JUDGMENT Sunil Ambwani & Satish Chandra,JJ.: - We have heard Shri Subodh Kumar and Shri Udit Chandra for the petitioners. Learned Standing Counsel appears for the State respondents. Shri Sanjog Kumar holding brief of Shri Prem Chandra appears for Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar, Shahjahanpur. 2. The petitioners have prayed for setting aside the order dated July 25, 2003 passed by the State Government under the signatures of Shri Ramesh Garg, Secretary, Nagar Vikas Anubhag-II, Government of UP, for and on behalf of Governor of Uttar Pradesh, by which he has cancelled resolution no.22 (3) dated 3.10.2001; resolution no.9 (6) dated 4.12.2001 and resolution no.16 (9) dated 6.6.2002 of Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar, Shahjahanpur under Section 34 (1-B) of the U.P. Nagar Palika Adhiniyam 1916, by which the land in Gata nos.106 and 107 (area 0.521 hec.) was allotted to the petitioners, which were earlier allotted to their uncle late Peera Khan, son of Shri Kaley Khan, resident of Mohalla Umarpur, Tilhar, District Shahjahanpur at annual rent of Rs.20/- and for permission to use the land for commercial purposes. 3. Late Shri Peera Khan, son of Sri Kaley Khan, resident of Mohalla Umarpur, Tilhar, District Shahjahanpur was the lessee of the land under the lease deed granted by the Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar to the petitioner. After his death on an application made by the petitioner the Nagar Palika Parishad vide its resolution no.22 (3) dated 3.10.2001 resolved to let out the land to the petitioners on a rent of Rs.200/- per annum, in pursuance to which an agreement of lease was executed on 5.10.2001 and which was signed by the Chairman of Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar, with the condition that no construction will be made nor the nature of the land will be changed without the permission of the Parishad. The petitioners also agreed for increase of rent after five years in accordance with the Government Orders. 4. The Nagar Palika Parishad by its resolution no.9 (6) dated 4.12.2001 allowed the petitioners on their application to use the land for commercial purpose with the condition that they will have to pay double the agreed rent i.e. Rs.400/- per year and which was accepted by the petitioner for which an agreement was executed between the Nagar Palika Parishad through its Chairman and the petitioners. 5.
5. The petitioners, after entering into an agreement for user of the land for commercial purpose and agreeing to pay the increased rent, applied to the Parishad to construct shops on the land. By resolution no.16 (9) dated 6.6.2002 the Parishad resolved to permit the petitioners to construct the shops on the land with the condition that the construction will be the property of the Nagar Palika Parishad. The land behind the shops will be used for the personal use of the petitioners and will not be let out or sold. The rent of the shop was fixed at Rs.50/- per month and of the rooms at Rs.25/- per month which the petitioner agreed to deposit with the Nagar Palika Parishad in addition to the rent of the land. An agreement to this effect was entered into between the Nagar Palika Parishad through its Chairman and the petitioners on 20.6.2002. The petitioners thereafter submitted a building plan for construction of shops, which was approved on 25.6.2002. 6. A complaint was made on Tehsil diwas on 4.12.2002 to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Tilhar about the irregularities in grant of lease and the permission to construct shops on which the Executive Engineer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar submitted a report on 17.12.2002 to the Sub Divisional Magistrate that the lease deed has been executed and the use of the land has been converted into commercial purposes and thereafter the building plans were sanctioned in accordance with the resolution passed by the Nagar Palika Parishad. The land is not a nazul land. The petitioners have been allowed to construct the shops of which the constructions will belong to Nagar Palika, Parishad and for which they have been required to deposit the rent @ Rs.50/- per shop and Rs.25/- per room. 7. The State Government by the impugned order dated 25.7.2003 has cancelled the resolutions of the Nagar Palika Parishad dated 3.10.2001, 4.12.2001 and 6.6.2002 under Section 34 (1-B) of the UP Nagar Palika Adhiniyam 1916, giving rise to this writ petition. 8. It is submitted by Shri Subodh Kumar that no notice was given to the petitioners nor any opportunity of hearing was provided before cancelling the resolution. The land is not a nazul land. It was leased out to petitioner's uncle prior to the year 1966.
