JUDGMENT : K.T. Sankaran, J. SM No. 328 of 1999 was initiated before the Land Tribunal, Kanhangad, showing the respondents 1 to 5 herein as A party and respondent No. 7 Panayamthatta Narayanan Nair as the B party. The SM proceedings related to an extent of 0.50 Acres of land in RS No. 336/2A2 in Ajanur Village of Hosdurg Taluk. The Land Tribunal issued a printed order with necessary details filled up therein and allowed the SM. It was held that a certificate of purchase will be issued to the Aparty. The order in the SM is dated 27th October, 2000. 2. The revision petitioners filed AA No. 31 of 2003 on the file of the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms), Kannur, challenging the order of the Land Tribunal. The appellants before the Appellate Authority were third parties. The revision petitioners/appellants contended that the property did not belong in jenmam to Panayamthatta Narayanan Nair and the property belonged to Adot Thaivalappu tharwad. They also contended that there is a Devasthanam in one of the items of the properties belonging to the tharwad and the SM schedule property is one of the items earmarked for certain viniyogas for the Devaswom. The revision petitioners/appellants contended that they came to know of the order of the Land Tribunal only when the A parties took a defence in OS No. 343 of 2002, Munsiff’s Court, Hosdurg, filed by the revision petitioners. At the time when the appeal came up for hearing, OS No. 343 of 2002 was disposed of and copies of the judgment and decree were produced before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority, however, dismissed the appeal which is under challenge in this revision. According to the revision petitioners, the property in question belonged to Adot Thaivalappu tharwad and all the members of the tharwad (including the A party) are sharers. Therefore, the ‘A’ parties are not entitled to claim exclusive right over the property and on that ground, they cannot get a purchase certificate in respect of that property in their favour. 3. In OS No. 343 of 2002, the plaintiffs therein are the Devaswom, represented by the President, Secretary and Treasurer and the karanavar of the tharwad. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the President, Secretary and the Treasurer of the Devaswom are also members of the tharwad. 3. In OS No. 343 of 2002, the plaintiffs therein are the Devaswom, represented by the President, Secretary and Treasurer and the karanavar of the tharwad. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the President, Secretary and the Treasurer of the Devaswom are also members of the tharwad. That suit was for a declaration of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession of the property in dispute. The Munsiff’s Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the property of the tharwad cannot be treated as the property of the Devaswom and that there was no vesting of the property of the tharwad in the Devaswom. It was held that the plaintiff Devaswom did not acquire any title over the suit property and that all the members of the tharwad and their legal representatives have right over the suit property. The Munsiff Court in OS No. 343 of 2002 held as follows: "9.........I have absolutely no hesitation in holding that the suit property originally belonged to the tharwad by name Adot Thaivalappu Tharwad of which the predecessor in interest of the defendants was also a member. 10....... It is not known how this Panayamthatta Narayanan Nair became the jenmi of the property when Exts.Al to A4 and All clinchingly prove that the jenmi of the property was Adot Thaivalappu Tharwad. It is curious enough to note that in the original written statement filed by the defendants, there is no mention about the name of the landlord. Similarly, in Ext. B1 gift deed also, there is no mention about the name of the landlord. Evidently, none of the tharwad members who had right over the suit property as on the date of Ext. B2, has been made a party in that proceedings. That being so, it cannot be said that Ext. B2 order is binding on them. Since it has been proved that Kunhiraman was the member of the tharwad, he was having fractional right over the property and such a fractional title holder cannot claim the property on kuzhikanom right. So, the contention of the defendants that the property belonged to Kunhiraman in his individual capacity and subsequently, the defendants 2 to 6 became its absolute owners etc., are only to be rejected. It is true that as seen from Ext. So, the contention of the defendants that the property belonged to Kunhiraman in his individual capacity and subsequently, the defendants 2 to 6 became its absolute owners etc., are only to be rejected. It is true that as seen from Ext. B4 series documents, late Kunhiraman as well as the defendants have paid basic tax in respect of the suit property for a very long period. However, these basic tax receipts themselves will not confer any absolute title on Kunhiraman or the defendants. It can only be said that they have paid the basic tax as the co-owners of the suit property. 12.........Property of the tharwad cannot be treated as the property of the tharwad Devaswom. It is true that the Devaswom mentioned in the plaint is a private temple. Still unless any property is endowed or gifted to the deity, the nature of the property would be continuing, as if the property of the tharwad members, The plaintiff herein has no definite case regarding the gifting of property in favour of the deity. At the time of argument, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that there was no gifting of property in favour of the family deity, but the properties have been set apart for the viniyogas of the family temple as well as a community temple. If that be so, there is no vesting of any property with the family deity. 15. If it is prove that the plaintiff Devaswom did not acquire any title over the suit property, then the position is that all the members of the erstwhile tharwad and their legal representatives will be having right over the suit property. 