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2014 DIGILAW 890 (PAT)

Ram Narayan Mishra v. State of Bihar

2014-08-19

JITENDRA MOHAN SHARMA, NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH

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JUDGMENT : NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH, J. Before delivering the judgment in this appeal, we would like to record our anguish. This is a jail appeal in relation to an incident, which took place on 12.11.1983, wherein the sole-appellant is alleged to have inflicted fatal blow with the spade (Kudali) on the deceased. In course of treatment the victim died. From the lower court record we find that even in the lower court, the appellant was so poor that he had to be provided with a counsel by the State to defend him. He had surrendered before the Trial Court in the year 1989 and was remanded to judicial custody, where he remained till the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.10.1991 of life imprisonment passed by the Trial Court. He filed this appeal as a jail appeal before this Court, which was taken up on 05.12.1991 and admitted. It was recorded that bail would be considered after receipt of lower court record. Everyone forgot the appellant. In spite of the receipt of the lower court record and in spite of the fact that this appeal was jail appeal, the Registry of this Court did nothing to list the matter for consideration of bail. It was only in 1998, i.e., more than 7 years thereafter that the matter was listed and Mr. Pranav Kumar, learned counsel was appointed as Amicus Curiae and, thereafter, on 19.02.1998 the petitioner, having been in custody for over 9 years, was released on bail. This is a matter of concern for the Registry of this Court and we hope that this callous attitude and insensitivity will not be repeated in future. 2. We have heard Mr. Pranav Kumar, Amicus Curiae and Mr. Ajay Mishra, learned A.P.P. and also perused the records. The sole-appellant has been convicted by judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09thof October, 1991 in Sessions Trial No.24 of 1990 by the learned Sessions Judge, Sitamarhi for an offence under Section-302 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. 3. The prosecution case is based upon the fardbeyan of one Vijay Kumar Mishra (P.W.1), the son of the deceased, which was recorded by Mr. S. Zoha, A.S.I. (not examined) at Sri Krishna Medical College & Hospital, Muzaffarpur (hereinafter in short ‘S.K.M.C.H.’) on 14.11.1983 while the deceased was being treated there. 3. The prosecution case is based upon the fardbeyan of one Vijay Kumar Mishra (P.W.1), the son of the deceased, which was recorded by Mr. S. Zoha, A.S.I. (not examined) at Sri Krishna Medical College & Hospital, Muzaffarpur (hereinafter in short ‘S.K.M.C.H.’) on 14.11.1983 while the deceased was being treated there. It may be recorded that the deceased died in the S.K.M.C.H. two days thereafter. The allegation as per the fardbeyan is that on 12.11.1983 at about 9 am the appellant was found digging a patch of land with a spade (Kudali) adjacent to his house, which was objected to by the deceased, Shyam Narayan Mishra, who tried to stop him and sudden altercation started. It is alleged that when Shyam Narayan Mishra tried to hold the spade, the appellant hit with the sharp edge of the spade on the head. It is then alleged that once Shyam Narayan Mishra fell down, he was hit by the backside of the spade above his eye. In this injured condition, the deceased, Shyam Narayan Mishra was then brought on 12.11.1983 to the Primary Health Centre and was then referred to the S.K.M.C.H. where this statement was recorded on 14.11.1983. The appellant absconded. After investigation charge-sheet was submitted under Section-302 IPC and in course of treatment, as noted above, Shyam Narayan Mishra died on 16.11.1983. Cognizance having been taken, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. The appellant having surrendered in the year 1989, the trial commenced and in course of trial as there was no one to represent the appellant, the Court appointed a State counsel to defend him. The trial ended in the conviction, as noted above, followed by the jail appeal, as noticed above. 4. In order to establish its case the prosecution has examined 8 witnesses. P.W.1-Vijay Kumar Mishra, as noted above, is the informant and the son of the deceased, Shyam Narayan Mishra. P.W.2 is Ramkumari Devi, the wife of deceased, P.W.3 is Radhakant Mishra, P.W.4 is Kameshwari Devi the mother of the deceased and P.W.5 is Parmanand Mishra who has been tendered. P.W.6 is Dr. Binod Kumar Mehta who conducted the postmortem examination. P.W.7-Bimal Kumar Shukla and P.W.8-Madan Prasad Sharma are both Advocates, who had nothing to do with the case or the investigation, but have been brought as witnesses. P.W.6 is Dr. Binod Kumar Mehta who conducted the postmortem examination. P.W.7-Bimal Kumar Shukla and P.W.8-Madan Prasad Sharma are both Advocates, who had nothing to do with the case or the investigation, but have been brought as witnesses. First, P.W.7-Bimal Kumar Shukla, Advocate was brought to prove the inquest report and the formal F.I.R. P.W.8-Madan Prasad Sharma, Advocate was brought to prove the entire case diary in absence of the Investigating Officer being examined. 