8. It is submitted by Shri Subodh Kumar that no notice was given to the petitioners nor any opportunity of hearing was provided before cancelling the resolution. The land is not a nazul land. It was leased out to petitioner's uncle prior to the year 1966. After his death the Parishad resolved to let out the land to the petitioners by increasing the yearly rent to Rs.200/- per year. The permission for commercial user and for construction of shops, which were to remain the property of the Nagar Palika Parishad and for which the petitioners agreed to enhance the rent of the land and to deposit the rent of the shops regularly. The shops have been constructed by the petitioners in accordance with the building plans. He submits that Section 34 (1B) does not authorise the State Government to cancel the resolutions after the auctions in pursuance to the resolutions was carried out. Section 34 (1-B) gives powers to the State Government on its own motion or on a report or complaint to prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under the Act by Board or a Committee of a Board or a Joint Committee or any officers or servants of a Board, if in its opinion such resolution or order is prejudicial to the public interest or has been passed or made in abuse of the powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force. Once the auctions conducted in pursuance to such alleged offending resolutions have been carried out, the order of the State Government would not affect such auctions. He submits that in the present case after execution of the lease deed and the conversion of the user for commercial use the shops were constructed in accordance with the sanctioned building plans. The orders passed by the State Government, therefore, after constructions of the shops are complete, could not have taken away the rights of the petitioners. 9.
He submits that in the present case after execution of the lease deed and the conversion of the user for commercial use the shops were constructed in accordance with the sanctioned building plans. The orders passed by the State Government, therefore, after constructions of the shops are complete, could not have taken away the rights of the petitioners. 9. Shri Subodh Kumar has relied on a judgment of Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Kannauj vs. The State of UP & ors AIR 1971 SC 2147 and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Har Pal Singh vs. the State of UP and another AIR 1977 Allahabad 302 in which it was held that sub-section (1-B) of Section 34 does not clothe the State Government with a power to take away the effect of the resolution, which is purported to be cancelled. In the said case the Board dismissed the services of 74 sweepers, who had gone on sudden strikes in pursuance to the resolution passed by the Board without adopting the procedure provided under the Enquiry, Punishment and Termination of Service Rules. The State Government cancelled the resolution under Section 34 (1-B) of the Act. The Supreme Court held as follows: - "It should be noted that the words underlined above were inserted by an amendment which came into force on 30th November, 1964, that is to say much after the order of dismissal by the Executive Officer had been passed, though before the order of the State Government dated 12th May, 1965. Before the amendment, the State Government could pass the order of prohibition of execution only when, in its opinion, the resolution or order was prejudicial to the public interest; but, after the amendment, such an order could also be made by the State Government if, in its opinion, the resolution or order was made in- abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force. It was contended on behalf of the Board that it was not competent for the State Government in this case to make the order on the ground that the order of dismissal was in flagrant breach of a provision of the law for the time being in force.
It was contended on behalf of the Board that it was not competent for the State Government in this case to make the order on the ground that the order of dismissal was in flagrant breach of a provision of the law for the time being in force. But that point is only of academic interest, because the order itself shows that it had been passed also on the ground that the order of dismissal was prejudicial to the public interest. We assume, therefore, that the State Government was satisfied that the order of dismissal passed by the Executive Officer was prejudicial to the public interest. The question, however, is whether, after the order of dismissal had been passed on the 9th April, 1964, the State Government had the power virtually to set aside or cancel the order under the cover of purporting "to prohibit the execution or further execution of that order." In our opinion, that sub-section does not clothe the State Government with such a power. The resolution of the Board or the order of a duly authorised officer of the Board is not liable to be cancelled or set aside under this section. All that could be done under it is to prohibit the execution or further execution of the resolution or order, or the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order. Where the resolution or order does not require any acts to be performed or steps to be taken for the. execution or further execution of the resolution or order of the Board or of its Officer, as in the present case, there is really nothing to prohibit.
