscellaneous appeal was preferred in the matter and the same has also been dismissed by the impugned order dated 13.8.2011. The present appeal has been filed with a delay of 528 days and the reason assigned in the application for condonation of delay with that after obtaining the order. On 5.11.2011 the matter was forwarded to the Secretary, Public Works Department and the permission was granted on 24.9.2012 and thereafter the appeal has been filed before this Court on 15.4.2013. This Court is of the considered opinion that even if it is assumed that some delay took place in obtaining necessary approval for filing the appeal, however the facts remain that sanction was granted on 24.9.2012. The State Government has finally preferred the present appeal on 15.4.2013. No explanation has been offered in respect of the aforesaid period. Not only this the claimants were granted interest by virtu of the original award, which has attained finality. The State of Madhya Pradesh has not been able to give satisfactory explanation in respect of day to day delay, which has taken place in filing the present appeal.
No explanation has been offered in respect of the aforesaid period. Not only this the claimants were granted interest by virtu of the original award, which has attained finality. The State of Madhya Pradesh has not been able to give satisfactory explanation in respect of day to day delay, which has taken place in filing the present appeal. In almost in similar circumstances this Court has dismissed the first appeal filed by the State Government vide order dated 5.3.2014 in the case of Land Acquisition Officer and another v. Chunnilal (FA No. 176/2010) and the same reads as under :- FA No.176/2010 5.3.2014 : Shri Himanshu Joshi, learned Government Advocate for the petitioners; Shri Swapnesh Jain, learned counsel for the respondent. The present appeal has been filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh and General Manager, District Industry and Trade Centre, Indore being aggrieved by award dated 26.4.2005 as well as order dated 31.7.2008 passed by the XI Additional District Judge, Indore in Civil Case (Land Acquisition) No.9/2008. The appeal is barred by limitation and the application for condonation of delay has been filed. It has been stated in the application for condonation of delay that the award was passed on 26.4.2005 and thereafter a reference was preferred by the respondents/State under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. By an order dated 31.7.2008 the learned XI Additional District Judge, Indore has enhanced the compensation. The present appeal has been filed against the order dated 31.7.2008, the same was forwarded to the Law Department on 16.12.2009 and on 10.2.2010 permission was granted by the Law Department to prefer an appeal. The appeal was finally preferred on 26.2.2010 resulting in a delay of 484 days. This Court carefully gone through the application for condonation of delay and it does not provide explanation for day to day delay, which has taken place in the matter. The reasoning assigned for delay reflects sheer carelessness and lethargic attitude adopted in handling the matter. In a similar case relating to condonation of delay, this Court has dismissed the appeal preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh and the following order was passed : FA No.380/2011 11.1.2012 : Mr. M. L. Sharma, learned Dy. Government Advocate for the appellant State; Mr. G. S. Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent. Heard.
In a similar case relating to condonation of delay, this Court has dismissed the appeal preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh and the following order was passed : FA No.380/2011 11.1.2012 : Mr. M. L. Sharma, learned Dy. Government Advocate for the appellant State; Mr. G. S. Yadav, learned counsel for the respondent. Heard. The present appeal has been filed under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 along with an application for condonation of delay i.e. IA No.3333/2011. Learned counsel for the respondent has brought to the notice of this Court an order dated 30th November, 2011 wherein in identical facts and circumstances of the case, this Court has dismissed the application for condonation of delay. The respondent State in the application for condonation of delay has offered similar explanation which was offered in FA No.545/2011. The order passed by this Court in FA No.545/2011 reads as under :- “In the case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujrat Industrial Development Corporation and another reported in 2010(3) MPLJ 506, the apex Court held that the object of prescribing limitation is to ensure that parties seek remedy without delay. The apex Court has so observed that the law of limitation is to ensure that parties seek remedy without delay. The apex Court has observed that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the Courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.
To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the Courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The apex Court in the catina of decision has held that in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State its agencies/instrumentalities the apex Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/as a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files for table to table consumes considerable time causing delay. In the light of the above and on going through the contents of the application for condonation of delay filed by the appellants, I am of the view that the appellants have not offered and plausible/tangible explanation for the long delay of 145 days. In view of the aforesaid, no sufficient ground is made out to condone the delay of 145 days. Accordingly IA No.6378/2011 is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the first appeal filed by the appellant is also dismissed. Consequently, the first appeal filed by the State is dismissed as barred by limitation. However, if the department comes to the conclusion that the default was due to callousness of the OIC the State is at liberty to recover the amount from him.” Keeping in view the aforesaid order passed by this Court in an identical case, as the appellants have not offered any tangible explanation for delay of 860 days, the first appeal preferred by the State Government is dismissed as barred by limitation. However, in case the department arrives at the conclusion that default was on the part of some officer of the State Government, the departmental shall be free to proceed against such officer, in accordance with law. With the aforesaid, the first appeal stands dismissed.
However, in case the department arrives at the conclusion that default was on the part of some officer of the State Government, the departmental shall be free to proceed against such officer, in accordance with law. With the aforesaid, the first appeal stands dismissed. The order dismissing the appeal of the State of Madhya Pradesh was subjected to judicial scrutiny before the apex Court and the apex Court has dismissed the SLP preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh i.e. SLP (Civil) No.14527/2013 (State of M.P. v. Kanhaiyalal) on 1.4.2013. In the light of the judgment delivered by the apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Kanhaiyalal (supra), as the delay has not been explained, no sufficient cause is made out for condonation of delay. However, in case the department arrives at the conclusion that default was on the part of some officer of the State Government, the department shall be free to proceed against such offiicer, in accordance with law. Accordingly, the present first appeal also stands dismissed.” 3. In light of the aforesaid, as the delay has not been explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause is made out for condonation of the delay. The application for condonation of delay stands rejected. The appeal also stands dismissed. ......................