5. At this stage, we would like to notice this peculiar manner, in which the Trial Court conducted the trial. In this regard, the Evidence Act is clear as to who can prove a fact and how a document has to be proved. Giving complete go bye to the law, two roaming Advocates are brought in to prove the documents as aforesaid. This is totally impermissible in law. We are surprised that a Court, like the Sessions Judge, failed to appreciate the law in this regard. Such roaming witnesses (commonly known as ‘Sankat Mochan’ witnesses) are impermissible. Evidence brought on record by them cannot be looked into as it is not evidence duly proved or brought on record, which has to be totally discarded. So far as the practice of examining these ‘Sankat Mochan’ witnesses is concerned, we condemn this practice, which, we find, is prevalent in this State only because of lack of legal education and lack of learning amongst the Judicial Officers. 6. We direct the Bihar Judicial Academy to take up this issue because repeatedly cases after cases roaming Advocate’s clerks or Advocates are brought in by the prosecution to prove formal or official documents without anything being brought on record as to why such documents cannot be proved by primary source and why secondary source has to be adopted and, even if secondary source has to be adopted, how is the secondary evidence being competently proved? 7. Having said so about the ‘Sankat Mochan’ witnesses we would like to say a word about police case diary. Police case diary is the record made and maintained by a Police Officer in course of investigation. It also contains a memorandum of statements of witnesses interrogated in course of investigation and recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C. It also includes his objective findings. It is his record. Police case diary is the record made and maintained by a Police Officer in course of investigation. It also contains a memorandum of statements of witnesses interrogated in course of investigation and recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C. It also includes his objective findings. It is his record. Code of Criminal Procedure clearly states as to for what purposes case diary or statements recorded therein can be used. It can only be used in course of trial either to refresh memory of a witness or to contradict the statement of a prosecution witness as made in the Court to that as made in course of investigation. It must be remembered that the statements so recorded is a part of case records because it is a part of police report (charge-sheet) [Section 173 (5)] that is filed in the Court, on the basis of which the Court takes cognizance. Then if the case is to be committed to the Court of Sessions for trial such part of the statements, on which the prosecution would rely in the trial, has to be supplied by the police as police papers to the accused (Sections 207 and 209 Cr.P.C.). It is these materials on basis of which charges are framed. This presupposes that the prosecution cannot normally travel beyond these police papers and the accused is noticed as to the prosecution case which would be set up in trial. Thus, the statement so recorded is a record but it does not follow that it is a part of evidence because the Court has to deliver a judgment only on basis of evidence. Reference may be here made to Section-162 which prohibits the use of statements recorded under Section-161 (3) except to contradict prosecution witness or where such statement is a dying declaration or leading to recovery. If we refer to Section-172 (2) Cr.P.C., it clearly predicates that Court may refer to the case diary but with strong warning that it is not evidence. The purpose is only to look for contradictions. Then, why are the Courts in Bihar permitting case diaries either as a part or as a whole to be exhibited and marked as exhibit and use it as evidence in the case. There surely is a misconception that even for the purposes of showing contradiction, the case diary must first be brought on record as an evidence. Then, why are the Courts in Bihar permitting case diaries either as a part or as a whole to be exhibited and marked as exhibit and use it as evidence in the case. There surely is a misconception that even for the purposes of showing contradiction, the case diary must first be brought on record as an evidence. This is not the correct position. If the Investigating Officer is available and he being the author of the case diary, he has to be confronted with the statement of the witnesses in the Court with the statement they have made in course of investigation as recorded by him, which is known to the defence because the defence is supplied with police paper and case diary is on record for the Investigating Officer to refresh himself. But, this is done after the witness is reminded or questioned about having made a statement before police in course of investigation. Here, no part of the case diary is to be exhibited or treated as evidence. It is the evidence of the Investigating Officer or for that matter the evidence of prosecution witness that is relevant and valid. If the Investigating Officer is not available then