Where the resolution or order does not require any acts to be performed or steps to be taken for the. execution or further execution of the resolution or order of the Board or of its Officer, as in the present case, there is really nothing to prohibit. It was contended on behalf of the State that, when the State Government was empowered to order prohibition of the execution of the resolution or order, it was virtually em- powered to set aside or cancel the order and, in support of this view, a reference was made to sub-section (4) of that section which provides that it shall be the duty of the Board, if so required by the authority making the order under sub-section (1-B) to take any action which it would have been entitled to take, if the resolution or order had never been made or passed, and which is necessary for preventing any person from doing or continuing to do anything in pursuance of the resolution or order. If the object of the provision was to clothe the State Government with the power to cancel or set aside the resolution of the Board or order, it would have simply said so without resorting to the circumlocution "prohibit the execution or further execution of the resolution or order". We do not, therefore, think that sub-s. (1-B) read with sub S. (4) applies to any resolution or order which exhausts itself after it is passed or made. That is the view taken by a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Shujaat Ullah Khan v. State of U.P. & Others.(1) In that case, a resolution was passed by the Board exonerating Shujaat Ullah Khan, who was the Executive Officer of the Board, from certain charges that had been framed against him. The State Government, thereupon, purporting to act under section 34(1- B) of the Act, quashed the Board's resolution on the ground that it was illegal, not having been passed by 2/3rds of the members constituting the Board and was otherwise prejudicial to the public interest. This, order of the State Government was challenged by Shujaat Ullah Khan on several grounds, one of them being that no order under s. 34(1-B) could be passed, because the resolution of the Board had been fully implemented and nothing remained to be executed in respect there of.
This, order of the State Government was challenged by Shujaat Ullah Khan on several grounds, one of them being that no order under s. 34(1-B) could be passed, because the resolution of the Board had been fully implemented and nothing remained to be executed in respect there of. This contention was accepted by the learned Judge who observed as follows "It is clear that the only order that can be passed by the State Government under this sub- section is a prohibitory order to prevent something being done in the future. It is not open to the Government, acting under this sub- section, to give any positive direction such as has been given in the present case, where the Government has ordered the Board to reconsider its report and to make a further enquiry and take a fresh decision. The resolution passed by the Board, exonerating the Executive Officer and dropping the charges against him, exhausted itself as soon as it was passed, for the charges were straightaway dropped and the Executive Officer stood exonerated. There remained nothing to be done in the future and there was nothing left for execution or further execution that could be prohibited by the State Government under sec. 34(1-B)." In our opinion, that reasoning equally applies to the present case. The order of dismissal was self-operative and nothing remained for execution or further execution which could be prohibited by the State Government under that section. On that ground alone, the order passed by the State Government will have to be set aside." 10. In Har Pal Singh vs. The State of UP and another (supra) a Division Bench of this Court, relying upon Municipal Board, Kannauj vs. State of UP (supra), set aside the order passed by the State Government under Section 34 (1-B) by which it has cancelled the resolution of the Board dated 1.1.1974, which was confirmed by the Board on 8.1.1974 and in pursuance to which a registered agreement was entered into between Shri Har Pal Singh-the petitioner and the Board for operating the rope way and for which an agreement was executed extending the lease of the petitioner for a period of five years. This Court held as follows: - "It is also clear that it cannot apply to a case where the resolution or order passed by the Board has already been carried into effect.
This Court held as follows: - "It is also clear that it cannot apply to a case where the resolution or order passed by the Board has already been carried into effect. In our view, the section does not authorise the State Government to undo an act which has already been completed in pursuance of a resolution. In the present case after the resolution of the Board was passed in consonance with the provisions of Sections 96, 97 and 98 of the Act, a registered agreement was entered into between the parties. This was so because contracts have to be sanctioned by a resolution and thereafter the Board and the contracting parties have to enter into an agreement which is then registered. After the resolution sanctioning lease of the petitioner for a further period of five years was passed the only act that had to be done in execution of that resolution was to enter into an agreement with the petitioner in accordance with Sections 97 and 98 of the Act. That agreement was entered into much before the State Government passed the impugned order. Thus, when the order came to be passed no further act was required to be done in pursuance to the resolution. The rights of the parties after agreement had been reached came to be governed by the agreement and not by the resolution as has been contended for by the Standing Counsel A perusal of Section 96 of the Act shows that the legislature has drawn a distinction between a resolution and a contract, for it postulates that before a contract is entered into by the Board it must be preceded by a resolution. Section 34 (I-B) empowers the State Government to cancel a resolution and we cannot read into it a power to cancel a contract entered into by the Board and a third party, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 96, 97 and 98 of the Act." 11. Sub-section (1-B) of Section 34 is quoted as below: - (1-B).
