ORDER : W.P. No. 3284 of 2014 is filed questioning the action of the first respondent in rejecting the petitioners tender, and in accepting the tender of the second respondent, for supply of 100% polyster uniform sarees under Tender Call Notice No.3069/K2/2013 dated 10.09.2013, despite the petitioner being found to be the lowest tenderer, as being illegal and arbitrary. The petitioner seeks a consequential direction to the first respondent to accept their tender. The petitioner filed W.P. No.6056 of 2014 questioning the proceedings of the 1st respondent dated 18.02.2014, communicating the letter dated 27.01.2014, whereby they were declared as not having qualified as a supplier pursuant to the Tender Call Notice No.3069/K2/2013 dated 10.09.2013, as arbitrary and illegal. A consequential direction is sought to the first respondent to accept the petitioners tender. An amendment petition was filed, thereafter, including a challenge to the validity of the work order dated 19.02.2014, issued by the first respondent in favour of the second respondent, as being arbitrary and illegal. Facts, in brief, are that the first respondent procures sarees for being supplied to Anganwadis workers throughout the State. On 10.09.2013 it invited tenders, from eligible suppliers, to be filed before 10.10.2013. The tender notice stipulated that the pre- qualification bid and technical bid would be opened on 10.10.2013; and only those tenderers, who were found technically qualified, would be permitted to participate in the price bid. The petitioner claims to have been informed by the first respondent on 31.10.2013 that a meeting was proposed to be held to open the financial bids, on 01.11.2013 at 4.00 P.M, of those tenderers who had qualified in the pre-qualification and technical evaluation stage. It is their case that, on the price bids of five tenderers being opened on 01.11.2013, their bid was found to be the lowest, and the bid of the 2nd respondent the second lowest; M/s. Kedia Silk Mills Private Limited, Hyderabad filed W.P. No.28677 of 2013 wherein an interim order was passed staying the tender process; and the said Writ Petition was later withdrawn on 20.12.2013. The petitioner submitted a representation on 10.01.2014 to the first respondent pointing out the lack of qualifications of the other tenderers, including the second respondent, and requested that their case be considered as they had already passed through the qualification bid and price bid stages. The petitioner submitted a representation on 10.01.2014 to the first respondent pointing out the lack of qualifications of the other tenderers, including the second respondent, and requested that their case be considered as they had already passed through the qualification bid and price bid stages. They were informed by the 1st respondent on 04.02.2014 to take back their earnest money deposit of Rs.25 Lakhs, as the tender of the second respondent was accepted. Pursuant to the order of this Court, in WPMP. No.4035 of 2014 in W.P. No.3284 of 2014, the work order issued to the second respondent on 28.01.2014 was withdrawn by letter dated 07.02.2014. The petitioner was intimated by letter dated 27.01.2014, which was delivered to them by speed post on 10.02.2014, of the reasons for rejection of their tender. They were again informed of the reasons, for rejection of their bid, by letter dated 18.02.2014. The work order was issued again to the second respondent on 19.02.2014 for supply of uniform sarees for the year 2013-14. The petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, by way of W.P. No.3284 of 2014, questioning the action of the first respondent, in holding them ineligible, as arbitrary and unreasonable. The work order was issued again to the second respondent on 19.02.2014 for supply of uniform sarees for the year 2013-14. The petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, by way of W.P. No.3284 of 2014, questioning the action of the first respondent, in holding them ineligible, as arbitrary and unreasonable. According to the petitioner, the case of the second respondent should not have been considered for evaluation of the price bid; though it has nearly 23 mills all over the country, the second respondent does not own a single composite mill; they did not submit any certificate, issued by the Ministry of Textiles, Government of India after 14.08.2007, to show that they have a composite mill; none of the mills owned by the second respondent are engaged in the manufacture of 100% polyster uniform sarees, and they make only cotton and cotton polyster cloth; the second respondent did not submit a certificate of successful completion of a similar work in a single bill or work order worth Rs.7.5 crores in one out of the preceding two years; execution of a work order in favour of several school management committees in the State of A.P, which are associated to a common body known as the Rajiv Vidya Mission, does not amount to execution of a single work order; having accepted their qualification bid, and having found their financial bid to be the lowest, the first respondent cannot now turn round and contend that the petitioner is not qualified at the technical evaluation stage; they should have been put on notice, and given an opportunity to substantiate their fitness for being awarded the contract; and the action of the first respondent is in violation of principles of natural justice. In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent it is stated that, pursuant to the tender notification, 24 firms obtained tender documents, of which 9 submitted their bids; after scrutiny of the tender documents, the tender committee found 5 firms, including the petitioner, technically eligible based on the information furnished by them; the pre-qualification and technical bids were opened and scrutinized on 10.10.2013; during scrutiny, the petitioners representative was asked to submit attested photocopies as evidence of successful completion of one similar work of at least 750 lakhs or above in the preceding two years; the petitioners representative stated that the relevant documents would be submitted at the time of opening of the financial bid; in the tender committee meeting held on 02.11.2013 the other bidders raised objections to the validity of the petitioners claim to have supplied cloth worth Rs.7.50 crores in a single order to Naandi Foundation; in the meanwhile M/s. Kedia Silk Mills Private Limited, Hyderabad filed W.P. No.28677 of 2013; as interim orders were passed, the tenders could not be finalized; later W.P. No.28677 of 2013 was withdrawn on 20.12.2013; on receipt of the final orders from the High Court the process was recommenced, and the documents submitted by the tenderers were scrutinized again; the petitioner did not furnish proof of their experience of having supplied material worth Rs.750 Lakhs in a single order during the last two years; instead they furnished documents which showed that material was supplied to Naandi Foundation by R.L. Tanna & Company and Aarti Dresses, Hyderabad; the documents submitted by them did not reveal supply of uniform cloth worth Rs.7.50 crores in a single work order during the last two years; Naandi Foundation, Hyderabad had issued a certificate dated 01.10.2013 stating that they had procured cloth from R.L. Tanna & Company, Hyderabad for Rs.5.38 crores and Aarti Dresses, Hyderabad, for Rs.2.16 Crores; as is evident from their own letter dated 10.01.2014, the petitioner was informed of their ineligibility; despite several opportunities being afforded to them, the petitioner did not submit proof of their having fulfilled the conditions stipulated in Clause B-3(iii); the petitioner had furnished documents claiming to have supplied material to Naandi Foundation through R.L. Tanna & Company and Aarti Dresses, Hyderabad; as R.L. Tanna & Company and Aarti Dresses, Hyderabad did not participate in the tender process, these documents were not considered; as the petitioner did not supply material directly to Naandi Foundation, they were ineligible in terms of Clause B-3(iii) of the tender conditions; the first respondent did not negotiate with the second respondent; on the other hand, the second respondent voluntarily came forward to supply the material at the lowest rate i.e. the rate quoted by the petitioner; the second respondent is a Government of India undertaking; it submitted a certificate issued by the Director, Ministry of Textiles, Government of India, New Delhi, which is the controlling Ministry, stating that the second respondent had 22 mills, and had an in-house spinning, weaving and processing capacity; accordingly, they were found eligible duly relying on the certificate of the Ministry of Textiles, Government of India; the second respondent submitted a work order placed by the State Project Director, Rajiv Vidya Mission, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, dated 24.01.2011 for supply of uniform cloth to different schools in the State of Andhra Pradesh worth Rs.27.71 Crores; from the petitioners letter dated 10.01.2014, it is evident that they were informed in person several times that, unless they furnished documents in support of their having fulfilled Clause B3(iii) of the tender document, their bid would not be considered; it is not correct, therefore, to state that they were not given adequate opportunity; despite ample opportunity being given, the petitioner did not furnish documents to show their compliance of Clause B- 3(iii) of the tender conditions; they were informed, by letters dated 27.01.2014 and 18.02.2014, of the reasons for not considering their bid for supply of uniform cloth; the bid of the second respondent, a Government of India Public Sector Undertaking under the Ministry of Textiles, was the second lowest; they had fulfilled all the conditions stipulated in the tender conditions, and had submitted all the documents in support thereof; they voluntarily came forward to supply uniform cloth at the rates