the reason for his non-availability has first to be brought on record and then the prosecution witnesses have to be cross-examined with regard to statements given by them in course of investigation to the police officer and then, without the case dairy being proved, as it is already a part of the records and by virtue of Section-172 (2) Cr.P.C. is available to the Court, the contradictions are to be pointed out by the defence, but, in no circumstances the case diary can be proved and brought in as substantive evidence in a trial. Courts are to proceed on basis of evidence as deposed and recorded in Court and cannot treat statements under Section-161 (3) Cr.P.C. as recorded by police as evidence. The sooner this wrong practice ends the better it is. No judgment can be based upon facts noted in the case diary, as the case diary, wrongly proved and brought in as evidence in the trial, is no evidence. 8. At this stage, we may notice that the allegation initially was that first the appellant struck the deceased with the sharp edge of spade. No judgment can be based upon facts noted in the case diary, as the case diary, wrongly proved and brought in as evidence in the trial, is no evidence. 8. At this stage, we may notice that the allegation initially was that first the appellant struck the deceased with the sharp edge of spade. Only to establish the intention to kill, it is alleged that he was then assaulted with the backside of the spade above the eye when the victim had fallen down. When we see the postmortem report, this second part is not at all supported by any medical injury. There is a singular injury by a sharp cutting weapon like the spade. That later part of the prosecution story is a clear exaggeration, which had been thought upon in two days’ interval between the incident, which took place on 12.11.1983 and the fardbeyan, which was recorded on 14.11.1983. From this, we would like to notice another serious lapse of the system. When we notice the gap between the incident and the fardbeyan, being 48 hours, we asked the learned A.P.P., whether on record there is any evidence justifying the delay. There is none. We became curious. We examined the records ourselves and were aghast to note certain facts, which point to insensitivity of the Trial Court. Any trial Judge, especially in cases, where the accused is being represented by the State being poor and illiterate unaware of his rights, an obligation is cast upon the Court to be more vigilant of the rights of such accused. It is not a mere case that a Court is trying. It is the life of an accused which is at stake for having taken law, allegedly, in his hands. This sensitivity appears to be totally lost at all stages. 9. When we looked into the records, we found that in fact on 12.11.1983 itself the injured was brought to the police station and admittedly referred to S.K.M.C.H. A requisition had been made by the police officer to the doctors in the S.K.M.C.H. to prepare an injury report and treat the person. In the requisition, which is on record, the date is interpolated, but, what could not to be interpolated is that this requisition is in two copies, received by someone on 13.11.1983, which is clearly endorsed on the requisition. In the requisition, which is on record, the date is interpolated, but, what could not to be interpolated is that this requisition is in two copies, received by someone on 13.11.1983, which is clearly endorsed on the requisition. This clearly establishes that the victim had been sent to the S.K.M.C.H. on 12.11.1983 itself, to the knowledge of the police, still no statement was recorded or if recorded it was never brought on record. What was the injury and how was it caused is also not on record because we cannot accept that no injury report was prepared. If it was prepared, it was not brought on record. It is only two days after admission to the S.K.M.C.H. that the fardbeyan is recorded. It is so recorded on 14.11.1983 but then what happens. It is registered as a formal F.I.R. only on 16.11.1983, after the injured dies and inquest report is prepared. Even though F.I.R. is registered formally on 16.11.1983, it is straightway registered under Section-302 IPC, despite the fact that the fardbeyan was recorded on 14.11.1983 when the victim was very much alive. The matter does not end here. Having registered the F.I.R. on 16.11.1983, it is sent to the Court only on 18.11.1983 i.e. after two days. 10. In our view, this sequence of events, which is mostly on record and proved, was totally overlooked by the Court. This totally discredits the prosecution story. The entire credibility of oral evidence, which comes in Court after seven years after the incident, loses all sanctity. There is not a whisper of any explanation for this highly unusual sequence of events. Occurrence, injury and reference by police to S.K.M.C.H. is on 12.11.1983. Fardbeyan is recorded on 14.11.1983. It is registered as an F.I.R. on 16.11.1983 when the victim dies. It is sent to the Court only on 18.11.1983. To the contrary, there has been a consistent suggestion to the prosecution witnesses, who posed as eye-witnesses that no such occurrence had taken place at all. They were not eye-witnesses to any such occurrence, yet, we regret that