Section 34 (I-B) empowers the State Government to cancel a resolution and we cannot read into it a power to cancel a contract entered into by the Board and a third party, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 96, 97 and 98 of the Act." 11. Sub-section (1-B) of Section 34 is quoted as below: - (1-B). The State Government may, of its own motion or on report or complaint received by order prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a board or a committee of a board or a joint committee or any officer or servant of a board or of a joint committee, if in its opinion such resolution or order is prejudicial to the public interest, or has been passed or made in abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force, and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order." 12. Shri Subodh Kumar has also challenged the impugned order on the principles of promissory estoppel. He submits that once the resolution has been carried out and the shops have been constructed, it was no longer open for the State Government and the Nagar Palika Parishad to cancel the resolution and the consequent agreement. After the constructions of shop, which have become the property of Nagar Palika Parishad and for which the petitioner has been depositing the rent, it is no longer open to cancel the agreement. The petitioners have not caused any breach of the provisions of the agreement. The State Government after the execution of the agreements and the constructions of shops could not have cancelled the resolution as the powers vested in the State Government to stop the execution of the resolution cannot be exercised after such execution is complete, as nothing was left to be performed in pursuance to the resolution to be complied with for which the power could be exercised by the State Government. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar states that the petitioners are liable to stop the constructions work forthwith in view of the order of the State Government and to hand over possession of the land to Nagar Palika Parishad.
13. Learned counsel appearing for the Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar states that the petitioners are liable to stop the constructions work forthwith in view of the order of the State Government and to hand over possession of the land to Nagar Palika Parishad. The auction in pursuance to the alleged resolution was not fully exhausted inasmuch as constructions were in progress when the State Government passed the order cancelling the resolution. He relied upon the averments in para 18 of the counter affidavit of Shri Sushil Chandra Saxena, Clerk in Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar, District Shahjahanpur in which it is stated that the Nagar Palika Parishad could not have transferred the property except by public tender and after auction after wide publication of such auction. In para 21 it is stated that the High Court by its order dated 8.8.2003 directed the petitioners to place on record the copy of newspapers showing that before the allotment no advertisement inviting tenders or public auction was made by the Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar. The petitioners have enclosed a typed copy of Hindi Samachar Patra dated 22.9.2001 of which the original or photocopy has not been filed. No such publication was made in the newspapers. The Executive Officer has given a report on an enquiry that no such publication was made. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the Parishad has also relied upon an order passed by the Prescribed Authority, Development Area, Tilhar dated 5.9.2003 in the matter of building plan no.2 dated 4.4.2002 under Section 7-A of Regulation of Building Operations Act (State vs. Mahfus Khan and ors) by which after giving notice to the petitioners in response to which they did not appear. It was found that the land in Gata nos.106 and 107 was allotted to Mahfush Khan and Mohmood Khan for agricultural purposes on yearly rent of Rs.200/- per year and for which an agreement was executed between the allottees and the Nagar Palika Parishad and thereafter by a second agreement the rent was increased from Rs.200/- to Rs.400/-. By the third agreement the land was permitted to be used for commercial purposes. The land belongs to Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar for which no declaration has been sought under Section 143 of UP ZA & LR Act. The Nagar Palika Parishad has by its letter no.277 dated 30.12.2002 cancelled the allotment, and all the agreements for allotment and raising constructions.
