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Bombay High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 883 (BOM)

Shatrughan Dada Kamble v. State of Maharashtra

2014-04-03

N.M.JAMDAR

body2014
Judgment 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The learned counsel for the Respondents waive service. Taken up for final disposal. 2. Writ Petition No.1849 of 2013 is filed by Academy of Fine Arts & Crafts Trust (Management) and Writ Petition No.7387 of 2013 is filed by Shatrughan Dada Kamble (Employee). Since both these petitions challenge the same impugned order, they are taken up for hearing together and are disposed of by this common judgment. 3. The main question that arises in these petitions is what is the purport of Rule 36(2)(a)(i) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools Rules, 1981 (Rules of 1981). This sub-rule specifies that the Enquiry Committee shall consist of one member from amongst the members of the Management nominated by the Management. The issue is whether the Management can nominate a person outside the Management and whether the condition of appointing a person within Management is a mandatory provision which will vitiated an enquiry. 4. The Employee was working with the Management as a Head Clerk. He was appointed in Academy of Fine Arts & Crafts English School and Junior College run by the Management on 4 December 1991. He was promoted to the post of Head Clerk on 2 June 2008. A show cause notice came to be issued to the Employee on 31 March 2011, calling upon him to give his reply. The show cause notice enumerated various allegations. It was inter alia alleged that the Employee fraudulently took signatures on his promotion file. The Employee was placed under suspension on 23 April 2011. A charge-sheet came to be issued on 14 May 2011 which was received by the Employee. An enquiry committee was constituted in which one Mr. Ramakant Pande, Ex Head Master of Bansidhar Agarwal School was nominated as a member by the Management on its behalf. The Employee objected to the appointment of Mr.Pande. The enquiry proceeded. Witnesses were examined. The Enquiry Committee gave its finding holding the Employee guilty. A termination order came to be issued on 10 January 2011. 5. The Employee filed an appeal bearing Appeal No. 5 of 2012 in the School Tribunal, Mumbai. The Employee raised various contentions as regards legality of the enquiry. According to him, the Secretary of the Management and the Headmistress were hostile to him and the same Secretary was appointed as a Presenting Officer. It was also urged that Mr. 5. The Employee filed an appeal bearing Appeal No. 5 of 2012 in the School Tribunal, Mumbai. The Employee raised various contentions as regards legality of the enquiry. According to him, the Secretary of the Management and the Headmistress were hostile to him and the same Secretary was appointed as a Presenting Officer. It was also urged that Mr. Pande, who had nothing to do with the Management was appointed as a nominee of the Management, which was contrary to the rule 36(2)(a)(i) of the said Rules. The Management denied the allegations of Employee as regards the bias of Secretary and Headmistress. The Management defended the enquiry proceedings stating that full opportunity was given to the Employee to put forth his case. It was contended by the Management that the Employee was found guilty of the charges which were proved in the enquiry. It was submitted that earlier Mr. M.M. Thomare was appointed as a nominee of the Management however, since he was ill, Mr. Pande came to be nominated on behalf of the Management. It was submitted that the amended deed of the trust allowed such nomination. 6. The School Tribunal framed an issue as to whether the enquiry conducted against the Employee was legal and proper as contemplated under rules 36 and 37 of the Rules of 1981 and as per the principles of natural justice. The School Tribunal found that Mr. Pande, Ex Head Master of Bansidhar Agarwal School was not connected with the Management. The Management had filed a copy of Schedule III maintained under Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 as regards the Amendment on the Constitution of Trust which permitted the Trust Board of the Management to nominate or appoint an Employee or a person not related to the Trust or Institutions for being a part of the Enquiry Committee. The School Tribunal considered the definition of the ‘Management’ under Section 2 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 and held that Mr. Pande could not fall in the definition of the ‘Management.’ The School Tribunal held that Mr. Pande not being amongst the members of the Management, could not have been a part of the Enquiry Committee and, therefore the enquiry was vitiated. Accordingly, the School Tribunal by the impugned order dated 14 March 2013 set aside the order of termination dated 10 January 2011. Pande not being amongst the members of the Management, could not have been a part of the Enquiry Committee and, therefore the enquiry was vitiated. Accordingly, the School Tribunal by the impugned order dated 14 March 2013 set aside the order of termination dated 10 January 2011. The Management was directed to reinstate the Employee with continuity of service but without back wages and to conduct de novo enquiry and for that purpose, the Employee could be placed under suspension. 