T. Vaiphei, J. -- Having heard Mr. T.J. Mahanta, the learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. J. Abedin, the learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents, I have no hesitation to hold that this writ petition is bereft of merit and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 2. The petitioners, who were initially appointed as stipendiary teachers of various schools of Darrang District on 3-6-1996 and whose services were regularized with effect from 31-3-1998 after successful completion of their trainings, are now claiming a regular scale of pay with effect from their initial date of joining their posts i.e. with effect from 3-6-1996. To appreciate their claim, I may at the outset reproduce below the order of appointment of the petitioner No. 1 as Assistant Teacher of Naodinga L.P. School as representative of the appointment orders of the remaining petitioners: “Office of the Deputy Inspector of Schools : Mangaldoi ORDER In pursuance of the Honble High Court's order dated 17-1-92 C.R. No. 160 and 161 of 1992 and in pursuance of the D.E.E.'s letter No. EHA.30/93 dated 3-2-96 and DEEO's letter No. DES/P/12/96/2491 dated 4-4-96 Sri Jitendra Sarma is hereby appointed temporarily on ad-hoc basis on monthly stipend of Rs. 900/- fixed and posted at Naodinga L.P. school against the posts allotted vide D.E.E.O.'s letter No. EHA.30/93 dated 3-2-96 subject to the result of appeal pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India with effect from the date of joining. The appointee will be considered for regular scale of pay on successful completion of prescribed training as per existing norms and procedure of Education Department and subject to satisfactory police verification report. In case of failure to pass the training examination within the stipulated time for 3 chances his/her services shall be terminated. The expenditure is debitable under the Head of Accounts “2002-Genl. Edn.(I)-III centrally sponsored Schgemes-01-Ele-Edn-(a)-Operation Blackboard-I-Salarries (Plan) 1996-97. Sd/- S.P. Barua Deputy Inspector of Schools, Mangaldoi.” (Underlined for emphasis) 3. A perusal of the aforesaid order plainly makes it clear that payment of regular scale of pay to the petitioners was conditional upon the successful completion by them of the prescribed training as per the existing norms and procedure. It is the further condition of their initial appointment that if they failed to pass the training examination within the stipulated time for three chances, their services should be terminated.
It is the further condition of their initial appointment that if they failed to pass the training examination within the stipulated time for three chances, their services should be terminated. The petitioners had successfully completed their Junior Basic training on 31-3-1998 and were accordingly paid regular pay scale to them with effect from the date of completing their training i.e. 31-3-1998. Thus, the petitioners came to be paid a regular scale of pay with effect from 31-3-1998 in accordance with the terms and conditions of their initial appointment orders, for which they cannot have any legitimate grievance. 4. It is, however, contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, that after the judgment of the Apex Court, the respondent authorities appointed some candidates, whose names had been included in the same select list, as Assistant Teachers of L.P. Schools on regular basis with a regular pay scale and other admissible allowances from the date of their joining the post. In my opinion, a perusal of the appointment letters at Annexure-3 series does not indicate that the appointments were made from the date they were appointed as stipendiary teachers. Moreover, such payment of regular pay scale from the date when they were merely appointed with fixed stipend without the approval of the competent authorities would be impermissible and, therefore, would be illegal. It is by now a well-settled proposition of law that past illegal action of the respondent authorities cannot be used as a precedent for claiming similar relief. Therefore, the relief claimed by the petitioners for payment of regular pay scale with retrospective effect is not sustainable in law. 5. For what has been stated in the foregoing, this writ petition has no merit and is, therefore, dismissed but by directing the parties to bear their respective costs.