The land belongs to Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar for which no declaration has been sought under Section 143 of UP ZA & LR Act. The Nagar Palika Parishad has by its letter no.277 dated 30.12.2002 cancelled the allotment, and all the agreements for allotment and raising constructions. The State Government has also cancelled the resolution by which the land was proposed to be settled with the allottees and permissions were given for constructions. The Prescribed Authority held that all the resolutions and agreements were made in violation of the rules for the purposes of causing financial loss to the Nagar Palika Parishad. After cancellation of the agreement of the Nagar Palika Parishad on 30.12.2002 and the cancellation of the resolution by the State Government on 25.6.2003 the opposite parties have no right to raise any constructions on the land. He consequently cancelled the building plan no.2 for raising constructions of shops and directed the Nagar Palika Parishad to remove the constructions on the cost of the allottees. 15. It is submitted by learned counsel appearing for the Parishad that the petitioners have not challenged the orders passed by the Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar vide letter no.277 dated 30.12.2002 by which agreement entered into by Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar with the petitioner was cancelled and the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, Development Area, Tilhar dated 5.9.2003 by which the building plan no.2 sanctioned on 21.11.2002 was cancelled. He submits that in the circumstances the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 16. In rejoinder Shri Subodh Kumar submits that after passing the resolutions and having entered into an agreement for letting out the land on lease and permitting its commercial user with further conditions that the constructions of the shops will belong to the Nagar Palika Parishad for which separate agreements were executed, it is not open to the Nagar Palika Parishad to contend that the resolutions were passed and agreements were entered into without any advertisement or that it was necessary to obtain permission under Section 143 of UP ZA & LR Act for putting it to commercial use. He submits that consequence of using the land for commercial or industrial purposes under Section 143 of UP ZA & LR Act does not amount to cancellation of lease and demolition of the constructions.
He submits that consequence of using the land for commercial or industrial purposes under Section 143 of UP ZA & LR Act does not amount to cancellation of lease and demolition of the constructions. The Nagar Palika Parishad can always apply for converting the land, which was let out to the petitioner and permitted to use for commercial purpose to obtain the permission from the concerned Sub Divisional Magistrate. 17. The order passed by the Prescribed Authority, Development Area, Tilhar refers to a letter no.277 dated 30.12.2002 passed by the Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar by which all the agreements with regard to letting out the land, its commercial use and permission to raise constructions and consequential agreements were cancelled. This order was passed much prior to the order of the State Government dated 25.7.2003 by which the resolutions dated 3.10.2001, 4.12.2001 and 6.6.2002 were cancelled. The Nagar Palika Parishad cancelled the agreements purportedly on the ground that the land was settled on lease with the petitioners without making any advertisement and on that ground the petitioners' sanctioned plan was also cancelled by the Prescribed Authority, Development Area, Tilhar on 5.9.2003. The petitioner had not challenged the order of the Nagar Palika Parishad dated 30.12.2002 cancelling the allotment of land and all agreements executed for that purpose as well as the order dated 5.9.2003 and the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority, Development Area, Tilhar by which the building plans were cancelled. The orders of the State Government cancelling the resolution were passed much later to the orders passed by the Nagar Palika Parishad on 30.12.2002. 18. The land was not proposed to be settled with the petitioners as heirs of late Shri Peera Khan, who was the lessee of the agricultural land in pursuance to the lease deed executed in his favour on the revenue record to be paid by him at Rs.20/- per year. The Nagar Palika Parishad passed resolution no.22 (3) on 3.10.2001 letting out the land to the petitioners on the lease rent of Rs.200/- per year without carrying out any advertisement. The general public was not informed of the availability of land for allotment nor any proceeding of tender or auction was carried out.