quoted by the petitioner; the bids were finalised in a fair and transparent manner; the petitioner has not been discriminated against; and their endeavour is only to delay the process of procurement of uniform cloth. Heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, the Learned Government Pleader for Women an Child Welfare appearing for the first respondent and Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of respondents 2 and 3. It is convenient to examine the contentions urged by Counsel on either side under different heads. I. ALTERNATE REMEDY: Learned Government Pleader for Women and Child Welfare would submit that the petitioners remedy is not to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but to seek resolution of their disputes under Clause 1.15(4) of the tender document. Clause 1.15(4) reads as under: In case of a dispute or difference arising between the COMMISSIONER, WOMEN DEVELOPMENT & CHILD WELFARE DEPT., and the Bidder relating to any matter arising out of or connected with this agreement, such disputes or difference shall be settled in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of India, 1996 within the jurisdiction of Hyderabad. The challenge in present Writ Petition is to the award of work to the second respondent. It is not a post-contractual dispute, for the petitioner has neither been awarded the work nor has the first respondent entered into an agreement with them. Clause 1.15(iv) of the tender conditions is attracted only in relation to matters arising out of or connected with an agreement and, as no such agreement has been entered into between the petitioner and the first respondent, the question of settlement of the disputes, in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not arise. The plea of existence of an alternate remedy, necessitating the petitioner being relegated thereto, does not merit acceptance. It is necessary for this Court, therefore, to examine the contentions urged by the petitioner, in challenge to the award of the work to the second respondent, on its merits. II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A DECISION TAKEN TO REJECT A TENDER: ITS SCOPE: Before examining the contentions, urged by Learned Counsel on either side on its merits, it is necessary to consider, in brief, the scope of judicial review of a decision taken, by the tendering authority, to reject the tender. The State and its instrumentalities must act within the ambit of the Rule of Law. It cannot conduct itself arbitrarily. The State and its instrumentalities must act within the ambit of the Rule of Law. It cannot conduct itself arbitrarily. (Star Enterprises v. C.I.D.C. of Maharashtra Ltd, (1990) 3 SCC 280 ; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, 1979 (3) SCC 489 . Every action of the State must be informed by reason and should be free from arbitrariness. This is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affectation of some right or denial of some privilege. (Ramana Dayaram Shetty). The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State and non-arbitrariness, in essence and substance, is the heartbeat of fair play. Their actions are amenable to judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason, and not whimsically for an ulterior purpose. (M/s. Michigan Rubber (I) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka Judgment of the Supreme Court in C.A.No.5898 of 2012 dated 17.08.2012. An action which is unfair or unreasonable cannot be sustained. The State is required to act bona fide and not arbitrarily when its action is like to prejudicially affect the rights of others. (Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Maddula Ratnavalli ). An act, uninformed by reason, is arbitrary. The rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whim or caprice. (Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector ; Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. ). In the award of contracts, the Government and its agencies must act reasonably and fairly. To that extent the tenderer has an enforceable right, and the Court can examine whether the person aggrieved has been treated unfairly, or has been discriminated against to the detriment of public interest. (Meerut Development Authority v. Assn. of Management Studies, (2009)6 SCC 171 : (2009)2 SCC (Civ) 803; Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd, (2000) 1 SCR 505 and Maa Binda Express Carrier v. North-East Frontier Railway, 2014) 3 SCC 760. Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits the State or its instrumentality from arbitrarily choosing a contractor at its will and pleasure. At the same time, no person can claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the government or its instrumentalities. Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits the State or its instrumentality from arbitrarily choosing a contractor at its will and pleasure. At the same time, no person can claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the government or its instrumentalities. All that he can claim is that, in competing for the contract, he should not be unfairly treated and discriminated to the detriment of public interest. (Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 469 . The court can interfere if the decision making process is vitiated by malafides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. (Air India Ltd.). Award of a contract is, essentially, a commercial transaction which must be determined on considerations relevant to a commercial decision. This implies that the terms, subject to which tenders are invited, are not open to judicial scrutiny unless it is found to have been tailor-made to benefit a particular tenderer or class of tenderers. The authority inviting tenders can enter into negotiations or grant relaxation for bonafide and cogent reasons provided such relaxation is permissible under the terms governing the tender process. (Maa Binda Express Carrier). In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document, and in awarding a contract, greater latitude is to be conceded to the State authorities. Unless the action of the tendering authority is found to be malicious, interference by Courts is not warranted. If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding the contract, interference by the Court is limited. (M/s. Michigan Rubber (I) Ltd.). While the power exercised by the Government and its instrumentalities, in the award of a contract, is subject to judicial review at the instance of an aggrieved party, submission of a tender, in response to a notice inviting tenders, is merely an offer which the State or its agencies are under no obligation to accept. The bidders, participating in the tender process, cannot insist that their tenders should be accepted simply because a given tender is the lowest for execution of the works of the Government. All that the participating bidders are entitled to is a fair, equal and non- discriminatory treatment in the matter of evaluation of their tenders. The bidders, participating in the tender process, cannot insist that their tenders should be accepted simply because a given tender is the lowest for execution of the works of the Government. All that the participating bidders are entitled to is a fair, equal and non- discriminatory treatment in the matter of evaluation of their tenders. (Maa Binda Express Carrier; Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11 ; Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 393 : 2005 7 JT 214 ; and Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517. While contractual matters are not beyond the realm of judicial review, its application is limited (Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa, 2006) 10 SCC 236; Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service ; and LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd. ) primarily to the infirmity in the decision making process, and whether it is reasonable and rational or arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications Ltd, AIR 1996 SC 51 . The Court does not sit as a court of appeal, but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. Although the terms of the invitation to tender is not open to judicial scrutiny, as it is in the contractual realm, Courts examine the award of contract, by the Government or its agencies, to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. (Noble Resources Ltd.; Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan ; G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council ; Directorate of Education v. Educomp Datamatics Ltd. ). There are inherent limitations in the exercise of judicial review of contractual powers, as the Government must have the freedom of contract and a free-play in the joints. The duty to act fairly will vary in extent, depending upon the nature of cases to which the said principle is sought to be applied. The State has the right to refuse the lowest or any other tender, provided it tries to get the best person or the best quotation, and the power to choose has not been exercised for collateral purposes or in infringement of Article 14. (Tata Cellular). When the power of judicial review is invoked, in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. (Tata Cellular). When the power of judicial review is invoked, in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. The limited scope of judicial review by the High Court envisages examination of the question whether there is any material irregularity in the decision making process or whether the decision to reject the tender is irrational, unreasonable or arbitrary. If the decision relating to the award of contract is bonafide and in public interest, Courts will not interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer is made out. The power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or a contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. (Jagdish Mandal; Sterling Computers Ltd; Tata Cellular; Raunaq International Ltd.; Air India Ltd.; Association of Registration Plates; and B.S.N. Joshi v. Nair Coal Services Ltd., AIR 2007 SC 437 ). While exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court must ever remain conscious that it is only if the decision to reject the tender is so unreasonable, that no reasonable man could have taken such a decision, can the decision be said to be vitiated by arbitrariness violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. While examining and scrutinising the decision-making process, the facts of a given case may have to be appreciated to test the decision on grounds of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. To the limited extent, of scrutinising the decision-making process, it is open to the court to review the facts evaluated by the decision-maker. (State of U.P. v. Johri Mal ; Noble Resources Ltd.). III. HAS THE PETITIONER FULFILLED CLAUSE B-3(iii) OF THE TENDER CONDITIONS? To the limited extent, of scrutinising the decision-making process, it is open to the court to review the facts evaluated by the decision-maker. (State of U.P. v. Johri Mal ; Noble Resources Ltd.). III. HAS THE PETITIONER FULFILLED CLAUSE B-3(iii) OF THE TENDER CONDITIONS? Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner has fulfilled clause B-3(iii) of the tender conditions; while the work order placed by Naandi Foundation was on R.L.Tanna & Company and Aarti Dresses, Hyderabad, these two firms are the authorised agents of the petitioner; the work order placed on their authorised agents must be construed as a work order placed on the petitioner itself; no firm had raised any objection at the time of opening of the financial bid; the petitioner never claimed that an order was placed on them directly by Naandi Foundation; they had informed, at the time of filing the tender itself, that supplies to Naandi Foundation of Rs.778 Lakhs were made through their authorised dealers R.L.Tanna & Company and Aarti Dresses, Hyderabad, and they had received payments for the entire supplies; these two agencies only mediated the order; the supplies required by Naandi Foundation were made by the petitioner; Naandi Foundation had also confirmed that the order had been placed on the petitioner through these two agencies; the petitioner submitted letter dated 10.01.2014 in reply to the oral request received from the office of the first respondent, and had filed copies of the orders placed by Naandi Foundation on the two agents, the order placed by the agents on the petitioner, the delivery challans, proof of receipt of payment, and the certificate issued by Naandi Foundation; it is only after taking note of these aspects, on the date of opening of the financial bids, was it orally announced that the petitioner was successful in the tender; the petitioner was found to be the L-I tenderer on the financial bids being opened; as such the question of again examining the petitioners technical eligibility does not arise; and having accepted their qualification bid, and having found their financial bid to be the lowest, the first respondent cannot now turn round and contend that the petitioner is not qualified at the technical evaluation stage. On the other hand, the Learned Government Pleader for Women Development and Child Welfare, appearing on behalf of the first respondent, would submit that the petitioner had admitted, in their letter dated 10.01.2014, that their bid was not considered as they had executed the order through two dealers; while the petitioner did not fulfil clause B.3(iii) of the tender conditions, the second respondent had complied with the tender conditions; and the action of the first respondent, in awarding the work to the second respondent, is legal and valid. Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent, would submit that the petitioner does not possess the qualifications prescribed in the bid document; they were made aware, in the meeting convened by the first respondent, of the reasons which weighed with them in rejecting the petitioners bid; this fact was admitted by the petitioner in their letter dated 10.01.2014; no documents have been produced by the petitioner to establish that they had supplied material, under a single work order, for Rs.7.50 crores; the petitioners capability to supply sarees was in issue; as the petitioners bid has been rightly rejected, the first respondent was justified in accepting the second respondents bid as they were the second lowest tenderer; and the certificate of Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013, filed by the petitioner along with the Writ Petition, is fabricated. Learned Senior Counsel would rely on B. Laxmidevamma v. State of A.P., (2001) 9 SCC 326 . The limited question that has to be considered, in a writ petition filed by the unsuccessful tenderer, is whether the authority had acted unreasonably in taking the decision to reject the tender. Before interfering in tender or contractual matters, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court should pose to itself the following questions : i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is malafide or is intended to favour someone or the process adopted or the decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say : 'the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with the relevant law could have reached'; and ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (Jagdish Mandal; M/s. Michigan Rubber (I) Ltd.; Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority v. Universal Estate, (2010) 14 SCC 253 ; and Tejas Constructions & Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Concil, Sendhwa, (1973) 2 SCC 836 . In the absence of allegation of malafides in their conduct, in refusing to accept the best offer, the Court must proceed on the footing that the State or its instrumentalities have acted bonafide. (Star Enterprises). As the dispute in these Writ Petitions is between two rival tenderers, and each of them claim that the other is ineligible, it is necessary to refer to the relevant clauses of the tender notification dated 10.09.2013. Clause B.3 prescribes the information which the tender or bid document should contain and, thereunder, attested copies of all the documents in proof of the bidders financial and technical capability, necessary to perform the contract and meet the criteria outlined in the pre-qualification, are required to be enclosed. All the submitted bids are required to include the information mentioned in Clauses (i) to (viii) thereunder. Clause B.3(iii) reads as under: Attested photocopies of proof in evidence of at least one successful completion of similar work in a single bill or work order worth at least Rs.500 lakhs and/or above in the preceding two years. The requirement of a single bill or work order, worth Rs.500 lakhs and/or above in the preceding two years, was subsequently amended, and the words Rs.500 lakhs were substituted by the words Rs.750 Lakhs. Form P-3 of the bid document requires the tenderers to submit details of similar works executed in a single bill or order worth Rs.750 Lakhs in the preceding two years. The tenderers were required to furnish information regarding (1) name of the organization/State Government Department and address to which service was provided; (2) Contract No. and date of the agreement with the said organization; (3) description of the contract (details of the sarees supplied); (4) total value of the contract; (5) period of contract; and (6) if there was delay in performance, reasons for the same. In column No.1 the petitioner stated the name of the organisation as Naandi Foundation. In Column No.2, they merely furnished the date as 24.08.2012. In column No.1 the petitioner stated the name of the organisation as Naandi Foundation. In Column No.2, they merely furnished the date as 24.08.2012. With regards description of the contract (details of the sarees supplied), the petitioner stated uniform cloth. The period of contract was stated to be from 01.09.2012 to 31.03.2013. The petitioner mentioned Rs.7,78,41,816/- in the total value of the contract column. The documents, filed by the petitioner along with their writ petition, include the certificate of Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013 stating that they had placed an order for uniform cloth to Kanchan India Limited, 19-20, Bhilwara Textile Market, Pur road, Bhilwara on 11.08.2012, through R.L.Tanna & Co. and Aarti Dresses, for their Nanhikali Project; they had received the material as per their specifications, and as per delivery schedule; they were satisfied with the quality and service offered by them; they had again placed an order for this year i.e. 2013-14; they had used this material since 2006-07; and there was satisfaction of quality from the end users. The bid documents, submitted by the petitioner before the first respondent, include the letter addressed by Naandi Foundation to Aarti Dresses, D.No.2-99, Tattiannaram Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, dated 24.08.2012 confirming that all their uniforms should be supplied in Kanchan India Limited cloth quality samples submitted by Aarti Dresses and approved by the Purchase Committee of Naandi Foundation. A similar letter dated 24.08.2012, addressed to R.L. Tanna & Co. by Naandi Foundation confirming that all their uniforms should be supplied in Kanchan India Limited cloth quality samples submitted by R.L. Tanna & Co and approved by the purchase committee of Naandi Foundation, is also enclosed. The bid documents submitted by the petitioner also include a copy of the order placed by R.L.Tanna & Co. on the petitioner dated 01.09.2012 for supply of uniform shirting and suiting to Naandi Foundation; and a similar letter from Aarti Dresses to the petitioner dated 01.09.2012, placing an order for supply of shirting and suiting to be supplied to Naandi Foundation. The documents filed by the first respondent, along with their