7. The impugned order has been challenged by both the parties. The Management has challenged the finding that the enquiry is vitiated and has sought consequential directions. The Employee is aggrieved by the direction that no back wages will be paid. 8. The main question thus arises is whether the enquiry is vitiated. Both Mr. Mihir Desai, learned counsel for the Management and Mr. N.R. Bubna, learned counsel for the Employee advanced their submissions on this aspect. Mr. Desai firstly submitted that rule 36(2) (a)(i) does not mandate that the nominee of the Management should be from the Management and secondly the provision is directory and resultant prejudice must be shown by the Employee. According to him, the fact that an outsider is appointed in the Enquiry Committee by the Management causes no prejudice to the Employee. He submitted that the constitution of the Trust was amended which permitted the President to nominate any person not related to the Trust on the Enquiry Committee. He submitted that pursuant to the amendment, a resolution was duly passed by the Management for appointment of Mr. Pande. He submitted that this would adequately bring the appointment of Mr. Pande within the ambit of law. Mr. Desai placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala & Ors. Vs. S.K. Sharma ( 1996 (3) SCC 364 ),decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of AmarDye-Chem Ltd. Vs. M.R. Bhope & Ors. (1994 I CLR 565),decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of RamdasB. Kotian Vs. Bank of Baroda & Anr. (2007 (6) Mh.L.J.589)and the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of ShikshanPrasarak Mandal & Anr. Vs. The Presiding Officer & Ors. (WP No.2607/1995 decided on 13/03/2007). 9. Mr. (1994 I CLR 565),decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of RamdasB. Kotian Vs. Bank of Baroda & Anr. (2007 (6) Mh.L.J.589)and the decision of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of ShikshanPrasarak Mandal & Anr. Vs. The Presiding Officer & Ors. (WP No.2607/1995 decided on 13/03/2007). 9. Mr. Bubna, on the other hand, submitted that the Employee had objected to the appointment of Mr. Pande. He submitted that it was the case of the Employee that the Secretary and the Headmistress were hostile to him and at their behest Mr. Pande, who is an outsider, was nominated. He submitted that in the facts of this case, therefore there is prejudice caused to him. He supported the finding of the School Tribunal as regards the enquiry being vitiated for not being in consonance with Rule 36(2)(a)(i). He however, contended that the denial of back wages is incorrect as, for no fault on his part, the enquiry has been vitiated. He submitted that if the enquiry is to be held de novo, at the most the issue of back wages can be left open to be decided at the conclusion of the enquiry. 10. Before turning to the main question at hand as regards the interpretation of the Rule 36(2)(a) (i), the scheme regarding termination of employee needs to be noticed. The Rules of 1981 indicate a self contained procedure. 11. The Rules of 1981 lay down a particular procedure to be adopted while dealing with the termination of the permanent staff. The Rules of 1981 have been framed under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. The statements of objects and reasons of the Act is to regulate recruitment and services of Employees in certain private schools with a view to provide them security and stability in service. It is with this object, keeping in mind, that a particular machinery has been laid down for taking an action against an Employee. Rule 22 specifies Duties and Code of Conduct of Head, Assistant Head, Supervisors, Teachers and non-teaching staff. Rule 28 deals with Removal or Termination of Service of temporary and Permanent Employees. It contemplates punishments on the ground of misconduct, moral turpitude, wilful and persistent negligence of duty and incompetence etc. Rule 22 specifies Duties and Code of Conduct of Head, Assistant Head, Supervisors, Teachers and non-teaching staff. Rule 28 deals with Removal or Termination of Service of temporary and Permanent Employees. It contemplates punishments on the ground of misconduct, moral turpitude, wilful and persistent negligence of duty and incompetence etc. Rule 29 specifies penalties that can be imposed, including termination of service, reduction in rank, warning, withholding of an increment etc. Rule 31 classifies penalties. Rule 32 lays down procedure for imposing minor penalties. Rule 33 deals with procedure for inflicting major penalties. This rule gives power to the Management to place an Employee under suspension, in contemplation of an enquiry with certain conditions. Rule 34 specifies payment of subsistence allowance which lays down certain time schedule, after which subsistence allowance gets revised. 