ignoring these, the Trial Court blindly relied upon their statements made in the Court and convicted the person. That surely cannot be done. The Court has to decide in accordance with the evidence and its admissibility and probative value and not on whims and caprice based on undefined notion of justice. Justice to whom? That surely cannot be done. The Court has to decide in accordance with the evidence and its admissibility and probative value and not on whims and caprice based on undefined notion of justice. Justice to whom? Is it justice only for the deceased or is it not, that it has to be justice for the accused as well. 11. Even if we accept the evidence as gospel truth then what do we have. It was at best a singular blow in a dispute, which started at the spur of the moment with no premeditation. Can it be an offence punishable under Section-302 IPC? The answer can only be no. What the Courts in Bihar are forgetting is that we have to first start from Section-299 IPC, which defines culpable homicide. We then come to Section-300 IPC, which defines culpable homicide amounting to murder. Section-300 IPC itself has several exceptions. They are statutory exceptions and part of the Section. They are not to be ignored or forgotten as that is the statutory scheme. Once a person comes within those exceptions of Section-300 IPC then, for the purposes of punishment, we have to refer to Section-304 IPC. If the case does not fall within the exception of Section-300 IPC then for the purposes of punishment one has to refer to Section-302 IPC. This is the scheme which the Courts in Bihar have forgotten. For them, if anybody dies as a consequence of injury caused by the accused, it can only be punishable under Section-302 IPC and nothing else. We are sorry, it is not so. Even when we come to Section-304 IPC, for the purposes of punishment it is in two parts. The only thing is that the extent of punishment varies depending upon the exception to Section-300 IPC within which a person would fall. We may notice the extreme case where a person has caused such injury, which in normal course would lead to death, he cannot ipso facto be convicted under Section-302 IPC. If he had no intention to cause death, his case would fall within the first part of Section-304 IPC. These distinctions have been forgotten by the Trial Courts in Bihar, which is leading to gross miscarriage of justice as in this case. If he had no intention to cause death, his case would fall within the first part of Section-304 IPC. These distinctions have been forgotten by the Trial Courts in Bihar, which is leading to gross miscarriage of justice as in this case. Had the Trial Court been even slightly vigilant and responsive to its duties, both towards the victim as well as the accused, the appellant would not have languished in jail for over 9 years unattended only to be wrongly convicted. 12. In the facts noted above, we cannot rely either upon the fardbeyan or the evidence that was recorded in Court seven years thereafter in support of the fardbeyan. There is absolutely no explanation as to why when the incident took place at 9 am on 12.11.1983 and the victim was brought and admitted to the S.K.M.C.H. on the same day, neither any injury report was prepared or if so prepared was not brought on record. No statement was recorded and, if so recorded, was not brought on record. What did the bed head ticket says at the time of admission was not brought on record. It is only two days thereafter that the alleged fardbeyan was recorded but not registered as an F.I.R. much less under Section-307 IPC because at that time the victim was alive. It is only after the victim died at the S.K.M.C.H. on 16.11.1983 that the inquest report was prepared and the fardbeyan recorded two days earlier on 14.11.1983 was then registered as an F.I.R. under Section-302 IPC straightway. It does not end there. The F.I.R. was then sent to the Court only two days thereafter, i.e., on 18.11.1983. All this clearly establishes that, in fact, there was no complaint of any homicidal action on part of the appellant at any point earlier before the victim died and it is after good four days that the story is manufactured. This in itself, in absence of any plausible explanation for this by the proseuction and the extraordinary sequence of events entitles the appellant to clean acquittal. 13. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court. The appellant is acquitted of the charge levelled against him and he is relieved from the liabilities of bail bond. 14. Before parting with the judgment, we appreciate the assistance given by Mr. 13. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court. The appellant is acquitted of the charge levelled against him and he is relieved from the liabilities of bail bond. 14. Before parting with the judgment, we appreciate the assistance given by Mr. Pranav Kumar, Amicus Curiae and the fair stand taken by Mr. Ajay Mishra, learned A.P.P. We direct the High Court Legal Services Authority to ensure payment of Rs.5,000.00 to Mr. Pranav Kumar, Amicus Curiae for the assistance rendered to Court by him. 15. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Bihar Judicial Academy for being used appropriately in the interest of justice.