16. Further, there is abundant evidence to show that the suit property is in the possession of the defendants, as co-owners. There is also evidence to show that the house which is sought to be recovered, has been constructed by late Kunhiraman. Ext. B7 is the license and permit obtained in his name. Ext. B6 is the license and permit obtained by the defendants for construction of bath-room and latrine attached to the original house. Ext. B5 series are the receipts obtained by the defendants for payment of building tax. They are in the name of late Kunhiraman as well as the defendants. B7 is the license and permit obtained in his name. Ext. B6 is the license and permit obtained by the defendants for construction of bath-room and latrine attached to the original house. Ext. B5 series are the receipts obtained by the defendants for payment of building tax. They are in the name of late Kunhiraman as well as the defendants. All these aspects would definitely go to show that the building situated in the suit property was not constructed by the tharwad or tharwad members; but it was not constructed by Kunhiraman individually. Therefore, the possession claimed by the plaintiff over the suit property is also not proved." 4. One of the reasons stated by the Appellate Authority to dismiss the appeal is that after coming into force of the Kerala Hindu Joint Family System (Abolition) Act, here is no concept of karanavan of a tharwad and therefore, the appeal is not maintainable. Under Section 102 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, any person aggrieved by any order of the Land Tribunal under Section 72F may appeal against such order, Though one of the appellants is described as the karanavan of the tharwad, that does not mean that he is not competent to file the appeal under Section 102 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Karanavan of a tharwad is also a member of the tharwad. If the claim of that person is that he is a member of the tharwad and he has right in the property in dispute, he is entitled to maintain an appeal under Section 102 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act even though he is described as karanavan of the tharwad. A misdescription as such would not make the appeal not maintainable, if otherwise it is maintainable in substance. As held in Parukutty v. Appukuttan', 1978 KHC 39 : 1979 KLT 162 : 1978 KLN SN 2 sub-section (1) of Section 104 of the Land Reforms Act applies only to proceedings against joint families and not to proceedings by them and a person as karanavan was competent to make the application. Section 104 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act reads as follows: "104. Proceedings by or against joint families, etc. Section 104 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act reads as follows: "104. Proceedings by or against joint families, etc. - (1) Where, in any proceeding under this Act, a joint family is a party, it shall be sufficient to implead the Manager, karanavan or yajaman and the senior most male member of such family and, in the case of a Marumakkathayam or Aliyasanthana family, also the karanavan or yajaman of each tavazhi or kavaru, but any other member of the family shall have the right to get himself impleaded as a party. (2) Where any such proceeding relates to any property or part thereof under the management of a receiver appointed by a Court, it shall be sufficient to implead the receiver as party to the proceeding and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, it shall not be necessary to obtain the permission of the Court which appointed the | receiver for so impleading him. (3) The provisions of this Section, shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other provision of this Act." It is true that the decision in Parukutty v. Appukuttan, 1978 KHC 39: 1978 KLT 162 : 1978 KLN SN 2 relates to a case before the commencement of the Kerala Hindu Joint Family System (Abolition) Act. Even after the commencement of the Kerala Hindu Joint Family System (Abolition) Act, a misdescription of a person as karanavan in the appeal filed by him would not make his appeal as not maintainable, if as a member of the tharw ad and as a co-owner, he is otherwise entitled to maintain the appeal. 5. The revision petitioners were not parties to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal. They contended that they are co-owners of the property over which the A parties alone had no exclusive rights. That was a matter to be decided in the case. The Appellate Authority did not decide that question, though such a contention was specifically raised. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal only on technicalities. Even assuming that the judgment in OS No. 343 of 2002 is not binding on the A party since the ultimate decision in the suit was in their favour, that does not mean that the Appellate Authority should not decide the question on the merits. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal only on technicalities. Even assuming that the judgment in OS No. 343 of 2002 is not binding on the A party since the ultimate decision in the suit was in their favour, that does not mean that the Appellate Authority should not decide the question on the merits. It is relevant to note that the case of A parties is that the property belonged in jenmam to Panayamthatta Narayanan Nair whereas according to the revision petitioners, the property belonged in jenmam to Adot Thaivalappu tharwad. This is a matter to be considered by the authorities under the Land Reforms Act while dealing with the claim of the A parties. 6. The revision petitioners submitted that some of the members of Adot Thaivalappu tharwad (Narayanan and Others) filed OS No. 180 of 2011, on the file of the Court of the Munsiff, Hosdurg, against the A parties in the present case (respondents 1 to 5 in the revision) for a declaration that the property in question belonged to the members of the tharwad after coming into force of the Kerala Hindu Joint Family System (Abolition) Act and for a consequential injunction restraining the A parties from committing any waste in the property. It is submitted that OS No. 180 of 2011 is pending disposal. 7. Since the Appellate Authority failed to consider the real questions involved in the case and since the appeal was dismissed on an unsustainable ground, I set aside the judgment of the Appellate Authority. In the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the appeal is liable to be allowed and the order of the Land Tribunal is liable to be set aside. This requires the remand of the case to the Land Tribunal for fresh consideration. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The judgment of the Appellate Authority and the order of the Land Tribunal are set aside and the matter is remanded to the Land Tribunal for fresh disposal, after affording an opportunity of being heard to all the parties. It is made clear that any interested party would be entitled to get himself impleaded in the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, so that a complete and final adjudication of the disputes in the case can be made by the Land Tribunal.