12. Rule 36 deals with an Inquiry Committee. Sub-rule (2) (a) of Rule 36 lays down constitution of the Enquiry Committee. Relevant part of Rule reads thus:- “36. Inquiry Committee : (1) If an employee is allegedly found to be guilty on [any of the grounds specified in sub-rule (5) of rule 28] and the Management decides to hold an inquiry, it shall do so through a properly constituted Inquiry Committee. Such a committee shall conduct an inquiry only in such cases where major penalties are to be inflicted. The Chief Executive Officer authorised by the Management in this behalf (and in the case of an inquiry against the Management) shall communicate to the employee or the Head concerned by registered post acknowledgment due the allegations and demand from him a written explanation within seven days from the date of receipt of the statement of allegations. (2) If the Chief Executive Officer or the President, as the case may be, finds that the explanation submitted by the employee or the Head referred to in sub-rule(1) is not satisfactory, he shall place it before the Management within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the explanation. (2) If the Chief Executive Officer or the President, as the case may be, finds that the explanation submitted by the employee or the Head referred to in sub-rule(1) is not satisfactory, he shall place it before the Management within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the explanation. The Management shall in turn decide within fifteen days whether an inquiry be conducted against the employee and if it decides to conduct the inquiry, the inquiry shall be conducted by an Inquiry Committee constituted in the following manner, that is to say, - (i) one member from amongst the members of the Management to be nominated by the Management, or by the President of the Management if so authorised by the Management, whose name shall be communicated to the Chief Executive Officer within 15 days from the date of the decision of the Management; (ii) one member to be nominated by the Employee from amongst the Employees of any private school; (a)- in the case of an Employee -(iii) one member chosen by the Chief Executive Officer from the panel of teachers on whom State/National Award has been conferred. (b) in the case of the Head referred to in sub-rule(1) - (i) one member who shall be the President of the Management; (ii) one member to be nominated by the Head from amongst the employees of any private school; (iii) one member chosen by the President from the panel of Head Masters on whom State/National Award has been conferred.] (3) ........” 13. Sub-rule 1 of Rule 36 specifically mandates that if the Management decides to hold an enquiry, it shall do so through ‘a properly constituted Enquiry Committee.’ Rule 36 not only lays down the composition of the Committee but it also visualizes that there could be a deviation from this composition and thus, it provides a mandate that enquiry ‘shall’ be held by a ‘properly constituted’ Enquiry Committee. A ‘properly constituted’ Enquiry Committee means the one specified in Sub-rule (2). It shall be of three members, one from amongst the members of the Management, second nominated by the Employee from amongst the Employees of any private school and third chosen from the panel of teachers. 14. A ‘properly constituted’ Enquiry Committee means the one specified in Sub-rule (2). It shall be of three members, one from amongst the members of the Management, second nominated by the Employee from amongst the Employees of any private school and third chosen from the panel of teachers. 14. If one looks at the provision regarding the member to be nominated by the Management, legislature has specifically used the words ‘one member from amongst the members of the Management’ whilst for a nominee of an Employee, it is stated that it could be from ‘amongst the Employees of any private school.’ Management’s nominee must be from the Management, and Employee’s nominee can be from any private school. The legislature is presumed to have its reason for making this specific distinction. There is a clear intent to make a distinction between nominee of the employee and the nominee of the Management and which of them is to be from outside and which must be within the Management. 15. Each of the committee members has his own role to play drawing from his experience and knowledge and it is the interaction with all three will decide the fate of the enquiry. If the composition is altered, it may result in imbalance in the committee and may lead to a skewed outcome. The object of the legislature is made expressly clear through mandate in sub-rule (1) that enquiry shall be through 'a properly constituted Enquiry Committee.' There is an intrinsic indication in the provision itself that the provision is to be held mandatory. 