L. G. Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar
2014-08-14
ASHUTOSH KUMAR
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
ORAL ORDER Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The present application on behalf of nine petitioners has been filed for quashing of the order dated 19.02.2013 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna in S.K.Puri P.S. Case No.26 of 2012, whereby cognizance has been taken under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. Opposite party no.2 (informant) is the Director of M/s Skylark Computers Pvt. Ltd.. He entered into an agreement with L.G. Electronics India Pvt. Ltd., represented through the then Branch Accounts Manager (petitioner no.8), for running the Service Centre of the L.G. Company. It has been alleged in the First Information Report that the first agreement took place in the year 2005 for 12 months. Whereafter it was renewed on year to year basis, which continued till December, 2010. After that, agreement was, deliberately, renewed only for two months i.e. January, 2011 and February, 2011. 4. It has been alleged in the First Information Report that a 12-months lease-agreement was the practice, but the renewal for two months was only for the purposes of terminating the agreement with the informant. The termination clause gave one month time to the Company for prior notice. This Clause was also disregarded and only 11 days notice was given to the informant. 5. The substance of the allegation in the long First Information Report lodged by the opposite party no.2 is that the petitioners and others adopted harassing attitude and such a pathetic approach of the accused persons led to huge losses for the informant. The dues, as against the accused persons, according to the estimation of the informant, was Rs.35,17,018.00, out of which amount the informant has only received Rs.6,23,669.41. On the basis of the aforementioned allegations, a case, vide S.K.Puri P.S. Case No.26 of 2012 was registered for investigation for offence under Sections 403, 406, 420, 477(A), 468, 506 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. 6. The police, after investigation, submitted charge-sheet only against Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code and, consequently, by the order impugned, cognizance has been taken for the offence under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. The petitioner no.1 is the Company, a global prayer in the sector of electronic/digital products. Petitioner no.2 is the Managing Director of the Company and is a permanent resident of South Korea. He has nothing to do with the business of the franchisee.
7. The petitioner no.1 is the Company, a global prayer in the sector of electronic/digital products. Petitioner no.2 is the Managing Director of the Company and is a permanent resident of South Korea. He has nothing to do with the business of the franchisee. Petitioner no.3, at the relevant time, was the Chief Operating Officer, whereas petitioner no.4 is the H.R. Head of the Company. Petitioner nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are the Head of the Departments of Customer Service, Regional Service Manager, Branch Service Manager, Branch Accounts Manager and Store Incharge respectively. 8. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that none of them were directly involved with the concern of the franchisee, who is the informant in this case. It has, thus, been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the entire substance of allegation, primary part of which has been disbelieved by the police, is relating to business transaction by virtue of a contractual relationship between the parties because of the written contract. Since the case is primarily of a civil nature, there is not even a scintilla of material to make out a case under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. It has further been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that only because the franchisee agreement with opposite party no.2 was terminated because of deficiency in service that the present case has been lodged. On such grounds, it has been urged that the order taking cognizance be held to be bad in the eyes of law. 9. The counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no.2, on the other hand, has stated that only because the petitioners happen to be a big player in the field that the police also chose to shut its eyes to the misdeeds of the accused persons. It has further been submitted on his behalf that the local police has gone in cahoots with the accused persons and has submitted charge-sheet only under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code so as to anyhow mitigate the seriousness of the crime actually committed by the accused persons. The counsel for opposite party no.2 has also argued that with great difficulty the police authorities became ready to institute the case. In such an event, it has been stated, the bias and partisan approach of the investigating agency is only but natural. 10.
The counsel for opposite party no.2 has also argued that with great difficulty the police authorities became ready to institute the case. In such an event, it has been stated, the bias and partisan approach of the investigating agency is only but natural. 10. On carefully analyzing the submission of the parties and on perusal of the records, it appears that the informant in the present case is a franchisee of the Company, petitioner no.1. The entire gamut of allegation in the First Information Report hovers around the dispute with respect to settlement of account and return of goods. In such an event, it is difficult to fasten any criminal liability upon anyone of the petitioners. 11. From perusal of the records, it further appears that with respect to petitioner nos. 1 to 5, there is not even an indirect allegation against them. They are the persons, who are looking after the centralized management of the Company. Petitioner nos. 6 to 9 are handling the work of service/maintenance and customer care, who have nothing to do with the actual payment to the franchisee or the selection and termination of a franchisee for the Company. Asking such persons, who are basically employees of a commercial venture, to face trial would be nothing but an abuse of process of the Court, especially when no offence under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code can at all be said to have been made out. 12. Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishment for criminal intimidation, which is reproduced as under: - “506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.--Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.- And if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or 2[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 13. The term „criminal intimidation? has been defined in Section 503 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as under: “503.
The term „criminal intimidation? has been defined in Section 503 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as under: “503. Criminal intimidation.--Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.-A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.” 14. From a plain reading of both the Sections, Section 506 and Section 503 of the Indian Penal Code, it would appear that the basic ingredient of the offence is that the person must be threatened by another person with any injury to his person, reputation or property. In the case in hand, there is absolutely no allegation with respect to the offence under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears, rather, surprising as to how charge-sheet in the case was submitted under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. 15. Having, thus, analyzed the prosecution version and finding that the dispute between the parties is with respect to termination of the franchisee contract, return of the spare parts and settlement of claim amount, no criminal liability, much less, liability under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code could be saddled on the petitioners. 16. The Apex Court has shown concern about the tendency in the business circles to convert a purely civil dispute into a criminal case. Such a tendency has cropped up because of the prevalent impression that the civil laws remedy are time consuming, whereas in a criminal case, because of the fear of losing the liberty, there is likelihood of immediate settlement of disputes. Such tendency has to be, nay, nipped in the bud. 17. In the cases of Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr.
Such a tendency has cropped up because of the prevalent impression that the civil laws remedy are time consuming, whereas in a criminal case, because of the fear of losing the liberty, there is likelihood of immediate settlement of disputes. Such tendency has to be, nay, nipped in the bud. 17. In the cases of Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. V. State of Uttaranchal & Ors, (A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 251) and Thermax Limited and others v. K.M.Johny and others, { (2011) 13 SCC 412 ), the Apex Court has held that criminal prosecution ought not to be used as an instrument of harassment or seeking private vendetta with an ulterior motive. A civil matter cannot be settled by agitating the forum of criminal law. 18. Thus, on the premised reasons, the order taking cognizance dated 19.02.2013, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna in S.K. Puri P.S. Case No.26 of 2012, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and is, therefore, quashed. The application is allowed.