counter-affidavit, include a copy of the certificate issued by Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013 certifying that they had placed an order, for uniform cloth of Kanchan India Limited, 19-20, Bhilwara Textile Market, Pur Road, Bhilwara, on 11.08.2012 to R.L. Tanna & Co. The documents filed by the first respondent, along with their counter-affidavit, include a copy of the certificate issued by Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013 certifying that they had placed an order, for uniform cloth of Kanchan India Limited, 19-20, Bhilwara Textile Market, Pur Road, Bhilwara, on 11.08.2012 to R.L. Tanna & Co. and Aarti Dresses for their Nanhikali Project; they had received the material as per their specifications, and as per delivery schedule; they were satisfied with the quality and service offered by them, and had again placed the order for the year 2013-14; they had used this material since 2006-07; and there was satisfaction of quality from end users. The records placed before this Court by the first respondent disclose that the certificate of Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013, filed by the petitioner along with the writ petition, is merely a photostat copy. The original certificate of Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013, (a copy of which was filed by the first respondent along with their counter-affidavit), was submitted by the petitioner, along with other bid documents, to the first respondent. The original certificate dated 01.10.2013, submitted by the petitioner along with their bid documents, is at variance with the photostat copy of the certificate dated 01.10.2013 enclosed as the last document in the records (a copy of which was filed by them along with the Writ Petition). While the original certificate of Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013 records that they had placed an order for uniform cloth of Kanchan India Limited to R.L.Tanna & Co and Aarti Dresses, the photostat copy of the certificate of Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013 records that an order was placed for uniform cloth on Kanchan India Limited through R.L. Tanna & Co. and Aarti Dresses. It is only after Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent, pointed out, during the course of hearing on 06.06.2014, the discrepancy in the two certificates submitted by the petitioner dated 01.10.2013, one along with their tender and the other as an enclosure to the present Writ Petition, was a reply affidavit filed by the petitioner on 10.06.2014 seeking to explain the discrepancy. During the course of hearing of these Writ Petitions, this Court expressed its reservations on the genuineness of the certificate of Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013, a copy of which was filed by the petitioner along with the writ petition, as some words appeared to this Court to have been interpolated therein, and certain words, in the original certificate, appeared to have been substituted in the copy filed before this Court. This suspicion, of the petitioner having submitted a fabricated document, was further strengthened as the petitioners letter dated 10.01.2014, submitted to the first respondent more than three months thereafter, made no reference to any request being made by the first respondent to the petitioner necessitating a second certificate being submitted by them, in the place of the earlier certificate. In their letter dated 10.01.2014, addressed to the first respondent, the petitioner stated that they were contacted by the office of the Commissioner by telephone on 07.01.2014 about the status of the orders; certain clarifications were sought regarding proof of supplying uniforms worth Rs.750 lakhs in a single work order, and execution of the orders satisfactorily; as per the tender conditions, three attested photostat copies in evidence of at least one successful completion of similar work in a single bill or work order worth at least Rs.750 lakhs and/or above in the preceding two years was required; they had produced order copies, bill copies and delivery challans for Rs.778 Lakhs supplied to Naandi Foundation through their authorised dealers viz., R.L.Tanna & Co and Aarti Dresses, Hyderabad; they had received payments also; they had also produced a certificate from Naandi Foundation that the above supplies were meant for distribution in government schools; when they met the Commissioner on this issue, he had informed them that their bid, which was the lowest, was not considered because the orders, executed to Naandi Foundation through their two dealers, was not considered eligible and, hence, the order would be given to the second lowest tenderer. The petitioner further stated that, if the Commissioner rejected or objected to their execution of supplies made to Naandi Foundation through a single work order through two of their authorised dealers R.L.Tanna & Co. The petitioner further stated that, if the Commissioner rejected or objected to their execution of supplies made to Naandi Foundation through a single work order through two of their authorised dealers R.L.Tanna & Co. and Aarti Dresses, Hyderabad, to the tune of Rs.778 lakhs that too even after Naandi Foundation had clearly stated that the supplies were for distribution in government schools, it would be in violation of the tender conditions and a partisan act; and none of the other four agencies, who had executed school wise orders and received school wise demand drafts towards payment, should be considered. This letter dated 10.01.2014 makes no mention of the petitioner having submitted a second certificate, in lieu of the earlier certificate issued in their favour, by Naandi Foundation. In B. Laxmidevamma the Supreme Court found nothing wrong in the dismissal of the writ petition both by learned Single Judge and by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, where the relief sought for was based on a fake G.O, and a fake order of the High Court was produced by the petitioner. The Supreme Court directed the High Court to conduct an inquiry into the matter or to have an inquiry conducted as to whether the G.O. was a fake, whether the interim order of the High Court was a non- existent order, and whether any such order in the WPMP was produced before the Secretary to the Government. While the original certificate of Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013, (the copy filed by the first respondent along with their counter- affidavit), is to be found in the records placed before this Court, the last page of the records is a photostat copy of the certificate of Naandi Foundation dated 01.10.2013 (the copy filed by the petitioner along with the Writ Petition). While the possibility of the photostat copy of the certificate dated 01.10.2013, (the copy filed along with the Writ Petition), being inserted in the records, only to avoid action being taken against the petition for abuse of the process of Court, cannot be ruled out, it is unnecessary to delve further on this aspect as, even otherwise, it is evident that the petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of Clause B-3(iii) of the tender conditions. As noted hereinabove, the requirement of clause B-3(iii) is that the tenderer should have completed a similar work, in a single bill or work order, for Rs.750 Lakhs. While the certificate dated 01.10.2013 no doubt relates to supplies made to Naandi Foundation in excess of Rs.750 Lakhs, the question which necessitates examination is whether supplies were made by the petitioner pursuant to a work order placed on them by Naandi Foundation. The documents filed by the petitioner, along with the tender submitted by them to the first respondent, show that two separate work orders were placed by Naandi Foundation, one on R.L. Tanna & Company and the other on Aarti Dresses, for supply of cloth manufactured by the petitioner. The work orders placed on R.L. Tanna & Company and Aarti Dresses, to supply cloth manufactured by the petitioner, cannot be equated to a work order being placed on the petitioner themselves. It is also not the petitioners case that they had either effected supplies directly to Naandi Foundation or that they had received payment for such supplies directly from Naandi Foundation. The records placed before this Court by the first respondent contain several invoices of the petitioner for supplies made by them to R.L. Tanna & Co. and Aarti Dresses. These invoices contain the transporters names and the L.R. numbers. It is evident, therefore, that the petitioner had supplied shirting and suiting material only to R.L.Tanna & Co. and Aarti Dresses, and not to Naandi Foundation; a work order was placed by Naandi Foundation on R.L. Tanna & Co. and Aarti Dresses for supply of uniform cloth manufactured by the petitioner; and Naandi Foundation did not place any work order on the petitioner herein. The action of the first respondent in rejecting the petitioners bid, on the ground that they did not fulfill the requirements of Clause B-3(iii) of the tender conditions, cannot, therefore, be faulted. The prescribed procedure, for evaluation of the bids, is to first ascertain whether the tenderer has fulfilled the eligibility criteria stipulated in the tender conditions and, only if they are found to have satisfied the technical eligibility criteria stipulated in the tender conditions, to then open the financial bids to ascertain who, among the tenderers who satisfied the technical eligibility criteria, is the lowest tenderer for award of the work. The mere fact that, on the financial bids being opened, the petitioner was found to be the lowest tenderer does not justify their being awarded the work even if it is found later that they do not satisfy the technical eligibility criteria stipulated in the tender conditions. On a challenge to the award of work this Court, in judicial review proceedings, would examine whether or not the tenderer, who has been awarded the work, has fulfilled the eligibility criteria prescribed in the tender conditions, and set aside the award of work if they have not. As rejection of the petitioners bid by the first respondent has been found by this Court to be in accordance with law, and it is evident that the petitioner has not fulfilled the requirements of clause B-3(iii) of the tender conditions, it matters little that the petitioner was held technically ineligible after the financial bids were opened, and they were found to be the lowest tenderer. The petitioners letter dated 10.01.2014 shows that they were informed on several occasions of their having not fulfilled the conditions stipulated in clause B-3(iii) of the tender conditions. It is not as if the 1st respondent has, with an ulterior motive and malafide intent, held that the petitioner did not fulfill the technical eligibility criteria only to deny them the award of the work. Non- compliance, with these procedural requirements of the tender conditions, is not fatal. IV. IS THE LETTER OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT DATED 27.01.2014, INFORMING THE PETITIONER OF THE REASONS FOR REJECTION OF THEIR BID, ANTE-DATED? Non- compliance, with these procedural requirements of the tender conditions, is not fatal. IV. IS THE LETTER OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT DATED 27.01.2014, INFORMING THE PETITIONER OF THE REASONS FOR REJECTION OF THEIR BID, ANTE-DATED? Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner received the letter dated 18.02.2014, on 21.02.2014, stating that they were already informed vide letter dated 27.01.2014 that they did not fulfil Clause B-3(iii) of the tender conditions, and could not be considered for issuance of the work order for supply of uniform sarees during 2013-14; the letter dated 27.01.2014, enclosed to the letter dated 18.02.2014, was not served on the petitioner either on 27.01.2014 or thereafter; they came to know of the said letter only when they received it along with the letter dated 18.02.2014; the letter dated 27.01.2014 is ante-dated, and is prepared only to defeat the petitioners claim; and the very fact that the letter dated 27.01.2014 is ante-dated is evident from the fact that the said letter was not brought to the notice of this Court when W.P. No.3284 of 2014 came up for admission on 06.02.2014. On the other hand, the Learned Government Pleader for Women and Child Welfare would submit that the first work order placed on the second respondent on 28.01.2014 was cancelled; and the letter dated 27.01.2014 was served on the petitioner, thereafter, on 10.02.2014, prior to the subsequent work order being placed on the second respondent on 19.02.2014. The first respondent withdrew the work order issued earlier to the second respondent on 28.01.2014, informed the petitioner of the reasons why their tender was rejected, and thereafter placed a work order afresh on the second respondent on 19.02.2014. Pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court on 06.02.2014 the first respondent informed the petitioner, vide letter dated 18.02.2014, that they had, vide letter dated 27.01.2014, informed the petitioner that they did not fulfil Clause B.3(iii) of the tender conditions, and their tender could not be considered for issue of work order for supply of uniform sarees for Anganwadi Workers and Anganwadi Helpers during 2013-14; the said letter dated 27.01.2014 was delivered on 10.02.2014 to the petitioner through speed post; and a copy of the same was being communicated to the petitioner for their information. Enclosed thereto was the letter dated 27.01.2014 whereby the petitioner was informed that, on opening of the financial bids, the rate quoted by the petitioner at Rs.247/- per saree was found to be the lowest; during the tender committee meeting, the other firms had raised objections on the documents furnished by the petitioner with regards the eligibility criteria stipulated in Clause B-3(iii) of the tender documents i.e., evidence of at least one successful completion of similar work of uniform cloth worth at least Rs.750 lakhs and or above in the preceding two years; the documents produced by the petitioner were again scrutinized, and it was noticed that the petitioner did not fulfil the criteria of successful completion of a similar work worth Rs.750 lakhs in a single order; Naandi Foundation did not place an order on the petitioner as claimed by them; no documents were produced in support of their claim of having made supplies to Naandi Foundation; Naandi Foundation had issued a certificate stating that they had placed an order for supply of uniform cloth to R.L.Tanna & Co. and Aarti Dresses for supply of Kanchan India Company cloth; the petitioner was given ample time to produce the required documents, which they failed to do; and, in view of the above, they were being informed that they were not qualified as a supplier as per the tender condition, and could not be considered for issue of a work order for supply of uniform sarees to AWWs and AWHs during 2013-14. W.P. No.3284 of 2014, filed by the petitioner on 05.02.2014, came up for admission before this Court on 06.02.2014. On being asked whether the petitioner was the lowest tenderer, the Learned Government Pleader for Women and Child Welfare replied in the affirmative, and informed this Court that the petitioner was the lowest tenderer, and the second respondent was the second lowest tenderer; the tender of the second respondent was accepted; and the petitioners tender was rejected. On being asked whether the petitioner was the lowest tenderer, the Learned Government Pleader for Women and Child Welfare replied in the affirmative, and informed this Court that the petitioner was the lowest tenderer, and the second respondent was the second lowest tenderer; the tender of the second respondent was accepted; and the petitioners tender was rejected. As the order rejecting the petitioners tender was bereft of reasons this Court, in its order in W.P.M.P. No.4035 of 2014 in W.P.No.3284 of 2014 dated 06.02.2014, observed that no order, much less a reasoned order, was passed and communicated to the petitioner informing them of the reasons why their tender was rejected; the law declared by the Supreme Court, in Star Enterprises, required the competent authority, when the highest bid was rejected, to sufficiently indicate reasons for such rejection; and, in view of the law laid down in Star Enterprises, failure of the respondents to assign reasons for rejecting the petitioners tender would necessitate an interim order being passed. This Court, while granting interim stay of all further proceedings, made it clear that the said order did not preclude the respondents from withdrawing the work order issued to the second respondent and, thereafter, to take action in accordance with law. The first respondent issued proceedings dated 07.02.2014 withdrawing the work order placed on the second respondent. It is no doubt true that the first respondent did not inform this Court, when the matter was heard on 06.02.2014, of reasons being communicated to the petitioner, vide letter dated 27.01.2014, for rejection of their bid. From the counter-affidavit of the first respondent, it is evident that the letter dated 27.01.2014 was delivered to the petitioner only on 10.02.2014 through speed post, after the matter was heard on 06.02.2014. Thereafter the first respondent, in its letter dated 18.02.2014, reiterated the contents of their earlier letter dated 27.01.2014. It is only after the letter of the first respondent dated 27.01.2014, was delivered to the petitioner on 10.02.2014, was a fresh work order placed on the second respondent by proceedings dated 19.02.2014. As the subject work was awarded afresh to the second respondent on 19.02.2014, only after the petitioner was communicated of the reasons for rejection of their bid on 10.02.2014, it is wholly unnecessary for this Court to probe further on whether or not the letter of the first respondent dated 27.01.2014 was ante-dated. As the subject work was awarded afresh to the second respondent on 19.02.2014, only after the petitioner was communicated of the reasons for rejection of their bid on 10.02.2014, it is wholly unnecessary for this Court to probe further on whether or not the letter of the first respondent dated 27.01.2014 was ante-dated. V. AS REJECTION OF THEIR BID HAS BEEN UPHELD BY THIS COURT, DOES THE PETITIONER HAVE THE LOCUS STANDI TO QUESTION THE ACTION OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT IN AWARDING THE WORK TO THE SECOND RESPONDENT? As the action of the first respondent, in rejecting the petitioners tender, is not illegal should this Court still examine, in a dispute between two rival tenderers (the petitioner on the one hand and the second respondent on the other), whether the second respondent had fulfilled the tender conditions, and whether the first respondent is justified in accepting the tender of the second respondent? Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that, even if rejection of the petitioners bid is held to be valid, the petitioner has the locus standi to question award of the work to the second respondent; the work order placed on the second respondent necessitates being set aside; and the first respondent should be directed to take a decision afresh in accordance with law. On the other hand Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent, would submit that the petitioner, who does not fulfil the conditions prescribed in the tender document and who was disqualified as ineligible, cannot question award of the work to the second respondent; as the petitioner cannot be awarded the work, the action of the first respondent in awarding the work to the second respondent can be questioned only in a public interest litigation; while the capacity of the second respondent to execute the work order could have been examined at the behest of the other three tenderers, who had also qualified at the technical evaluation stage, it cannot be examined at the behest of the petitioner who was found not to have satisfied the technical eligibility criteria; the other three tenderers have not chosen to question award of the work to the second respondent; and, as the second respondent has come forward to supply sarees at the price quoted by the petitioner (lowest tenderer), the action of the first respondent in accepting their bid, and in awarding the work to them, cannot be said to be against larger public interest. Except the petitioner, none of the other tenderers have questioned the action of the first respondent in awarding the work to the second respondent. As the action of the first respondent, in rejecting their tender, is not illegal the petitioner cannot be awarded the work. In such circumstances, is this Court still required to examine whether or not award of the work to the second respondent is valid for, even if the petitioners contentions in this regard were to be accepted, they cannot be awarded the work; and, if the tender of the second respondent were to be set aside, the first respondent would then be required to invite tenders afresh. While it may not be proper to hold, as a general rule, that in no case should such an order be passed, it goes without saying that this Court must exercise utmost circumspection in passing any such order. Before considering the circumstances in which this Court may interfere with the award of work to the successful tenderer, at the behest of a tenderer whose disqualification is found to be valid, it is necessary to examine whether or not the second respondent fulfilled the tender conditions for being awarded the subject work. VI. Before considering the circumstances in which this Court may interfere with the award of work to the successful tenderer, at the behest of a tenderer whose disqualification is found to be valid, it is necessary to examine whether or not the second respondent fulfilled the tender conditions for being awarded the subject work. VI. HAS THE 2ND RESPONDENT FULFILLED THE REQUIREMENTS OF CLAUSE B-3(iii) OF THE TENDER CONDITIONS? Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the 2nd respondent did not submit any certificate showing successful completion of a similar work, in a single bill or work order, worth Rs.7.5 crores in any one of the preceding two years; the second respondent had executed the work orders, of different school management committees, through Rajiv Vidya Mission; each order, placed by each of these school managing committees, is a single work order; execution of a work order, in favour of several school management committees in the State of A.P which are associated with a common body called the Rajiv Vidya Mission, cannot be construed as execution of a single work order; the mere fact that these work orders were placed by the school management committees, at the behest of Rajiv Vidya Mission, does not make the various orders, a single work order; and the second respondent has not fulfilled the requirements of clause B.3(iii) of the tender conditions. Learned Counsel would rely on Tejas Constructions & Infrastructure (P) Ltd. in this regard. On the other hand Sri E.Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent, would submit that the work order placed on the second respondent was by Rajiv Vidya Mission; this work order constitutes a single work order; and the mere fact that the said work order required the second respondent to supply cloth to various school managements did not detract from its constituting a single work order. In Tejas Constructions & Infrastructure (P) Ltd., the Sendhwa Municipal Council in the State of M.P, invited tenders from eligible contractors for construction of an integrated water supply scheme. Clause (1) of the Notice Inviting Tenders (NIT) stipulated the following essential conditions of eligibility for the intending bidders: 1. Registered contractors have to produce valid registration certificate in the category of S-V or equivalent in any State/Central Government Department or government undertaking. Clause (1) of the Notice Inviting Tenders (NIT) stipulated the following essential conditions of eligibility for the intending bidders: 1. Registered contractors have to produce valid registration certificate in the category of S-V or equivalent in any State/Central Government Department or government undertaking. (a) Registered contractors/firms of repute/joint venture firms have to produce certificate for executing single work of integrated water supply scheme comprising of intake well, raw/clear water pumping main, pumps, OHTS, distribution system completed and running successfully at present, having value equal to 60% of the cost of the proposed works in the last 5 years. This certificate should clearly mention the amount of contract, completion period as per tender and actual completion period. (In case of WPI adjustment for cost of works the same may be furnished along with a certificate of a chartered accountant.) The certificate shall be issued from the officer not below the rank of executive engineer or equivalent. (b) Certified copy of the audited balance sheet of last 5 years showing annual turnover equal to estimated cost of the work and average net worth equal to 40% of the cost of works. The appellant raised an objection to the eligibility of the 2nd respondent to participate in the bid process on the ground that they did not have the requisite experience of executing a single integrated water supply scheme of the requisite value. The 2nd respondent had claimed eligibility, to offer their technical bid, clubbing different water supply scheme projects which, according to the appellant, was impermissible. The challenge to the eligibility of the 2nd respondent, and the allotment of the project work to them, was confined mainly to the ground that they did not have the requisite experience of executing a single integrated water supply scheme of the required value. It was asserted, on behalf of the 2nd respondent, that they satisfied the requirement of having executed a single integrated water supply scheme. The High Court came to the conclusion that the 2nd respondent was eligible to offer a bid as it had the requisite experience of executing a single integrated water supply project of the requisite value. Before the Supreme Court the challenge to the eligibility of the 2nd respondent to offer their bid, on the ground of non-execution of a single integrated water supply scheme for the requisite value, was twofold. Before the Supreme Court the challenge to the eligibility of the 2nd respondent to offer their bid, on the ground of non-execution of a single integrated water supply scheme for the requisite value, was twofold. Firstly, it was contended that the works executed by the 2nd respondent were distinct and different works which did not constitute a single integrated water supply scheme. The second ground was that the work executed by the 2nd respondent for Upleta also did not satisfy the requirement of the tender notice in as much as the said work did not involve construction of intake wells, which was an essential item of work for any integrated water supply scheme. It is in this context that the Supreme Court held: The High Court has, while examining the question of eligibility of Respondent 2 by reference to the execution of the single integrated water supply scheme, recorded a finding that the nature of the work executed by Respondent 2 for Upleta satisfied the requirement of the tender notice. That finding, in our view, is in no way irrational or absurd. We say so because the certificate relied upon by Respondent 2 sufficiently demonstrates that Respondent 2 had designed, and executed an integrated water supply scheme for Upleta which included raw water transmission from intake wells and transmission of treated clear water from WTP including providing, supplying and laying of pipelines, construction of ESRs, sumps, pump houses and providing erecting pumping machinery. It is also noteworthy that in the matter of evaluation of the bids and determination of the eligibility of the bidders Municipal Council had the advantage of the aid & advice of an empanelled consultant, a technical hand, who could well appreciate the significance of the tender condition regarding the bidder executing the single integrated water supply scheme and fulfilling that condition of tender by reference to the work undertaken by them. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the view taken by the High Court of the allotment of work made in favour of respondent No.2 The second respondent, in Tejas Constructions25, had clubbed different water supply scheme projects, as proof of having executed a single integrated water supply scheme. This was held to satisfy the requirement of the tender notice. In the present case, the work of Rs.27.71 Crores was awarded to the second respondent by Rajiv Vidya Mission. This was held to satisfy the requirement of the tender notice. In the present case, the work of Rs.27.71 Crores was awarded to the second respondent by Rajiv Vidya Mission. This single work order related to supply of cloth to different schools. While Sri E. Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent, would submit that the first respondent is justified in taking into consideration the work order, placed by Rajiv Vidya Mision on the second respondent, as proof of compliance of clause B.3(iii), Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that each individual order, placed on them by various schools, should be taken as a separate work order placed on the second respondent. In their letter dated 10.01.2014, the petitioner stated that the second respondent had supplied uniform cloth to individual schools; orders were placed by the school committees; and payments were made by individual school committees while enclosing the orders issued by the State Project Director, A.P.Rajiv Vidya Mission, Hyderabad, as per the guidelines of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department of School Education and Literacy, New Delhi, asking school committees to place orders individually, and make payments individually through demand drafts. The certificate produced by the second respondent related to the work order placed on them by Rajiv Vidya Mission, for supply of cloth to various schools, for Rs.27.71 Crores far in excess of the stipulated Rs.7.50 Crores. On a work order being placed by them on the second respondent, Rajiv Vidya Mission had directed the managements of various schools, in-turn, to place orders on the second respondent and make payment directly to them. The work orders, placed by individual school managements on the second respondent, are based solely on the work order placed by Rajiv Vidya Mission on the second respondent. This procedure was, evidently, adopted as it was found convenient for each school management, depending on their requirement, to place individual orders directly on the second respondent, instead of routing their orders through Rajiv Vidya Mission. Similarly, instead of routing payments to be made by each individual school management through them, Rajiv Vidya Mission found it convenient to direct the school managements to make payments directly to the second respondent. Similarly, instead of routing payments to be made by each individual school management through them, Rajiv Vidya Mission found it convenient to direct the school managements to make payments directly to the second respondent. The school management committees would not have placed orders directly on the second respondent, but for the fact that they were directed to do so by Rajiv Vidya Mission. Such a direction was issued by Rajiv Vidya Mission because of the work order placed by them on the second respondent. It is evident, therefore, that the work order placed by Rajiv Vidya Mission on the second respondent could alone have been taken into consideration, and not the subsequent individual work orders placed by the school management committees, on the second respondent, at the directions of Rajiv Vidya Mission. The first respondent is, therefore, justified in holding that the second respondent had fulfilled the requirement of Clause B-3(iii) of the tender conditions. VII. CERTIFICATE SUBMITTED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT IS NOT IN THE PRESCRIBED FORMAT: Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the 2nd respondent did not submit the certificate in the prescribed format; and the certificate produced by them, from the Ministry of Textiles, is not in accordance with the format prescribed by the Government of India. The certificate produced by the second respondent, as proof of their having a composite mill, is from the Ministry of Textiles, Government of India. It is not even the petitioners case that the Ministry of Textiles did not issue the said certificate. What is pointed out by Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that the certificate furnished by the second respondent is in a format different from the certificates issued to others by the Ministry of Textiles. Learned Counsel has not shown any statutory provision, either plenary or subordinate, which requires the certificate to be given in a particular format. In the absence of any law requiring the certificate to be issued in a particular format, it matters little that certificate issued by the Ministry of Textiles, Government of India, in favour of the second respondent, is at variance with the certificates issued by them to others. VIII. ON THE WORK ORDER ISSUED TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEING WITHDRAWN, CAN A FRESH WORK ORDER BE PLACED ON THEM AGAIN? VIII. ON THE WORK ORDER ISSUED TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT BEING WITHDRAWN, CAN A FRESH WORK ORDER BE PLACED ON THEM AGAIN? Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the first respondent, having withdrawn the work order issued to the second respondent by proceedings dated 07.02.2014, cannot allot the work to the very same tenderer; on withdrawal of the earlier work order, the person on whom the said work order was placed is rendered ineligible, and cannot again be awarded the subject work; the petitioner should have been put on notice, and given an opportunity to substantiate their fitness for being awarded the contract; and the action of the first respondent is in violation of principles of natural justice. The first respondent informed the second respondent, by their letter dated 28.01.2014, that subsequently, on opening of the financial bids by the tender committee, the rate quoted by the petitioner of Rs.247/- per saree was found to be the lowest, and the rate quoted by the second respondent at Rs.257/- per saree was the second lowest; on scrutiny of all the documents produced by the petitioner, the tender committee had noticed that the petitioner did not fulfil the criteria of successful completion of a similar work worth Rs.750/- lakhs in a single order; the petitioner was given the opportunity to produce the required documents, which they could not produce; the second respondent, being the second lowest tenderer and a Government of India organization and which had fulfilled all the conditions laid down in the tender, was selected as the successful bidder; the second respondent had also agreed to supply sarees at Rs.247/- per saree, inclusive of all taxes, transportation to ICDS Project Headquarters; and the rate of Rs.247/- per saree, agreed to be supplied by the second respondent, was accepted for supply of uniform sarees to 83,066 Anganwadi Workers and 72,712 Anganwadi Helpers at the rate of two sarees for each AWW and AWH during 2013-14. The first respondent, vide letter dated 07.02.2014, informed the second respondent that the High Court had, by order in WPMP. The first respondent, vide letter dated 07.02.2014, informed the second respondent that the High Court had, by order in WPMP. No.4035 of 2014 in W.P. No.3284 of 2014 dated 06.02.2014, directed them to withdraw the work order issued in favour of the second respondent in connection with the writ petition filed by the petitioner; and, in view of the above circumstances, the work order issued in their favour, vide letter dated 28.01.2014, was withdrawn. Thereafter the first respondent, by letter dated 19.02.2014, informed the second respondent that, in the light of the directions of the High Court in WPMP. No.4035 of 2014 in W.P. No.3284 of 2014 dated 06.02.2014, the work order issued earlier on 28.01.2014 was withdrawn by their letter dated 07.02.2014; in continuation of the work order dated 28.01.2014, the second respondent was being informed that the rate of Rs.247/- per saree was agreed, and an order was placed for supply of uniform sarees to 83,066 AWWs and 72,712 AWHs @ two sarees for each AWW/AWH during 2013-14. The work order, issued earlier in favour of the second respondent on 28.01.2014, was withdrawn by the first respondent as this Court had faulted them from not passing an order assigning reasons for rejecting the petitioners lowest bid. While the State or its instrumentalities are entitled to award the work to the most eligible tenderer, and not necessarily the lowest, they are required to record reasons for doing so. As the first respondent had not informed the petitioners, of the reasons for rejection of their lowest bid, this Court, by its order dated 06.02.2014 while granting stay of award of work to the second respondent, left it open to the first respondent to withdraw the work order issued in favour of the second respondent and, thereafter, to take action in accordance with law. Withdrawal of the earlier work order was not because the first respondent found the second respondent ineligible for award of the work, but was for the reason that they had awarded the work to the second respondent without informing the lowest tenderer (the petitioner) of the reasons for rejecting their bid. After withdrawing the earlier work order placed on the second respondent, the first respondent has communicated to the petitioner the reasons for rejecting their bid. It is only, thereafter, was the work order issued afresh in favour of the second respondent. After withdrawing the earlier work order placed on the second respondent, the first respondent has communicated to the petitioner the reasons for rejecting their bid. It is only, thereafter, was the work order issued afresh in favour of the second respondent. The mere fact that the earlier work order placed on the second respondent was withdrawn, because the lowest tenderer was not informed of the reasons for rejection of their bid, does not disable the first respondent from complying with the requirement of assigning reasons to the lowest tenderer for rejecting their bid; and, thereafter, to award the work to the second lowest tenderer. The law declared by the Supreme Court, in Star Enterprises, only requires the tendering authority to assign reasons for rejecting the lowest bid and not to give the lowest bidder an opportunity of being heard. The tender conditions do not stipulate an opportunity of being heard to be given to the lowest tenderer before rejection of their bid. While the requirement of assigning reasons is to ensure fairness in action and transparency in the award of the work to the most eligible tenderer, and not necessarily the lowest, the tendering authority is not obligated, in addition, to provide the lowest tenderer an opportunity of being heard before their tender is rejected. The contention that, once the work order placed on the successful tenderer is withdrawn, they cannot again be issued a work order does not therefore merit acceptance. IX. HAS THE 2ND RESPONDENT FULFILLED THE REQUIREMENTS OF CLAUSE B-2(2) OF THE TENDER CONDITIONS? Sri Vedula Srinivas, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that, though the second respondent has 23 mills, it does not own a single composite mill anywhere in the country; they