The Nagar Palika Parishad passed resolution no.22 (3) on 3.10.2001 letting out the land to the petitioners on the lease rent of Rs.200/- per year without carrying out any advertisement. The general public was not informed of the availability of land for allotment nor any proceeding of tender or auction was carried out. The Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar has by his certificate dated 22.9.2003 annexed to the counter affidavit as Annexure CA-2 has, after verification of the records, certified that for the purpose of allotment of the land no publication was made in the newspapers nor any proceedings of auction were held or any tenders were invited for that purpose. 19. In the affidavit of Shri Mahmood Khan dated 2.9.2003 filed in this Court he has annexed a typed copy of a publication in the newspaper by the Executive Officer, Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar, Shahjahanpur dated 14.9.2001 in Hindi Samachar Patra dated 22.9.2001 for settlement of the lease (Kirayedari) in respect of agricultural land in plot nos. 106 and 107 in the campus of Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar dated 1.10.2001 at 11 AM. In paras 5 of this affidavit it is stated that the public notice was published in the newspaper. The name of the newspaper, which is said to have wide circulation, has not been given in the affidavit. The Nagar Palika Parishad in addition in the counter affidavit dated 1.10.2003 has denied any such publication and has annexed the certificate of the Executive Officer dated 22.9.2003 that no such publication was made in the newspaper nor any auction was held or any tenders were invited. In the circumstances, we find that the Nagar Palika Parishad acted arbitrarily and illegally for settling the land privately with the petitioners. The successive resolutions and the agreements were clearly demonstrate that the land was settled with an intention to allow the petitioners to construct the shops and for which the Nagar Palika Parishad neither issued any advertisement nor took permission for converting the nature of the land from agricultural to commercial in accordance with the provisions of Section 143 of UP ZA & LR Act, 1951. 20. We may further observe here that having entered into an agreement to let out 5210 sq. yards of land on the side of the road at a small amount of Rs.
20. We may further observe here that having entered into an agreement to let out 5210 sq. yards of land on the side of the road at a small amount of Rs. 200/- per year without allowing the general public to participate in the proceedings and having entered into the agreements, successive resolutions and agreements to allow the land to be used for commercial purposes and for construction of the shops of which the property was to remain with Nagar Palika Parishad and for which the petitioner was required to deposit the rent, the Nagar Palika Parishad acted in a manner which only benefited the petitioners. The photographs annexed to the writ petition show that more than ten shops are in the process of constructions. The constructions were not complete, when the writ petitions were filed. 21. The order of the Prescribed Authority, Development Area, Tilhar dated 5.9.2003 annexed to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Nagar Palika Parishad shows that the petitioners had participated in the proceedings. They had filed affidavits of 20 persons including Shri Surendra Singhal of Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar in the proceedings on 1.2.2003 affirming that the land was allotted without any coercion or pressure on the Chairman of Nagar Palika Parishad. In the reply given by the petitioners and the affidavits they did not state that any advertisement was carried our or proceedings of auction were held before the land, was settled with the petitioners. Further we find from the order of the Prescribed Authority, Development Area, Tilhar dated 5.9.2003 that the petitioners were fully aware of the cancellation of all the agreements by Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar with the petitioners by letter no.277 dated 30.12.2002. These facts clearly demonstrate that the petitioners had full knowledge of the cancellation of the agreements by Nagar Palika Parishad on 30.12.2002 and the order cancelling the building plan. The petitioners have not challenged these orders and thus they cannot be granted any consequential reliefs. 22. In the present case, the execution of the agreements did not conclude the further auction, which was required to be taken in pursuance to the resolutions passed by the Nagar Palika Parishad on 3.10.2001, 4.12.2001 and 6.6.2002. The agreements provided for lease deed to be executed at the early rent of Rs.200/- per year to be deposited by 31st March every year.
The agreements provided for lease deed to be executed at the early rent of Rs.200/- per year to be deposited by 31st March every year. The period of lease is not specified in the agreement and thus under the Transfer of Property Act the lease would be treated to be a lease from year to year. The second agreement provided for increase of rent from Rs.200/- to Rs.400/- per year which could be further increased after a period of five years at 12.5% on the consideration of use of the land for commercial purposes. This agreement also did not conclude as it did not provide for any period for which the lease was executed. Further we find that the third agreement for construction of shops of which the property will remain in Nagar Palika Parishad was in the process of execution by raising constructions after getting the building plan sanctioned when the Nagar Palika Parishad cancelled the agreements by its order dated 30.12.2002 and the State Government cancelled the resolutions by the impugned order dated 25.7.2003. The execution or further execution of the resolution was thus in progress, when the State Government exercised the powers under Section 34 (1B) of UP Nagar Palika Adhiniam, 1916. The auctions in pursuance to these resolutions were not complete in all respects and had not exhausted at the time when the State Government exercised its powers for cancelling the resolution. 23. So far as the argument concerning principle of natural justice in giving notice to the petitioners and the invocation of principle of promissory estappel are concerned, we are of the view that prior to the passing of the impugned order by the State Government under Section 34 (1B) the Nagar Palika Parishad had cancelled the allotments, permission for commercial use and for constructions vide agreements dated 30.12.2002; the sanctioned plan was also cancelled on 5.9.2003. The petitioners had participated in the proceedings for cancellation of the building plans in which they had also led evidence. They were thus fully aware of the complaint and the proceedings, which were pending against them.