16. An issue arose in the case of VidyaVikas Mandal & Anr. (supra) before the Apex Court as to whether the members of the Enquiry Committee appointed under Rule 37(6) should submit a combined report or it is open for them to submit an individual report. In the case of VidyaVikas Mandal & Anr. (supra), a charge was framed against the Employee. The Enquiry Committee was constituted under Rule 36 (2). Upon conclusion of the enquiry, two members submitted their different findings and one member submitted his separate finding. While considering this aspect, the Apex Court held that Rule 37 (6) is mandatory in nature. It held that when a committee of three members is appointed, all the three should submit their combined report and if a combined report is not so submitted, it will be a serious error. While considering this aspect, the Apex Court held that Rule 37 (6) is mandatory in nature. It held that when a committee of three members is appointed, all the three should submit their combined report and if a combined report is not so submitted, it will be a serious error. The Apex Court held that since the report was not in accordance with the mandatory provision, the Tribunal, the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed a serious error in acting upon the report. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as under:- “As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, Rule 37 (6), which is mandatory in nature, has not been strictly complied with. The Inquiry Committee comprising of three members, as already noticed, only one member nominated by the Management has submitted his Inquiry report within the time stipulated as per Rule 37 (6) and admittedly, the other two members nominated by the Employee and an independent member have not submitted their report within the time prescribed under Rule 37 (6). However, the learned Judges of the Division Bench, though noticed that the two members out of three found 12 the Employee not guilty, failed to appreciate that the said findings by the two members of the committee were submitted after the expiry of the period prescribed under Rule 37(6). In our opinion, the report submitted by individual members is also not in accordance with the Rules. When the Committee of three members are appointed to inquire into a particular matter, all the three should submit their combined report whether consenting or otherwise. Since the report is not in accordance with the mandatory provisions, the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge and also the Division Bench of the High Court have committed a serious error in accepting the said report and acted on it and thereby ordering the reinstatement with back wages. Since the reinstatement and back wages now ordered are quite contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 37 (6), we have no hesitation in setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal, and learned Single Judge and also of the Division Bench of the 13 High Court. Since the reinstatement and back wages now ordered are quite contrary to the mandatory provisions of Rule 37 (6), we have no hesitation in setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal, and learned Single Judge and also of the Division Bench of the 13 High Court. In addition, we also set aside the order passed by the Management based on the report submitted by the single member of the Committee, which is also quite contrary to the Rules.” 17. The Apex Court has held that the rule which requires a committee member to submit a combined report is mandatory in nature and breach of which would be treated as a serious error. The Apex Court has held submission of report individually even by a properly constituted committee, is not permitted and obligation to submit report jointly is mandatory and vitiates the enquiry. If such strict compliance is indicated by the Apex Court, then it is axiomatic that the constitution committee, of which the qualifications are specified, with a mandate that committee must be a properly constituted, has to be considered as mandatory in nature. Thus, the interpretation placed on Rule 36(2) that the composition is mandatory in nature, finds support of reasoning of the Apex Court, albeit in case of another rule. 18. Mr. Desai, learned counsel for the Management placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of SudhaD/o Bhaskarrao Saikhede Vs. Yashodabai Shikshan Sanstha (2003 (4) Mh.L.J.659). In that case before the Division Bench, an issue arose as to whether a teacher who is appointed on whom State/National Award has been conferred should be in service or retired. It was contended before the Division Bench that under Rule 36(2) (a)(iii) the State awardee teacher cannot be above the age of 65. The Division Bench held that Rule 36(2) (a)(iii) does not disqualify the awardee teacher if he is above the age of 65 years. The Division Bench held that no such embargo can be imported in the said rule. This judgment of the Division Bench is pressed into service to contend that the provision of this rule would be directory in nature, however this decision of the Division Bench does not assist the Management. The Division Bench was considering the interpretation of Rule 36(2)(a)(iii). The