did not submit any certificate, issued by the Ministry of Textiles, Government of India, after 14.08.2007 to show that they have a composite mill; none of the mills owned by the second respondent are engaged in the manufacture of 100% polyster uniform sarees; they make only cotton and cotton polyster cloth; and the second respondent did not fulfil the requirements of clause B.2.2 of the tender conditions. On the other hand the Learned Government Pleader for Women and Child Welfare would submit that clause H.4(1) confers power on the first respondent to accept or reject any of the bid; the first respondent was empowered to relax the tender conditions; and as the second respondent had substantially complied with the requirement of clause B-2(2) of the tender conditions, the subject work was awarded to them. Sri E.Manohar, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent, would submit that, while the second respondent may not have a composite mill, they have 23 mills all over the country; they are fully capable of supplying the sarees sought to be procured by the first respondent; and the second respondent, a Central Government Public Sector Undertaking, had made supplies to the first respondent in the earlier years also. Clause B.2 of the tender conditions stipulates the eligibility criteria. Clause B.2(2) reads as under: The Bidder must have a Composite Mill (i.e., should have their own in- house facility for spinning, weaving, processing, dying and printing units in his/her name etc.,). Valid copy of composite Mill Certificate issued after 14.08.2007 from Ministry of Textiles, Government of India must be submitted along with the technical bid. The certificate must clearly indicate the spinning, weaving and processing facilities under one unit/location. It is not in dispute that the second respondent does not have a composite mill i.e., it does not have an in-house facility for spinning, weaving, processing, dying and printing unit under one roof. The first respondent, taking into consideration the certificate issued by the Ministry of Textiles, Government of India, and that the 2nd respondent had 23 mills throughout the country, awarded the work in their favour. The first respondent reserved the right to accept any bid and to reject any or all the bids under Clause H.4 of Section H of the tender conditions. Clause (1) thereof reads as under: WOMEN DEVELOPMENT & CHILD WELFARE DEPT., reserves the right to accept or reject any bid, and to annual the bidding process and reject all bids at any time prior to award of contract, without thereby incurring any liability to the affected bidder(s) or any obligation to inform the affected bidder(s) of the grounds for such decision. The scope of a provision, similar to clause H-4(1), fell for consideration in Raunaq International Ltd., and the Supreme Court held: In the present case, however, the relaxation was permissible under the terms of the tender. The relaxation which the Board has granted to M/s Raunaq International Ltd. is on valid principles looking at the expertise of the tenderer and his past experience although it does not exactly tally with the prescribed criteria. What is more relevant, M/s I.V.R. Construction Ltd. who have challenged this award of tender themselves do not fulfil the requisite criteria. They do not possess the prescribed experience qualification. Therefore, any judicial relief at the instance of a party which does not fulfil the requisite criteria seems to be misplaced (emphasis supplied) While the submission of the Learned Government Pleader that, in view of Clause H-4(i) of the tender conditions, the first respondent was entitled to relax the tender conditions and award the work to the second respondent, cannot be said to be without merit, it is unnecessary for this Court to examine the scope of Clause H-4(i) as, even otherwise, award of work to the second respondent does not necessitate interference. While a strict construction of Clause B-2 (ii) of the tender conditions would necessitate the bid submitted by the second respondent also to be rejected, this Court would interfere only if larger public interest required it to do so, for rejection of the bid of the second respondent would not entitle the petitioner to be awarded the work as they were found ineligible, having failed to fulfil the requirement of Clause B-3(iii) of the tender conditions. X. THIS COURT WOULD INTERFERE WITH THE AWARD OF WORK, OR REJECTION OF THE TENDER, ONLY IN LARGER PUBLIC INTEREST: If, the dispute is purely between two tenderers, the court must carefully verify whether there is any element of public interest involved in the litigation. Unless the court is satisfied that there is a substantial amount of public interest, or the transaction is entered into malafide, the court should not intervene under Article 226 in disputes betweens two rival tenderers. (Raunaq International Ltd.). The duty to act fairly is a part of the fair procedure envisaged under Articles 14 and 21, and every activity of the public authority, or those under public duty, must be received and guided by public interest. (Raunaq International Ltd.). The duty to act fairly is a part of the fair procedure envisaged under Articles 14 and 21, and every activity of the public authority, or those under public duty, must be received and guided by public interest. (Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor ; Mahesh Chandra v. U.P. Financial Corpn. ; LIC v. Consumer Education and Research Centre). On a challenge to the award of a contract or rejection of a tender, by a public authority or the State, the court must be satisfied that there is some element of public interest involved in entertaining such a petition. The elements of public interest are (1) public money would be expended for the purposes of the contract; (2) the goods or services which are being commissioned could be for a public purpose; (3) the public would be directly interested in the timely fulfilment of the contract so that the services become available to the public expeditiously; and (4) the public would also be interested in the quality of the work undertaken or goods supplied by the tenderer. (Raunaq International Ltd.). Save substantial public interest being adversely affected, or the transaction being vitiated by malafides, the Court should not, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily interfere in matters in the contractual domain. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the Court must exercise its discretion with caution and only in furtherance of public interest, and not merely on the making out of a legal point. Only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, should it intervene. (Air India Ltd.). As the petitioner did not fulfil the requirements of clause B-3(iii) of the tender conditions, the mere fact that they were the lowest tenderer does not entitle them to claim that the subject work should be awarded to them. While the Government cannot give a contract for a consideration higher than that can be obtained for it unless, of course, there are other considerations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so, (Meerut Development Authority; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority), price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. A mere difference in the prices offered by the tenderers may or may not be decisive in deciding whether any public interest is involved necessitating intervention in such a commercial transaction. (Air India Ltd.). A contract need not be given to the lowest tenderer, and the employer is the best judge thereof as it is, ordinarily, within its domain. The Court's interference in such matters should be minimal and it should, normally, exercise judicial restraint unless illegality or arbitrariness, on the part of the employer, is apparent on the face of the record. (B.S.N. Joshi). In examining whether larger public interest would be served if this Court were either to interfere, or refrain from interference, it must be borne in mind that the second respondent is a Government of India public sector undertaking. Though the second respondent does not have a composite mill, it has around 23 mills spread all over the country. The second respondent has not only supplied cloth to the first respondent in the earlier years also, but has also agreed to supply cloth, under the present work order, at the rate quoted by the lowest tenderer i.e., the petitioner herein. The first respondent would not, therefore, suffer any financial loss on the work being awarded in favour of the second respondent. On the other hand if this Court were to declare the action of the first respondent, in awarding the work to the second respondent, as illegal the consequence would only be that the process of inviting bids would have to be initiated afresh by the first respondent. Not only would this result in incurring needless expenditure, but it may also result in escalation in the price of sarees, placing an additional financial burden on the first respondent. Larger public interest would, undoubtedly, be served on award of the work to a Government of India public sector undertaking as any profit, which they may make, would only benefit the public exchequer. Larger public interest would be served if this Court were to exercise judicial restraint, and refrain from interfering with the award of work by the first respondent in favour of the second respondent. XI. CONCLUSION: I see no reason, therefore, to interfere with the action of the first respondent in awarding the work to the second respondent. Both the Writ Petitions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, are also dismissed. XI. CONCLUSION: I see no reason, therefore, to interfere with the action of the first respondent in awarding the work to the second respondent. Both the Writ Petitions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, are also dismissed. 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