The petitioners had participated in the proceedings for cancellation of the building plans in which they had also led evidence. They were thus fully aware of the complaint and the proceedings, which were pending against them. The petitioners had filed the affidavits of the members of Nagar Palika Parishad on 1.2.2003 and had also made an application on 27.1.2003 to summon the Chairman of Nagar Palika Parishad for cross-examination on which orders were passed, and that the Chairman, Nagar Palika Parishad had appeared before the Prescribed Authority, Development Area, Tilhar on 27.1.2013. The Chairman recorded his statement in which he has stated that vide resolution no.321 dated 27.1.2003 he had made recommendations to the Prescribed Authority/ Commissioner, Bareilly Region, Bareilly and the State Government for the cancellation of the resolutions regarding Gata nos. 106 and 107 for which no orders were issued till then. The petitioners were thus fully aware of the pendency of the proceedings for cancellation of the resolutions and the consequent agreement on 27.1.2003. They were contesting the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority, Development Area, Tilhar when the orders were passed by the State Government. They has not stated any where in the writ petition that they had even after acquiring the knowledge contested the proceedings, or had submitted any objections. 24. On the aforesaid facts and circumstances brought before us, we are of the view that the then Chairman of the Nagar Palika Parishad had clandestinely without making any publication inviting offers from general public settled the agricultural land within the Nagar Palika Parishad, Tilhar adjoining the main road with the petitioners initially for agricultural purposes, and thereafter by a further resolution entered into an agreement for its commercial use and also for construction of shops. He passed all these resolutions only for the benefit of the petitioners in violation of the principles settled by this Court and Supreme Court that any settlement of public land with individual should precede notice and advertisement to the general public and that such settlement should be made by auction or inviting tenders.
He passed all these resolutions only for the benefit of the petitioners in violation of the principles settled by this Court and Supreme Court that any settlement of public land with individual should precede notice and advertisement to the general public and that such settlement should be made by auction or inviting tenders. The Nagar Palika Parishad also violated the provisions of Section 143 of UP ZA & LR Act in allowing the land to be used for commercial purpose without applying to the concerned SDM for conversion of the land user from agricultural to commercial purpose and thereafter permitting the petitioners to raise constructions of shops on rent to be paid to Nagar Palika Parishad. After realising the illegality committed in settling the land with the petitioners, the Nagar Palika Parishad cancelled the agreements on 30.12.2002. The petitioners have not challenged the order passed by Nagar Palika Parishad of which they acquired full knowledge through the statement of Chairman of Nagar Palika Parishad recorded in the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority, Development Area, Tilhar initiated on the request of Nagar Palika Parishad vide its letter no.276 dated 26.12.2002. The agreements were cancelled before the auction in pursuance to the agreement of construction of shops was complete and since the resolutions of the Nagar Palika Parishad had remained on record, the State Government vide impugned order cancelled these resolutions of which the execution was already stalled and the agreements in pursuance to the resolutions were cancelled by the Nagar Palika Parishad. The shops were in the process of constructions when the agreements were cancelled and the sanctioned plans were rejected. The judgments of the Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Kannauj vs. State of UP (supra) and of this Court in Har Pal Singh vs. the State of UP and another (supra) laying down the principles of law that the resolutions of which the execution is complete cannot be cancelled by the State Government under Section 34 (1-B) of UP Nagar Palika Adhiniyam 1916, have no application on the facts of the present case. 25. The writ petition is dismissed.