Division Bench held that no such embargo can be imported in the said rule. This judgment of the Division Bench is pressed into service to contend that the provision of this rule would be directory in nature, however this decision of the Division Bench does not assist the Management. The Division Bench was considering the interpretation of Rule 36(2)(a)(iii). The bare perusal of rule would show that unlike Rule 36(2)(a)(i) which specifies that member should be from amongst the members of the Management, there is no such qualification in sub-rule (iii). Even otherwise, this sub-rule operates in a different context and it is not in question in the present case. It also needs to be noted another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Leelataid/o Annapa Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra (WP No.5867/08 decided on 18/11/08)has held that since ‘teacher’ is defined in the Act, he must be in service. There appears to be a conflict of opinion as regards interpretation of rule 36(2)(a)(iii) and it is referred to larger bench. However, this conflict need not detain the issue at hand, as it operates in respect of a different sub-rule. 19. The next contention that was raised by Mr. Desai is that the Trust has amended its constitution and has incorporated a clause which nominates a person not related to Trust or Institution for any administrative work or investigation or any committee including Enquiry Committee formed under the Government Act or the Rules. It was submitted that pursuant to this amendment, a resolution has been passed appointing Mr.Pande as a member in the Enquiry Committee. As far as the matters of internal administration are concerned, the Trust may authorise an outsider but as regards the constitution of Enquiry Committee is concerned, it must be in conformity with the mandate of the statute. Once it is held that enquiry must be held through a properly constituted committee meaning thereby as per the composition laid down, then it is not open for the Management to deviate from the same. 20. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of GaneshS/o. Mahadeorao Thawre Vs. Central Hindu Military Education Society & Anr. (2007 (6) Mh.L.J.589)is also of no assistance to the Management. In this decision, Rule 36(2)(b) of the MEPS Rules and clause 12 of Section 2 of the MEPS Act fell for consideration. 20. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of GaneshS/o. Mahadeorao Thawre Vs. Central Hindu Military Education Society & Anr. (2007 (6) Mh.L.J.589)is also of no assistance to the Management. In this decision, Rule 36(2)(b) of the MEPS Rules and clause 12 of Section 2 of the MEPS Act fell for consideration. The Division Bench was concerned with the definition of ‘Management’ and held that the Chairman of the Branch Managing Committee which was constituted by the Management to control the affairs of the school, could be considered as the President of the Management for the purpose of Rule 36(2)(b) of MEPS Rules. The Division Bench held that this rule is silent on the point of delegation and the bye-laws of the Trust do not prohibit for delegation of powers of the President. In the case before the Division Bench, the Branch Managing Committee was not completely unconnected with the Management. The Division Bench considered that in case of a Society which runs hundreds of schools, it could not be possible for it’s President to participate in all enquiries and a delegation within the Management was permissible. In the present case, Mr. Pande admittedly has absolutely no connection with the Management and he is total outsider. The ratio of the decision of the Division Bench cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. 21. The Apex Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala (supra) dealt with an issue of validity of an enquiry held in breach of statutory provisions. The Apex Court laid down for other infraction of rule or statutory provisions, an enquiry cannot be directly held to be vitiated. After taking review of the decision, the Apex Court summarized the principle as under:- “33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the Employee): (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an Employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature of (b) whether it is procedural in character. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature of (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this : Procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/Employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed.-Except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/Employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice in established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the Employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity inspite of the delinquent officer/Employee asking for it. The prejudice is sell-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To report, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle slated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle.” 22. Mr. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle slated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle.” 22. Mr. Desai submitted that there is no prejudice to the Employee by the appointment of Mr. Pande. This argument cannot be accepted. The rules are framed under enactment of which one of the objects is to provide security of tenure of Employees. The mandate of Rule 36 that the enquiry must be conducted through a properly constituted committee is one such safeguard in favour of an Employee. If the constitution of a committee is not as mandated, then that may give rise to the resultant prejudice. There could be an area of debate when there is no object to the composition of the committee by the Employee at all. However in the present case, an objection was taken by the Employee that Mr. Pande is deliberately brought by the Secretary of the Management, who is hostile to him. 23. As regards the argument that the Employee did not object to the appointment, does not appear to be correct on facts. In the writ petition is filed by the Management itself, it can be seen that the enquiry began on 26 March 2011. Next date was 5 July 2011. On the next date thereafter on 10 July 2011, a written objection was raised by the Employee as regards the appointment of Mr. Pande as it being contrary to the rules. Thus, from the averments made in the petition by the Management itself, it could be seen that within two weeks of the constitution of the committee, an objection was raised in writing regarding appointment of Mr. Pande and inspite of objection and inspite of mandatory nature of rules, the enquiry proceeded further. The decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of AmarDye-Chem Ltd. (supra) relied upon by Mr. Desai, which deals with the actual prejudice does not assist him in the facts of the present case in view of the above discussion. In view of the above discussion, the view taken by the School Tribunal that the enquiry stood vitiated and that it needs to be held de novo cannot be faulted with. Desai, which deals with the actual prejudice does not assist him in the facts of the present case in view of the above discussion. In view of the above discussion, the view taken by the School Tribunal that the enquiry stood vitiated and that it needs to be held de novo cannot be faulted with. The petition filed by the Management must fail on that count. 24. As regards the petition filed by the Employee is concerned, it is only as regards denial of back wages and other part of the impugned order are not challenged. Both the counsel agree that the direction of reinstatement without back wages would mean that no back wages to be paid before conclusion of the enquiry, and it will depend on it’s result. The learned counsel for the Employee states that this clarification will suffice his purpose. He then submitted that the Management must pay to the Employee 100% subsistence allowance as was being paid for some time which was lateron withdrawn. There is no specific prayer in the petition. However, since the enquiry is ordered to be held afresh and the Employee is ordered to be continued in suspension, it is clarified that only for the purpose of computing the subsistence allowance to be paid after the date of the impugned order, the date of suspension shall be treated as 23 April 2011 and taking that date, subsistence allowance shall be paid as per the rules from the date of the impugned order onwards. Other claims i.e. emoluments will be determined at the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings. 25. Accordingly, Writ Petition No.1849 of 2013 filed by the Management is rejected. Writ Petition No.7387 of 2013 filed by the Employee is disposed of by clarifying that the order passed by the Tribunal directing that the Petitioner-Employee shall be reinstated without back wages would mean that the question of back wages will be decided after the conclusion of a fresh enquiry as directed by the impugned order. 26. All contentions of the parties as regards payment of back wages are kept open. 27. As regards submission of the Petitioner for grant of subsistence allowance, it is clarified that for the purpose of calculation of the payment of subsistence allowance from the date of impugned order, the date of suspension of the Petitioner shall be taken as 23 April 2011. 27. As regards submission of the Petitioner for grant of subsistence allowance, it is clarified that for the purpose of calculation of the payment of subsistence allowance from the date of impugned order, the date of suspension of the Petitioner shall be taken as 23 April 2011. Subsistence allowance will be paid as per the rules keeping in mind the above mentioned dates. Arrears, if any, of the subsistence allowance which is payable to the Petitioner as directed above, shall be paid within four weeks from today. 28. Time limit for completion of enquiry is extended by a period of four months from today. As regards other amounts claimed by the Petitioner for monetary benefit will be considered at the conclusion of the enquiry.